SOCIAL ONTOLOGY & COLLECTIVE INTENTIONALITY

2022 VIENNA

Keynote Speakers

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ISOS INTERNATIONAL SOCIAL ONTOLOGY SOCIETY

Contents

Keynotes

Thomas Bugnyar - Testing social cognition in ravens

❖ Tuesday, August 23rd ,11:00-12:30
❖ Location: Festsaal, Hauptgebäude

Social life has been proposed as one of the driving forces for the evolution of cognition. A key feature in the life of cognitively advanced mammals like primates is the formation of long-term social relationships like 'friendships'. Whether this is also true for birds is debated. Reporting on recent data from captive and wild ravens Corvus corax, I argue that i) the quality of social relationships of these birds is comparable to that of primates, ii) that ravens are aware of their own and others' relationships and iii) that they may use this knowledge selectively and strategically. Taken together, these findings support the idea that the need for, and use of, bonding partners may be one of the factors driving the cognitive evolution in these large-brained birds.

Nikos Nikiforakis - Predicting social tipping and norm change

❖ Tuesday, August 23rd, 17:30-19:00
❖ Location: HS1, NIG

Social tipping—instances of sudden change that upend social order—is rarely anticipated and usually understood only in hindsight. However, the ability to predict when societies will spontaneously reach a tipping point has significant implications for welfare, especially when social norms are detrimental. The talk will introduce a theoretical framework for predicting social tipping and exploring questions such as: Why do norms sometimes persist when they are detrimental to social welfare? What types of policies can increase the likelihood of socially beneficial change? Does social diversity increase the likelihood of socially beneficial change? Data from large-scale laboratory experiments is used to evaluate theoretical predictions, test policy interventions, and explore the characteristics of leaders of social change.

Natalie Sebanz - TBC

❖ Wednesday August 24th, 16:30-18:00
❖ Location: HS1, NIG

Jade Fletcher - Canberra Planning for Gender Kinds

❖ Thursday August 25th, 9:00-9:5
❖ Location: HS1, NIG

The Canberra Plan endures as one of the most promising systematic approaches to philosophical theorising. It offers an exhaustive theoretical enterprise: it aims to synthesise a fairly traditional conception of philosophical analysis with metaphysical naturalism. One putative advantage of the approach is that it respects our pre-philosophical beliefs, such that we get to take much of our ordinary talk as true, whilst incurring minimal ontological inflation. In this paper I argue that the Canberra Plan is ill-equipped to offer a satisfactory theory of gender. Insofar as the Canberra Plan aims to provide a general and unified approach to philosophical theorising, this is a significant problem. I argue that this deficit in the method stems from the robust role assigned to pre-theoretical beliefs in constructing philosophical analyses. I utilise a critical conception of ideology to explain why our pre-theoretic beliefs about certain social kinds are likely to deliver politically dubious metaphysics of the social world. The first half of the paper is dedicated to exercising this theoretical shortcoming. In the second half, I suggest a way in which the Canberra Plan can address and rectify this problem, with a view to

maintaining the theoretical viability of the Canberra Plan with respect to politically important concepts.

Quayshawn Spencer - A Metaphysical Mapping Problem for Race Theorists and Human Population Geneticists

- ❖ Thursday August 25th, 16:30-18:00
- ❖ Location: HS1, NIG

In this talk, I identify and clarify a mapping phenomenon that's almost twenty years old. The phenomenon is that the populations at a fivefold subdivision of humans into biological populations—the so-called human continental populations—correspond one-to-one with the five official races of the Office of Management and Budget in the US government. This phenomenon has raised the interesting philosophical question of what exactly is the metaphysical relation being exemplified by this particular mapping. Metaphysicians of race have offered multiple different theories. Most importantly, Levin thinks that it's co-exemplification of a certain kind of biological population, Ásta has argued that it's a function of tracking, Hardimon has argued that it's co-exemplification of minimalist race, and Taylor thinks that the relation is (at best) co-extension. However, in this paper, I argue that the metaphysical relation that's exemplified is identity. After presenting and defending *the identity thesis*, I explore multiple interesting implications of the identity thesis for metaphysicians of race and social ontologists.

Arto Laitinen - On the normativity of social conventions: bootstrapping, content-independence, and co-authorship

- ❖ Friday August 26th, 9:30-11:00
- ❖ Location: HS1, NIG

Do we have normative reasons to follow social conventions to the extent that they are good, or simply because they are social conventions? This talk approaches this question drawing on the so-called bootstrapping objection, on the idea of content-independent justification, and on the idea of recognition of others as co-authors of social norms.

Normative reasons for action are typically also reasons for intentions and desires: the same desirability characteristics that explain the normative fittingness of acting in a certain way, explain the normative fittingness of corresponding desires and intentions. The idea that intentions or desires would be reasons for action has been criticized as a form of objectionable "bootstrapping": the mere fact that I desire or intend something does not make it desirable; substantive features do. It is one thing to intend something and another thing to have a normative reason to intend or to carry out the intention. On the other hand, the bootstrapping objection needs to be qualified, as promising and other exercises of normative powers seem to create normative reasons seemingly ex nihilo. For example promising creates reasons relatively independently of the normative reasons to promise. What about social conventions? Does the mere fact that "this is the way we do things here" provide reasons, or would that amount to objectionable bootstrapping? Are social conventions sufficiently like outcomes of exercises of normative powers to escape the bootstrapping worry?

Typically, what speaks in favour of acting are features that make that action desirable or good. We have reasons to do what is good, and to respect and not destroy things of value. If a social practice has good consequences, or intrinsically valuable features, or expresses appropriate regard for others, we have reasons to engage in it. Whether we have reason to engage in a practice seems thus to depend on the (goodness of the) content of the action or practice. Exercises of normative powers such as promises, democratic decisions or authoritative commands are exceptional in creating normative

9

reasons in a (relatively) content-independent way: it is a feature of exercises of authority that they make a normative difference (relatively) independently of the contents of the decision or command. What about social conventions: is their normative significance directly dependent on how good or bad they are, or do they have some content-independent normative significance? Neither answer seems to capture the normativity of social conventions fully. The talk examines different answers to this question, including an appeal to the idea of recognition of others as co-authors of norms.

Deborah Tollefsen - Shaping the Institutional Mind

- ❖ Friday August 26th, 17:00-18:30
- ❖ Location: HS1, NIG

In *Mindshaping* Tadeusz Zawidzki (2013) argues that what makes human social cognition unique is our ability to shape each other's minds in order to make them easier to interpret. This helps to facilitate complex forms of social coordination and cooperation. This "mindshaping" takes a variety of forms such as imitation, norm conformity, and narrative self-constitution and exhibits itself in sophisticated social practices such as pedagogy. Zawidzki is building on a key insight offered by Victoria McGreer (2007) that folk psychology not only predicts and explains, but regulates action. Its predictive and explanatory power is a function of its regulatory power. More recently, Kristin Andrews has identified this as the "folk psychological spiral" (2015). In this paper, I argue that when we attribute mental states to institutions such as corporations, we are shaping the institutional mind and making the institution more easily interpretable from the intentional stance. We are harnessing the regulatory power of folk psychology to make institutions more and more agent-like. Institutional mindshaping further increases our ability to cooperate and coordinate in a complex social world. I offer two examples of institutional mindshaping in support of this thesis—one drawn from corporate criminal law and the other involving corporate narratives. I conclude by contrasting my approach to institutional/group agency with those developed by Peter French (1987) and List and Pettit (2011).

Symposia

Construction, Critique, Case Studies – A Methodological Manifesto for Non-Ideal Social OntologyConstruction

16:00-17:30 Tuesday, August 23rd

We want to discuss the theoretical and methodological possibilities of a non-ideal Social Ontology with you. There is much movement in this direction in our community. Let's focus this movement by working out theoretical implications and foundational aims. This might be, in part, the reconstruction of a feminist critique of metaphysics; it might be, on the other hand, a mediation of terms with applications itself. Accountability is one of these key terms. It is a recurring theme in the three contributions:

- Helen Mussell - Relational ontology and relational ethics: investigating the non-ideal through legal conceptual analysis
- Åsa Burman - Non-Ideal Social Ontology – The Power View
- Beatrice Kobow - The Paintings for the Temple – How to represent the Ideal / Non-ideal

Our symposium opens with three short impulse lectures, but the real work will be done in the discussion. Please attend and be part of the conversation!

Group Know-How and Joint Expertise: theory and case studies
14:00-16:30 Wednesday, August 24th

People act together in all kinds of collaborative work and performance. Dyads and small groups, in particular, exhibit rich forms of joint intelligence in action, both in everyday skills and in the striking forms of expertise found in sport, music, and many domains of professional activity. Much research addresses the nature of individual know-how and embodied skill. Much other research addresses the mechanisms of joint action and the basis of expertise in groups and teams. How do we consider both topics at once? Is 'group know-how' a genuine phenomenon, and (if so) what is its nature? What is the basis of shared or joint expertise? This symposium approaches these questions directly, in terms of current theory and contemporary experimental research, and also through case studies of specific domains. The symposium will have short talks to leave ample time for discussion.

14:00-15:00

- John Sutton - intro and symposium questions
- Jonathan Birch - active mutual enablement
- Sarah Bro Trasmundi- systemic coordination dynamics in healthcare teams
- Michael Kimmel- What it takes to improvise together – an intersectional approach
- Open discussion

15:30-16:30

- Judith Martens - Emergent coordination and group know-how
- Mikko Salmela - Group expertise as collective affective niche construction
- Initial short response from John Sutton
- Open discussion

Malfunctions of Corporate Agency
14:00-16:30 Thursday, August 25th

Robert Williams - Unreasonable group belief

An unreasonable group belief is one that isn't supported by the group's evidence. To identify instances, we need a grip on (i) what it is for a group to believe something; (ii) what it is for a group to have certain evidence; (iii) what it is for some evidence to support certain beliefs.

I'll focus on (ii), and explore a functional characterization of evidence that presupposes answers to (i) and (iii). I'll present a way of looking at a famous theorem in formal epistemology, on which it tells us that the propositions that play the evidence-role (for a given entity) must describe those events that trigger belief-change (for that entity).

What these facts are, and so what evidence is, depends on the information-processing architecture of the entity involved. In humans, evidence might consist in facts about e.g. incident sensations, or patterns of contentful perceptual states, or the states of affairs thereby perceived, if those are the facts which given our particular cognitive architecture, induce rational belief change. In corporate entities, the triggers of belief change may instead be changes in the vice chancellor's beliefs, the act of entering some information into a database, or the formation of a social norm in a relevant subcommittee. Since corporate structures can vary a great deal from instance to instance, there is likely to be no common characterization of what evidence is for structured groups in general----but

the functional characterization will guide us to identify what evidence is (and so what mistakes are being made) in each individual case.

Olivier Roy - Collective epistemic attitudes under membership uncertainty

The classical models of common and distributed knowledge have not been designed to study cases where the group members can be uncertain about who is and who is not in the group. In this talk, I will present classical and more recent results, obtained in collaboration with Marta Bílková (Czech Academy of Science) and Zoé Christoff (University of Groningen), about so-called "epistemic logic with names," a generalization of epistemic logic where the identity of the agents, and the group they belong to, might not be common knowledge. After introducing the logic, I will highlight the differences in the logical behavior of group epistemic attitudes when membership is and when it is not common knowledge and show preliminary results concerning their dynamics through communication.

Marko Meyer - The seven epistemic vices of business organizations

What are the salient epistemic deficits in business organizations? I approach this question through the lens of epistemic vices. Organizational epistemic vices are characteristics that undermine the creation, sharing, and storing of knowledge in organizations. There is no settled understanding of which epistemic vices commonly exist at the collective level, and whether any of these vices are exclusive to collectives. Current proposals are guided by taxonomies of individual epistemic vice. However, assuming that taxonomies of individual epistemic vice are applicable at the collective level runs the risks of missing epistemic vices that exist only on the collective level; of drawing distinctions without a difference; and of failing to guide inquiry towards the most salient epistemic vices. I take a data-led approach to identifying epistemic vices in one type of collective, namely business organizations. Using methods from quantitative linguistics and quantitative psychology, I analyze the language employees actually use when describing the companies they work based on a large dataset of employee reviews from Glassdoor.com. 14% of reviews mention epistemic deficits of their companies. I identify seven distinct epistemic vices that employees ascribe to their organizations. Of these seven vices, only three have close correlates in the existing literature: dishonesty, incompetence, and sloppiness. Four others have not been identified at all or only in aspects: obsolescence, fragmentation, irrelevance, and disconnection. The latter three of these vices exist exclusively at the collective level. I find evidence of three mechanisms that may lead to epistemic vice: organizational vices due to vices of their members, due to the interaction between their members in an organizational structure, and due to emergence at the organizational level. The paper suggests several ways in which collective epistemic vice can be ameliorated that are not available at the individual level, notably the adoption of better knowledge sharing practices; better resourcing; and the removal of conflicts of interest and other obstacles that make epistemically vicious behavior functional.

Anne Schwenkenbecher - Doxastic inconsistency in corporate agents

It is usually considered a crucial element of intentional agency that one's beliefs are consistent with one another to a high degree and that one cares about whether or not they are consistent. Even if no individual agent's beliefs are perfectly consistent, there is a point at which inconsistency of beliefs will undermine an individual's agency and – therewith – their moral agency. In this talk, I examine corporate doxastic inconsistency, which will occur only in complex structures: where one part of the organisation does not 'know' what the other part 'knows' – in other words, where knowledge (here understood as true belief) fails to be distributed in the right way to ensure the organization is able to act on its relevant beliefs. Naturally, the greater an organisation's complexity, the greater is the potential for internal doxastic inconsistency. It would appear that countless organisations or corporate

agents are doxastically inconsistent in this way – and potentially diminished in their moral agency. Fast-changing administrative regimes can often generate outright contradictions between purported commitments and internal norms and guidelines in organizations – imposing additional epistemic burdens on employees and undermining the organization's functioning. What is more, doxastic inconsistency can lead to disastrous outcomes, as was the case with the mining corporation Rio Tinto's destruction of ancient rock shelters in Western Australia in May 2020, following a "communications breakdown" within the organization. Still, one might want to resist the conclusion that flawed epistemic structures excuse rogue organizations from moral responsibility and blame.

Talks

Adamo, Ludovica - Hierarchical Shared Agency & Hierarchical Groups

What is hierarchical shared agency? What happens when agents act together when an authority tells them what to do? These questions have been recently receiving attention in the collective intentionality literature. Large-scale groups such as states, corporations, and non-profit organisations, have a hierarchical structure where authorities coordinate the actions of their subordinates through plans. Several authors have analysed plans created by authorities for their groups (Shapiro 2011; 2014) and the structure of hierarchical groups (List & Pettit 2006; Ludwig 2017; Searle 1995). However, when they examine hierarchical shared agency, these accounts only consider it in relation to hierarchical groups. Kirk Ludwig (2017) analyses institutions acting together hierarchically, and Scott Shapiro (2011) considers states as large-scale groups acting together under a political authority. They, then, merge the concepts of hierarchical shared agency and group hierarchy.

I argue that hierarchical shared agency and hierarchical groups are two distinct phenomena. Hierarchical groups can engage in hierarchical shared activities, but hierarchical shared agency can also occur independently of the existence of hierarchical groups.

For hierarchical shared activity to occur, there needs to be a transmission of reasons from one person to another. One person needs to make other people act for her reasons. This transmission of reasons often happens in hierarchical groups, but it does not have to. To show how, I consider the 'beach rescue case', where hierarchical shared agency occurs independently of a structured group. This is a one-off case where a man is drowning in the sea, and someone on the shore, S, starts directing some bystanders to organise a rescue for him. The bystanders follow S's directions, and they rescue the drowning man. When the bystanders follow S's plan, a transmission of reasons occurs between them. S's plan stores the reasons S had to create it, and when other agents act on them, they tap into S's reasons. S made other people do as she told by transmitting them reasons and was thus in a position of authority over the others despite the absence of any pre-existing group.

Hierarchical shared activity can occur in hierarchical groups. In talking about hierarchical groups, we refer to the groups' structure, which persists over time whether groups act or not. To have a hierarchical group, we need agents to occupy status roles with specific status functions within the group, and those roles and functions need to be collectively accepted by the group members. In talking about status roles and functions, I rely on Searle's (1995) and Ludwig's (2017) definitions, but I propose a different view of collective acceptance.

Status roles and functions explain the persistence of groups over time and help define the structure of groups. They are not, though, sufficient or necessary to generate and explain hierarchical shared agency. The paper aims to make an important distinction between two phenomena that are often discussed as being the same in the literature. Distinguishing between them can account for cases of hierarchical shared activity that are not backed up by a pre-existing group.

13

Akdeniz, Asli & Sarah Mathew - Normative versus prosocial underpinnings of human decision making

Humans heavily rely on social learning to acquire culturally relevant information. This renders norm compliance a useful tendency for individuals to possess. The acquisition of norms via social learning usually occurs without differentiating between prosocial and other norms. This non-differentiation could give rise to the creation of a stable norm compliant disposition in individuals, which would offer a temporal and between-domain stability of behavior. Such a stability would then enable individuals to predict how the members of their social group would behave across a wide range of domains and allow cooperation to scaffold in human societies. Examining the relative importance of normative versus prosocial motivations in individual decision making is therefore crucial for understanding the origins of human cooperation. Moreover, if the basis of human extended cooperation is the stability of behavior due to norm compliance, it would also shed light into the roots of in-group/out-group bias and ethnic discrimination. We investigate whether there exists a stable norm compliant disposition and, if so, how it could have provided a basis on which human extended cooperation is built. Using an online laboratory experiment in two cultures with different norm tightness, Dutch (loose norms) and Turkish (tight norms), we evaluate individuals' norm compliance dispositions and its association with prosocial behavior. Participants in our experiment play a set of economic games and respond to a set of culturally specific normative statements. By analyzing the correlation across games and statements, we will test whether: 1) there is a norm compliant disposition that can explain an individual's compliance in different domains, 2) an individual's norm compliant disposition predicts their prosocial choices, and 3) the cultural tightness in a society regulates behavior only at the aggregate level or both at the aggregate and the individual level. Our findings will highlight the extent to which normative versus prosocial motivations underpin decision making when individual and group interests are not aligned, and can help tailor policies to promote sustainable and moral choices.

Alonso, Facundo - Fickleness and control in individual and shared agency

The possibility of an individual agent's unilateral change of mind in the context of shared agency has grabbed the attention of several philosophers (Gilbert, Bratman) and yet we possess a limited theoretical understanding of it. When I form an intention to act in the future, I have to confront the possibility of my eventually changing my mind. But in cases of shared agency, in addition to having to confront the possibility of my own fickleness, I have to confront the possibility of yours. Is there a special problem with there being several, rather than one, sources of instability in joint action?

An agent may intend and embark on a personal project and then, as time passes by, lose interest in it and drop her intention as a result. We are all too well aware of this possibility and yet this typically does not detract us from committing to a particular project this time. Much in the same way in which we are aware that we may lose interest in our own individual project, we are aware that we may lose interest in our joint projects with others, too. By the same token, we are also aware that our partner may lose interest in our joint project as well. And, somehow, normally, awareness of this latter possibility produces a certain uneasiness in us which awareness of any of the former possibilities does not. We typically feel a type of anxiety about whether our partner will follow through that we do not feel about whether we will ourselves do. Why is that? Is that feeling well-supported or rational?

A plausible conjecture is that what creates this feeling in contexts of shared agency is the individual's awareness that her control over the joint action is shared with her partner's. It is the anxiety of her not having exclusive control over the joint action. It is true that sometimes we want to have sole control over the projects we embark upon. That's why we sometimes prefer to do something ourselves rather than do it jointly with others. That said, I argue that the idea of exclusive control is not fully explanatory in this context. First, the thought that it is part of the essence of individual action

that one exercises sole control over it is many times an illusion –think of your taking the bus to work this morning. Second, sometimes an agent rightly feels more in control of a joint action she partakes in than she does with respect to an action of her own. I take myself to be in more control of us (you and I) going for a run together tomorrow at 6 am than I do about my going for a run on my own tomorrow at 6 am. What does this suggest? That the aforementioned feeling of anxiety is sometimes ungrounded? That the explanation of it lies somewhere else? These are some of the questions I explore in my paper.

Altner, Franz - Why care about a corporate will?

Philosophers that claim that structured groups can meet the conditions for ordinary and moral agency often argue that we can hold these groups responsible for what they do or for their quality of will. This means that they can participate in responsibility practices understood along Strawsonian lines. Somewhat surprisingly these accounts, almost universally, model group actions according to a Davidsonian understanding of action. Under this conception groups act if they respond to reasons, which are constituted by a belief and desire pair.

In the philosophy of action it has been known for quite some time that the Davidsonian understanding of a will does not capture those features that we care about from a perspective of holding responsible, as Watson (1994), in his paper "Two faces of responsibility", has argued. The "belief-desire account of action [..] obscures the relevant distinction between [..] voluntary conduct and operant conditioning, between structural defects and virtues. [..] We can't be rightly blamed unless we have control of the causes of our conduct. If we lack control of our desires [..] we lack control over our wills."

In my presentation I want to show two things. First, which accounts of group agency assume a Davidsonian understanding of group action and which accounts assume a model of a group will that is more demanding and better captures what we care about in another agent's quality of will.

In a second step I lay out two challenges that capture the insights in Watson's quote. Namely, that most accounts of group action fail to do justice to structural defects of groups, which undermine their capacity to be capable of a will. These structural defects are of a distinct social kind, grounded in their social environment and their role within society. For these reasons they are more pervasive among groups, than they are among individual agents.

They also fail to distinguish between those activities that are due to the agent and those that are external to it and in which the authorship of the group is undermined.

Andler, Matthew – Sexual Orientation: The Demarcation Question

Why do certain sexual dispositions (such as gender-based sexual dispositions) as opposed to others (such as height-based sexual dispositions) count as sexual orientations? In this paper, I formalize the aforementioned question, which I refer to as the demarcation question of sexual orientation, and I argue in favor of a social structuralist theory of orientation demarcation. In particular, I argue that orientation-grounding sexual dispositions, as opposed to mere sexual dispositions, count as sexual orientations in virtue of their privileging, subordinating, and/or marginalizing roles in relation to heteropatriarchal kinship structures.

Arango, Alejandro and Adam Burgos - Social Identities as Social Affordances

We will argue that social identities should be understood as social affordances (SAs). Roughly, we take a social affordance to be a possibility for action or interaction within a given social niche, where such possibility is prompted and constrained (but not fully defined) by the objective nature of a thing (a

person, a ritual, etc.), while also being partly defined by the properties of the thing relative to the perceiver/agent. These situated possibilities occur within the full complexity of the social world.

Very much in a pragmatist spirit, we see the SA framework operating in three distinct ways with regard to social identities. In a basic structural level, SAs account for their dual nature as subjective and objective. A social identity is always a two-sided affair, involving how a person sees themself in the social space and how others see them. There are two aspects to someone's social identity: a subjective aspect and an objective aspect. The subjective aspect is a matter of self-conception: it is the way persons conceive of themselves. The objective aspect, conversely, is about how others see individuals in terms of group membership. Two important points for our purposes: 1) the subjective aspect has some measure of traction on the objective (this precludes cases of subjective-only identification), and 2) individuals can mean different things when they think of themselves as having a given identity, that is, the subjective aspect can be teased out differently from the objective aspect. Social identities are therefore real and have to come to be part of the world by the continuous enactment of social practices in which they appear as possibilities.

At the level of the pragmatics of social identities, social affordances are sensitive to the myriad different ways that they are constructed, reproduced, resisted, strengthened, and even erased. Our account responds to the need for social identities to appear in the social space as—and this is common to perceptual phenomena—context-and perceiver-dependent. But what are the implications of stating that perception of social identity is a contextual issue? One might think, and rightly so, that the perceivability of persons' physical traits has often been the basis on which a racialized identity has been assigned. The perceivability of material culture (in clothing, food, music, among others) has been the basis on which ethnicized identity has been assigned. In both cases, the key element is that certain people are perceived to be of a certain race or ethnicity. Lastly, the logic and structure of social affordances constitutes the intelligibility itself of social identities for their bearers and for others.

Araz, Bahar – Social positioning and the nature of gender relations

Social phenomena emerge from human interaction, though are causally and ontologically irreducible to the human individuals and interactions on which they nevertheless remain dependent. This position is well grounded in recent ontological reasoning (Lawson 1997). The processes whereby specific phenomena do actually emerge, or have emerged, however, is less well studied. so I shall argue, advances a theory of status that is consistent with modern conceptions in social ontology, one that implicit covers the category of gender relations. In this framework, the theory of social positioning conceptualizes the nature of gender relations.

Tony Lawson has recently developed a theory of social positioning that is about rights and obligations. In light of this theory, a central idea of the social positioning theory is about social relations that underpin power relationships. In this study, regarding to social positioning theory, I will demonstrate gender relations that is ultimately based on power relationship. Thus, various forms of power relations, such as objectification, coercion, manipulation and domination, are the key concepts of gender relations (Martins 202). This study will inquire the theory of gender based on social positioning theory.

Auwerda, Zachary - Conferralism and Group Agency

Ásta's conferralist framework provides a metaphysical account of social categories, such as sex, gender, race, disability, and so on. In conferralism, social properties are conferred when others perceive the corresponding base properties. For example, I might confer the property "male" onto a person based on my perception of certain biological features that I take as the base properties for the property "male." Importantly, conferred properties are given to us by others. This means that

properties about me, such as my race and gender, are given (conferred) onto me by others' attitudes about me. Many criticisms of conferralism, such as Barnes & Andler (2020) and Burman (2019), focus on the scope of the conferralist framework. The general form of these criticisms is that conferralism struggles to fully capture some social property (or properties) that it purports to explain. One way of responding to these criticisms is to limit the scope of the conferralist framework. In other words, conferralism only applies to properties that are obviously (or uncontroversially) conferred. My claim is that even if we limit the scope of conferralism to uncontroversial conferred properties, Ásta's conferralist framework still fails to give an account of this limited set of properties. This failure stems from Ásta holding two incompatible positions. First, Ásta maintains that groups can confer social properties. Second, Ásta commits herself to methodological individualism. The crux of the problem is that we can construct cases of groups performing uncontroversial conferrals that do not nicely reduce down to the conferrals of individuals. Ásta (2021) has noted that her commitment to methodological individualism is not a fundamental part of her theory and that she is open to giving it up if she has to. I suggest that she give up this commitment, as non-reductive accounts of group agency would benefit the conferralist framework in two ways. First, an account of group agency would help explain how group conferrals work. While Ásta does hold that groups can perform conferrals, she has yet to explain the nature of group conferrals. Second, without a non-reductive account of group agency, conferralism will struggle when individual conferrals and group conferrals diverge. In these cases, a group conferral of property P does not merely reduce to the group members conferring the property P. For example, a group might confer a property P without any individual member perceiving the base properties for P.

