Most research on metaphysical indeterminacy has been conducted within general and science-informed metaphysics; whereas social metaphysics—a relatively novel field in analytic philosophy anyway—is still conducting its initial scouting operations. Nonetheless, I believe that the social world represents a very promising locus of (metaphysical) indeterminacy.
ISOS News is a blog series where we invite members to share their experiences with various ISOS initiatives, including the small grants program (which you can read more about here). Applications for 2027 will open in a month or two.
The next post in this series is by Giulia Schirripa, currently a fourth-year PhD student at the University of St Andrews and the University of Stirling. Last year, Giulia organised a conference on metaphysical indeterminacy at the University of St Andrews, Scotland, featuring invited talks by Maureen Donnelly, A. J. Cotnoir, Kevin Richardson, Alessandro Torza, George Darby, and Robert Williams and contributed talks by King Fung Kelvin Chan, Kamil Furman, and Will Moorfoot. Send her an email if you'd like to get involved!
Metaphysical indeterminacy is the phenomenon whereby indeterminacy is a feature of the world itself—not of our knowledge of it (epistemic indeterminacy) or of how we represent it (semantic indeterminacy). This theoretical possibility was dubbed 'confused' or 'simply unintelligible' by prominent philosophers like Bertrand Russell and David Lewis, and it has been traditionally left out of 'serious' metaphysical theorising. In recent decades, however, more and more philosophers have consistently and productively engaged with it; several paths have now been explored, and the intelligibility and coherence of the idea of worldly indeterminacy has now been largely established.
Most research on metaphysical indeterminacy has been conducted within general and science-informed metaphysics; whereas social metaphysics—a relatively novel field in analytic philosophy anyway—is still conducting its initial scouting operations. Nonetheless, I believe that the social world represents a very promising locus of (metaphysical) indeterminacy. Using the tools already available in the general metaphysician’s toolkit and engaging with the dumps and cul-de-sacs already discovered may significantly help the exploration of social indeterminacy. (To be sure, I’m convinced that what is to be discovered about social indeterminacy should in turn inform the discussion within general metaphysics, but this may be too far along the line right now.)
The spirit of the conference was highly interdisciplinary and collegial. As the organiser, my aim was to provide an opportunity for researchers at different academic stages (from early-career to full professor) to connect and engage in fruitful discussions with others working on metaphysical indeterminacy from different angles. While it is generally the case that no research project can be conducted in a vacuum, this is especially true for those topics where different approaches and methodologies intersect. To convey this sense of cohesion and relatedness among different contributions, the conference followed a circular structure, moving from general metaphysics, to social metaphysics, to science-informed metaphysics, and then back to general metaphysics.
The first day was devoted to the first arc. After the introductory remarks, which provided the roadmap for the conference, the (thorny) issue of vague objects and how to best conceive of them was the focus of the first couple of talks. Maureen Donnelly (University at Buffalo) discussed a framework taking parthood as the relevant relation, whereas A. J. Cotnoir (University of St Andrews) developed a suitable mereotopological approach. The afternoon was devoted to social metaphysics. King Fung Kelvin Chan (University of Aberdeen) presented an account of constructional indeterminacy by drawing on Kevin Richardson’s (Duke University) work, who in turn closed the first conference day by considering how fear of social indeterminacy should be best conceived of as fear of metaphysical indeterminacy.
The second arc was the focus of the second day. The first talk of the morning was given by Alessandro Torza (University of Parma), who presented a novel theory of metaphysical indeterminacy based on objective change that could account for paradigmatic cases such as quantum indeterminacy. Then, Kamil Furman (Jagiellonian University) problematised E. J. Lowe’s argument that quantum particles lack determinate identity conditions while suggesting an alternative way to resist Gareth Evans’ argument against vague objects. Finally, George Darby (Oxford Brookes University) closed the session on science-informed metaphysics by reflecting on some meta-metaphysical issues posed by quantum indeterminacy. In the afternoon, Will Moorfoot (University of Southampton) argued for the possibility of indeterminate supervenience, and Robbie Williams (University of Leeds) closed the conference by reflecting on how we can make sense of the possibility that there is indeterminacy at the fundamental level, even assuming that it is inconceivable.
As an early-career researcher, this event proved extremely enriching and fruitful. I had the opportunity to engage with expert researchers and hear about their most recent work, as well as build a sense of community with other Master and PhD students interested in metaphysical indeterminacy. Importantly, even philosophers working in other areas of philosophy or without a previous interest or knowledge about metaphysical indeterminacy attended the conference and found it valuable to learn more about it. Moreover, after this conference, Kelvin and I decided to set up a reading group on metaphysical indeterminacy that has been running since September 2025. We meet online fortnightly and have so far read and discussed Indeterminacy in the World (2023) by Alessandro Torza, Indeterminate Identity (2000) by Terence Parsons, and several papers on the topic. Please drop me an email at gs235@st-andrews.ac.uk if you’d like to get involved!
I deeply believe in conducting interdisciplinary research and promoting exchanges among researchers with diverse backgrounds and areas of expertise, so I am very grateful to ISOS for acknowledging the potential of this conference for the field of social ontology itself.
Giulia Schirripa is a final-year PhD candidate in the St Andrews–Stirling joint doctoral program. They mainly work in analytic metaphysics and social philosophy, but also have a strong interest in feminist philosophy and philosophy of language. Their PhD research aims to investigate and ultimately defend an account of metaphysical indeterminacy, while also establishing the social world as an important yet under-explored locus of metaphysical indeterminacy.
"International Social Ontology Society" is registered as a non-profit organization in Austria.