This paper has two sections. In the first section, I consider some criticisms of conferralism to help locate uncontroversial examples of conferred properties. In the second section, I explore cases where groups confer these uncontroversial conferred properties. I then argue that Ásta's commitment to methodological individualism prevents her from accounting for group conferrals that diverge from individual conferrals. I conclude by suggesting some theories of group agency that appear to fit well with the conferralist framework.

Baleshta, Clair - A Feminist Perspective on The Benefits of Collective Action

Most standard accounts of collective action rely on ideal theory methodology, wherein theories begin from simplified or 'idealized' conditions under the assumption that non-ideal complexities can be reintroduced afterward (Friedlaender 2018, 270). Feminist philosophers have questioned the use of such methodology both in general and in specific application to collective action contexts. Overarching critiques of ideal theory note that "almost by definition, it follows from the focus of ideal theory that little or nothing will be said on actual historic oppression and its legacy in the present, or current ongoing oppression" (Mills 2005, 168). Similarly, ideal theory in collective action contexts has been shown to overlook systemic inequalities between agents within a collective, while also ignoring vast differences "in the distribution of power and vulnerability among collective entities" (Isaacs 2018, 277). In response to the shortcomings of ideal theory, feminist approaches to collective action have specifically aimed to "acknowledge the reality of unjust inequality and examine how it might affect the very dynamics and mechanisms of collective action" (234).

As such, feminist analyses regarding collective action have often focused on the descriptive task of identifying injustices that occur within said action. In other words, they explain how the process of acting collectively may disadvantage oppressed agents. Understanding the ways in which collectives can reinforce systemic inequality has been greatly conducive to developing our understanding of collective action itself. In this paper, however, I aim to ask the opposite question: in what ways might collective action benefit those in oppressed groups? Drawing on work in relational autonomy, I will

overview the unique capacity feminist theorizing has to identify how certain collective action can enhance the autonomy of oppressed agents by increasing their range of available options to choose from when acting. In doing so, I appeal to the example of hermeneutical injustice experienced by members of marginalized groups and the process of collective consciousness-raising as a means of overcoming said injustice (Fricker 2007). I demonstrate that, by taking collective action in response to unjust hermeneutical constraints, we not only expand the range of options an agent has but can overcome systemic barriers faced by those in oppressed social locations. Similar to work on the adverse features of acting collectively, this finding regarding benefits may have implications for our view of collective action more generally. My intention is that, from this analysis, readers will gain an appreciation for why a holistic or 'collectivist' approach is essential for our understanding of collective actions such as consciousness-raising.

Banaś, Paweł - Legal officials and artefact theory of law

In this paper, I wish to argue that the role legal officials play in constituting legal institutions as kinds is diminished compared to what one would expect after adopting the general positivistic attitude towards artefact theory of law. First, I offer a short summary of the idea of "legal officials" as it is employed by legal positivists. I then describe two possible alternative views in respect to the role of officials in the artefact theory of law. The first one assumes that since only legal officials are authorized to say what the actual norms of a legal system are – it is via their collective intentionality that legal kinds truly come into existence. I argue that the consequence of this view is that the general community of citizens (or the folk) is supposed to track the content of collective intentionality of legal officials and can eventually turn out to be mistaken about it. On the other hand, one can assume that it is the collective intentionality of the folk that ultimately constitutes the content of legal kinds and that the role legal officials play ought to be considered as purely instrumental. As a result, all the properties of legal kinds (and not just their general ideas) are provided by the folk and legal officials ought to track them and can eventually turn out to be mistaken about it. I aim to describe the latter view as well as to describe its consequence, i.e. that by exploiting their authority, legal officials may (and usually do) impose or force their views regarding contents of legal kinds on the folk. This is, however, irrelevant if one aims to provide an ontological artefactual interpretation of social facts thesis.

Baron, Teresa - Original parenthood, shared intentions, and double-donor surrogacy

Arrangements in which an individual or couple have a biologically unrelated child produced on their behalf have sometimes been characterised as 'double donor surrogacy' (DDS). In this paper, I argue that this characterisation presents a red herring for philosophers of parenthood; it presupposes that such arrangements are indeed a form of surrogacy, and therefore presupposes that commissioning parents are original parents of the resulting child. By 'original parents' I mean those with a unique entitlement to parent that child 'from the outset.' However, DDS shares morally significant features with both ordinary surrogacy and planned private adoption: the absence of a biological relationship between the child and the prospective parents, and the shared intention of the relevant parties (prior to the child's birth) that the prospective parents will raise that child. Adoption, however, is treated very differently from surrogacy in most jurisdictions (for example, private adoption arrangements are prohibited in many countries).

I argue that the socio-moral differences in our treatment of adoption and assisted reproduction rely on the concept of original parenthood. Differences in moral and legal constraints on some transfers of children (i.e. adoptive transfers) but not other transfers (i.e. those involved in assisted reproduction) are grounded in presuppositions about the rights and obligations of original parents. Prospective adoptive parents have no right to a particular child until after they have completed their

adoption; individuals undergoing surrogacy, however, are thought to have a claim to this particular child, who cannot be 'reassigned' to more suitable prospective parents. Commissioning parents in DDS arrangements must have an independent claim to be the original parents of the child in question, if these arrangements are to be understood as a form of surrogacy rather than planned adoption.

The clearest candidate for justifying such a claim is an intentionalist account of parenthood. I argue that this approach is untenable, and leads to a collapse of the distinction between adoption and surrogacy. We therefore ought to either re-evaluate our differential treatment of parental rights in these practices, or reject the characterisation of DDS arrangements as a form of 'surrogacy'. This prompts the further question of what should be taken as morally prior: a belief in the adoption/surrogacy distinction, or our account of parental rights.

Battich, Lucas - Shared perception and the sense of reality

When we perceive the world, we experience a host of perceptual contents. We see shapes, colours, and movement, experience textures through touch, and hear the timbre and frequency of sounds. But there is more to perception than sensory contents: we also experience things around us as being real, rather than, for example, merely imagined. We can differentiate veridical perceptual experiences from imagination, because veridical perception comes together with a feeling that we are perceiving the real world. We have a sense of reality. But what makes an experience feel real? What gives a sense of reality to our perceptual experiences?

Most philosophical accounts of the sense of reality in perception take an individualistic approach. Many perceptual experiences, however, are not merely individual, but socially shared: infants learn to look where others are looking, doctors jointly assess radiographs to detect tumours, hunters track preys together, and musicians will jointly experience the music they play.

In this paper, I examine whether shared perception is a normative precondition to the possibility of experiencing the world as real. Can we have a sense of reality without the ability to coordinate and share our perceptions with others? In other words, can we have a sense of reality if we have never experienced sharing percepts with others?

Several analytic philosophers argue that the ability to share our perceptual experiences with others is, in fact, essential for the concept of a shared objective world, where mind-independent objects are attended in common. Similarly, in the phenomenological tradition, Husserl argued that intersubjective experience is part of what constitutes the very idea of an objective world: it is a condition of possibility for any knowledge of external objects. Without social engagement, there is no concept of objectivity.

These views are concerned with the normative preconditions for the concept of an external objective reality. The sense of reality, however, is a basic feature of our perceptual experience, which may be shared by pre-linguistic and non-conceptual populations, including infants and non-human animals. Here, I defend the stronger position that sharing percepts with others is a normative precondition to the sense of reality as a non-conceptual feature of perceptual experience. Based on current work in theoretical psychology, I will first categorise different levels of sharing and coordinating percepts. From this, I will argue that the ability to coordinate my perceptual attention to an object together with another individual in a flexible manner, goes hand in hand with the ability to experience the object as a mind-independent thing separate from myself. I will finally consider an important empirical corollary of this view for imagination and hallucination in non-human animals and artificial agents: creatures that lack the ability to coordinate perception with others, may also lack the ability to separate imaginings and hallucination from objective reality.

Bauwens, Michaël - Where is the King of France? On the location problem in social ontology

The location problem in social ontology is a difficulty for a naturalist ontology when institutions like organizations have no physical basis. Hindriks (2013) proposed a constitution model whereby organizations are constituted by, but not identical to, their members. Together with his enactment account, this allows him to distinguish the location of the persons constituting the organization, from the location of the organization.

However, his proposal depends on the existence of territorial jurisdictions as epitomized in the post-1648 Westphalian state system that became the global standard, which in turn depends on the recognition by persons of such a territorial system. Hence, the territorial system itself, qua institution, would be constituted by persons, and tying organizations to territory does not really solve the location problem.

Two further problems arise as well. In the case of multiple organizations constituted by the same group of people, Hindriks claims that the different organizations can be enacted at different points of time. But in that case, the organization is constituted by the alternative possibilities to enact one or the other organization, which requires a contingent choice which may never materialize. It is hard to see how this fits in with Hindriks' non-reductive materialism.

A similar problem arises in the case of organizations that are (temporarily) without members. Hindriks offers the case of a papal interregnum whereby the college of cardinals ensures that the constitutive rule of the papacy still exists. However, in line with the previous point, the cardinals may deliberately refuse to elect a new pope – as has in fact happened in the past. Moreover, it opens up the question how far removed from instantiating the required persons the institution can be – is the French monarchy still in an interregnum?

A combination of powers and platonism can resolve these problems, while maintaining the central role Hindriks ascribes to persons. Two or more institutions are regarded as identical if they instantiate a sufficiently similar set of rules, conceived of as abstract objects not tied to space or time. That is their basic and minimal degree of existence. However, they can only be acted upon by persons who have the power to choose between the alternative possibilities of acting upon one or the other institution. Moreover, they exist to a higher degree the more readily available they are to be acted upon and the more valued they are vis-à-vis other institutions. This allows for a rich and dynamic account whereby the French monarchy still exists in a very weak sense.

Bazargan-Forward, Saba - The 'Control Problem', Authority, and Group Agency

Accounts of group agency must explain how a group-agent can, qua group-agent, control what it does, when the constituent members of the group-agent who implement the group actions are themselves, qua individuals, in control of their conduct. There appears to be multiple, competing 'foci' of agency within a group-agent. This has come to be known as the 'control problem'. One solution is to borrow from defenses of epiphenomenalism in the philosophy of mind and, more generally, of higher-order explanations in the special sciences. The suggested solution, roughly, is that higher-order property can be causally relevant without being causally determinative. Some have applied this theory to group-control, thereby purporting to solve the control problem. But I argue that we can dissolve the control problem without committing to controversial views of the relationship between higher-order and lower-order properties in scientific explanation. To that end, I present a novel way of approaching the control problem. I argue that the group-agent needn't have causal control over its constituent members in order to function as a group-agent, so long as it has normative authority over its members.

To show this, I repair to a structurally analogous problem in individual, diachronic decision making. In exercising diachronic agency, an agent confers authority on her past self when it comes to deciding how to act now. Her past self, in effect, issues orders to her present self, where those orders confer a Razian protected reason to comply, thereby normatively (rather than causally) binding her future self. In this way, her past self has practical authority over the present self – despite that her present self is fully capable of gratuitously 'disobeying' her past self. This example of diachronic, individual agency presents a model for how to makes sense of synchronic group-agency in the context of potentially competing agential foci. The group agent's decision-making apparatus has normative authority over the group's members, in that it confers upon them Razian protected reasons to conduct themselves in a certain way. It's true that the members are psychologically capable of disobeying these instructions. But as we saw, distal causal control is unnecessary for individual diachronic decision-making. The same goes, I argue, for synchronic decision-making within a group-agent: the group-agent's decision-making apparatus retains normative authority over its constituents without necessarily exercising causal control over them. This, of course, is a story about authority rather than control. But the moral is that causal control isn't necessary for deliberative agency. Rather, authority is. So long as the decision-making apparatus within a group agent retains normative authority over its constituents, it possesses the requisite deliberative agency.

Beardsley, Jake - Gender Identity as Narrative, Gender as Genre

I develop a semantic account of 'gender identity' and a pragmatic account of gender-categorizing statements such as "Jack is a man." In the semantic project, I argue that there are two operative meanings of 'gender identity,' one which describes a person's current conscious beliefs about their gender and one which describes a person's entrenched psychological features. In the pragmatic account, I develop an extended analogy between the pragmatics of gender and the pragmatics of aesthetic genres. I hope to demonstrate three things: (1) That concepts of 'gender identity' are coherent and epistemically valuable, (2) that it is coherent to "gender" a person on the basis of their identity, for example, by calling a transgender man a 'man,' and (3) that aesthetic or emotional preferences play an important role in disputes about gender. This account also points toward a two-tiered metaphysics of gender, in which the more fundamental tier describes the "central phenomenon of gender" (plausibly, social hierarchy or cultural lineages), while the less fundamental tier describes experiential categories analogous to genres.

Ben-Ze-'Ev, Aaron – I Want to Know Where Love Is: On the ontological status of love

The issue of which bodily organ underlies romantic experiences is no longer in dispute: We know that it is the brain, rather than the heart. An interesting twist in this dispute concerns the ontological location of love suggesting that love is not located within the individual's body, but resides within the connection between the two lovers. Does this view make sense?

We can discern two major views concerning the ontological status of love: (1) love is a property of the agent; (2) love is a property of the relation. The first view, which is compatible with the care model of love (Frankfurt, 1999), seems to be intuitively true: Like other mental states, the emotion of love is a property of the agent. The relation-focused model of love, which is compatible with the dialogue model of love (Krebs, 2015), tends to transfer the epistemic (and normative) importance of the connection in love into the ontological realm by claiming that love is a property of, and in some formulations even resides in, the connection between the two lovers (Fredrickson, 2013; Helm, 2010: ch. 8).

This ontological claim is problematic—one reason being that feelings, such as pain or enjoyment, which are essential to love, are property of an individual. Hence, we cannot dismiss the relation to the

agent in characterizing love. Accordingly, we would expect that some features of love, such as feelings, evaluations, and action tendencies, are properties of the agent, whereas other features, such as compatibility and resonance are properties of the relationship. Romantic resonance is indeed a property that can be attributed to both lovers and their connection. The resonating emotional experience can, but does not have to, be shared by the two agents. A lover can emotionally resonate to her partner's feelings without the partner being able to resonate to her feelings. Lower types of resonance, like lower-types of love can be unrequited (Ben-Ze'ev, 2019).

In light of the above considerations, we may say that the ontological status of complex romantic experiences consists of both the agent feeling love and of the connection between the two lovers. Despite the significance of the romantic bond to profound love, love neither resides outside the agent in the space between the lovers, nor inside the agent. Rather, the complex typical romantic experience has elements of both. However, in less typical romantic experiences, such as unrequited love, the weight of both elements may be considerably reduced.

Betschart, Alfred - The Nature of Social Norms in Jean-Paul Sartre's Ethics of the 1960s

Although Critique de la raison dialectique (Critique of dialectical reason; CRD) is Jean-Paul Sartre's second major philosophical work, it is frequently misunderstood even by very experienced Sartre scholars. Its main part offers a framework of concepts to grasp the human environment, especially the social one. These include concepts such as praxis, hexis, and practico-inert, the various forms of collectives, but also the limits of human action, which cause the human being to fail again and again.

Based on this framework, Sartre elaborated two texts on ethics in the 1960s. They were intended for the lecture he gave at the Gramsci Institute in Rome in 1964 and for the lectures he was to give at Cornell University in 1965. Only belatedly were these manuscripts published in 2015 and 2005 under the titles Les racines de l'éthique and Morale et histoire, respectively. The reception of these two texts has not yet really taken place, not even among Sartre scholars.

In analogy to his distinction between praxis, hexis, and practico-inert, Sartre differentiates between values, customs, and institutions. The latter show themselves in commands and consist especially of laws. The customs, in turn, contain norms, values, goods, examples, and also ideals. The discussion of values and the justification of decisions about values are the object of praxis. Whereas in both customs and institutions, the past of society is repeated, praxis is always something that happens in the present. To no surprise, according to Sartre, one characteristic of normative discussions is their diachronic multiplicity.

An important point in this regard is Sartre's distinction between ethics and morality, insofar as he equates ethics with authentic action and morality with inauthentic action. Here Sartre incorporates his ideas about authenticity, which he had already developed in the 1940s. True ethics means living ethical discussions as conceived in Sartre's version of discourse ethics. Here, human beings discuss alternatives of actions with their needs and desires as their fundamental basis, whereas deontological morality is a reified morality and an instrument in the hand of the ruling (social, political, religious) groups. As an illustration, Sartre refers to the discussion about the thalidomide (Contergan) scandal, where, in his view, praxis was fighting the practico-inert—the mothers who demanded their right to abortion were fighting against the religious and political élite who opposed abortion.

In his works from the 1960s, Sartre confirms what he already stated in the 1940s: ethics is always about interpersonal relationships, never about the relationship between an individual and God or an abstract Other. His statement about the opposition between the unconditional imperative and conditional possibilities is also more or less a repetition of earlier views. However, in line with his

analyses of the limitedness of the possibilities of goal- and value-oriented action in the CRD, he emphasizes this aspect in his two ethical writings from the 1960s. Another aspect Sartre now stresses is the grounding of values in the animal structure of human needs.

With his two works from the 1960s, Sartre positions ethics in a social setting as few philosophers before and after him did.

Bissett, Jack - Instability in Covert Social Kinds; The Flexible View of Covert Kind Reference

To describe certain human kinds (e.g., race, gender) as 'covert' social kinds is to claim that they are widely held to be natural or biological, but are in fact constructed socially. One problem faced by social constructionists in accounting for the reference of covert kinds is the 'qua problem. The qua problem posits that entities (e.g., a homosexual man) typically belong to many kinds (e.g., warm-blooded, able-bodied, male, white, mammalian, homosexual), and in grounding the reference of a particular term it is not clear in virtue of what amongst the potential referents we fix as the referent of that term. In response to this problem, some such as Mallon and Löhr have shifted to hybrid theories of reference for covert kind terms, integrating a minimal level of descriptive or conceptual content. However, this paper argues that such theories struggle to account for the instability of covert kind reference in the sense that social constructionists posit different referents of covert kinds depending upon the time, purpose, and context in which the kind is spoken of. I evaluate two potential solutions to this problem. Firstly, Deutsch's defence of purely causal reference against the qua problem, which claims that there is no qua problem and we can understand the reference of terms to be grounded in certain properties and not others because those properties cause the reference grounding. Secondly, my proposal of a 'flexible view' of covert kind reference, which posits that covert kinds are polysemous terms whose referent changes depending upon the context, time, place, purpose, sense of meaning and world of evaluation in which the term is used. For instance, when spoken of in certain social, political, cultural, or historical contexts, the referent of covert kind terms might be thicker inasmuch as what constitutes the basis of the term's meaning is governed by the salience of weightier norms and expectations. Whereas in other contexts, or when the terms are used for more explanatory purposes, the referent might be thinner insofar as it incorporates little to do with the structural position of the kind and those who occupy it.

Since Deutsch's arguments against the qua problem depend upon the causal relevance of referents to initial reference grounding, this paper contends that it cannot articulate the reference of covert kinds whose true referents are distinct from those initially grounded. On the other hand, I argue that the 'flexible view' of covert kind reference is well-placed to broach the referential instability of covert kinds, while maintaining compatibility with constructionist and hybridist responses to the mismatch and qua problems. I then consider the implications of this thesis on how social constructionism understands covert kinds, and defend my position against the objection that the 'flexible view' erodes into semantic internalism.

Björnsson, Gunnar - We ought to give your interests and point of view more weight

It matters morally what weight we are given by others, or what de facto moral standing they accord us. More concretely, it matters what weight they give to our interests and points of view in their thoughts and actions compared to what weight is given to their own interests and points of view, or to those of others. Our sense of being equals, or of having equal dignity, is strongly tied to the idea that we deserve to be given equal weight, ceteris paribus. We can feel this with particular clarity when we or someone we care about is given less weight than that by people they depend on, or by society at large, because of who they are or what group they belong to.

In this talk, I argue that there is such a thing as the weight that that an individual ought to be given by a group, where this is not just the weight that they ought to be given by members of that group. (Specifically, my concern is with weight that ought to be given by groups that lack established decision procedures and are not naturally understood as bona fide moral agents in their own right.)

The argument proceeds in two steps.

In the first, I argue that it is of moral importance what weight we are given by various groups, independently of the importance of being given a certain weight by each of the members of that group. I provide two supporting considerations. The first is an appeal to cases intended to directly illustrate the phenomenon. The second is an argument from analogy: It is often important that we are given a certain weight over time, in a way that is not reducible to the importance of being given a certain weight at each time. This illustrates that the weight-giving that matters isn't just tied to individual times, and I suggest that it generalizes: it also isn't just tied to individual agents.

In the second, I argue that it makes sense to demand of groups that they give a certain individual a certain relative weight, where this demand cannot be reduced to demands on individual group members that they give the individual this weight. Though a number of people have argued that non-agential groups can have obligations, or share obligations, the obligations in question have typically been obligations to produce or prevent a certain effect: saving a swimmer, or preventing climate catastrophe. Giving weight to someone might seem to require a capacity to deliberate and decide, an ability absent in non-agential groups. A version of this worry is pressed in recent arguments that non-agential groups lack the capacity to make decisions and therefore cannot bear obligations. Here, I provide new motivation for the idea that, with or without deliberative capacities, such groups can bear obligations based on the reasons-responsive capacities of their members, and argue that an account of the relevant sort is directly applicable to weight-giving, properly understood.

Blomberg, Olle - Communal normativity

Many different kinds of reasons can favour acting in compliance with a social norm. The risk of harming others may favour compliance with a social norm of wearing face-masks on public transport. Facilitation of efficient and smooth social coordination favours compliance with many social norms. Similarly with reasons that favour violation of a social norm. The risk of harming others and reinforcing oppression favours violating a social norm of female genital mutilation. Facilitation of novelty, improvisation and social creativity favour violation of social norms on many occasions. My question in in this talk is whether there is also a general reason favouring compliance with a social norm which is grounded in group membership. Holists/collectivists such as Margaret Gilbert (e.g. 1999), Bennett Helm (2017) and Raimo Tuomela (e.g. 2007) have suggested that there is such social or communal normativity and accountability. At least one individualist about social norms, Nicholas Southwood (2011), has suggested something similar: that there may be practice-dependent non-moral justification among community members to hold each other accountable with respect violations of social norms. Another individualists, such as Laura Valentini (2021), have instead argued that insofar as there is a general reason to comply with social norms, it is a moral reason grounded in agency-respect.

I argue that while these different types of accounts of the normativity of social norms all have some virtues, all also have problems: It is not clear how Southwood and Valentini can explain how a social norm can provide reasons for compliance to community members who are not personally committed to it. While Gilbert's, Helm's and Tuomela's accounts do not suffer form this problem, they do not have much to say about what explains and justifies the normative hold of social norms on community

members. My aim is to sketch alternative account of why we often have, or think we have, group membership-grounded reasons to comply with a social norm.

Bloom-Christen, Anna - Divided Attention: Perceptual Habits in Cross-Cultural Interaction

How does attention shape cross-cultural interaction? And how do specific cultural backgrounds shape one's attention?

Broadly defined, attention is an act of directing the mind. The capacity to steer attention is an integral and constitutive part of our experiences and social lives. Our interactions in public and private spaces, institutions, offices and schools rely on cooperation, which in turn depends on our capacity to jointly attend to the same thing, and to each other.

This paper explores attention and its role in cross-cultural interaction. Drawing on philosophy of perception and anthropology of intentions, it analyzes the connection between experience-specific facets of attention and their impact on cross-cultural interaction by means of an ethnographic case study in post-apartheid South Africa.

My hypothesis is that habits of attention evolve from perceptual, bodily immersion into specific social settings, as well as from exposure to hypotheses and arguments that, once absorbed, lead to normative attention. This modulation of attention is to some degree personal, but should be understood as connected to collective life experience. Examining this hypothesis, the paper seeks to shed light on the complex relations between mental and bodily habits of attention as fundamentally directed by specific experiences and norms.

Drawing parallels between intellectual and practical experience, the paper asks how to best understand attentional habits and their culturally patterned aspects. By reconsidering attention not merely as an act, but as a habitual capacity to direct the mind, the paper explores the perceptual legacy as well as the transformative potential of attention in multicultural societies. The main aim of this paper is to clarify the impact of attention on culturally specific legacies of attentional habits by studying its occurrence both as socially connecting and in its dividing power.

Bondurant, Hannah - Transformative Shared Experiences & Situating the Self

One receives information about oneself from outside sources to confirm or discover one's own beliefs, attitudes, dispositions, and often what group (and its features) to which one belongs. Yet cognitive biases and the source's social status can influence our evaluations of feedback from outside sources. Since evidence suggests self-criticism is not an entirely reliable epistemic practice, I present what I call "transformative shared experiences" (TSEs) as way to understand how feedback from others shape not only the ways we see ourselves but also how we exist as individuals. The paper looks at how TSEs work, especially between people from different groups, and how they can change a person's metaphysical status (including group membership).

An experience can be "shared" in a thick, rich sense that exists when those who partake feel an intense connection and shared identity with each other. Religious ceremonies, military duty, and fraternities center around establishing bonds through shared experiences. Ideally, TSEs involve epistemic, personal, and moral transformation through interactions with others. I argue that TSEs take place on cognitive, personal, and cultural levels by drawing from developmental neuroscience, feminist and critical race theory, and Confucianism.

To conceptualize TSEs, I use research on shared intentionality concerning how we think when we engage in cooperative activities as individuals or as a society. Shared intentionality or agency involves

25

individuals not just sharing goals but also cognitive representations of multiple actions, roles, and perspectives. Successful shared intentionality has both joint cooperative activity and similar representations of how things are going and should go. Research on the nature of "cultural cognition" shows that, at a young age, children are able to create a "shared fictional reality" with others through games which consist in rules, norms, representations, and narratives about what the world is and what it should be like. This construction of social reality is ongoing as this natural tendency is what leads us to create institutions, policies, and other structures to maintain our cultural traditions and values. Feedback about oneself, such as how one should identify as a person, is found within this shared reality.

By exploring TSEs, we can better understand how transformation, good and bad, emerges from exchanges of feedback and experiences that shape not just perspective but actual existence and one's ability to relate to oneself and others. While we need to seriously consider the ways TSEs can go wrong, I argue that transformative shared experiences with a diversity of sources is one way to help combat self-ignorance and the kind of epistemic injustice we commit towards others when discrediting their feedback due to identity prejudice.

Bottazzi, Emanuele - A Social Ontology of Scandal

Despite its importance in the public debate — take for example the Panama Papers, scandal is not considered in social ontology. This is perhaps due to the religious tone associated to this notion, being it an action that gives the occasion for others to sin. But we can see the scandalous sin not as an action against some supernatural entity, but as something that harms the core goals of someone situated in a specific community. Stripped away from its theological meaning, scandal is a kind of negative social influence on the behaviour of some agents.

To have a formal ontological analysis of scandal it has to be understood by means of a more basic notion and its counterpart, that is, help and hindrance.

When Ada helps Beatrice we could say that Ada brings about that, if Beatrice tries something, this very something is the case.

If, instead, Ada brings about that if Beatrice tries something, this very something is *not* the case, then we could say that Ada is hindering Beatrice from doing that very something.

We could say that Ada, in both situations, could help (or hinder) Beatrice *unintentionally*.

In order to help (hinder) her *intentionally*, Ada has to *try* to help Beatrice to make that Ada was (not) trying is the case. In the case of hindrance we could say that to intentionally hinder someone is a sort of *spite*.

Spite, obviously, is not necessarily scandal. But take now the case of Ada bringing about that if Beatrice tries *not* to do something, this very something *is* the case, even if Ada acts intentionally or not. We believe that this latter case is central to investigate the peculiar status of our notion scandal. Notwithstanding internal conflicts of the scandalised agent, a scandal makes that this very agent ends up in a situation that was *trying not* to be the case.

With this analysis we will show, finally, how is it possible to consider cases that one could not immediately associate to scandal, as for example in the recent sociological discussion on trigger warnings.

Braasch, Sarah - A Non-Ideal Account of Meaning Based Upon a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions

What does it mean for a language to be the language of that population? David Lewis argues in Convention that a language is the language of a certain population, if that population has a social convention of truthfulness in that language. This might seem intuitive, even if an idealization. Don't we use language to align our beliefs about objects and facts in the world?

I argue that this is mistaken. We are never simply aligning our beliefs. We use language to impose our worldviews upon one another.

Social power is antecedent to linguistic meaning. The world doesn't come to us carved at the joints. We do the carving. And, we are always carving the world into extension sets of referents and corresponding linguistic concepts. I am carving the world as I type.

Linguistic meaning is a social institution like any other social institution; linguistic meaning is a social convention; it is a step public social good. And, the assumption and conferral of practical authority is an essential feature of all social institutions/conventions (step public social goods).

This is why I use a Modified Lewisian/Hartian Account of Social Conventions as the basis for a Non-Ideal Account of Meaning. This account can accommodate our pre-theoretical intuitions that linguistic meaning evolves over time, waxing and waning, as sub social groups introduce and cease to use linguistic terms and concepts and referents. It also solves many problems in the philosophy of language.

It solves Saul Kripke's problem of the eternal initial baptism/primitive reference. The initial baptism is an ostensive definition with a demonstrative reference, i.e., a pointing with authority. The initial baptism is rendered an identity statement between two rigid designators (the pointing and the authority), because a social group has conferred naming authority. This answers to our pre-theoretical intuitions that we use proper names and general terms as rigid designators, even for what we construe as artifact kind terms.

And, we may use proper names and general terms to refer to objects about which we may know nothing. This is the beauty of an account of reference for proper names and general terms that is a social convention to refer as a naming authority refers. (This is why I argue that linguistic competence is much more a matter of know how than know that.)

It also solves Gareth Evans' problems with his causal description theory of reference for proper names. Every time we stand in the ostensive definition relation to an object, we make it the case that the name/general term that we use possesses indexicality. But, because the ostensive definition relation is the most intimate relation in which a speaker may stand with respect to the referent, the truth conditions of our statements never become severed from the things that we care about in the present. Using a name is bestowing a name, if I have the authority to so bestow a name.

Bränmark, Johan - Vagueness in social reality

While there are some contemporary defenders of ontic vagueness or metaphysical indeterminacy, such as Williams or Barnes, what is probably the standard view is still that alleged examples of such vagueness or indeterminacy are really semantic or epistemic in character. For many philosophers, the idea that objects in the world could be vague is close to incomprehensible. While it might be true that the exact borders of, say, Mount Kilimanjaro can be disputed, and that there might not be a clear-cut answer as to whether a particular boulder on its slope is part of Mount Kilimanjaro, this is just because there is vagueness in how we conceptually carve up the physical landscape of which something like

Mount Kilimanjaro is a part. The complete physical layout of the world ultimately is what it is. Nothing vague about it, at least not on a metaphysical level.

If we turn to social reality, things become more complicated however – or at least so it will be argued here. The reason is that the ways in which we conceptualize objects in the social world do not just carve up an already existing social landscape. Instead, our conceptualizations of these objects, our beliefs about them, and our actions in relation to them, together play a constitutive role in grounding the existence of the relevant social objects. To put it simply: if some of the relevant categories and ideas are vague, there will be cases of ontic vagueness in social reality. And if the relevant categories and ideas are very often vague, which it will be argued that we have reason to think that they are, ontic vagueness will be endemic to social reality. This will potentially have consequences for what kinds of questions to which social ontology can provide answers, where for many contested categories there will not be metaphysically determinate answers as to whether certain things belong to a certain category or not. If we ask the question "Is bitcoin money?", there might not be a determinate answer. If we ask questions about which individuals that are men or women, again, there might in some cases not be a determinate answer.

On this kind of view, to the extent that philosophers (or others) offer precisifications of social categories, potentially making the status of certain social objects more determinate, they are engaging in attempts to change social reality rather than in attempts at describing it better. Is there a way to avoid this conclusion? At least in principle, it should be possible that a sufficiently developed philosophical account of social reality could function to privilege certain precisifications, and that there could be a possibility of what might be called latent truth discovery. But it will be argued here that we have no reason to assume this kind of methodological stance when doing social ontology, and that rather than trying to fix issues of vagueness and indeterminacy, philosophical accounts of social reality should be respectful of them.

Britten-Neish, George - Anscombe, socially extended cognition and interpersonal coupling

Interest in socially extended cognition (Lyre 2018) has been motivated by increasing evidence for 'cognitive offloading' (Risko & Gilbert 2016), processes by which agents make use of information-processing resources in their social environments to perform cognitive tasks. This puts intentional action at the centre of many socially-extended cognitive capacities, since paradigm cases of cognitive unloading are mediated by actions that are under intentional control. In the associated philosophical literature, this intentional action type is often called 'coupling' (Aizawa 2010).

Typically, discussion of coupling has assumed a causal theory (Davidson 1980), according to which intentional actions are causal composites: when an agents' intention causes a bodily movement so that (in good cases) the movement satisfies the agent's goal in acting, this is an intentional action. On this model, (a) action is the outer boundary of the mind's direct causal power, and (b) the agent's body is the outer boundary of action. So, it looks like defenders of socially extended models should find reasons to reject (a), (b) or both. If we reject (a) we must think of coupling as an internal mental action of an emergent joint agent; if we reject (b) we must think of participants in a joint action as constituting an 'extended phenotype' for each separate agent. Both options encounter problems dealing with standard cases of cognitive offloading.

Anscombe (1957) would see this as a false choice. Rather than the agent-action relation being grounded in a causal link between a discrete intentional state and a bodily movement, intentional actions are, for Anscombe, those that are appropriately situated within an extended pattern of interactions and practices for the agent (and others) to recognise them as constitutive of (potentially-

28

shared) intentional projects. While considerations like these have motivated recent calls for a 'Wittgensteinian turn' in extended cognition more widely (Loughlin 2021), comparatively little attention has been paid to Anscombe's distinct proposals about the nature of intentional action in the context of joint action. These accord strikingly well with converging research on skilled agency (Toner & Moran 2021) and 'dynamic' models of joint action (Tollefsen & Dale 2012), while anticipating socially extended cognition's focus on how minds are scaffolded by their linguistic and social environments. I argue we therefore have good reasons to adopt a naturalised Anscombian account of interpersonal coupling. From this perspective, worries about (mis-)locating the causal boundaries between minds lose their grip; they arise from the Davidsonian model we can now reject.

Brouwer, Thomas - Social Indeterminacy

Indeterminacy – at a first approximation – is the phenomenon whereby, for some state of affairs s, there is no fact of the matter about whether s obtains. Indeterminacy is a familiar topic of discussion in metaphysics, logic and philosophy of language, particularly in the guise of vagueness: cases such as the property of being bald, which have a borderline area where the underlying facts (i.e. number of hairs) do not appear to determinately settle whether something has the property. Metaphysicians discuss whether indeterminacy is a feature of language, thought or reality itself; logicians discuss whether indeterminacy imposes a non-classical logic on us, and if so which; philosophers of language discuss the semantics of vague terms, presupposition failures and empty names.

This talk is about indeterminacy among the social facts. A natural first question is of course whether there is ever indeterminacy among the social facts; but a prima facie case for its existence is not hard to construct. For a simple case, think of types of social facts which can be brought about by stipulation, e.g. by authoritative declarations, and then imagine a stipulation with vague content. The king of Ruritania declares that henceforth, only the bald may wear a tie; there now seems to be no fact of the matter as to whether a borderline-bald tie-wearer is breaking the law. The correct construal of such a case is obviously open to debate, but I will argue that social indeterminacy is genuine, and furthermore that it can arise in other guises aside from vagueness, including forms of non-well-founded grounding.

The more interesting question is not so much whether there is social indeterminacy, but how its various forms are to be understood metaphysically. In this talk, I use a two-dimensional approach to social facts, à la Einheuser (2006) and Epstein (2015), to make sense of the phenomenon, and I will argue that social indeterminacy – or some of it, at any rate – is best construed as ontic rather than semantic or epistemic in character. I will then explore a specific theory of ontic social indeterminacy in the spirit of 'modal' views like Akiba (2004) and Barnes & Williams (2011), an approach which I'll will argue combines naturally with the two-dimensionalist tool-set.

I devote specific attention to the interesting relation between indeterminacy and what we might call the extensibility of the social: given a description of the social facts, and holding the underlying facts fixed, we can always imagine a scenario in which there would have been more of them than there are. This feature of social reality complicates the task of characterising social indeterminacy, for there is no naturally fixed stock of social matters of facts which, in cases of indeterminacy, we can take to be incompletely settled. I will propose a way of handling this complication.

Brynjarsdottir, Eyja - Raising the Stakes: Themes from a New Wave of #MeToo

In the spring of 2021, a new #MeToo wave hit Iceland. This was prompted by a public outpooring of sympathy with a male media celebrity who had been accused of assaulting a woman, and claimed to be falsely accused and persecuted. Further stories of abuse by male celebrities began to emerge, two popular musicians had to cancel their summer gigs due to numerous accusations of sexual abuse, and coincidentally one of the stars of the Icelandic football team, who was working as a professional player

in the Premier League in England, was arrested and suspended the same summer for child sex offenses in the UK. Debate about these cases became quite loud, with fans of the celebrities gathering in their defense, while others felt outraged by their actions. This wave of activism was still ongoing early in 2022, when five men in top positions in finance and media were all made to resign from their positions due to accusations of having collectively abused a young woman. Men in such powerful positions would never have lost their jobs for this kind of reason just a few years earlier.

In this talk, I analyze the local discourse surrounding this new #MeToo wave, and consider what makes the society now receptive to demands and issues that it has hitherto ignored. Why are accusations of sexual violence more likely to be taken seriously now than they were only a few years earlier? I argue that this is due to the success of a strong social movement and that due to experience gained since 2017, feminists now seem better equipped to respond to backlash to the current wave. New methods have emerged, young women have become very forceful in their activism, and active male allyship has become more visible. On the other hand, backlash and resistance has included well-known themes such as claiming that "MeToo has gone too far", and that women are lying about assault in order to "bring attention to themselves". Some backlash tactics refer specifically to use of social media and to "cancel culture", such as by relying on hyperbolic and misleading terms such as 'unlawful execution', 'taking the law into one's own hands', 'innocent until proven guilty', emphasizing that sexual abuse and assault should only be dealt with inside the legal system and not be discussed at all outside a court of law, and those speaking up about their experiences of abuse have been threatened with slander lawsuits. I argue that these backlash techniques are a form of diffusion and often involve gaslighting on a collective social level. However, responses to them have become quite forceful, with young women successfully using social media in inventive ways to their advantage.

Bryson, Joanna - Polarisation and the fundamentals of human sociality

Perhaps uniquely in the natural world, humans can quickly shift their social identity along any cleavage point, even ones introduced in a moment through simple manipulations such as free t-shirts. We can imagine that this capacity initially served a very useful purpose for a sparse network of high-cost, intelligent individuals roaming over Savannah rallying support to take advantage of opportunities presented particularly to scavengers, much as we see today in Alpine ravens. But humans with their enormous memories and capacities for cognition were able to "boot strap" a second replicator system, language, eventually augmented by writing. These turned into innovation engines – innovations that could be tested and applied by groups of people.

Polarisation is when we not only divide along lines of identity, but resent and dehumanise the other, the out group. Presently many assume that an increased capacity for communication, specifically social media, is causing or at least facilitating increased polarisation, yet the actual science repeatedly shows us that there is no such causal relationship, in fact not even a correlation between social media use and polarisation. In this talk I review this evidence, as well as presenting both a model and both old and new evidence supporting an alternative theory. Polarisation increases when risk is too costly – when it might lead to dissolution of a household or business – foreclosure, bankruptcy, loss of custody of children, or indeed death. The threat of these contexts tends to increase when economies are in decline – at least when decline is experienced by broad populations, which can also happen when inequality increases even if economies are stable or rising. In this context, those feeling threatened seek lower-risk social investments leading to more certain outcomes, even where these certain outcomes have lower expected yield than a higher risk, more inclusive strategy.

Depending on the duration of the talk, I may also show evidence that this model of polarisation ties into the mixed strategy solutions we see expressed by populations given punishment options in public

goods games, and why the population-level mix in strategies is correlated with strength of economy and of the rule of law.

Finally, I will briefly address the policy implications which are fairly clear: investment in maintaining both sustainable economies and adequate social "safety nets" are each essential to avoiding extreme polarisation and its concomitant violence.

Buekens, Filip - Labels and game-covering discourse

We present an informal account, based on insights from game theory, of how using words or 'labels' is involved in the creation, maintenance and disappearance of social roles and social facts. We defend a two-level approach. The ground level specifies an underlying game-theoretical account of the creation and maintenance of a social kind as a labeled and correlated equilibrium. This model is enriched by assigning a regulative role to the use of kind-terms ('labels') in pre-play communication. Pre-play communication reveals and creates commitments of players to choices that will eventually result in some kind of equilibrium. This regulative role of conversations and discourse is not based on the magical power of language or mind to 'create' or 'construct' those social roles or of declarative speech acts to 'constitute' new facts. Both Searle's approach to the role of language in the creation of institutions and social constructivists accounts of the effects of labels and public categorizations assume that representation is key to explaining the emergence of institutions and social kinds. Our alternative approach holds that the key role of language in the creation and maintenance of institutional facts is based on the directive function of language use – informally: the use of communicative acts to get audiences to do something, to make certain choices, etc. In game theory, pre-play communication are promises and threats to get the other to make choices that support, or fit, the desired equilibrium of the sender. The use of a label is, on this account, part of game-covering discourse that supports credible commitments and stabilizes equilibria, and those equilibria can then be described in terms of terms used in the speech acts that gave rise to the equilibrium.

Burazin, Luka - Legal systems as abstract artifacts

The chapter claims that legal systems qua (sequences of) sets of legal norms fit neither of the two traditional ontological categories of entities. Although in an important sense related to contingent concrete entities such as legal officials, citizens, legal practice and normative documents, legal systems themselves are not concrete physical particulars. Also, although abstractions and thus intangible, immaterial and lacking a spatiotemporal location in the strict sense, they can neither be categorized as Platonistic ideal abstracta.

By applying Thomasson's artifactual theory, the chapter argues that legal systems should best be conceived as abstract artifacts, i.e., created immaterial objects existentially dependent on a variety of other entities. Legal systems are immaterial, with no spatiotemporal location in the strict sense, and in this sense abstract entities. However, they are located in time and treated by us as created entities (and thus artifacts) that depend on a number of concrete entities for both their coming into existence and remaining in existence. The chapter explains the ways in which legal systems existentially depend on legal officials, citizens, legal practice and normative documents.

Such an understanding of the ontology of legal systems fits many of our basic intuitions about and experiences with legal systems. E.g., that legal systems are human-made, temporal, contingent and changing entities, essentially dependent on particular normative authorities. It also brings some theoretical gains. It makes more explicit the ontological relationship between legal systems and normative authorities, explains different ways in which legal systems depend on legal offices and the persons holding these offices, shows more precisely how social efficacy conditions the existence of

legal systems, and reveals the essential connection between legal norms and the acts of their promulgation, derogation, and interpretation of their linguistic formulations.

Burman, Åsa - A taxonomy of social facts

How many types of social facts are there? The purpose of this paper is to develop a taxonomy of social facts to answer that question. I start by giving a more comprehensive account of social power, the power view, than has hitherto been offered in contemporary social ontology. My account of social power relies on a fundamental distinction: social power that is directly dependent on the intentionality of agents and social power that is indirectly dependent on the intentionality of agents to exist. Telic power and deontic power are direct forms of social power. Two indirect forms of social power are introduced and defined: spillover power and structural power. I show how these forms of social power can accommodate central social phenomena, such as an opaque gender and class structure. An important implication of the power view, with its four categories of social power, is that it can be used as a basis for a taxonomy of social facts. The key idea is that social power is the central social concept and nearly all the social facts in which we are interested contain one form of social power or another. Hence, I offer a taxonomy of social facts in virtue of social power. This taxonomy is then applied to real-world phenomena such as a gender structure to show its theoretical usefulness. It is shown that the different categories of social power can both reinforce and come into conflict with each other.

But what is it to act on such collective or group attitudes? This paper explores a number of different approaches and possibilities including (i) the approach that treats group agency as a monolithic form of individual agency, where the agency of participating individuals is at best only incidentally related to the agency of the group; (ii) the approach that thinks of individual agents as fungible human resources for the group and which accommodates the idea that individual agents could very well be alienated from the group; (iii) the approach that appeals to a causal or functional architecture specifying roles for individuals to play; (iv) the approach that appeals to collective ascriptions of a certain kind of status on those acting on collective attitudes; and (v) the approach that models the way an individual acts on or implements a collective attitude on the way that an individual acts on or implements her own attitudes.

Catapang Podosky, Paul & Nadia Jude - A Cultural Theory of the Information Disorder

The 'infodemic' is a term that rose to prominence during the COVID-19 pandemic. It broadly refers to an over-abundance of information, alongside the rapid and far-reaching spread of false or misleading information, made possible through the affordances of modern information technologies. The corrosive social, cultural, economic and political effects of infodemics, particularly during emergencies, are widely recognised by international organisations such as the World Health Organization and the United Nations. Beyond pandemics and emergency situations, many argue that we are more broadly in an age of 'information disorder' (Wardle & Derakhshan 2017). Typically, the way of framing this problem is in terms of mis-, dis- and mal-information. That is, the rapid spread and uptake of false or misleading information, differentiated by intended deceit.

This talk brings together literature across philosophy, sociology, media and communication studies to argue for a greater theoretical investment in the examination of social and cultural factors, rather than epistemic ones, at play in the dynamics of mis- and dis-information flows. By extending existing and emerging work across disciplines (Carey 2008; Ramírez-i-Ollé 2018; Starbird 2019, 2020; Rosa 2020; boyd 2021), we bring a sceptical eye to the typical concepts of analysis that frame our understanding of the shape and size of the information disorder: (ir)rationality, truth, belief, accuracy, reliability, justification, knowledge, and the like (e.g. Nadler and Shapiro 2021). In response, we introduce an

alternative conceptual framework for thinking about information that does not assume that information is fundamentally fact-based; and we avoid assumptions about the proper use of information as simply its involvement in knowledge-transmission. Rather, our framework argues that information is, at least partly and significantly, a cultural artifact; and one of its distinctive properties is its potential for use in (non-epistemic) community practices. That is, rather than seeing information through the lens of social epistemology, which is the overwhelming predominant approach, we offer a cultural theory of information. Within this framework, we understand information-sharing practices to be caught up in social and cultural factors such as maintaining self-esteem, expressing shared identity, enacting fellowship, avoiding embarrassment, and even simply conforming to expectations.

The significance of this approach is that it brings into focus possibilities for responding to the information disorder that have hitherto been underappreciated or ignored. Standard individualistic epistemic solutions focus on encouraging rationality, cultivating epistemic virtues, or suppressing epistemic vices (e.g. Nadler and Shapiro 2021; Croce and Piazza 2021; Meyer 2019; Carter and Meehan 2019; Mercier 2017, etc.). However, we argue that such epistemic approaches require that individuals (perhaps unnecessarily) risk their place in community. This, we think, renders such proposals implausible to possibly unethical. In contrast, we show that responding to the information disorder does not require changing our epistemic dispositions. Rather, we can prioritise changing the (non-epistemic) cultural use-value of a piece of information. And this can be achieved by focusing on effective norm-change, such as strategies for undercutting empirical and normative expectations about communicative behaviour (Bicchieri 2006, 2016, 2018a, 2018b).

Çelik, Zeynep - Collective Authorship in Theatrical Works: A Hierarchical Account

In many works of art, it is easy to define who the artist is. In painting, it is the painter. In photography, it is the photographer. But what about theatrical works? Who is the artist in a work of drama? Simply claiming that the director of a theatrical performance is the author is implausible on my account because theatre contains two forms of art: the script, and the performance. Because theatrical works are collective products, it is implausible to think of them having a singular author, though they display the work as if it is put forward by a single body.

In this paper, I shall give an account of authorship in theatrical works. I argue for a view on which the author of a theatrical work is a collective subject whose members typically include the scriptwriter, the director of the performance, and the actors. In developing this view, I draw on Margaret Gilbert's notion that social groups are plural subjects where the members must act as if they were a single body, and share the same goal (Gilbert, 1990, 8-9). Similar views of authorship in cinema have been put forward by Bacharach and Tollefsen (2011), and Paul Sellors (2007). However, I argue that theatre is distinctive in ways that make the collaborative view particularly plausible.

One question raised by accounts of this sort is who precisely should be included into the collective authorship. I argue for a hierarchical approach to collaborative authorship, where individuals such as the author of the play's script, the performance director, and the actors lie at the top of the list, followed by those who contribute creatively (like the lighting and costume designers, and makeup artists, etc.), and finally those who do not have creative contributions (like the ushers, prompters, the call boy, etc.) On this account, which draws on work by Avia Pasternak (2021) in political philosophy and has some similarities to a view of comic book authorship developed by Christy Mag Uidhir (2012), authorial contribution is a matter of degree. This opens up the possibility of an extremely inclusive conception of authorship on which members of the stage crew (and possibly even audience members) should be recognized among the co-authors of a theatrical performance, albeit to a degree.

Chilovi, Samuele - The Structure of Normative Explanation

The goal of this paper is to develop a unified account of the explanation of particular normative facts, and of the role and content of general principles within it. I argue that principles contribute to explaining particular normative facts by means of metaphysically grounding them, and defend this view from some influential challenges.

It appears intuitively plausible that particular normative facts are explained in part by general rules that connect explanans and explanandum. The legal rule that US citizens who are 18 years old can vote in presidential elections helps explaining why Robin has a right to vote in the election (Enoch 2019; Rosen 2017); the (putative) moral principle that an act is right just in case it maximizes expected utility helps explaining why particular acts are right (cf. Berker 2019); the (putative) social rule that people with certain features count as having a particular gender helps explaining why particular persons have that gender (Àsta 2013; Haslanger 2012).

On a view of normative explanation that is both simple and attractive, particular normative facts are metaphysically grounded in part by the rules and principles that explain them, and in part by such other facts as these rules make reference to (see Enoch 2019; Rosen 2017; Schaffer 2019).

Yet the view that normative facts are metaphysically grounded in the rules and principles that explain them has been targeted by two powerful criticisms.

The first has the structure of a dilemma based on different possible interpretations of the principles' content. If principles are modelled as universally quantified (bi)conditionals, then they would be explained by their instances, rather than explaining them. If they instead have an explanatory content, then they would be explanatorily redundant.

The second problem is that it appears that some of the target normative facts can obtain at times/worlds at which the rules that should explain them do not exist, violating the synchronicity and world-boundedness of grounding (Epstein 2015).

To solve these problems, I develop a solution structured in two parts. First, I develop a novel account of principles that allows them both to have an explanatory content, and to play an explanatory role. Second, I explore and comparatively assess two conceptions of grounding, one that allows grounding to hold diachronically and/or transworldly, and another that preserves its standard features but appeals to presentist and/or actualist interpretations of the problematic cases.

Christias, Panagiotis - "Volksgeist" as legislator: from metaphysical entity to legal fiction

Concerning Edmund Burke's political science, Leo Strauss asserts, in his renowned masterpiece on "History and Natural Law", that Burke is the real founding father of the German historical school. In this communication, I will focus on the possible statuses of the "Volksgeist" as moral subject of the sovereignty and as legislator. I will discuss the texts of Carl von Savigny, and of his historical school of Law, in the light of his sources, like Endmund Burke, and of the "Methodenstreit" that followed him and opened the debate in sciences like political economy and sociology. If, as Cicero asserts, "Rome was not made neither in one day, nor by one person; if Burke argues that "Englishmen" founded their own constitution throughout their entire history, acting continuously as Aristotle's "sage"; if Savigny asks for the Law to be produced by the evolution of the "Volk" as a historical subject, then what is the ontological status of the "Volksgeist" as legislator? I will argue that there can be only two possible outcomes: either the "Volksgeist" is a narrative subjectivity (Ricoeur) created by the very fact of historical narrations of the creation of national political systems, like Cicero's account of the creation

of Rome, and of Burke's apology of the English system, following the model of the jurisprudence, against the "philosophers of Paris"; or, it is a "legal fiction", as Otto Weininger would argue. I would, ultimately, opt for the second.

Church, Ian - An Anthropological Challenge for Group Belief

For the indigenous Tukanoans of the Columbian Amazon the processing of manioc is a critically important part life. Manioc, as Joseph Henrich explains, is "a highly productive, starch-rich tuber that permitted relatively dense populations to inhabit drought-prone tropical environments" (2016, 97). The problem is that manioc can be toxic, if not prepared properly. But importantly, if you were starving in the Amazonian jungle and ate some raw manioc, it wouldn't have an immediate negative affect on you. The toxin takes a long time to build up (sometimes years!), and (if you didn't know that manioc was toxic) it would be extremely difficult to trace your symptoms back to the tuber. In order to survive in the Columbian Amazon, the Tukanoan people needed to know a good/safe way to prepare the manioc so as to somehow remove the toxin; without that starch-rich source of calories, it's not clear that there would have been enough food in that area to support any significant number of people. But, over generations, and without any individuals knowing about the toxicity of manioc, the Tukanoan people (as a group) cultivated that knowledge; they learned how to process manioc.

The above case is merely a representative example of a broad phenomena found in the anthropology literature where group beliefs are the product of cultural learning that is ultimately, to use Henrich's phrase, "causally opaque" to all the individuals involved. Of course, having an accurate understanding of group belief is important for discussions regarding social ontology and collective intentionality. And while we might very plausibly think that accounts of group belief should be deeply informed by the social sciences, the epistemological literature on group belief has, sadly, largely been done from the armchair. In this paper, I argue that prominent accounts of group belief in epistemology are unable to accommodate representative examples of cultural learning highlighted within the anthropology literature (like the Tukanoan case above). In §1, I briefly elucidate two seminal accounts of group belief: namely, (i) the joint acceptance account found Margaret Gilbert's On Social Facts (1989) and (ii) the premise-based aggregation account found in Philip Pettit's article, "Groups with Minds of Their Own" (2003). Then, in §2, I further highlight a representative example of cultural learning within anthropology, an example that clearly illustrates how culture (frequently) informs and underwrites beliefs (for both individuals and groups) in ways that are causally opaque to everyone involved. Finally, in §3, I'll unpack the subsequent challenge that I see unfolding from the anthropology literature while gesturing towards some new directions.

Collins, Stephanie - Legislative Intent: A Rational Unity Account

Most anglophone legal philosophers are fictionalists about legislative intentions: they believe the legislature is not the kind of entity that can intend to bring about particular results by passing laws. This orthodoxy follows a tradition that includes influential legal philosophers such as Ronald Dworkin and Jeremy Waldron. Yet this orthodoxy is counterintuitive, since it implies that the legislature does not intend, for example, to enhance public safety, reduce inequalities, or otherwise follow the 'policy program' of the government when it brings laws into existence.

Recently, some legal philosophers have started to challenge the orthodoxy. In his prominent 2013 book The Nature of Legislature Intent, Richard Ekins uses a model of collective intentions that is (we argue) poorly suited to the legislature: the model of Michael Bratman. This model requires legislators to have an unrealistically high level of consensus concerning the intended effects of any given law. Other legal philosophers (such as David Tan) have argued that the legislature's intention is simply the aggregate of the intentions of individual legislators – even though nothing in the legislature's

procedures gives this status to the aggregate of legislators' intentions, and even though legislators might have a high level of disagreement. The legislature is a highly combative and fragmented group agent; any account of its intentions must attend to this fact.

In this paper, we start by rejecting the above-described 'common intent' and 'aggregated intent' accounts of legislative intentions. In doing this, we build on recent anti-individualist work in social ontology, such as that of Brian Epstein, Kendy Hess, Frank Hindriks, and Carol Rovane.

We then develop and defend a new account of legislative intentions. We call this the 'rational unity account.' On this account, we do not take a 'time-slice' view of the legislature at the moment a law is passed, at which moment we look into legislators' heads to determine the intention of the group. Instead, we take seriously the idea that the legislature is a distinct agent with its own rational point of view. On our account, the legislature's intention for any given law is determined by how that law coheres with all the other propositions to which the legislature is committed. We argue that, roughly, the legislature is committed to a proposition if that proposition is either an existing law or is a document to which the legislature has given its assent (such as an explanatory memorandum, annual budget, or committee report). In developing our account, we draw on and adapt the group agency theories of Carol Rovane, Kendy Hess, Philip Pettit, and others. Finally, we use our account to explain various doctrines of common law, such as the doctrines of 'implied appeal' and 'harmonious construction.' The result is that recent work in social ontology can be applied to the legislature—and to legislation—in ways that have not yet been acknowledged.

Common discourse concerning groups, clubs, political parties, institutions, corporations, governments, countries, the public, etc. involves the seeming attribution to those entities of psychological attitudes such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Some of this talk is merely meant to summarize the attitudes of the individuals within the groups. And sometimes the attributions are merely metaphoric, perhaps a useful way of rendering the phenomena, but not to be taken literally.

Cooper, Rachel - Social Kind*: Joint Intentional Mechanistic Kinds

The notion of social construction is notoriously obscure, or at least was until recent years, when analytic philosophers decided to pin down its meanings. Many of said analytic philosophers are engaged in what are called debunking projects. Debunkers are particularly interested in kinds that appear natural, but may in fact be social, or else in kinds that are obviously social, but may in fact be social in a deeper sense than has previously been recognized. It is sometimes argued that the notion of social construction that is of most interest or use to the debunker is the one that denotes a relation of metaphysical dependence, namely that of social constitution. In this paper, I argue that the kinds of most interest to debunkers are those which feature in regularities in part due to the existence of a commitment to a particular ideology or an adoption of a particular conceptual schema. In other words, I argue that to isolate the phenomenon of primary interest to debunkers we ought not focus on relations of metaphysical dependence, but rather on locating and describing the relevant joint intentional mechanisms.

The aim of my project is to answer the following question: How can a kind that seems natural, be social? To answer this question, I use Gilbertian plural subjects of a particular sort to give an analysis of the subjects of conceptual schema/ideologies and then show how these relate to paradigmatically social kinds (e.g., race, gender, sex, disability, sexual orientation, and so on). Some novel features of the account I give of such kinds are that 1) I recommend moving away from the usual focus in the social construction literature on metaphysical explanation, or on relations of metaphysical dependence, and moving instead toward giving causal explanations, and 2) I stress the importance of plural subjects and intentionality. In particular, I suggest that Gilbertian plural subjects of a particular

sort figure in a mechanistic explanation of the regularities observed among members of paradigmatically social kinds. I argue that this relationship to social groups or Gilbertian plural subjects is what makes the kinds of interest distinctively social, rather than their being socially constituted. Although they may very well be partially socially constituted, I make a case for thinking that this is not what makes them social in the most important or especially interesting sense.

Costa, Jonas Faria - Gregariousness: The sociality we missed during lockdown

There is a difference between studying alone at home and studying in a café. However, studying in a café is not a joint action. Rather, it is an individual action performed in a shared environment. The café, with plenty of people minding their own business, is an example of what I call a gregarious state of affairs. There are many other examples of gregarious state of affairs, such as working out in a gym, going to the cinema, or studying in a library. This very light form of sociality is what we lacked during a lockdown. I will provide a provisional account of gregariousness, based on features of the environment and features of the agents. I will identify two main aspects: not being isolated and not involving symmetric attitudes. My goal is to show that there is more to sociality than just coordination and norms. The problem is that many theories we currently use in social ontology, more specifically on collective intentionality and joint action, cannot explain gregariousness. Most theories focus on coordination or the normative aspects of sociality. However, when we missed going to a cinema, we did not miss having the right to demand others to stay quiet. Norms are an important aspect of the social world, but we have forgotten the most fundamental: we do not like to live in isolation. Throughout the literature, it is common to come across the term "mere aggregation". We have been overlooking the gregarious aspects of aggregations. As I will argue, we cannot fully explain this gregarious state of affairs using only norms. Thus, concepts of joint commitment (Gilbert) or institutional facts (Searle) cannot grasp gregariousness. One way to explain studying in a cafe would be to affirm that we are "doing nothing together" (Velleman), and maybe use the concept of shared intention (Bratman) to explain what that amounts to. As I will show, it will only amount to a normative relation between the people in that environment, which fails to explain gregariousness. There is a positive aspect of being near others, and not just a norm not to bother each other. Another way to explain the café example, therefore, is by explaining what it means to share presence. This could be done using the concept of second-person standpoint (Darwall). As I will argue, if we keep focusing on the forensic aspects of sharing presence, we will fail to grasp gregariousness, which is the positive aspect of not being isolated. The concept that gets closer to explaining gregariousness would be the sense of us (Zahavi), but, as I will argue, we would need to weaken it, since the "us" in a café is different from the "us" in a football team. My aim is not to argue that these theories are wrong, nor to provide a fully-fledged theory of gregariousness. My aim is to draw attention to this neglected aspect of the social world.

Crespo, Ricardo - The Ontology of Macroeconomic Entities

The aim of this paper is to discern the ontological condition of macroeconomic entities. The first section will introduce the definitions and differences between micro and macroeconomics. The second section will present the Microfoundations Program and its core tool, the "Representative Agent." It will show the problems of this approach: technical problems related to aggregation and with restrictions imposed to the utility functions, problems with the notion of representative agent used (the conventional economic utility-maximizing agent), the loss of the richness of heterogeneity (Arrow 1986: 390), and finally "deep" economic problems remarked by Alan Kirman (1992). The third section will present a thesis about the nature of the economic agent. This step is relevant because it will confirm from an ontological analysis the impossibility of considering a representative agent.

The fourth section will tackle the ontological nature of macroeconomic entities. It will consider the notions of supervenience and emergence applied to them, it will describe John Maynard Keynes's position, and will finally explain Aristotle's theory of wholes applying it to the paper´s topic. Finally, a short conclusion will wrap up the paper. The substantial entities implied in the macroeconomy are individuals and other substantial things that generate or influence macroeconomic entities. These entities originate in Coleman (1990: 28) expression a "system level" that exists as a net of properties of individual and other substantial relevant things and relations between them. It is in this sense that the system has a behaviour: the economy, the GDP, the demand for money, or employment grows or not. Macroeconomy is not a substantial reality, a "big thing", but a system of interactions that has a proper "life".

Daum-Avital, Liora, & Ofer Azar - Courtesy versus efficiency: Personal gifts and monetary gifts – Preferences and norms in the Israeli society

We analyze gift-giving and gift-receiving in the Israeli society. We examine the behavior and norms that Israelis adopt for ceremonial occasions such as weddings, Bar/Bat Mitzvah, birth celebrations and birthdays, in order to understand the abandonment of personal gifts and the embracing of monetary gifts instead. An online survey was sent to a diverse sample of participants all over Israel. The results show that there is a rejection of personal gifts and a preference for monetary gifts.

Most invitations to attend events are accepted (77% - 81% on average) and the average respondent attends every year more than five birthday parties and over eight other events (weddings, Bar/Bat Mitzvah and birth celebrations). These results reinforce the premise that events and gift-giving are tools that are important in societal life as they reinforce the bonds between people.

As expected, all respondents believed that gifts should be given when attending an event. Israelis show a major preference for monetary gifts. Good gifts come in the form of money while bad gifts are those that are personal and non-monetary. The only exception to this rule was birthday presents. What respondents perceived as appropriate was also what they thought would be more welcomed, and what they themselves desired as gifts when they were in the gift-receiving situation. Only 1% of the respondents believed that gift-receivers would enjoy getting a personal gift for a wedding, compared to 68.2 % at birthday celebrations. The strong tendency to give monetary gifts in weddings supports the idea that the guest feels obliged to consider the hosts' financial costs of organizing the event, and help them with this financial burden when choosing his gift.

This new norm of monetary gifts, where hiding the true cost of the gift is impossible (unlike in personal gifts), turned out to be a burden to 39.5% of the respondents, who reported that they at least sometimes declined invitations not because of unwillingness to go, but because of what was expected of them in terms of a gift to their host. This shows that in the Israeli society today, some key elements and notions of gift-giving, such as its power to create societal bonds, have been trespassed due to the financial aspect of gift-giving.

In Israel there is no gift list, which puts the guests in a situation where they are supposed to guess what would be appreciated as a gift. Consequently, buying personal gifts is perceived as an annoying and uncomfortable experience. Most Israelis are not interested in either buying or receiving personal gifts (other than in birthdays).

Compared to monetary gifts, personal gifts are perceived as more personal and having a sentimental value, but also as more disrespectful, cheap, inappropriate and unappreciated, and less practical and functional. The negative associations of a personal gift are surprising given that etiquette sources

consider the personal gift as the most considerate and personal, and that buying a personal gift requires more effort than giving cash or a check.

Davies, Jacqueline - Tensions in Teaching Relational Social Ontology in an Introductory Moral Issues Course

Introductory level "Applied Ethics," or "Moral Issues" courses developed in theoretical and pedagogical contexts that tend to distort or undermine adequate engagement with culturally marginalized ways of knowing and practicing ethics. Simply including them in the syllabus runs the risk of seriously distorting them and producing false confidence among students that they know anything about non-canonical ethical praxes. The cultural dominance of individualist social ontology has shaped theory and pedagogy in ways that much better suit the teaching of canonical European ethical theories, e.g., utilitarianism and Kantian deontology. How then can the praxes of culturally non-dominant relational social ontologies be introduced to students of "Applied Ethics" at the introductory level? Is this a project that should be undertaken?

An underlying premise of "Applied Ethics" is that diverse moral philosophies can be reduced to principles that can be applied to selected moral problems—hypothetical cases or controversies in the news. The demand made of students is to correctly grasp the principle and to recognize the relevant features of hypothetical or real-life cases to which the principles can be applied. Some space is left in this approach for individual students to evaluate and choose the principles that they think are best. Students have a high expectation that teachers will present moral theories in unbiased ways and not try to affect change in their commitments. By contrast ethical praxes that coincide with relational social ontologies depend on sustaining good relations not simply amongst those featured in the problem case but also with those who claim insight into them—the kind of insight one hopes a student of ethics could develop.

Epistemically and ethically adequate understanding of culturally specific relational social ontologies depends on real relationship with those who have insider knowledge of these specific ontologies. This demands reflexive awareness of the social situatedness of the instructor and students, pedagogical humility, and openness to being affected, and mindfully responsible efforts to affect others. I discuss the challenges and motivation for introducing first year philosophy students in a North American university to ethical praxes that presuppose culturally non-dominant relational social ontologies: Anishinaabe teachings, Ubuntu, Mahayana Buddhism, and Feminist Ethics of Care. The decision to include two canonical favourites of European and settler colonial philosophy (Utilitarianism and Kantian deontology) is also considered.

De Haan, Niels - Group Agents, Moral Competence and Duty-bearers: The Update Argument

Various collectivists argue that certain groups can be morally responsible in their own right. Typically, what underlies these judgments is the view that these groups qualify as agents. But collectivists differ in their view which groups exactly qualify as agents. Procedural collectivists explicate group agency in terms of an accepted collective decision-making procedure that enables the group robustly to identify and pursue representational and motivational attitudes while satisfying desiderata of rationality (Collins 2019; Copp 2006; French 1984; Hess 2014; Hindriks 2018; Lawford-Smith 2015; List and Pettit 2011), thereby restricting the notion to organized groups such as states, corporations, and universities. We-mode collectivists expand the notion of group agency to organized groups and unorganized groups (lacking decision-making procedures) that operate in the so-called we-mode (Tuomela 2013). Plural subject collectivists hold that almost any instance of plural action involves a plural subject, as long as the members are unified in a certain way (Gilbert 2014; Schmid 2018). I call

these unorganized groups without decision-making procedures that coalesce around goals purposive groups (e.g., two people walking together, a riot mob, the pro-life lobby). Collectivists all claim that 'their' group agents can bear moral duties (Collins 2019; Copp 2006; Gilbert 2014; Gilbert & Priest 2020; Schmid 2018; Tuomela and Mäkelä 2016 & 2020). However, little attention has been paid as to whether all 'their' group agents qualify as duty-bearers. In this paper, I argue that purposive groups do not qualify as duty-bearers even if they qualify as agents on either plural-subject- or we-mode-collectivism.

First, I develop the Update Argument. An agent is a duty-bearer only if the agent is morally competent, which requires the agent to have (i) moral understanding and (ii) the ability to control her behavior in light of her moral understanding. I argue that an agent has (ii) only if the agent has a sufficient degree of positive and negative control over updating her goal-seeking states in light of her moral understanding. To update a goal-seeking state means to either stop the intention or to change the intention from X to Y. An agent has full negative control over her goal-seeking states if and only if no other agent has the capacity to arbitrarily decisively interfere with forming and updating her goal-seeking states. Lacking negative control implies the presence of manipulation, as another agent can be decisive with respect to one's goal-seeking states. It is unfair to hold an agent to moral requirements when it is not up to the agent whether she acts in accordance with such requirements.

Next, I apply the Update Argument to we-mode- and plural-subject-collectivism. I argue that (Gilbert's) plural subjects necessarily lack negative control over stopping their goal-seeking states once a joint commitment is in place. And I argue that purposive we-mode groups necessarily lack negative control over changing their goal-seeking states. Thus, purposive groups necessarily lack moral competence. This creates a cut-off point for groups as duty-bearers: Organized groups may qualify as duty-bearers, whereas purposive groups cannot qualify as duty-bearers.

Di Feo, Marco - The Normative Weaving of Collective Subjects

Different types of human collective subjects have different types of structures, on which different normative plots depend. The latter organize the collective life. Structure determines the roles of the parties and organization governs them, so that they perform their functions jointly. The purpose of this contribution is to present the essential dynamics that generate this normative plot. In the contemporary debate, the analysis of top-down normativity (laws, rules, social norms, etc.), with which the community governs the interactions between its members, prevails. Following of Conte's phenomenology (1983) and Searle's analyses (1995. 20109), we can define this type of obligations as "constitutive rules". They create certain social contexts and define the conditions of belonging and participation of those who intend to act and interact in them. These are therefore norms that are realized upstream of human relationships and that affect them from above. In particular, we find this type of regulatory structuring in social contexts that require a complex bureaucratic and institutional organization. Alongside this fundamental dimension, this contribution also intends to enhance another normative dimension, which has a different genesis and ontological development. This is the bottom-up normative dimension, which spontaneously arises within human relationships (affective, sentimental, friendly, etc.). It contributes to the ontological constitution of many types of collective subjects (couples, families, clans, etc.), which have their own unitary agency, without having to structure themselves from a legal and institutional point of view. Interpersonal relationships begin to play this constituent role to the extent that they allow to performance certain types of performative and declarative social acts (Austin, 1962; Conte, 2002), which have the deontic power (Searle, 2010) to establish mutual obligations and bonds (Reinach, 1913). In the bottom-up perspective, interpersonal bonds and certain types of spontaneous acts can play a fundamental role in the constitution of higher orders of social unity. Phenomenological analysis shows the genetic and

functional difference of the bonds that are generated in this dimension. Unlike the constitutive rules, they are configured as "constituent rules" that generate their contexts in the variable and creative spontaneity of human relationships. In the overall weaving of society, bottom-up and top-down normativity meet, intertwine and stratify, in a continuous tension. The task of this contribution is also to analyze the essential dynamics of this interaction, on which the constitution of our social world and its qualitative ontology depend.

Di Lucia, Paolo & Lorenzo Passerini Glazel - Deontic States-of-Affairs: An Ontological Turn in the Semiotics of Norms

During the 20th century, the development of semiotics had a great impact on the philosophical investigations of social normative phenomena, particularly in legal philosophy. The analysis of normative language became the prevalent methodological approach among many legal philosophers, and the science of law was frequently understood as an analysis of the normative sentences issued by legal authorities (see, for instance, the pioneering works by Felix Oppenheim, Norberto Bobbio and Uberto Scarpelli). This approach led to the development of a merely linguistic conception of norms and to a semiotic theory of their validity: if norms are conceived as linguistic entities, their validity — often identified with their specific mode of existence — is accordingly conceived as a predicate of normative sentences. Within such a context, the idea that norms can also have an existence as social entities independently of their linguistic formulations was considered by some an unacceptable metaphysical hypostatization.

However, the resort to the fruitful tools of semiotic analysis in the investigation of normative phenomena does not necessarily imply the adoption of an exclusively linguistic conception of norms. The examples of sortal incorrectness examined by Amedeo G. Conte (1970, 1974, 2006) — norms, not sentences, can be infringed, or repealed — show that the search for the referents of the word 'norm' must go beyond the realm of linguistic entities. Among the entities to which the word 'norm' may refer, we focus on "deontic states-of-affairs", which are understood by Conte as the deontic análoga of facts or ontic states-of-affairs.

The introduction of the notion of deontic states-of-affairs, which was fostered by some of the implications of the theory of performatives, marks an ontological turn in the semiotic analysis of normative phenomena. However, even if many deontic states-of-affairs — especially in the domain of law — are created by specific normative speech acts, many others are not. It is thus necessary to distinguish thetic and athetic deontic states-of-affairs, the former being created by specific norm-creating acts, the latter, of which customary norms are a paradigmatic example, emerging within a society independently of language and norm-creating acts.

In our presentation we investigate, on the one hand, the implications of the notion of deontic states-of-affairs for a theory of the existence and validity of norms as social entities, and wonder, on the other hand, whether validity can still be considered — in the wake of the well-known definition by Hans Kelsen (1934; 1960) — the specific mode of existence of norms when informal and asystemic forms of normativity are taken into account.

Diaz-Leon, Esa - On two ways of ameliorating a concept

In this talk I want to introduce and develop an important and so-far neglected distinction between two ways of ameliorating a concept, that is, two ways of revising or changing the meaning of a term or the concept associated with the term, for moral or political reasons. On the one hand, there is the project of revising the information we associate with the term and which helps to fix the referent of the term. This information can be understood in terms of inferential patterns or descriptions

associated with the term or, more in general, as the application conditions associated with the term. The application conditions are the conditions (which can be ether sufficient conditions, necessary conditions, or both necessary and sufficient) that it would take for something to fall under the term. On the other hand, there is the project of changing the referent directly. In this talk, I will discuss several examples of terms where it is politically useful to appeal to the distinction between changing the application conditions vs. changing the referent. For example, in the case of 'race', it might be politically useful to change the application conditions of 'race' so that certain kinds such as socially constructed properties are no longer ruled out as possible referents. On the other hand, some ameliorative projects give direct arguments for the term 'race' to refer to socially constructed properties. One of the main upshots of my argument is that there are two important, politically significant ways of contesting and ameliorating the meaning of a term: by means of revising the information associated with the term, vs. by means of replacing the referent with another.

Dünckmann, Florian - Why space matters: Social Ontology and Geography

It is one core assumption of my native discipline Human Geography that all actors are ultimately embodied i.e. bound in time and space. Therefore, in my contribution, I'd like to reflect on the role(s) that embodiment and spatiality can/should play in the field of Social Ontology.

There are two distinct directions in which the relation between collective intentionality and space can be conceptualized: Firstly, one can analyze the way that geography, i.e. the delimitation and categorization of physical space, is shaped by phenomena of collective intentionality like shared beliefs, joint attention, or shared responsibilities. Let's take the difference between regions (like the Alps or Skandinavia) and territories (like nation states). While both spatial types are socially constructed – in that they depend on the acceptance of many –, regions can be understood to arise from common acceptances. The idea of territories (especially nation states), on the other hand, in addition depends on a group of individuals that think and act in a we-mode – however indirect and contradictory it might be – and their joint belief in the specific relation between them and the particular part of earth's surface. Spatial categories are not only the content of collective intentional states but are also often at the root of the definition of these very groups.

This leads to the second direction, in which collective intentionality and space can be conceptualized: In which way is the spatiality and the embodiment of those who 'hold' intentional states relevant for the questions of Social Ontology? Looking at the contributions made so far in this field of inquiry, individuals and groups seem to 'hang in the air', i.e. they are bodiless and not located in space. What essentially is different when we instead talk of bodies that occupy space? In my contribution, I'd like to discuss different modes/functions that spatiality can play in collective intentionality, like space being a specific medium of jointness or the question of spatial responsibility.

Lastly, I'd like to show how insights from Social Ontology might help to analyze applied research questions that arise in the field of spatial planning: In a research project about civic engagement in rural villages we applied an explanatory model that was based on the logic of joint commitments. This model could explain certain characteristics of voluntary work in a much better way than the assumption that people act out of their individual responsibility for the community.

Duvarci, Yaren - Virtues of Social Construction as Grounding

Within the feminist framework of gender, there is a major agreement: Gender is socially constructed. While there is agreement that gender is socially constructed, it is less clear how social construction works. To explain how social construction works, and what it is to be socially constructed, some metaphysicians including Schaffer, Griffith and Epstein offer an account of social construction based

on grounding. Since social construction as grounding (SCG) is a general metaphysical issue, it also states that the social construction of gender can be explained with the grounding framework.

Schaffer (2017) and Griffith (2018) applies SCG to gender in their respective papers. However, this framework was criticized by Barnes and Mikkola with the concern that the grounding accounts of gender cannot adequately represent the debates in the literature over what gender is. I argue that social construction as grounding is, in fact, beneficial considering feminist aims since SCG accounts of gender do not attempt to define what is "woman", "man", "non-binary", etc. I argue that it is better to ask the question "What grounds gender?" than the question "What is gender?" for feminist aims. The first question helps us find the relevant social patterns that ground the fact "S is a woman", identify those patterns, and at the end eliminate them; whereas the latter question might privilege some women and marginalize others by defining what is "woman". I argue that what is seen as a flaw of the SCG account is actually one of its benefits, and if we accept the SCG framework applied to gender, what is known as "the normativity problem" does not become a challenge anymore.

Eigner, Michael - Illegitimate but rational. Organizational roles and the fitness of individuals to be held responsible for their actions.

Contemporary views on organizations and their structures link the success of such an entity to the legitimacy of norms within the organization. Cristina Bicchieri (2006) states that people care about their personal values and norms as well as the actions and goals of organizations and the effect of the organization on the outside world. An incongruence between those eradicates the legitimacy people ascribe to an organization's actions, which can, in turn, lead to an increase in non-compliance by their members. Such a "corporate akrasia" (Pettit 2003) is assumed to be an irregular, negative state, which needs to be changed by either the organizational or behavioural route (see List and Pettit 2011). The problem with this view, I shall argue, is that people do not act as private individuals in their organization (see Herzog 2018, 11), but take up an organizational role, adapt to social norms and social practices and express role-congruent behaviour. They take up the coat of their organizational role and wear it in relation to that function. I claim that actions by an organization or by people with an organizational role are accepted by members as legitimate if the source of legitimacy springs from the (1) organizational culture, (2) the role-specific duties, or through the (3) organization's context. These 3 potential sources of legitimacy help individuals justify actions within their organization, without needing to resolve the issue of value incongruence between individuals and organizations. Such an approach allows for people to have different attitudes in multiple contexts. My findings also have implications for the normative status of actions within organizations, as the fitness of individuals to be held responsible is diminished by these sources of legitimacy.The paper begins by explaining the theoretical background of decision-making processes in organizations. In section 2 I adapt Frank Hindrik's equilibria approach to social practices to organizations. I then show in the next section the problem of corporate akrasia and explain the 3 sources of legitimacy. In the 4th section, I evaluate the fitness to be held responsible of members of organizations and discuss a possible way to eliminate these 3 sources.

Emilio, Marco - Conflict, Trust-Building, and Cooperation

Recent investigations on joint action show growing interest in overcoming the apparent dichotomy between cooperation and competition that, according to D. Schweikard and other authors, seems to prevail in some current debates.

This tendency can be related to a few outcomes of empirical and applied research on the dynamic character of cooperative processes. Regarding the investigation on human evolution, the interplay between inter-communal conflict and cooperation has often been considered a critical factor in

supporting the development of individual and collective social skills. Moreover, some researchers in experimental psychology have highlighted that many social contexts require competing while cooperating with the same target and have speculated that such "co-opetition" situations constitute conflicting expectations that lead to flexible and interdependent behaviours among individuals. In addition, conflict management literature has stressed that resolving conflicts demands trust between conflicting parties, implicitly indicating that trust can be intentionally pursued to develop persistent collaboration.

According to these observations, investigating the intentional structure of trust-building actions in the emergence of cooperation among competing players may be relevant to broadening the current understanding of cooperation.

However, the intentional elicitation of trust in overcoming conflicts is elusive, and it seems to involve nested intentionality among different players, making it a complex subject to investigate. Nonetheless, examining trust can shed light on how the relation between co-intenders in a joint action involves cognitive, normative, and affective components, as H.B. Schmid has suggested. The composite structure of the issue requires the intertwining of philosophical investigations on joint actions and trust, which have not often systematically dialogued with each other.

This paper aims to sketch an examination of the intentional structure of trust-building actions among competitors. Starting from R. Tuomela's view of cooperation, I will argue that an overall image of what cooperation is should consider the (potential or actual) "conflicting background" from which it emerges, often through trust-building actions.

Pursuing this general goal, (1) I will start by analysing some current philosophic accounts of trust and relate them to Raimo and Maj Tuomela's understanding of trust within the framework of I-mode, pro-group and we-mode cooperation. (2) Hence, I will scrutinise some cases of conflicts related to managing the particularly challenging common-pool resource of fish stock. Due to its configuration, the communitarian governance of this natural asset is notably complex, and many competitions tend to arise among different actors. On an empirical level of analysis, overcoming conflicts in this context implies building trust among rival players, third-party mediators, and public institutions. At the same time, it requires defining rules perceived as legitimate and fair by all conflict parties. (3) In a third step, drawing on the contribution of Daniel Attas in the field of political philosophy, I will sketch an analysis of the intentional structure of trust-building joint actions, underlying some questions concerning vulnerability, fairness, and reciprocity. (4) Therefore, I will elaborate on what this examination of trust-building activities entails for a comprehensive view of the emergence of cooperation from conflict. I will develop the idea that trust's intentional promotion (and maintenance) is necessary to build robust cooperation. However, different trust-building approaches (e.g., "realistic" or "communication-based") lead to diverse outcomes in terms of trust and cooperation. (5) As a last step, I will outline some open questions regarding agency transformation, the notion of salience, and implicit coordination as discussed within the current debate on cooperative joint action.

Epstein, Brian - The metaphysics of marriage: Understanding families of social kinds

It has long been known that varieties of marriage vary enormously among cultures. Anthropologists and philosophers have long debated the "definition" and/or "core" of marriage, and definitions of marriage have long been central to policy debates. It is often unclear, however, just what the target is of definitions or analyses of marriage. In some domains, what seems to be sought is a general definition meant to apply to all marriages. Certain anthropologists studying marriage cross-culturally, for instance, look for common features that apply to all marriages, such as the recognition of legitimacy of offspring, the possession of rights to sexual exclusivity (e.g., Leach 1955, Gough 1959,

Goodenough 1970, Collier 1988, Bell 1997). Likewise, some philosophers analyzing marriage seek general features, typically some set of rights and obligations (e.g., Searle 1995, Nolan forthcoming). Others seem to be talking about marriage at an intermediate level, such as contemporary western marriage (Wedgewood 1999, Brake 2012).Yet other discussions of marriage seek to analyze very particular institutions, such as US Federal marriage between 1996 and 2015 (i.e., between the passage of DOMA and the Supreme Court ruling on Obergefell), or Massachusetts marriage in 2022. Some philosophical claims turn on the contrast between different degrees of generality (e.g., the debate between Richard 2020 and Ludwig 2020, where Ludwig argues that Richard's argument for reference-change equivocates between such degrees). How are we to understand the vast family of marriage-kinds? What is the relation among them, and how should we approach their interrelated real definitions?

I argue that standard treatments of kind hierarchies (like genus-species, determinable-determinate, and role-realizer) do not work for marriage-kinds. I give two arguments against both a genus-species and determinable-determinate understanding of hierarchies of marriage kinds. First is a modal argument. In general, determinables of a determinate are not limited to those found in the actual world: a shade of blue that does not actually occur in the world (that is, a merely possible shade of blue) is nonetheless a shade of blue. By contrast, a couple cannot be married in virtue of a merely possible institution. (A similar point can be made about genera and species). In other words, the modal profile of marriage at different levels of the hierarchy is unlike the modal profile of determinables and their determinates. Second is a mismatch argument: with determinables and determinates (and likewise with genera and species), every member of a determinate (or species) must also be a member of the determinable (or genus). This is not the case for marriage, where for instance one can be Massachusetts-married and yet not US-Federally-married. I discuss cases under DOMA where this is an explicit feature of the law. I also discuss shortcomings of a role-realizer analysis of marriage hierarchies. One issue is that this analysis is not amenable to multi-level hierarchies, so do not apply in a reasonable way to the hierarchy of marriage-kinds; the other is that none of the marriage-kinds (even the more general ones) is a good candidate for a role-kind.

Instead, I explore how marriage-kinds are anchored (i.e., metaphysically generated) to develop an account of what these kinds are and how they are related to one another. This inquiry has implications for understanding kinds more generally, and also for practical and policy work on marriage.

Faller, August - Import-Export Rules for Social Kinds

Some perfidious acts are war crimes. They are war crimes because the Geneva Conventions ruled so. But consider perfidious acts committed before the Geneva Conventions: were some of those war crimes as well, or are they "grandfathered" into the realm of legal acts? Further, what if the Geneva Conventions had left out perfidy completely? Would some perfidious acts still be war crimes?

These questions relate to the importing and exporting of social kinds to different times and places. Famously, Bruno Latour rejected the importing and exporting of many kinds, including diseases, arguing that even scientific kinds are socially constructed and do not exist outside of their social context. At the other extreme, Brian Epstein and Jonathan Schaffer have recently argued that all social kinds, including the kind "war criminal", export to any time or world, even if the social conditions that gave rise to the kind do not exist then or there.

In this paper I argue against each of these positions. Part of the argument rejects Latour's contention that no social kind can exist outside of its milieu through a comparison of social and natural kinds. Another part of the argument rejects Epstein and Schaffer's contention that institutional kinds like "war criminal" apply before they have been instituted (or at worlds in which they were never

instituted). In the process, I explore the relationship between the exportation of social kinds and the emic-etic distinction in anthropological field research. I argue that uses of this distinction in field research rarely track the metaphysical issue of import-export, but instead track either epistemic or ethical concerns.

This work is significant for at least two reasons. First, Epstein uses exportation to distinguish the relation of anchoring from metaphysical grounding. If neither grounding nor anchoring export, then exportation can't be used to distinguish them, as Epstein argues. Second, rejecting exportation has consequences for how social groups and artifacts persist. By rejecting exportation, we require the relevant social conditions (or historical basis) for a social kind to persist.

Felder, Francesca - Demarginalizing the Metaphysics of Intersectionality

Among many things, intersectionality is an antidote to white feminism. Yet, prominent works of recent feminist philosophy still employ an analytical framework that centers the oppression of cis-, straight, able-bodied, wealthy, white women (Berenstain, 2019, 2020). Translating Kimberlé Crenshaw's metaphor of intersecting axes of oppression into metaphysical terms could help philosophers center the experiences of multiply-marginalized groups. Sara Bernstein provides such a metaphysical account based on the standard view of intersectionality (Bernstein, 2020). While her account is promising, the standard view of intersectionality she models mischaracterizes the problem that intersectionality ought to address. As a result, her account of general categories, such as women, doesn't address how the experiences of one intersectional group ought to bear on another. After giving my own interpretation of Crenshaw's intersectionality, I give two interpretations of Bernstein's argument, one problematic and one promising. I then build upon the promising aspects of Bernstein's metaphysics to revise our notions of general categories as affirming differences among intersectional kinds.

Ferguson, Magnus - Does Forward Looking, Collective Responsibility Have an Accountability Problem?

My paper intervenes on an ongoing scholarly debate over how to best hold individuals accountable for their forward looking, collective responsibilities (herafter FLCR). On one side, Iris Marion Young and others have argued that it is unproductive to employ practices of blame against individuals who shirk their FLCR to respond to structural injustices (Goodin 1998; Young 2006, 2011; Zheng 2018, 2019). On the other side (and in response to growing interest in foregrounding FLCR over other forms of responsibility), a number of scholars have raised concerns that a blame-immune concept of FLCR is idealistic and unenforceable (Nussbaum 2011; Barry and Ferracioli 2013; Beck 2020). This debate raises important questions about the nature and scope of FLCRs, as well as practical issues over how to hold individuals accountable for their shared responsibilities to respond to structural or otherwise morally diffused injustices.

I argue that the 'accountability problem' of FLCR is overinflated because both sides of the debate talk past one another. To make this argument, I clarify what it means to 'shirk' an FLCR in order to show that there are different definitions of 'shirking' operative in opposing accounts. More specifically, Young et al claim that it is excessive to blame individuals who fail to discharge their FLCRs, while Nussbaum et al worry that it is excessively permissive to refrain from blaming individuals who fail to shoulder their FLCRs. Distinguishing between these different forms of shirking reveals that the two sides of the debate are compatible in principle – one can oppose blaming individuals who fail to discharge their FLCRs, while at the same time endorsing certain practices of blame (for example, judgments of moral laxity) for individuals who consistently fail to shoulder their FLCRs.

At bottom, my argument is that FLCR is best understood as an imperfect duty. FLCRs afford a great deal of discretion to the individuals who share them, but also open those individuals to judgments of moral laxity in the case of repeated failures to shoulder. In the context of FLCR, judgments of moral laxity can concern the extent to which an individual pursues her multiple FLCRs, the specific FLCRs that an individual prioritizes over others, and patterns of behavior that undermine collective efforts. Still, judgments of moral laxity need to be sensitive to concerns about overburdening, since it is practically impossible for individuals to shoulder all of their FLCRs. Moreover, such judgments also need to incorporate the social situatedness of the individuals in question, since various forms of social, political, and economic oppression can restrict one's capacities to participate in collective action. I conclude the paper by highlighting several challenges that arise when applying the 'ought implies can' principle to FLCR.

Fielding, Rachael - How the Coronavirus Pandemic Highlights Further Barriers to the Equal Division of Domestic Labour between Men and Women

This paper discusses recent developments and insights regarding the social structures of the household and the gendered distribution of domestic labour. It is important to note that although there is now a fantastic variation on what society considers a 'family', this essay focuses on a heterosexual narrative. I argue that the Coronavirus pandemic has highlighted significant problems with the equal division of domestic labour between men and women. With changes such as working from home being enforced through lockdown, many households have experienced a shift in their usual patterns of cooking, cleaning, childcare and more, and it seems that gender plays a significant role in the ways these changes have occurred.

Whilst on the surface it seems that this shift has caused many men to contribute more towards the traditionally female household domestic labour tasks, research suggests that even when men believe they are doing an equal share of the work to their partners, it is still the women that perform the majority of such tasks. Therefore, I believe that this demonstrates epistemic barriers for men in understanding the full extent of domestic labour. Whilst these barriers exist, it will be difficult to truly divide domestic labour equally, as men and women have an asymmetrical idea of what equal distribution entails; women still end up with more of the workload, even when men think the distribution is equal.

In addition to this, there are conceptual problems with domestic labour, with men dominantly perceiving such tasks as a woman's duty, and their own contributions as 'helping' women with this work. I argue that this will perpetuate inequality between men and women, and that in order to avoid this problem, we must be able to change our concept of domestic labour to one where both men and women equally see this as their duty and responsibility. Furthermore, it is important to clarify that equal distribution of domestic labour tasks not only involves sharing the time taken on such tasks, but also a fair balance of the mental and emotional strain that these tasks involve; research suggests that generally even when men contribute equal amounts of time to their partners, they are often doing work such as cooking and playing with children, which are perceived as the easier and more 'fun' tasks. As such, I argue that the mental and emotional strain of a task must also be factored into the ways that domestic labour is divided by men and women, in order for it to be considered truly equal.

Filipe, Rui -   A Fetish for all Economies – what Rubin and Lukács can teach about Marx and Political Economy

Commodity fetishism in Marx's Das Kapital has been the subject of a many discussions. This is in great part due to its structure . By showing an inversion where "a definite social relation between men, that assumes, in their eyes, the fantastic form of a relation between things", Marx presented us an

instrument that is easily applied in other spheres of reality and enabled a critic of the Political Economy of his time.

On one hand, we see a plethora of authors who, by seeing Marx more as an inspiration for original thought than someone to be read in an orthodox manner, discovered similar processes of inversion in innumerable sections of society. On the other hand, we see the element that allows Marx to make a Critic of Political Economy and not a criticized Political Economy.

However, while valuing these perspectives as important contributions to fetishism, I intend to further its reading and show how it points to deeper ontological consequences. To achieve this goal the works of Lukács and Isaak Rubin will play an essential role. Continuing Marx's thought, both of these authors show how fetishism is not only concerned with the theoretical attitude that a specific subject can have towards reality, but that it connects itself to an ontological affirmation were that reality is shaped by the way in which humans construct their environment.

Starting with Lukács, I will display how in his concept of reification the inversion refereed by Marx happens when reality itself is molded by a commodity society so that "man's own activity, his own labour becomes something objective and independent of him, something that controls him". In other words, man's own activity in capitalism transforms the way in which the products of this activity appear in their objective form.

And, even being an earlier writer than Lukács, Rubin's analysis can easily be his follow up. With the reified world of capitalism in the background, Rubin shows how a commodity society is one in which the product of man's activity finds its preferential form in value. And so, Political Economy, and even Economics, when focused primarily in value dependent phenomena, can only exist and are a product of a commodity society (a view that is rarely discussed in economical researches).

As a final moment, I will point out two important consequences. First, that when talking about objective social facts, we have to understand how human activity not only makes different products, but also that it shapes the objective form in which these products appear. Following this idea, a second, and more important, conclusion is that any economic understanding of reality cannot simply be a technical analysis of resource allocation or something similar. Instead, it should also have a sociological basis to ground the manner economical activity comes forth. Only after this can we have a picture were we understand not only economical phenomena where there they appear, but also deduce the inner logic in which we can conceive them fully.

Fletcher, Jade - Realism and Debunking about Social Kinds

Debates about realism and anti-realism in social metaphysics persist. Often, conceptions of realism stated in terms of mind-independence tend to rule out social kinds as being really real. Indeed, there has been a persistent theme to lump social constructionist theories together with untenable versions of anti-realism, where everything collapses into language, text, or discourse. Broadly, social constructionists believe that human belief and action plays a (causal or constitutive) role in creating social realities. A significant focus of social constructionist theories of social kinds like genders, races, and disability has been to show that the widely held beliefs about the nature of these kinds are significantly in error. What we thought were natural and biological features of reality are really created and sustained by human activity. Call this debunking social constructionism. Recently, there has been a lot of push back by social metaphysicians to anti-realist readings of social constructionism. For example, Haslanger and Barnes have both argued that the social structures which give rise to these social kinds are 'joints in (social) reality'. Defending the reality of a social kind then becomes a matter of showing that it is sufficiently objective, that it is causally efficacious, or perhaps deflating the

distinction between the natural and the social. One way to construe this push back is as a call to expand our understanding of 'realism' when applied to social kinds.

This paper aims to articulate an often-ignored conception of realism which does justice to the core theoretical purpose of debunking social constructionism: for the debunking social constructionist, inquiry is a matter of substantive and contingent discovery. In various forms, Wright, Thomasson, and Pettit have all proposed epistemic conceptions of realism. Whilst details vary, the core insight is that realism should be characterised by the possibility of substantive error. For the realist, the search for truth is a matter of discovery not invention, and success is not guaranteed. To be a realist about a domain is to contend with the possibility of our own ignorance. You might have thought that when social constructionists show that some kind is an essentially social kind, rather than a natural one, this deflates the status of that kind from being a real part of reality to being a mere shadow of our beliefs and practices. However, a better lesson to learn from such debunking is that inquirers must wade through ideology to make contact with their subject of discovery. Whilst social kinds may indeed be a product of human activity, they are not mere shadows and epistemic success is not guaranteed. This captures the required kind of autonomy that social kinds have from our mental lives: we can be fairly reliable when deploying social kind terms, but be deeply mislead about the nature of their referents. Thinking about realism in the way I suggest will shed light on the aptness of the debunker's methodology and provide a novel and interesting sense in which social kinds are really real.

Franda, Francesco - Construction and Value-ladeness in the Making of Social Kinds

It is often remarked that social sciences, more than other kinds of sciences, are value-laden. In particular, social kinds, which are the object of scientific investigation, turn out to be in several cases value-laden. However, what does it mean exactly for social kinds to be value-laden? This paper analyses the role that moral and practical values play in the making of social kinds. I argue that what I call "natural boundaries realism" (NBR), the view according to which at least certain social kinds are not constructed, is inadequate to accommodate the role of values in the making of social kinds, and that only a constructive account is compatible with value-ladeness.

Here is how the paper is structured. I first clarify what kinds of values we are concerned with and show why value-ladeness matters, as it concerns the debate over the objectivity of the social sciences. I then show that the first way in which values come into play is in that many social kinds are value-laden themselves, namely they are associated with properties of normative nature. In this sense, they are parallel to thick concepts in metaethics. I give examples of value-laden kinds from the literature and show that constructivists need not be realist about values, unlike NBR, that need to be realist about values or deny the existence of value-laden social kinds. The other way in which normativity comes into play is when certain decisions of normative nature must be made when it comes to trace the boundaries of the kind. I highlight how from the fact that the decisions are of normative nature does not imply that the social kinds themselves are value-laden. Again, NBR cannot accommodate this scientific practice, of which I give several examples. Finally, I argue that a view that is apparently similar to the one I presented here, Sally Haslanger's ameliorative approach, actually endorses NBR and therefore it is not metaphysically consistent.

Fruge, Christopher - Aggregate Wellbeing as Composite Artifact

There has been much debate over the form of the aggregation of wellbeing, where it is usually assumed that there is an objectively unique way that partial wellbeing aggregates to overall wellbeing for someone. In this paper, however, I argue that aggregation is subjective. Thus, how partial wellbeing aggregates varies depending on what sort of aggregation someone values. Such a subjectivist view about aggregation has been neglected, even among subjectivists about personal value. Most

subjectivists focus on how the value of a constituent depends on valuing attitudes. Yet, such subjectivism about partial wellbeing does not entail subjectivism about aggregation. Therefore, I offer an independent defense of aggregation subjectivism, and I formulate an account according to which aggregate wellbeing is a special sort of artifact.

A central motivation for subjectivism about partial wellbeing is the thought that personal value must fit or resonate with the person. This resonance constraint is usually associated with partial wellbeing, but it applies equally well to aggregate wellbeing. The combined wellbeing someone has from different portions of value must be attuned to their personality and concerns. They cannot be alienated from their own overall good.

Therefore, I argue that aggregation is subjective, because it requires valuing a certain manner of aggregation. This gives an account of the how of aggregation. There is an initial step of generating partial wellbeing via valuing attitudes, and partial wellbeing then gets aggregated via an aggregative attitude. However, this is not yet an explanation of why aggregation has this structure. I offer such an explanation by suggesting that wellbeing is a composite artifact, which shares a common structure with other composite artifacts like artworks, socially constructed entities, and games. Hence, the structure of wellbeing is explained by subsumption within a larger pattern.

Consider social artifacts, such as borders. Say that an early human settlement comes to agree that the nearby river will be their town's border. Here their arrangement contains two different collective agreements: that each part of the river be a part of the border, and that together all those parts of the border make up a contiguous border. The first agreement connects each part of the river to a corresponding part of the border, and the second agreement connects each part of the border to the whole border.

This same sort of structure, I argue, holds for aggregate wellbeing as well. The inputs would be the constituents that ground partial wellbeing and the connection would be the valuing attitudes that make those constituents valuable for the person. In terms of connection subjectivism about aggregate wellbeing, the inputs would be partial wellbeing as grounds and the connection would be the aggregative attitudes that make that partial wellbeing aggregate in a certain way. Thus, aggregate wellbeing can be subsumed within a larger pattern of composite artifacts.

Garcia, Miguel - Institutional Proxy Agency: A We-Mode Approach

Proxy agency is the capacity of individuals and groups to act for other individuals or groups in specific social transactions. For example, a legal team acts as a proxy for a client in a courtroom, the UK Prime Minister acts as a proxy for the UK Government when attending international meetings, and a spokesperson acts as a proxy for a corporation when delivering an official message. Yet, although a very common social phenomenon, proxy agency remains largely unexplored, especially within contemporary social ontology (with most social ontologists focused on the relationship between individual and collective agency). At this time, Ludwig (2014) offers the most elaborated account of proxy agency in collective action. However, his account relies on a reductionist, we-content approach to collective intentionality (á la Bratman). In this paper, I argue that this approach is far too weak to explain proxy agency in institutional contexts, where both the individuals and groups formally authorised to perform rule-guided group activities for the principal hold a strong, non-conditional we-commitment to act. In order to elucidate this feature, I provide here an alternative account of proxy agency based on a more robust, we-mode approach to collective intentionality (á la Tuomela). I suggest with this that, for institutional proxy agency to operate, there must be appropriate conditions of sociality in place. These conditions, as Tuomela (2013) argues, depend on the existence of organised groups acting according to shared we-attitudes; particularly, socially constructed group reasons.

Working on these elements, I explain how acting as a proxy involves (1) taking part in the performance of collective actions; (2) holding the power, and not just the permission, to act on behalf of an authorising agent; (3) being a representative, but not a mere substitute nor an instrument of the principal; and (4) carrying a certain degree of responsibility for the activities performed. After presenting a general framework for the elucidation of (1)-(4), I discuss the relevance of proxy agency in the construction of institutional objects, e.g., legal decisions, policies, and official statements. Though not yet a thorough account of institutional proxy agency, the analysis I present in this paper aims to highlight the need of further research.

Garruzzo, Anthony - Michel Foucault on Power, Ideology, and the Social Body

It is well known that throughout his published writings, lectures, and interviews Michel Foucault opposes attempts to identify his work with the tradition of ideology critique. What is less well known, however, is what his motivations were for insisting that his work should not be viewed as making contributions to the theory of ideology. In this talk, I argue that Foucault's basic conception of society (what he calls 'the social body') is what compels him to downplay the importance of ideology as a category of social analysis. In particular, Foucault's understanding of the networks of power relations that constitute and permeate the social body motivates him to reject an understanding of social organization and cohesion that views ideology as a central element or factor. Instead, he holds that technologies of power, including institutions that implement disciplinary regimes and bodies of knowledge that enable the management and control of populations, play a much more foundational role in social organization. These technologies make necessary the analysis of what Foucault describes as 'the micro-physics of power,' the ways in which power makes use of different tactics to 'invest itself in the body,' that is, to control minute aspects of the bodily behaviors of individuals. They also make necessary an analysis of social knowledge that functions as an instrument of power in ways that cannot be reduced to the inducement of mystification and false consciousness. Instead, different forms of social knowledge interact with different technologies of power in extremely subtle ways, and they are more effective precisely when they do in fact correctly represent social conditions and processes, rather than ideologically distorting them. In general, Foucault's argument is that an account of society that takes seriously the variety and subtlety of the techniques that are used to control people and achieve social organization must reject the tendency to explain social power primarily in terms of ideology.

Godman, Marion - Why multiculturalism is good for women

The late Susan Moller Okin famously asked, "is multiculturalism bad for women?" (2018) in response to Will Kymlicka's work and the general resurgence of multiculturalism in the 1990's. Okin argued that giving ethnic minorities special cultural- and group-differentiated rights would often be at the expense of the legitimate universal liberal rights of the women within these cultural and ethnic minorities (2002, 2018).

In this paper I explore a different and perhaps even more optimistic response on behalf of liberal multiculturalism. In brief, I argue for the inherent value of multiculturalism for women and aim to show that it is only from within a multiculturalist framework that many minority women can attain a gender identity that is more equal and also, a cultural identity that is valuable to them.

As Will Kymlicka has taught us, one of the main attractions of multiculturalism, is that its only within a culture that there is a context for meaningful choices (1995). This means that access to a culture is also access to a source of value or meaning of particular choices and awaress of options available. Moreover, I would stress, the value of a choice often has to satisfy a social-cultural condition; that is,

it is only from within a cultural community with individuals that share the same culture that we can gain the appropriate self-respect for our choices.

What is less appreciated is how choices about one's gender identity only makes sense from within a rich view of cultural membership. In other words, it is culture that provides the context for our meaningful choices about gender identity. A gender identity is not something that stands outside one's cultural belonging; rather gender categories evolve within a particular cultural system and also in reaction to particular displays of patriarchy (Volpp 2001). More precisely, I will argue that one's culture determines choices such as whether one regards gender as a binary option, whether a certain behavior is sanctioned or rewarded, and what "status" a particular gender has (Bach 2012; Godman 2018).

Of course, the impetus for feminism is often precisely the poor conditions and quality of choices for girls and women that exist in many cultures. But I argue that to change the conditions and quality of choices regarding one's gender, I argue, we need to work primarily through or within culture. I will illustrate my argument with the case of the Roma national minority in Sweden and its problems with implementing a broader gender representation. My argument explores some different routes to change within this Roma culture that are compatible with considering the situation of subordinated gender(s). While a few may want to exit their culture, for many individuals the main and desired option will be to retain their membership within their culture, but with a reformed gender status and role (see also Deveaux 2000). This might be promoted by more diverse gender political representation from the Roma or promoting a more diverse set of role models.

Gomori, Tamas - Predictive Coding and Institutions

Any theory of institutions has to have a solid account for how social cognition in general happens – how do we represent social interactions and our roles within them? The debates around the way institutions work and why they exist fall largely into two camps. On one side, institutions exist in a separate, social reality that cannot be reduced to physical facts. They are abstract rules recognized and upheld by a community and are fundamentally social and carry deontic power – they enable our uniquely human ability to act on reasons independent of our desires. The other side contends that institutions can be reduced to the behavior of the individuals that maintain them and can be described in game theoretic terms. Institutions are thus not a new, "social" reality, but simply the result of individual actors finding a way to maximize their individual payoffs in sets of coordination games. In the criticisms leveled against both sides, the rule-based accounts assume that the collective recognition of rules is enough to motivate individuals to follow these rules – which is not always the case. Game theoretic accounts, on the other hand, do not explain why institutional actions do not always match individual interests. But both accounts lack a solid foundation for how social cognition actually works.

A more radical camp takes an interactionist view at institutions, emphasizing that institutions exist in the interactions between individuals and not simply within their brains. While both game-theoretic and rule-based accounts acknowledge the importance of mind-reading in social cognition – and therefore, in institutions – this view emphasizes that research in social cognition has entertained notions of mind-reading that are overly individualistic and thus result in endlessly recursive mind-reading (e.g. I believe that she believes that I believe, etc.). This interactionist account holds that rethinking mind-reading abilities as happening fundamentally in a "we-mode", results in social interaction where each individual conceives of the interaction as part of a joint action, which allows individuals to engage in behaviors that cannot be accounted for in individualistic terms.

I hope to enrich this account of social cognition by turning to predictive coding as a framework. Predictive coding conceives of individuals as self-sustaining and self-producing biological systems, which exist in a constant interaction between brain, body and environment. The brain and body work together to minimize prediction error within themselves (the biological system) through an internal model, which minimizes error both through perception and action. In social interaction, agents still aim to minimize error and thus engage in ways that minimize error globally for each agent in the interaction. I will explore how social cognition conceived as prediction error minimization can be used to explain how institutions serve as ways to minimize error among agents who uphold them. As institutions serve as powerful tools to minimize prediction error, they structure joint interactions between individuals and help to explain why individuals follow rules and when they break them, as they negotiate social roles, obligations and opportunities.

Graf, Simon - Permissive Divergence: When Member-Level and Group-Level Attitudes Ought to Diverge

What is the relationship between collective epistemic states and individual epistemic states? It is natural to assume that when we talk of 'group knowledge' or 'group justification' we are merely generalizing about the epistemic states of the group's members. We might think that a group's belief that p is justified iff all (or a significant percentage) of the group's members justifiably believe p. This view, that to ascribe an epistemic state to a group is to indirectly ascribe it to (some of) its members, can be called epistemic summativism.

Epistemic summativism appears intuitive, and it is certainly both theoretically and ontologically conservative. However, it faces a serious problem: it is inconsistent with permissivism about epistemic justification. According to permissivism, for some bodies of evidence there is more than one rational doxastic attitude epistemic agents are permitted to hold (Kopec and Titlebau 2015; Ross 2018; Jackson and Turnbull forthcoming). Appropriately, permissivism allows a single body of evidence possessed by the group to rationalize different epistemic states for different members of the group. Even if all members would have the same evidence, other epistemic features of those individuals, such as epistemic standards (Schoenfield 2014, 2019), or epistemic goals (Kelly 2013) could rationally demand them to form different doxastic attitudes. In such cases, the epistemic state that is rational for the group as a whole cannot be determined summatively as a function of the states rationalized by its' members, since the group could equally have additional epistemic features demanding a divergent doxastic attitude. This might be the case if a group's judgements, but not those of its members, play institutional functions, or are governed by a specific form of charter. Call this class of cases permissive divergence cases.

These permissivism-based cases are a member species of so-called divergence arguments, a type of argument that purports to show that there can be a conflict between a property at the collective level and the individual level (Lackey 2016, 2021). Divergence arguments have been used to motivate and support inflationary or non-summative accounts of group belief (Gilbert 1989), group assertion (Lackey 2020, 2021; Ludwig 2014), collective virtue ascriptions (Fricker 2010; Lahoori 2007), collective justification (Schmitt 1994; Mathiensen 2011), or different kinds of collective knowledge, such as knowledge-how and knowledge-why (Bird 2010, 2014; Hutchins 1995a, 1995b; Habgood-Coote 2019). Often the divergence cases considered are merely built on intuitive judgements on a case-by-case basis without making their theoretical commitments explicit. As such, the cases considered, as well as the objections raised vastly differ in their intuitive appeal. Permissive divergence cases, on the other hand, are directly built on a widely accepted epistemic position (permissivism) and as such give us a general recipe for generating divergence cases, which does not rely on vague intuitions. In sum,

accepting epistemic permissivism leads us closer towards an inflationary ontology of socio-epistemic entities.

Gray, David - Racial Objects

Races are generally construed to fall within one of the three categories: (1) biologically significant (e.g., Kant 1777, Kitcher 1999, Andreasen, 1998, Spencer 2014), (2) non-existent (e.g., Appiah 1985, 1996, Zack 1993, Yudell, Blum 2002, Glasgow 2007, McPherson 2015, Yudell et al. 2016), or (3) social constructions (e.g., Du Bois 1897, Outlaw 1996, Alcoff 1997, Haslanger 2000, Sundstrom 2002, Ásta 2018). That races are social constructions is the dominant view in the metaphysics of race. Social constructionist accounts vary widely in terms of what grounds race. Two common features often discussed in the literature are who determines what races are (e.g., ordinary folk, experts, oppressors) and what features constitute race (e.g., visible traits, self-identification, external conferral.

In this essay, I examine a different question, "If races are social constructions, what kind of thing has been socially constructed?". I start by taking seriously an insight from Franz Fanon concerning the racialized treatment in "The Fact of Blackness": negative racialized treatment does not acknowledge an individual as a complete person but rather treats them as a kind of object (i.e., lacking in the ability to act in ways which would suggest they are not defined by their race alone). Given that this type of treatment seems central to the creation of races, I think it is more insightful to think of races as kinds of socially constructed objects rather than social constructions, simpliciter. The standard category of socially constructed objects is that of artifacts: objects that are both designed to serve a function and defined functionally. I argue that while races are like artifacts in that they often serve a particular functional role (e.g., economic), they are also unlike artifacts in that many of the features that are taken to be racial features are not built into races (as is common with artifacts serving functional roles) but aggregated out of natural properties (e.g., skin color, historical ancestral ties). In attempting to account for these differences between traditional artifacts and races, I develop and describe a hybrid category of 'natural artifacts'. This approach suggests that value-laden issues concerning how racism shapes the function of race in society inform the metaphysical issue of what races are.

This approach has some interesting upshots. First, some objections must be addressed as using racism to define race seems to invert the conceptual dependency relation between RACE and RACISM. However, if this challenge can be met, we will have a descriptive account of race that is definitionally similar to normative or ameliorative accounts of race suggested by Haslanger 2000. I will argue that this approach is better than ameliorative approaches as it captures hierarchical relations without merely stipulating what races are.

Greene, Catherine - What can finance teach us about social ontology?

Following Little (2021) this article seeks to approach social ontology from the perspective of practical social science. It argues that understanding the practice of finance can inform ontological debates because it indicates that what is 'out there in the world' depends very much on who is looking, and with what purpose they are looking. Broadly, this supports Little's view that there are "alternative ways of analysing the same set of social occurrences." (2021, pg. 16) Investors in equity markets buy shares in companies. These companies are real things, in the sense that they shape the organisation of our lives, and affect our environment. How should we understand the financial instruments that are issued by these companies and traded on financial markets? This paper argues that shares traded on stock exchanges are not just fractions of companies; and that characterising what they are is dependent on the purposes of those investing in them.

In theory, shares represent a fractional ownership of a company. For example, Company A lists on the London Stock Exchange to raise capital for a variety of purposes. An investor is given share certificates

(in the age of digitisation this doesn't literally happen anymore), and owns a small portion of Company A. On this view, investing in shares gives one ownership of a real company, and shares represent this ownership. Much of financial theory assumes that this is what happens.

However, a share can represent many different things, only one of which is ownership of an underlying company. Investors use a variety of strategies to make money, including benefitting from macro-economic changes, and changes in the statistical relationships between financial instruments. Let us suppose that Company A makes widgets for export. A macro-economic investor could buy the shares of Company A as part of an attempt to make money from the currency devaluation of Company A's home country. However, this investor has no particular opinions about Company A, and simply wants to buy shares in a lot of companies that export their products. Their investment in Company A is way to benefit from currency devaluation- they will make money if the currency devalues because other investors will buy the same companies, on the expectation that they will benefit from devaluation. For the macro investor, their shares are not primarily a share of Company A, but a financial instrument that gives them exposure to currency devaluation. In fact, they may exit their trade long before devaluation positively impacts Company A's bottom line. For investors pursuing other strategies, shares in Company A can represent a number of other things.

What implications does this have for social ontology? The analysis of financial markets suggests that some features of the social world can simultaneously be very different things, depending on the perspective, and purposes, of human beings (in this case, investors). Furthermore, a single investor can switch between these different interpretations over time. On this view, ontological truth and empirical success (making money) are intertwined, and cannot be judged separately (as Lauer, 2019 suggests).

Guido Loehr - Interest theories of rights and joint action

On the one hand, interests seem highly relevant when thinking about duties and entitlements in joint action. It is apparent that the duties we owe to other participants in a joint action appear to correlate with some of their subjective preferences. It even seems that the same action can be permissible in one group and impermissible in another simply because the members of both groups have different preferences. Think for example of the famous case of Paula and James taking a walk together (Gilbert, 2013). Paula has a right to demand that James slow down partly because she prefers to take a walk together that is less exhausting or more relaxing. Anyway, this reason will feature prominently in her reasoning defending her demand.

On the other hand, interest theories have difficulty explaining moral rights and duties, in particular rights that are directed in the Hohfeldian sense. These are rights and duties that are owed to particular poeple as opposed to people in general. These rights also correlate conceptually with directed duties, such that an explanation of rights should settle an explanation of the correlated duty. One major objection in this regard (see May, 2015) is that we often owe actions to others who do not have an interest in these actions just as we do not owe actions to others just because they have an interest in this action (third party interest objection). At least a simple Interest theory can therefore not give us a theory of directed duties and rights in morality and law.

The aim of this paper is to bring the phenomenon of directed duties and entitlements in joint action together with interest theories of rights. First, I argue that interests matter a lot because they motivate us to cooperate. Joint action cannot get off the ground unless two or more people are sufficiently motivated to cooperate. This also entails that individual actions do not just have to contribute to fulfilling a joint intention to phi (e.g., take a walk together). We can fulfill this intention in various different ways and not all these options are compatible with the preferences of the participants of the

joint action. So individual actions also have to contribute to fulfilling a joint intention to phi with this particular person. This is why we can refer to them to justify demands and criticism even if they have nothing directly to do with the joint intentions to phi. What kinds of interests motivate us? I argue that subjective preferences that are readily available to our awareness are relevant.

Second, I argue that some of the difficulties facing interest theories in the moral domain do not apply in the case of joint action. For example, the main objection to interest theories regarding third party interest does not apply to joint action as we may have no joint intention to cooperate with these third parties. Therefore, they have no entitlement against us. This is different in the moral realm where we arguably obligations toward people qua rational beings or qua humans or qua beings that can suffer.

Gunnemyr, Mattias - Sartorio and the Thirsty Traveller

A traveller fills his canteen with water before taking a trip into the desert. He needs the water to survive. He has two enemies who want him dead, A and B. A secretly replaces the water in the canteen with sand. Later, B steals the canteen thinking that it contains water. The traveller then dies of thirst. Who is responsible for the traveller's death? This is the century old riddle of the thirsty traveller, introduced by McLaughlin (1925-27) and discussed by e.g. Mackie (1980), Hart & Honoré (1985), Wright (2013), Talbert (2015), Sartorio (2015, 2016), and Bernstein (2019). Sartorio (2016) argues that while neither enemy caused the traveller's death, at least one of them is morally responsible for his death in virtue of having collectively contributed to it. If she is right, it is possible to be morally responsible for an outcome without having caused it.

Sartorio (2015) elaborates two arguments to the effect that neither enemy caused the death of the traveller. First, she argues that since our intuitions about causation in this case are uncertain, we should instead reflect on cases that are identical to it in all causally relevant respects but where our intuitions are clearer. She then goes through several parallel cases where it is clear that neither enemy caused the death of the traveller, results that indicate that neither enemy caused the death of the traveller in the original case. Second, she argues that what each enemy does works as a mere switch, and we typically do not think that mere switches are causes.

Finally, Sartorio (2015) suggest that we can capture the intuition that at least one of the enemies is morally responsible for the death of the traveller by acknowledging that a disjunctive fact – the stealing-or-substituting – caused the death of the traveller. You might be morally responsible for an outcome, she argues, if you are morally responsible for the cause of this outcome.

I question Sartorio's arguments and the suggestion that we should explain our intuitions about moral responsibility by looking at disjunctive facts. First, the alleged parallel cases that Sartorio (2015) considers are not identical to the original case in all morally relevant aspects. Second, given a more plausible way of perceiving the case of the thirsty traveller, neither what A did nor what B did protrudes as a mere switch. Third, there are other accounts of moral responsibility for outcomes that can explain our intuitions about moral responsibility better than Sartorio's account can. While Sartorio's account seems to explain our intuitions in this particular case, it works less well in a range of other cases. I end by giving the basics of an account that can explain our intuitions in the case of the thirsty traveller, as well as in a wide range of other cases. If this alternative account is correct, we can hold on to the intuitive idea that you must be causally responsible for an outcome in order to be morally responsible for it.

Haaksma, Katrina - Class Is Said In Two Ways: The Material and Social Construction of Class Categories

Both the material and social influences of economic class categories have a substantial impact on our reality. Analyses of class typically involve attention to the form and production of material value in addition to the impact this has on the social world. The fact that the social consequences of economic difference depend on objective material facts distinguishes class from many other hierarchical systems of categorization. According to an orthodox Marxian characterization of class, class consists of relations to the means of the production of value. Many contemporary analyses argue that other social categories, like race and gender, have played a crucial role in the construction of class.

On all these analyses, the categories of "class" are used to describe both material and social relations as well as the dynamics between the two. So there are at least two distinct concepts that emerge from our ordinary talk about class. The first is the economic sense of class as a relation to capital and the means of producing value. I follow a broadly Marxist feminist tradition in accepting a relational model of this type of class, which I'm calling material class. The second sense of class is purely social: on my view, it consists of the context-dependent constraints and enablements that emerge from socially salient features of individuals. This sense of class is also relational, but in a different way than the economic sense is relational—it concerns purely social relations. I follow Ásta's (2018) "conferralist" framework in characterizing this type of class, which I'm calling social class. In distinguishing these two class concepts, I rely on Khalidi's (2015) system of classification for social kinds. Accordingly, I argue that material class does not depend on any propositional attitudes for its existence, while social class does.

The primary contribution of this paper will be an argument for the existence of social class as a social kind that can't be analyzed in terms of material class categories. In addition, however, I argue that the distinction I draw has some interesting implications for class-based organizing and workers' resistance. Namely, it implies that building working class solidarity requires a demystification of social class categories and a renewed focus on material class.

Hakkarainen, Jani - Social Ontology Confirms: Metaphysics Does not Initially Presuppose Metaphysical Realism

The working definition of metaphysical realism is that there are ontologically mind-independent entities (e.g. Lowe 2006). One can suppose that such entities, in their nature and structures perhaps, are the object of consideration of metaphysics. Call that methodological supposition the second-order doctrine of metaphysical realism about metaphysics. It presupposes metaphysical realism and is typically assumed by the contemporary metaphysicians (e.g. Ibid., Sider 2011). In this paper, I argue that social ontology confirms that metaphysical realism about metaphysics is not to be assumed at the outset. Social ontology is significant for metametaphysics.

I begin by noticing that the problem-setting from which metaphysics begins is neutral on the truth of metaphysical realism about metaphysics. This question-setting consists of being as being, its features (e.g. unitarity and plurality) and principles (e.g. the principle of non-contradiction) when we are talking about general metaphysics. Considering being as being is initially indifferent to the truth of metaphysical realism about metaphysics. Its veracity comes to play only if we specify that it is ontologically mind-independent being we are considering in metaphysics. If one is justified not to do that specification in a metaphysical study, it is possible to conduct the study and not to assume metaphysical realism and hence metaphysical realism about metaphysics. This has consequences for ontology, which studies what there is and on what ground: metaphysical realism is relevant only if

ontological problems presuppose or ask it. That happens for example in an ontological problem whether there are laws of nature as ontologically mind-independent universals (e.g. Armstrong 1997).

Social ontology is a special metaphysics when it is taken to study entities rather than representations of being; metaphysics is the study of being as being. Social ontology confirms that metaphysical study does not initially presuppose metaphysical realism and hence metaphysical realism about metaphysics. Many social ontological problems concern possible entities that are ontologically dependent on mind in one way or another, such as the existence and nature of social kinds and institutions. Part of these problems is to make the type of ontological dependence we are considering exact.

Social ontological problems presuppose metaphysical realism only if there can be nothing ontologically mind-dependent social without there being something ontologically mind-independent. However, the truth of the latter proposition is initially an open metaphysical question that must not be stipulated at the outset. We need to begin with keeping an open mind for the possibility that ontologically mind-dependent entities are not grounded in ontologically mind-independent entities.

An epistemological consequence of all this is that arguments against the possibility of acquiring valuable epistemic states about ontologically mind-independent entities or even their existence (e.g. Hume 1748 and Putnam 1981) are not necessarily arguments against the epistemic legitimacy of social ontology. They are so only if acquiring valuable epistemic states about the objects of consideration of social ontology involve such states about the existence of ontologically mind-independent entities.

Hakli, Raul - How to formulate team reasoning

I will study the relationship between collective intentionality and team reasoning by trying to find a way to formulate the practical reasoning involved in team reasoning using the conceptual tools developed in the collective intentionality literature. There are two different conceptions of team reasoning available: They both share the idea of viewing the group as an agent choosing between different outcomes, but they differ in their understanding of the role of team reasoning in collective intentionality. According to one understanding, team reasoning is a method of reasoning that results in the formation of collective intentions. According to another, team reasoning is a method of reasoning that starts from collective intentions and therefore presupposes them. I will locate these reasoning methods in the standard picture of social ontology and collective intentionality and see what kind of a role they play in it and what kinds of questions they face and answers they give. I will employ the latter conception and try to formulate practical reasoning syllogisms that do not mix action-theoretic concepts with game- or decision-theoretic ones as the standard formulations do. In particular, I will try to avoid formulations in which agents are said to intend to maximize utility functions. This is a confusing way of formulating decision-making, because agents usually do not intend to maximize functions, but instead they intend to achieve goals and act, individually or together. I will argue that if we want to formulate practical reasoning that retains the idea of group agency involved in team reasoning then we cannot do with content accounts of collective intentionality that restrict the collective elements to the contents of intentional states. However, team reasoning does not demand the kind of attribution of agency to groups that subject accounts subscribe to, but the conceptual resources provided by mode accounts suffice.

Hansson Wahlberg, Tobias - Towards a Deflationary Truthmakers Account of Social Groups

Contemporary social ontologists typically reject the notion that social groups (such as book clubs, street bands and faculty committees) can be reductively identified with pluralities, sets or fusions of

individuals (see Ritchie 2015 for an overview of the issues). Instead, they hold that social groups are sui generis entities constituted or composed by, or grounded in, collections of individuals, and that these constitution/composition/grounding relations are asymmetric dependence relations distinct from n-adic identity relations (e.g. Uzquiano 2004; List and Pettit 2011; Epstein 2019). Surprisingly absent from these discussions is an alternative position which involves neither reductive identification nor the postulation of ontic sui generis entities. The alternative I have in mind, which draws on work in general metaphysics (e.g. Heil 2003; Armstrong 2004; Cameron 2008), is to theorise social groups – or rather, truths about them – in terms of deflationary truthmakers. In this talk I outline a sketch of this approach. Potentially, the approach allows us to say, with traditional ontological individualists, that there are only pluralities of individuals out there, ontologically speaking, but that there are nevertheless colloquial and social-scientific truths about social groups. Thus, if it is tenable, this kind of theory has the virtue of being both ontologically parsimonious and compatible with ordinary and social-scientific discourse.

The structure of the talk is as follows. I begin by briefly setting out the standard objections to the (now unpopular) stock reductive identifications. I then summarise difficulties for the ontological dependence accounts of social groups. Following this, I outline a deflationary truthmakers account of social groups and show how it avoids the difficulties just canvassed. Next, I address some potential objections to the approach. I end with some concluding remarks about how we may move on from here, with this alternative approach on the table.

Hardy, Emma - Leaning into a social and process-constituted account of food

The increasingly global nature of food systems, a growing awareness of ethical issues surrounding food systems, and the deterioration of monolithic community food philosophies have made individuals' relationships with food increasingly complicated. Individual food philosophies are an amalgamation of the community food philosophies the individual is immersed in; more traditional food philosophies (religious, cultural, etc.) often come into tension with more contemporary food philosophies (vegan, locavore, organic-only, fast food, etc.). Attending to what food is is, I argue, one framework that can facilitate more individually sustainable—more livable—individual food philosophies. And what food is is more complex than edible stuff on a plate. In this paper, I aim to give an account of food that is both extensionally plausible in light of our actual practices and helpful for our actual practices.

I argue that food is not only edible, but also social and process-constituted. For a thing to be edible (for a human) it needs to be digestible (by a human). While it is true that food is edible, there are also many things we take, in our actual food practices, to be edible yet not food—e.g., vitamin supplements. To accommodate this constraint from our actual practices, I argue for the social character of food. By social, I mean that a thing becomes food if it is taken by a food culture—or an individual with a relationship to a certain food culture—to be food. Because (at least some) people take natural objects in the world to be food, the natural objects become, for the people who take them to be food, food. This entails that the same thing may be simultaneously food in one context but not in another, e.g., different animal organs or huitlacoche/corn smut.

Because food items are not natural objects, there is a process by which the natural objects become food items. I argue that this process is one aspect of what food is: food is process-constituted. Where the food was produced, by whom, under what conditions, the journey from the producer to the retailer, the interaction between the consumer and the retailer, and what the consumer does to the food—this process is embedded into the very concept of food and 'the thing on the plate.' And although food being process-constituted may sound like a radical or revisionary claim, I demonstrate

through a series of cases that this account of food is helpful for making sense of many of our ordinary intuitions with respect to food items which we take to be substantially equivalent but not identical.

This account proposes a framework which would allow individuals to sustainably make food choices that allow them to live out their individual food philosophies through attending to the social and process-constituted character of food. In line with other recent arguments in food philosophy, this is an argument that what matters is how we eat, not what we eat—but that in order to know how to eat we first need to know what we eat.

Harrison, Glenn W., Andre Hofmeyr, Brian Monroe, Karlijn Morsink, Don Ross and Cuizhu Wang - Norms in the Lab

Structural accounts of norms view them as social facts that do not reduce to preferences of individuals. A model of norms should be identifiable in the lab and in the field without loss of generality over different types of social norms. It should also be able to show how some non-reducible social facts can be studied empirically through observed choices of individuals.

The philosophical conception of social norms due to Bicchieri (2017) suggests a possible methodology for identifying social norms from observations of the choices of individuals. It emphasises expectations and models norm compliance as supported by "self-fulfilling expectations in the sense that players' beliefs are consistent with their actions and the actions that follow from players' beliefs will validate those very beliefs" (Bicchieri, Muldoon & Sontuoso 2018).

Various experimental studies implemented by Bicchieri and co-authors have aimed to provide data to support her theory of social norms. However, there are some recurring limitations in these experimental protocols. First, both empirical and normative expectations are measured with respect to modal responses, rather than distributions. This fails to adequately assess the confidence level of the beliefs of subjects and fails to support statistical measurement of belief consistency. Second, all the experiments assume risk-neutrality which is a source of estimation bias with respect to beliefs. Third, their experiments fall short on incentive control. Fourth, they fail to be explicit about how the hypothesis of conditionality (the empirical claim that norms as social facts condition the choices of individual) can be measured through experimentation.

To promote the operationalizability of Bicchieri's concept of social norms, we design and implement an experiment that corrects for the above limitations. We repeat and modify one of Bicchieri's experimental settings, a strategic Ultimatum Game. We measure the empirical and normative expectations of subjects by eliciting distributions of beliefs about the responses of other subjects, incentivised using the Quadratic Scoring Rule. We apply a Binary Lottery Payment procedure to induce risk neutrality, facilitating inferences about beliefs. We apply experimental methods to ensure that our experiments are incentive compatible. We apply Bayesian methods to test the statistical consistency of beliefs, and estimate entire belief distributions to consider confidence. We also design several treatments to test whether other context conditionalize norm compliance.

Through the methodological principles reflected in our experiment, we argue that (1) although agents played as if governed by a fairness norm (because in the Ultimatum Game we do not give subjects much chance not to), (2) the descriptive norms and normative expectations of subjects, when measured properly, still are not aligned in the way that Bicchieri's account seems to require if it is to be made precise.

Hassall, Richard - The Social Ontology of Medical and Psychiatric Diagnoses

Sociologists of medicine have observed how diagnoses can function to define the sick role in social contexts and authorise medical social control (e.g. McGann, 2011). Medical diagnoses are what define diseases. They not only function as a basis for medical treatment, but also legitimise the treatment. In the case of psychiatry, they may also be used to justify compulsory detention of the patient in hospital. The influence of a diagnosis extends beyond a mere hypothesis to guide the treatment prescribed to the patient. A diagnosis, therefore, has some kind of institutional status in healthcare systems and in wider society.

In my presentation, I argue that the act of delivering a medical diagnosis creates an institutional fact. I make use of speech act theory to argue that the statement of a medical diagnosis is both an illocutionary and a perlocutionary speech act. The announcement by the physician of a diagnosis is more than just a statement of empirical fact. It is intended to persuade the recipient and other people in the healthcare system that something important about the patient has been established and is expected to have relevant consequences. It achieves certain distinct effects by virtue of its pronouncement. I argue, therefore, that the statement of a diagnosis creates what Searle (2010), in his account of the construction of social reality, calls an institutional fact. This is analogous to the way in which other kinds of speech acts, such as the formal pronouncement of marriage between two people, create such facts. A diagnosis is recorded as a fact in the patient's case file and thus acquires the status of an institutional fact. Even an incorrect diagnosis can acquire this status. If a patient wishes to challenge their diagnosis, it can be difficult to do so and requires them to find someone with the appropriate epistemic authority. The diagnosis can also in some cases impose legally enforceable restrictions on the patient's activity, such as for specified notifiable diseases (e.g. Covid).

Searle states that a test for an institutional fact is whether its existence implies certain deontic powers carries including rights, obligations, and authorisations. Medicine, and the set of institutions it encompasses, is a field that confers such powers. It is characterised by a high degree of epistemic authority which empowers its practitioners to fulfil their designated roles. These practitioners are also required to abide by stringent ethical standards. To constitute an institutional fact, the diagnosis has to be given by the relevant specialist, in the appropriate context, and following the specified assessment process appropriate to the illness in question. A diagnosis given within this context carries with it a socially recognised status. Since psychiatry is a branch of medicine, the same set of features apply to a psychiatric diagnosis.

Hepcaglayan, Cansu - Aristotle on Joint Commitment

In the context of developing a general account of friendship, Aristotle devotes Nicomachean Ethics [NE] IX.6 to the notion of homonoia (literally "sameness of mind"). Standardly this term is taken to indicate a kind of agreement among political fellows, and it is usually translated, accordingly, as "agreement", "like-mindedness", "unanimity", or "concord". But I argue in this paper that Aristotle's concept of homonoia cannot be perspicuously rendered as "agreement" or its cognates. For, as I show, in addition to sameness of belief or opinion homonoia involves shared commitments to the same goals and collective action aimed at realizing those goals, and terms like "agreement" or "like-mindedness" do not bring this activity-involving component of homonoia clearly into relief. I attempt to capture this activity-involving component by presenting a novel interpretation of Aristotelian homonoia as joint commitment. In doing so, I aim to shed new light on the precise relationship Aristotle draws between homonoia and friendship, with a special focus on the significance of the former for political friendship.

61

This paper is in three sections. In Section 1, I unpack the concept of homonoia in NE IX.6, expounding in particular the relationship Aristotle draws between homonoia and the notion of prohairesis, which is introduced a necessary condition of the former. The latter is commonly translated as "choice," but I argue that it is better taken as "willing" on grounds that, at least in the context of NE IX.6, Aristotle uses it to implicate the choice to commit to and act towards certain shared ends rather than the mere selection of means or ends. I then suggest that, when seen in the light of an understanding of prohairesis as willing in the sense of commitment and its expression in action, Aristotle's treatment of prohairesis as necessary for homonoia indicates that homonoia must involve, in addition to shared belief, both mutual commitment to shared ends and actions that reflect this commitment in order to obtain in a community.

In Section 2, I argue that the conception of homonoia defended in Section 1 is best understood as an account of city-wide joint commitment to the collective interest. To this end, I draw on Margaret Gilbert's influential account of joint commitment to show that Aristotle's three conditions on homonoia are plausibly read as articulating the features Gilbert takes to be constitutive of joint commitments. Furthermore, I argue that my analysis of like-mindedness as joint commitment provides a more perspicuous account than rival interpretations of like-mindedness as, e.g., agreement, unanimity, concord, or communal self-love. In Section 3, finally, I suggest ways in which the account of homonoia as joint commitment offers a solution to the puzzle as to what is the function of NE IX.6 in Aristotle's general theory of friendship. I also suggest ways in which the account offers a fresh perspective on the relationship between homonoia and the elusive notion of political friendship, one that is relevant to contemporary moral and political philosophy.

Hindriks, Frank - Functionalism Without Relentless Optimism: The Dark Side of Institutions

Functionalists are often optimists. Such optimists believe that things survive or persist because they have characteristics that are good for them. Like Pangloss, they believe that the fact that something exists implies that it is best, or at least that the fact that something persists entails that it is good. The Lisbon earthquake of 1755 shattered this kind of optimism, as Voltaire captures so well in his Candide. But it seems that everyday observations suffice to make the point. I am concerned here with functionalism about social structures, such as social practices and institutions. Prevailing social harms and injustices suggest that Panglossian optimism about such structures is uncalled for. Think, for instance, of phenomena such as homelessness, hunger and violence as well as various forms of discrimination, exploitation and oppression. In the light of this and other considerations, functionalism has been getting a bad rap (Brennan et al., 2013; Elster, 2015; Eriksson, 2019b).

Thus, the problem that I address here is that of unwarranted optimism: functionalists are committed to regarding persisting social structures as good, if not the best, even though many of them are bad or at least not as good as they can be. I argue that this problem is specific to the kind of optimistic functionalism just described. Furthermore, it is avoided by what I call 'realistic functionalism', which allows for institutions that are suboptimal or even bad. To explain how this can be, I distinguish between subjective benefits and objective value. And I argue that the function of most social structures is to generate subjective benefits for their participants. This means that those benefits explain why they persist. The thing to note, however, is that the participants are motivated by the benefits as they perceive them, which may come apart from its objective (dis)value. It follows that a persisting social structure can be subjectively beneficial without being objectively good. This is difficult to accept for those who associate functionalism with purposes or values (Searle, 1995). However, it is eminently plausible. Just as a well-functioning virus can decimate humanity, a social structure that persists due to the subjective benefits it generates can be suboptimal or even harmful or unjust.

To say that an institution functions well is not necessarily to commend it. Instead, it means that the institution is susceptible to a particular kind of explanation. The core idea is that what an entity normally does explains why it continues to exist. As I discuss in section 1, this insight creates space for rejecting optimistic functionalism in favor of realistic functionalism, which I present in section 2. In the remainder of the paper, I discuss how bad social structures, in particular harmful or unjust institutions, can persist. In section 3, I argue that people sometimes downplay how bad an institution is or exaggerate the significance of its injunction, which explains why they comply when they should not. In section 4, I address the dark side of institutions, to wit the fact that institutions are sometimes not merely harmful or unjust, but robustly so. I conclude that, because it illuminates this dark side, realistic functionalism provides for a particularly powerful response to the charge of unwarranted or relentless optimism.

As it captures the good, the bad and the ugly, realistic functionalism reveals how functionalist explanations can be respectable. At the same time, it sheds light on why things are often not as they should be. Because of this, functionalist explanations, as I conceive of them here, are an important tool for social change. Thus, functionalism need not be conservative, but can in fact be ameliorative.

Hirvonen, Onni - Challenges of collective recognition

This contribution presents a social-ontological perspective to the Hegelian philosophy of recognition. As Axel Honneth in his 2021 book argues, analysis of social recognition is a central chapter in the history of European philosophy, residing at the core of French, English, and German traditions of social philosophy. Contemporary recognition theories commonly draw from the Hegelian idea of intersubjective dependency of human persons: human beings require social recognition to become who they are. They are constituted through recognition, and recognition is also a normative response to human persons and their features and capabilities.

Although the Hegelian theories of recognition are most commonly formulated in terms of interpersonal relations, its political and critical applications are understood to happen at collective contexts. Recognition applies to minorities and their rights, struggle for recognition drives social and political movements, and recognition between states is a key element of international politics. This extension of the conceptual framework into the collective context is, however, underanalysed. It is doubtful if the psychological or the agential criteria of recognition – from which recognition theories derive their normative import – are, or even can be, fulfilled by the collective objects of recognition.

Although some connections of recognition and social ontology are acknowledged in the literature (e.g. Ikäheimo & Laitinen eds. 2011), the complications that follow from extending the recognition-talk into collective entities has not been discussed in detail. It is argued in this contribution that this lack of clear analysis makes theories of social recognition blind to the issues that rise from the conceptual extension of interpersonal recognition to collective recognition. These include, for example the lack of clear normative idea of how and why collectives ought to be recognized.

This presentation applies the conceptual tools from contemporary analytical social ontology to recognition theory in order to outline and clarify the individualistic and the collectivistic solutions to the challenge of collective recognition. The presentation also discusses the effects that these options have on the political theory of recognition, and aims to outline the social-ontological limits of recognition theory: What can be recognized and how? What are the normative limits of demands for recognition of collectives?

Holdier, A.G. - Illocuting Identity: Prayer and Pornography as Sociopolitical Speech Acts

For decades, a strand of contemporary philosophy of language has analyzed pornography as a speech act. As seen in the work of MacKinnon, McGowan, Langton, Bauer and others, such arguments propose that, in addition to its sexual content, pornography unavoidably conveys multiple illocutionary presuppositions to its audience such that various harmful social and political consequences manifest. Because those effects take at least two unjust forms — the subordination and silencing of women — pornography is more significant than just harmless fun for private consumption: it serves to structure our public expectations and interactions.

I propose that prayer functions in roughly the same way.

When a priest stands in the pulpit and leads a congregation in the Lord's Prayer, in addition to being a speech act with God as its (presumed) audience, this collective act manifests a variety of social and political consequences, organizing and unifying the members of the religious body as it tacitly manifests the sociopolitical boundaries of a religious identity. Moreover, prayer manifests the same kind of (though not the same) consequences as pornography: it reinforces a social hierarchy and defines the epistemic bounds of orthodoxy for a community. For pornography, the hierarchy (women's subordination) and the dogma (women's silencing) are damaging as a matter of their content, not their form — indeed, any speech act that reinforces such cultural systems is unjust, regardless of its lasciviousness.

In this paper, I submit the practice of prayer to the same disambiguation of propositional content from (liturgical, rather than sexual) form. Philosophical analyses of prayer tend to focus on questions of petitionary prayer's efficacy in light of God's omniscience: my concern is to instead focus on prayer itself as a sociopolitical speech act and the kind of illocutionary presuppositions and perlocutionary effects it manifests, regardless of theistic concerns. For example, prayer reinforces social hierarchies between believers and non-believers, clergy and laity, and, most importantly, between prayerful humanity and the Divine; particularly the last example qualifies as a form of subordination (but one that is, arguably, not immoral). Also, prayers — especially corporate liturgical or ritual prayers like those in prayerbooks or catechisms — define the epistemic bounds of orthodoxy for the faith by publicly establishing or reinforcing dogmatic pillars in a manner that effectively silences heretics.

So, to be clear: my point is neither that prayer is pornographic nor that pornography consumption is prayer. Rather, it is that prayer, like (and, indeed, moreso than) pornography, is an influential element of our social environment that regularly introduces illocutionary presuppositions into our cultural contexts.

One of the most common criticisms of pornographic speech acts is that pornography might not be speech at all. While this has been addressed, it is noteworthy that no such criticism is possible of prayer: though prayer's efficacy or audience is debatable, it is clearly speech. Consequently, an analysis of prayer as a sociolinguistic phenomenon offers a different opportunity to explore the valenced identity-structuring effects of illocutionary communication on our cultural contexts.

Honkasalo, Aleksi - Constitutive rules that regulate and regulative rules that constitute

Constitutive rules promise to explain how moving a piece of wood counts as making a move in chess, how a piece of paper can be money and how some noises have meaning. While the debates have focused on distinguishing regulative and constitutive rules, I wish to focus on the relationship between the regulative and the constitutive function of constitutive rules. Can constitutive rules also regulate? If constitutive rules regulate, do they regulate actions that are constituted by those rules, or do they regulate actions that exist independent of those rules?

Rules of games at least seem to regulate actions since they tell how a game piece may be moved. Not everyone agrees, however. For example, Geoffrey Midgley (1959) argues that constitutive rules cannot regulate, since breaking a constitutive rule would mean failing to do the action constituted by those rules and therefore no rule was violated. On the other hand, some rules of games do not seem to regulate actions. Rules of the form "X counts as Y" do not determine any conditions in which a violation would be possible (Glüer & Pagin 1998). If a ball fails to go over the goal line, it means that no goal was scored, but no rule of football was violated. Some have questioned whether these counts-as rules should be considered rules at all. Reductionists argue that counts-as rules are merely terminological devices, and the constitutive rules can be reduced to regulative rules (eg. Ross 1957, Hindriks 2009, cf. Roversi 2021).

I will highlight an unappreciated distinction between two types of rules: Type-1 rules regulate actions that can only exist within a game. These rules determine the correct and incorrect ways of moving a bishop. Type-2 rules, on the other hand, regulate actions that can exist outside of games. They determine how a particular piece of wood may be moved. Midgley's argument requires that constitutive rules are type-1, since violating a type-2 rule requires only that a piece of wood is moved, which is possible regardless of the existence of chess. However, type-1 rules still need to determine what counts as moving a bishop. Counts-as rules together with type-1 rules imply type-2 rules which, contra Midgley, can be violated.

Because type-1 rules require the counts-as rules, they do not satisfy the reductionists' goals. While the type-2 rules would prima facie satisfy the reductionists' goals, they still need some way to distinguish game piece types and tokens. With the type/token-distinction in place, type-2 rules seem to end up being constitutive after all. A proper account of constitutive rules then needs to explain the regulative as well as the constitutive function of these rules.

Hope, Pat - The Social Ontology of Fraser's Theory of Boundary Crises

In this paper I ague that Nancy Fraser's theory of boundary crises relies on a theory of how capitalism necessarily differentiates, stratifies, and genders economic production and social reproduction. I begin by presenting Fraser's social ontology of capitalism as a totality of contradictorily co-constituting spheres: those of politics, economics, social reproduction, and nature. First, I clarify her account of the relations between actors, their actions, and the spheres of which they are members as presented in her seminal article "Behind Marx's Hidden Abode" and her recent conversational volume with Rahel Jaeggi, Capitalism A Conversation in Critical Theory. I argue that social spheres are differentiated by the norms and forms of recognition to which persons, their actions, and products are subject, interrogating each of these concepts in turn. Next, I show that Fraser's theory of crisis requires that social spheres are differentiated and stratified. Insofar as Fraser claims that capitalist societies are necessarily threatened by boundary crises, she must hold both that social spheres are essentially separate and that they exist in hierarchical relations. In particular, capitalism systematically privileges the sphere of economic production over other spheres by differentially empowering producers over reproducers, citizens, and natural beings. Nevertheless, Fraser does not present a functionalist account of the relation between the productive and other spheres, and I highlight how she theorizes the co-constitution of and struggle between social spheres to illustrate this point. I then draw on the work of Tithi Bhattachrya, Cynthia Arruzza, and Michael Lebowitz to analyze the mechanism through which the spheres of economic production and social reproduction are differentiated and stratified. I argue that capitalist societies socially recognize productive labor as deserving compensation in the form of monetary value, while systematically undervaluing reproductive labor. Because market exchange is the primary means of obtaining goods and services under capitalism, this recognitional difference manifests as a distributional difference that empowers producers and disempowers

reproducers. Finally, I argue that the differentiation of economic and reproductive spheres is stabilized and reinforced through the gendered division of labor, which is produced first by reifying the difference between productive and reproductive labor into opposed social class—producers and reproducers—and then naturalizing those classes as natural kinds—men and women. Reification is supported by the division of labor, which tends to restrict persons to a single kind of labor so that their work appears as a non-accidental characteristic of their person. Naturalization, conversely, draws on and transforms pre-existing patriarchal associations between being biologically female, being socially recognized as a women, and performing reproductive labor, to perpetuate an ideology that assigns women to and devalues reproductive labor.

Horden, John & Dan López de Sa – Social Counting

Social metaphysicians have often treated concrete socially significant items as irreducible social objects, and hence as distinct yet coincident with the material objects or pluralities that somehow "constitute" or "embody" them. So, it is sometimes claimed, social groups are distinct from but coincident with their members, countries are distinct from but coincident with their territories, and banknotes are distinct from but coincident with the corresponding pieces of paper.

Reductive materialism, in contrast, treats such items as ordinary material objects and pluralities that contingently occupy social roles. Thus social groups, countries and banknotes can be respectively identified with the pluralities of people, aggregates of land and pieces of paper that contingently occupy the corresponding roles. Many of the standard arguments for non-reductionism have recently been shown to be faulty (see Hawley 2017; Ludwig 2017; López de Sa and Horden 2021), whereas reductive materialism seems comparatively unmysterious and ontologically parsimonious, as well as arguably better fitting everyday thought and talk about social issues.

In this paper we address two puzzles that arise for reductive materialism in connection with counting.

Sometimes, there seem to be too many material candidates to play a given social role. Take France, for instance. One might wonder how far down into the ground this territory extends, and whether it incorporates the air between or just above its trees and buildings. We are all familiar enough with two-dimensional depictions of France, apparently with sharply defined borders, but what about its three-dimensional surface? And even France's official two-dimensional borders will start to look somewhat fuzzy, viewed close up. At any given time, there may be no definite answer as to whether this boundary encompasses a certain blade of grass, grain of sand, or molecule of water. Thus there would appear to be many overlapping material objects with equal claim to be France. There is a genuine puzzle here, but this is just another instance of the much-discussed "problem of the many", and we'll argue that reductive materialism can deal with it better than its non-reductive rivals.

Conversely, there sometimes seem to be too few material candidates to play multiple social roles. For instance, so far there have been 46 U.S. Presidents, yet only 45 people have been U.S. President. How so? The short answer is that Grover Cleveland was both the 22nd and the 24th President, serving two non-consecutive terms. But how can Cleveland be two presidents, if he's just one person? Here we have an instance of what could be called the "problem of the one", where in certain contexts an object or group is correctly counted more than once, due to its instantiating multiple relevant properties, either synchronically or diachronically. Thus, in the right circumstances, one group of people can be counted as two sports teams, one building can be counted as two establishments, and one piece of paper can be counted as two letters. There is a genuine puzzle here, but as before, we'll argue that reductive materialism can deal with it better than its non-reductive rivals.

Hormio, Säde and Samuli Reijula – What universities know

Universities are knowledge institutions. Knowledge is at the core of their existence. Their constitutive collective end is the acquisition, transmission, and dissemination of information (Miller 2010). Compared to several other knowledge institutions (e.g., think tanks, government research organizations), universities have unusual organizational features. Researchers have different interests, and they are often only partly committed to the organizational agenda. Organizational resources are not allocated on solving some well-determined set of problems, and often there is even no agreement about the quality of the solutions reached. Due to these features, March, Cohen and Olsen (1972) characterized universities as organizational anarchies.

These anarchistic features are not necessarily a weakness. Rather, they reflect the special standing of universities among knowledge institutions. Universities are committed to producing knowledge as a public good and research at universities pushes the boundaries of knowledge. The relevance of a research question or an approach is often revealed only in the future, along with the value of solutions (e.g., the research on mRNA vaccinations). We argue that the distributed, self-organizing mode of knowledge production addresses this challenge by maintaining a diversity of approaches, topics and solutions needed for generating relevant knowledge under uncertainty.

With high level of specialization, fragmentation of knowledge is inevitable. Operating knowledge is compartmentalized knowledge: you need expertise to be selected for an operative role. To count as institutional knowledge, the knowledge must be attached to institutional structure regarding roles and lines of communication. The capacity of an institution to have broad and deep knowledge is based on their ability to pool together knowledge from various individuals and sources. Operating knowledge can resemble distributed cognition, where various distinct subtasks contribute to an overall task, which is the case with complex long-term scientific experiments, like those conducted at CERN's particle physics laboratory (Bird 2014). Requiring all knowledge to be shared knowledge within an institution would be implausible and impractical. In fact, universities, unlike many other knowledge institutions, often appear to have little shared knowledge. Experts disagree among themselves, and the overlap between their knowledge bases is limited. However, universities are rich in operating knowledge thanks to self-governing (quasi-autonomous) researchers engaging in a careful search for knowledge in their (narrow) areas of expertise.

The challenge for universities is to balance the need to preserve conditions for the free creation of operating knowledge, with the need to produce shared solutions for society. Universities should not be conceptualised as institutions with rigid top-level planning and neat division of labour. Instead, we will argue that the somewhat anarchistic nature of universities as knowledge institutions should be embraced. Broad self-autonomy of the researchers is the best way to realize the societal purpose of universities. This means that universities should contain reserves of research questions, solutions, and researchers with different profiles, allowing for useful operating knowledge to appear from unexpected sources. If the autonomy of researchers is capped too tightly through pre-research planning, funding constraints, and impact measurements, universities will lose some of their power as knowledge institutions.

Høyer Toft, Kristian - The normative profile of the deliberative corporate agents

In theory of corporate governance, the market liberal theory of the corporation tends to emphasize the principal-agent model equivalent to rendering the manager or the owner the morally responsible agent (Singer 2019). Call this the dominant view. However, challenging the dominant view are theories of the corporation that emphasizes its (original) political nature being a state authorized and deliberative agent (Ciepley 2018; Scherer & Palazzo 2007).

67

The two kinds of theory of the corporation have different normative profiles; sometimes referred to as the shareholder vs the stakeholder view. The former is governed by the profit-motive – often furthering the private good - whereas the latter is supposed to also include external stakeholders in a conversation about its purpose and strategy and it should contribute to a public (or even common) good. Hence, they exhibit a fundamental difference in normative profiles.

In recent theory of corporate moral agency, Philip Pettit, has argued that his approach is neutral about the normative profile of the corporate agent. Thus, it fits both the private corporation that seeks profits, as well as "clubs, churches, universities, voluntary organizations, political parties and indeed political states" (Pettit 2017).

To challenge Pettits claim to 'all coverage' or neutrality about fit with the two kinds of theory of the corporation (the shareholder vs the stakeholder view) theory of functionalist corporate moral agency is explored.

First, an argument is levelled against the functionalist theory of corporate moral agency (List & Pettit 2011) showing that a difference in normative profiles between corporate agents does matter, since this type of group autonomy-feature does not provide a satisfactory account of such differences in normative profiles.

Second, therefore it seems plausible that the shareholder view presupposes an individualist stance in the theory of corporate moral agency (Rönnegaard 2013), whereas the stakeholder view presupposes a group agent capable of deliberating and revising internal decision procedures. Moreover, the stakeholder view also seems to presuppose that the corporate agent can 'see' the overlap in stakeholders' interests and on that basis can derive a notion of the public good.

The kind of capacity presupposed in the stakeholder view, thus, often assumes that such corporations are more accountable and reflective about the moral stance required situation-wise.

However, such capacities are difficult to account for in the functionalist approach to corporate moral agency.

The paper will then consider what alternative non-functionalist or modified functionalist accounts could match or explain the moral capacity in deliberative corporations, before concluding about the prospects for qualifying corporate moral agency theory to account for differences in normative profiles of corporate agents.

Hubbs, Graham - Aristotle's Four Causes and Accounts of the Ontology of Money

In this presentation I will use Aristotle's account of the four causes of an artifact to study the variety of things that have historically functioned as money and to organize competing theories of money's ontology. Aristotle says that all human-made goods have four causes, which are their matter, form, efficient causal origin, and function. My presentation will show how the study of money can be systematized by characterizing its ontology in terms of these causes. Carefully separating efficient causality from money's function and form allows us to consider the two dominant theories of money— i.e., the orthodox, catallactic theory and its heterodox alternative, chartalism—in a new light. The key difference between these two theories, I argue, is the explanatory order each gives of money's social form and function. Seen in this light, it becomes clear why it is a mistake to look at money's origins to say definitively and without exception what money "really is." Money may function the way that the catallactic theory describes if all money-users treat that theory as true, even if the theory's origin story is false (which the historical record strongly suggests it is). Because money's ontology is social and thus historically dynamic, however, its activities can outstrip what a given theory says is possible, which,

historically, has happened time and time again with respect to the catallactic theory. To appreciate this last point, history is indispensable, as it opens our eyes to blindspots that can be created by treating a theory of historic contingencies as if that theory were describing immutable and eternal facts of nature. By articulating its history within the vocabulary of the Aristotelian framework, we get clearer about the possibilities of money, which just is to get clearer about its ontology. While I am primarily interested in the ontology of money, I hope this presentation provides an example of the methodological fruitfulness of applying Aristotle's account of the four causes to topics in social ontology.

Hugh-Jones, David, Moti Michaeli, & Roí Zultan - Group Reciprocity

Reciprocity is a powerful motivation. People behave towards others as those others behave toward them. At times, reciprocity extends beyond direct reciprocity to include agents who were not part of the initial interaction. Such indirect reciprocity can take two forms. Downstream reciprocity involves treating an agent according to how she treated others. Upstream reciprocity refers to an agent treating another agent as unrelated others have previously treated her. The evolutionary literature proposes mechanisms by which downstream reciprocity can evolve. Upstream reciprocity, however, is more difficult to explain in evolutionary terms.

We introduce the concept of Group reciprocity. Group reciprocity is a form of upstream reciprocity, whereby the action of one individual is reciprocated towards other members of that individual's group. Group reciprocity can explain the spreading of intergroup conflict but also helps to contain intergroup conflict from spreading beyond group boundaries. We argue that humans have an innate tendency to group-reciprocate, and that group reciprocity can evolve as a result of a group-level selection process. Thus, we aim to study both the ultimate and the proximate mechanisms underlying group reciprocity.

We show experimentally that group reciprocity emerges even in artificial groups lacking social context created in the laboratory. Participants played a trust game with a member of another group. In the next stage of the experiment, participants allocated a fixed sum of money between two other participants, one of whom can be (a) a member of the same group as the allocator (ingroup favoritism treatment); (b) the allocator's trust game partner (direct reciprocity treatment); or (c) a member of the trust game partner's group (group reciprocity treatment). We found that not all actions trigger group reciprocity. People reciprocated all actions (trustor and trustee) towards the perpetrator, but only trustee actions—being unambiguously intentional norm violations—towards the perpetrator's other group members.

We develop an evolutionary model of group reciprocity. We show that group labels are a sufficient condition for the evolution of group reciprocity. The intuition is that, with group reciprocity, when an individual helps an outgroup member, she incurs an individual cost but increases the probability that the helped agent will help members of her group in the future. Thus, helping promotes a pure public good, namely the group reputation. Selfish types, who never help, benefit individually but harm their group. Thus, groups with a higher share of group reciprocators have, on average, higher fitness. If the benefit to cost ratio of helping is large enough, selfish types—despite having the highest fitness in their group—have lower fitness than group reciprocators overall. This intuition is supported and generalized by computer simulations.

Hyska, Megan - What kind of object is a social movement?

Social movements are of intense interest in both political philosophy and the social sciences, and a huge amount of work has been done to theorize why they arise and how they transform society. This

paper observes that there are still, however, open questions about the ontology of social movements qua objects.

Social movements are sometimes characterized as events: for instance, as "rational attempts by excluded groups to mobilize...political leverage" (McAdam 1999, 36-37) or as "sustained campaign[s] of claim making" (Tilly & Tarrow 2015, 11). But it is also common to talk about social movements not as the events of such attempts and campaigns, but a kind of complex social entity that brings about, or otherwise participates in, these events. For instance, while acknowledging that movements are different from "`groups,' `organizations,' and `networks'", Avery Kolers (2015) treats them as akin to these entities insofar as they are "composed of individuals" (581). And In his treatment, Rodrigo Nunes (2011) cashes out talk of movements in terms of talk about networks of individuals (20-25), allowing that an individual can be "in" a network— again suggesting that a movement is a certain kind of complex social object.

While it is entirely common then to treat movements as objects, most of the substantial work in characterizing social movements them has treated them as events. This paper, in contrast, asks what social movements, qua objects, are like. And this question is a challenging one because social movements are famously internally heterogeneous: members may differ with respect to their tactical preferences, their social identities, and their degree of commitment and activity in service of the movement. Some have moreover challenged the assumption that members of a movement will even share a goal (Kolers 2016, Nunes 2011). Furthermore, a movement, while often encompassing more formal organizations, does not typically have a formalized leadership structure or decision-making protocol.

In approaching the question of what, then, could possibly unify people into a social movement-qua-object, what I suggest is that we should consider why we are interested in talking about social movements as objects at all. I argue that a major function of movement talk is explanatory: social movements are posited as part of an explanation of subsequent social change. This is most obvious in backward-looking movement talk, when the social change to be explained has already come to pass. But I argue that even in present-tense movement talk, movements are posited as part of political theories about what will explain certain changes when or if they come to pass, and contestations about the boundaries of social movements are then really clashes between different theories of political change— that is, between different explanatory theories.

My project in this paper is thus to articulate an account of movementhood that renders movements-qua-objects relevant to this sort of social explanation. Along the way, the question of what kind of objects movements are is drawn into a larger nexus of questions concerning the role of macro-level social objects in social explanation.

If an indispensability argument is invoked to defend the idea that groups really do have psychological attitudes in anything like the sense in which individuals do, then we are in need of an understanding of what it is to act on such attitudes. Psychological attitudes of the sort that are familiarly attributed to groups are the sort that figure in intentional, rationalizing explanations of action. So if groups genuinely have psychological attitudes in anything like the sense in which individuals do, then those attitudes are presumably indispensable to a form of intentional, rationalizing explanation of action.

Jackson, Bernard - Failing (the) discipline: a black philosopher's struggle with writing about reparations

For most of my academic career, which is most of my adult life, I have avoided conversations centered around reparations for the descendants of slavery. I thought it served as a distraction, a way for black

public figures to avoid what I took to be the more important conversations: namely, those centered around domestic violence in black households, the paucity of black men who graduate from college, and the lack of reliable resources—material and human—in the schools that serve marginalized persons. However, I have been forced to admit that problems I have identified above are intimately tied to socioeconomic circumstances, and one of the causal factors contributing to these circumstances is a lack of material resources. Blacks were promised forty acres and a mule during Reconstruction and Andrew Johnson reneged on that promise. Unlike ethnic-American whites who were vilified during the first half of the twentieth century but rewarded after their service in World War Two, blacks received none of the benefits of the GI bill. Finally, the good will that Lyndon Johnson felt that white Americans should feel for black Americans, and the initiatives began during his presidency, was not echoed—and the initiatives were systematically dismantled--by Ronald Reagan. Part of the Reagan revolution was a revolution in attitude: black men were dangerous and black women gamed the welfare system. These actions by members of the most important group persons in United States history—namely, the Presidents of the United States—served to keep black Americans in a position of subservience. While my white friends receive handsome sums for down payments on their first homes from their parents—my neighbor's parents bought him his first home with cash—while the Jewish-American woman who negotiated the installation of our solar panels does not have to worry about student loan debt because her parents footed the bill, and while the parents of a number of my colleagues can afford to quit their jobs and care for their grandchildren while their adult children work, we blacks folks are forced to take out Federal Housing Authority loans because we don't have large down payments, to pay back our student loans for the majority of our lives, and to work part-time and apply for government assistance in order to adequately care for our children. This is not the situation of every black American, but it is the situation of far too many of us. For these reasons, a discussion of reparations is vitally important.

In this essay, I engage in an exploration of the issues and challenges surrounding reparations. I present the work of three thinkers who have offered excellent arguments for engaging in the work in reparations. In addition, I discuss some important challenges to the call for reparations. As should be clear, I believe that despite the challenges to the arguments for reparations, engaging in such a program is morally required.

Janik, Bartosz - Grounding Legal Facts

Some legal scholars want to know what exists at the real, fundamental layer of legal reality. Usually, the primary assumption of their analysis is that there are social and legal facts and there is a substantial difference between these two, meaning that there is no easy way to reduce the legal facts to social facts. This might be due to the normativity of legal facts. Keeping that in mind, the problem of legal fundamentality and reality boils down to analyzing the relation between the legal and the social, in other words, the apparently nonreductive relation between social facts and legal facts. In recent years, there has been a considerable movement aiming at analyzing legal entities using the tools of social ontology, treating legal entities as artifacts (Burazin, Marmor, Himma).

The main task of this paper will be to analyze the relationship between legal and social facts in terms of metaphysical grounding and to analyze the potential link between collective intentionality (which stands behind social norms and social conventions that are the metaphysical basis for legal facts) and metaphysical dependence. The two main tasks related to this inquiry will be to stress out the potential tension between the causal creation (and explanation) of legal entities by the collective entity and non-causal metaphysical explanation of dependence between social and legal facts by means of grounding and to analyze the problem of mind-dependence of social facts and objective character of metaphysical grounding. I will argue that using the right conceptual schema (grounding separatism

and special nature of the legal grounding) those problems might be resolved and a unified picture of the legal ontology in terms of grounding might be given.

Jenkins, Ben - Ontological Injustice and Inverse Bias

In this talk I bring the literature on ontological injustice into contact with the literature on biases, arguing that this can aid efforts to reduce the implicated harms and wrongs. Ontological injustice occurs when the bare fact that someone belongs to a social category is wrongful. This is the case when, for instance, the operative criteria for social category membership wrongfully includes or excludes certain individuals (Dembroff, forthcoming). This is also the case when social category membership is partly constituted by the application of wrongful constraints and enablements (Jenkins, 2020). I begin this talk by covering these established varieties of ontological injustice. I then turn to the challenge faced by theorists of ontological injustice: identifying ways to disrupt and amend those social practices which amount to ontological injustice. Progress can be made on this challenge by identifying the mechanisms by which we attribute social category membership to others. For instance, if this process involved our beliefs about social categories, then by altering these beliefs we might be able to prevent instances of ontological injustice.

Here I argue that the mechanisms responsible for many social category attributions are inverse biases. I draw on Johnson's (2020) functional definition of social bias, to bring inverse biases into focus. According to Johnson, biases are mental constructs that reliably output predictions in cases where the individual has insufficient information to be certain of something. Social biases are a subset of biases which take, by way of an input, the attribution of a social category to a target (i.e. a person), and then reliably output a prediction about the other properties exhibited by the target. For example, having attributed the social category [WOMAN] to a target, a bias might generate the prediction that the target has the property [LONG HAIR]. I use the term "inverse bias" to refer to those biases that move in the opposite direction, beginning with the attribution of some non-social properties and generating a prediction about the target's social category membership. Someone may, for instance, have a mental construct which takes information about a target's hair and reliably outputs a prediction about their gender.

Not all instances of inverse bias will give rise to ontological injustice – some may not be wrongful at all, instead acting as normatively neutral social inferences. But many instances of ontological injustice will involve the implementation of an inverse bias. I support this claim with two considerations. First, many social category attributions occur in the same contexts as biases – when we have insufficient information to be certain about something. And second, social category attributions occur in the same capacities as biases – often automatically, uncontrolled or relatively unconscious. I close with a discussion of the lessons learnt by identifying social categorisation as instances of inverse bias. Namely, that it might be easier to prevent the attribution of social categories than to alter the active criteria for social category membership (Stafford, Holroyd & Scaife, 2018). And that social category attributions are likely to have affective and behavioural accompaniments (Brownstein, 2018).

Jonker, Julian, & David Dick - Crises of Identity in Social Ontology

What does a bank run have in common with a civil war? Beyond both being times of strife, they both involve the same distinctive kind of crisis of social ontology.

While accounts vary concerning what social facts are required to create social institutions (be they attitudes, behavioral regularities or coordinated equilibrium points), it is generally agreed that social institutions depend on these social facts to exist. One mode of failure for a social institution agents simply ceasing to exhibit the relevant attitudes or behaviors. Here, the social institution fails by fading out of existence. Examples of such failures are the Roman denarius and the Ottoman Empire.

But bank runs and civil wars aren't like that. They are cases where the institution survives, but the interlocking attitudes or behaviors become misaligned in a way that causes a crisis of identity. The currency in a bank run still exists, but its value and use are disputed. The nation in a civil war still exists, but the source and scope of its authority are disputed. The misalignment stems from the realization that the agreement involved in the underlying social fact (the interlocking attitudes or behavioral regularities) is incomplete in some way, so that individuals now disagree, or come to see that they have disagreed for some time about what the currency is worth or where the borders of the nation lie.

Crises of identity of this kind are pervasive. That they might also be regular is suggested by financial assets, which suffer crises of identity when individuals come to doubt that the nominal value of the asset reflects its real value. Consider assets which have the form of an obligation backed by some collateral. If we come to doubt that the backing relation is good, we come to doubt the value of the obligation and therefore the nominal value of the asset. Crises of this same form can and do occur for other economic, political, and religious institutions, though they arise not because of doubts about backing by collateral, but about some other element of the institution which had thought to be the subject of consensus.

Since such crises are pervasive and regular, and can lead to existential failure, the question arises whether they are built into the structure of social institutions and therefore inevitable. The Rawlsian project of political liberalism is an attempt to secure a particular social institution (the just state) against this sort of crisis, by showing that the just state can maintain the right kind of overlapping consensus amongst reasonable citizens and thereby stably reproduce itself. The observations in this paper point to an open question, parallel to the Rawlsian project, but posed to all social ontologists. We need to understand whether social institution can be stable in the face of crises of identity; and, particularly if crises are inevitable, we need to study the pathologies and life cycle of social kinds.

Jordan, J. Scott - Wild Empathy: Cultural Work and Infrastructures of Suffering

The purpose of the present talk is to propose there exists a certain, practical danger to conceptualizing empathy and racism as socioemotional phenomena. Ever since Premack and Woodruff's (1978) invention of the concept, "theory of mind" (ToM), many psychologists have believed the mental states of others are simply unavailable to us, because all we can actually see of others is their observable behavior. As a result, any notions of what another might want, believe, or think are easily conceptualized as cognitive inferences we derive from their actions. Once the public comes to believe this idea, that empathy and racism exist in the head, it simultaneously attains license to unwittingly perpetuate the cultural conditions that sustain increasingly sociopathic, racist infrastructures. For within the ToM way of thinking, if I, myself, consciously empathize with out-group members and never consciously experience racist thoughts or beliefs, I can simultaneously believe that the ways in which I live my life—the neighborhood I live in, the car I drive, and the clothes I wear—have absolutely nothing to do with empathy and racism.

The present talk will propose that is precisely this disassociation of empathy, racism, and culturally-lived life that keeps members of privileged culture committed to mental conceptualizations of empathy and racism (Craig, Rahko, & Jordan, in press). In short, believing in mental accounts of empathy and racism allows individuals to live and experience the material wealth of privileged life, while simultaneously believing they harbor no such mental states and, as a result, are actually anti-racist.

As an alternative, I propose an approach to empathy and racism based on Wild Systems Theory (Jordan, 2021, 2013), an ontology of human sociality that avoids subjective-objective distinctions and,

73

instead, conceptualizes all living systems as multi-scale, self-sustaining embodiments of context. In brief, such a positions asserts that every aspect of our being—our bodies, perceptions, actions, and thoughts—emerge spontaneously and continually within the phylogenetic, cultural, social, developmental, and dyadic times-scales of context in which we are perpetually embedded. In short, we are embodiments of all of these contexts. We are embodied aboutness. We are meaning.

Within the WST framework, racism and empathy are conceptualized in ways that admit to having what are traditionally referred to as "cognitive" components, while simultaneously extending them into the world as matters of multi-scale sustainment. This transforms the question of empathy and racism from whether or not one harbors racist thoughts, to an examination of the multi-scale impacts ones being has on the lives of others. Cultural infrastructures therefore—the neighborhood, the car, the clothes— can be seen as collectively generated systems of work and resources that allow the privileged to effectively avoid contact with those whose underprivileged lives are kept so by the lived lives of the privileged; what one might refer to as infrastructures of suffering.

Juzaszek, Maciej and Adam Dyrda - Moral encroachment on institutional belief

Institutions qua artefacts exist because certain people (folk, officials) believe that they do exist, expect others to accept such beliefs and act on them. Moreover, agents believe an institution exists because they need it, though they may not fully recognise their beliefs' complex functions or the motives that causally underlie such beliefs. Institutional beliefs are thus held by people (not institutions), primarily officials, sometimes ordinary folk, and through which the institutional reality is being coined.

The main problem we want to address is the problem of proper epistemic justification of such institutional beliefs. Proper justification for holding such beliefs is that other people have them as well; such justification is merely instrumental and subsidiary, rather than primary or substantial. The epistemic-ethical justification of foundational beliefs amounts to checking whether beliefs about an institution are formed in the right way. Since this epistemological question is also at root ethical, the domain of our inquiry is rightly set within so-called ethics of belief.

According to the epistemic purists (e.g. G. Gardiner), epistemic justification of a belief depends solely on epistemological factors, especially evidence and the cognitive abilities of a believer. Practical or moral factors do not influence them. However, recently many authors (e.g. R. Basu, Bolinger) have argued that epistemic justification sometimes relies on moral factors, especially when the moral stakes of having a particular belief (usually false) are high. Such a position is called moral encroachment. It morally requires the believer to consider relevant alternatives to the belief X, even if X is properly epistemically justified.

In the paper, we argue that moral encroachment exists in the sphere of institutional beliefs in its robust form, i.e. that there are both situations in which moral reasons order the believer a) to take into account relevant alternatives that from a purely evidentialist point of view would be omitted; and b) to omit relevant possibilities that from a purely evidentialist point of view would be taken into account. Whether we are dealing with a) or b), we call the direction of moral encroachment. We claim that moral reasons behind moral encroachment on institutional beliefs may be e,g. the well-being of the members of the society; however, the direction is determined by other factors, such as social order, social cohesion, the rule of law, democracy etc.

For instance, in a badly-ordered society (the laking rule of law, democratic values, pluralism of ideas etc.), the institutional moral encroachment takes direction a). Let's imagine that the citizens of the Republic of Polavia believe the court, unconstitutionally created and filled by the government, is a proper court. Even though their belief is epistemologically justified because they are told so by a

reliable source, e.g. prime minister, moral encroachment requires them to consider relevant alternatives that the authorities lie or manipulate. The court does not have any legal legitimacy. The moral stakes are high because the rule of law is in danger, which may result in a risk for the well-being of Polavians.

Kane, Laura - The Right to be Forgotten: A Relational Defense

A tension at the center of Google Spain v. AEPD involves the 'right to be forgotten' and how it balances competing rights to privacy with rights to information. The "right to be forgotten" is the right to have inaccurate and dated information about an agent removed from search results if there is no compelling justification for its continued accessibility. Those who would interpret the Court's decision as granting individuals a license to erase information from the web at will are reading the decision more radically than it is. Rather, the Court's decision tries to ensure that when interests in being forgotten online are at stake, certain kinds of information – information such as non-violent misdemeanors or embarrassing associations – should not be as easily and readily accessible. Importantly, this does not mean that delisted information has been erased and cannot be accessed in other ways. Instead, in the absence of public interest, the decision holds that such information should not be easily accessible and instantly available merely by typing a person's name into Google.

In this paper I will argue that a "right to be forgotten" on search engines like Google is a right to privacy that can be defended by appealing to the ways in which privacy affords us the opportunity to establish and maintain the kinds of relationships that we want. This defense is based on an access-model of privacy, but one that crucially focuses on privacy's importance for our ability to form meaningful relationships with others. This view differs from the control-based view (Fried) and the dignity-based view (Warren and Brandeis), because this view involves what privacy does for us in relation to others. Specifically, the value of privacy is not about keeping things from others, but about creating meaningful conditions to share intimate details of our lives with those whom we want to forge deeper connections. The right to be forgotten, then, is important in relation to the values of privacy and accountability because it enables us to form relationships with others that can be moderated by the access we allow others to private information about ourselves. As such, this right makes it possible to hold ourselves accountable within relationships because we can reveal details from our past on our own terms in ways that foster trust and intimacy.

Karagiannopoulos, Yorgos - Money and partial (in)dependence: On the limits of traditional (anti)realist frameworks.

Two are the century old competing ontologies on money: The commodity theory holds that money is a liquid commodity (i.e., a social object) whose sole use-value derives from it serving as medium of exchange (Marx 1867; Menger 1892). By contradistinction, the credit theory holds that money's exchange value derives from it being a credible medium, i.e., a social relationship (Innes 1914; Ingham 2004). From a metaphysical standpoint, the dispute reflects the controversy between realism and anti-realism. Those who advance accounts according to which the essential properties of money as a universal are "science-independent", to use Mäki's terms (2020), are realist. By contrast, those who build up frameworks that focus on the credibility of money insofar as the latter is conceived as relatively arbitrary and contingent, are anti-realists (see Graeber 2011). However, although different accounts emphasize on different features of money, they more or less agree on the constitutive profile of money (Lawson 2016): (i) money mediates exchanges of values (ii) money is a symbol of credibility. Rather their dispute rests on the relative priority of (i) over (ii) or the other way around (see Guala 2020).

I argue that the metaphysical controversy fails to hit the right spot, because it lacks the proper tools to understand the peculiarities of the social world. Such a peculiarity is money. The constitutive profile of money shows that according to (i) money is mind independent while according to (ii) it is mind dependent. I urge to take money's constitutive profile at face value. That means to understand money as partially independent of us, agents.

However, according to the traditional metaphysical frameworks of realism and anti-realism (see Boyd 1989; Devitt 1991; Wright 1992; Psillos 1999), partial (in)dependence is meaningless: something either is or is not agent independent. I present three other variations of dependence: science/theory (in)dependence, casual (in)dependence, existential (in)dependence. I argue that they fail to deliver the properly comprehend money's features too. Therefore, either we must reject that there is partial independence or provide an alternative metaphysical framework. I opt for the second position and present briefly the criterion of modifiability. This criterion allows us to be more or less realists about the entity in question with respect to the latter's ability to be modified. Since money's constitutive profile includes credibility and assuming that credibility is modifiable by social relations then money has an anti-realist touch. At the same time, it is less modifiable than, say, a fable because part of money's constitutive profile refers to casual powers that obtain with relative autonomy.

Kasar, Pelin - Questioning The Role of Makers' Intentions in Thomasson's Account of Artefacts

According to Amie Thomasson's theory of artifacts, an artefact belongs to a certain artifactual kind only if its maker intended to produce an instance of that artifactual kind (2007). She reaches this ontological consequence by making conceptual analysis of artifactual kind terms. In her account, human concepts and intentions are relevant to the nature of artifactual kinds on two levels: first (1) is speaker conceptions and second (2) is maker's intentions (2009): In the first level, we ground and re-ground our artifactual kind terms by appealing to a creators' intended kind. I intend to refer to an object by saying "chair", if I believe that it is the product of successful intentions to create a chair. This is the level human concepts are involved in the nature of artifactual kinds by establishing the unifying feature of artifactual kinds in general. As a result of a grounder's appeal to creator intentions, natures of artifactual kinds are constituted by human intentions on a second level by makers' intentions regarding what features are relevant to kind membership (Ibid). This is the part Thomasson's account identifies an artefact too firmly with the intentions of its creators. According to this view, an object is a chair only if it is the product of successful intentions to create a chair.

In my paper, I argue that Thomasson's theory of artifacts is not entirely consistent with our use of artifactual kind terms as it is supposed to be. There is a serious tension between our application of artifactual kind terms and the nature of artifactual kinds in her account. This is due to the reliance of her analysis on an assumption about speakers' conceptions of category membership of an object when grounding an artifactual term. She regards speakers' conceptions more fixed and context-independent than they actually are by sharing Paul Bloom's assumption about our application of artifactual kind terms. As a result, her theory relies heavily on creator intentions in membership conditions of an artifactual kind and this makes her account too narrow.

In order to show how Thomasson's assumption regarding the concepts of grounders affects her account, first (1) I discuss her methodology, namely the conceptual analysis used to reach conclusions about nature of artefact kinds. Then (2) I focus on Bloom's account since his account of the application of artifactual kind terms is key to understanding Thomasson's assumption about speakers' concepts. Finally (3) after I present my objection to Thomasson's account and consider a possible case where I

am going to asses her two responses; I am going to show that her responses are not tenable by drawing on work of Barbara Malt and Steven Sloman.

Kazankov, Denis - Multiple Groundability of Social Kinds

My talk aims to be a contribution to the debate about the ground-theoretic metaphysics of social kinds. It seems that many social kinds, K, can have multiple distinct grounds: a fact of the form [x is a member of K] can be fully grounded in multiple alternative facts across different social arrangements. For example, there are several alternative facts in virtue of which x may be a politician, taxpayer, convict or legal authority depending on what social arrangements are in place.

There are two main options on how to interpret the multiple groundability of social kinds.

(Option 1) The full grounding conditions of facts of the form [x is a member of K] as fixed by specific social arrangements are not equivalent to the real definition of the kind denoted by 'K'. Therefore, a variance in these conditions across different social arrangements does not lead to a variance in what social kind 'K' stands for.

(Option 2) The full grounding conditions of facts of the form [x is a member of K] as fixed by specific social arrangements are equivalent to the real definition of the kind denoted by 'K'. Therefore, a variance in these conditions across different social arrangements leads to a variance in what social kind 'K' stands for.

To illustrate, according to Option 1, what, by definition, it is to be a politician is a distinct and more general fact irreducible to the specific conditions about what, given certain social arrangements, makes individual people politicians. By contrast, Option 2 denies this claim. Accordingly, it implies that, even though we mistakenly tend to assume that the concept 'politician' refers to the same social kind in all alternative social arrangements, its extension is, in fact, variable across these arrangements.

I will argue that we should not content ourselves with the above two options because each of them faces a serious problem. On the one hand, Option 1 flies in the face of the widely endorsed principle of Grounding Necessitarianism (GN).

(GN) If the fact ϕ grounds the fact ψ, then, necessarily, if ϕ, then ψ.

On the other hand, Option 2 violates Universality.

(Universality) Social kinds are universally applicable even to those objects that satisfy their grounding conditions but are situated outside the social arrangements fixing these conditions.

The violation of Universality is problematic especially with respect to those social kinds that feature in our normative judgements about social phenomena that take place outside our own society. I will consider possible responses that the advocates of each option can take to preserve GN and Universality (respectively) but argue that they fail.

My conclusion will be that we should engineer social kind concepts so that they no longer denote the kinds that are susceptible to the above problems. According to my proposed revision, social kind concepts should denote the kinds whose real definitions are normatively thick and equivalent to their full grounding conditions. Yet, these full grounding conditions present an exclusive disjunction of two sets of grounding sub-conditions. While the first set applies to a given kind only if it is normatively insignificant and varies across different social arrangements, the second set applies to it only if it is normatively significant and is fixed by normatively ideal social arrangements. I will show that, under the proposed revision, GN is secured, and Universality is violated only in unproblematic cases.

Keen, Emily - Frames of Reference

In this research program, the researcher has reflected on how members of a collective group, in this case a committee of volunteers have made sense of language statements and the context of a social reality. Language statements are a linguistic medium for the communication of mental intentions, conceptual thoughts, beliefs and perceptual judgements. An individual's sense of reality is their ability to psychologically grasp and structure attributes in the mind, by way of intentionally, logically relating the properties of new information to the properties of existing knowledge. This study therefore questions how the properties of new information are framed, informed and reasoned by individual's existing intentions and perceptions.

During this study, the researcher interviewed and observed the discourse of a collective group of volunteers. Each participant involved in this study was a member of a committee who was responsible for planning an annual community folk festival.

In completion of this study, the researcher investigated Roderick Chisholm's realist school of thought, epistemological commitments and theory of categories. Dialectically combining Chisholm's metaphysical and epistemological commitments has provided the researcher with the fundamental logic, reasoning and metatheory needed to investigate how participant's beliefs, thoughts and intentions influence their sense of a social context and of language.

As an outcome of this investigation the researcher developed a 9-step analytical method for the analysis of group discourse. This study has also identified how types of expressions and utterance are used by individuals within a group to reason, relate and structure attributes that are consistent with the individual's existing frames of reference and intentions.

Keinänen, Markku, Arto Laitinen, and Jani Hakkarainen - Ontological dependence and social ontology

Relations of dependence are central to social reality. Groups are dependent on the individuals who are their members, and individual members are in a different way dependent on the group. Institutions and artefacts may in different ways be dependent on human intentionality and on their natural or material basis.

In this talk we explore whether the various analyses of "ontological dependence" in general metaphysics (Simons 1987, Fine 1995, and Tahko & Lowe 2015) capture the main kinds of dependence in social ontology.

Dependence can be analyzed modally or non-modally. X's ontological dependence on Y may concern X's existence, identity, or essence. Dependence can be a one-on-one relation or one-on-many relation, and it can be rigid (dependence on certain individuals) or non-rigid (dependence on individuals of a certain kind, or dependence on the existence of some mass). The main aim of the talk is to provide a map of these, with illustrations drawn from social ontology. We will also examine whether the main kinds of dependence in social ontology are thereby readily covered, or whether further work is needed.

Khalidi, Muhammad Ali - Social Historical Kinds

Among the many kinds that we identify in the social world, some are individuated synchronically, according to their current properties or features, while others are individuated at least partly diachronically, according to their origin, history, or trajectory. For example, government, marriage, and money are primarily identified with respect to the synchronic roles that they play in the social world. Meanwhile, parliament, baptism, and bitcoin are individuated at least in part in terms of their

origin or history. A particular institution would not be a parliament — at least not in the strict sense — unless it can be traced back to the Magna Carta. Similarly, a particular social ritual would not be a baptism unless it descends from certain practices that date back to the origins of Christianity. On closer inspection, things are not so simple, since history seems also to enter into the individuation of the first group of social kinds. For example, something would not be a token of money unless it has the right provenance, say, unless it was minted in the requisite way by the treasury in a certain jurisdiction. Thus, one can distinguish between token-historical kinds, like baptism, which have the very same origin or history, and type-historical kinds, like money, which have the same type of origin or history in different societies at different times (Franklin-Hall 2017). Moreover, when it comes to many token-historical kinds, their members have been copied from the very same exemplar, blueprint, or template (Millikan 1999). Such kinds are often also hybrid, being individuated partly based on their history and partly on their synchronic features. Indeed, they tend to be copied precisely because they have certain causal properties or powers. These distinctions bring out important differences among social kinds, but they also point to some fruitful similarities among seemingly diverse kinds in the social domain (such as baptism and bitcoin), as well as between historical kinds in the social and the biological domains (such as species). This paper will focus on two issues that arise in conjunction with historical social kinds. The first has to do with different reasons for individuating social kinds historically, depending on whether these are token- or type-historical kinds. The second concerns different grounds for individuating social kinds diachronically or historically, whether type- or token-historical kinds. In some cases, it seems to relate to establishing authenticity or legitimacy (as in the case of money), rather than understanding etiology or tracking a causal trajectory, but I will argue that this emphasis on authenticity may only be apparent.

Klix, Nikolai - On the common approach towards societal diversity

Societal diversity seems to elicit demand for a distinct response, and it has become the standard social convention to frame this response in terms of ´toleration´/´tolerance´ to indicate acceptance of this diversity. In this paper, I argue that the common approach on societal diversity should be reframed in terms of a ´respect´-based concept in instances that are genuinely based on a neutral or positive evaluation.

In the conventional conception of ´toleration´, famously elaborated e.g. Galeotti (2002) and Forst (2003) and widely held in the scholarly perspective, the concept is based on a negative evaluation of the subject matter. However, considering the remarkably improved common approach towards societal diversity in recent decades (the advancement of same-sex marriage laws being a paradigmatic example) and the ongoing custom to frame this approach in terms of ´toleration´ in public discourses, it seems that the common perception of ´toleration´ may have gradually shifted. Namely, in that, a negative evaluation of the subject matter is not necessarily postulated anymore when applying ´tolerance´ in discourses of societal diversity. Hence, the scope of ´toleration´ would have become extended.

Nevertheless, if we assume that ´tolerance´ could be equally based on a negative, neutral, or positive evaluation, there would be no clear means to infer this evaluation from each instance of usage of the concept. Therefore, I advocate as a decidedly normative point, that ´tolerance´ is societally too significant to be exposed to differing and imprecise conceptions. I defend an unambiguous meaning of ´toleration´ which is given by the conventional conception where the negative core evaluation cannot be convincingly discarded from the concept. Moreover, the conventional conception expresses genuinely what the concept was originally aimed for without extending its´ scope implausibly.

It appears that while the common approach regarding societal diversity matters has on many occasions evolved beyond what is conventionally considered ´tolerance´, we still resort to the concept since there is no generally acknowledged alternative term available. Hence, language seems to trail behind the social reality it ought to describe. This, in turn, calls for a revision of the generally used expression for the common approach to societal diversity. I suggest applying the research perspective of conceptual engineering for this operational move. The rearticulation of the common approach on societal diversity should be based on a concept that features acceptance without a precedent negative evaluation, thus distinctly departing from ´tolerance´.

As ´respect´ is genuinely based on a neutral or positive evaluation of its subject matter, it appears intuitively as a plausible replacement. I argue, nonetheless, that ´tolerance´ and ´respect´ are too dissimilar in their conceptual range for straightforward substitution. Therefore, I propose to rearticulate the public societal approach to societal diversity with a conceptually engineered more fine-grained conceptual variant of ´respect´ that qualifies as a replacement of ´tolerance´. Reorienting the common approach on diversity in terms of a ´respect´-based concept provides a more adequate articulation to describe contemporary societal reality and bears potential for rectifying relations of subordination.

Klosek, Rafal - The Ontology of the Basic Structure

G. A. Cohen (1997) famously criticized John Rawls's ([1971] 1999) restriction of the principles of justice to the basic structure of society. He argued that the site of distributive justice also extends to that of personal behaviour and not just that of the institutions in the basic structure. Cohen's criticism has attracted great critical attention (Julius 2003; Pogge 2000; Scheffler 2006; Williams 1998). However, in this paper, I will focus on a much less explored feature of Cohen's argument, namely, the assumption that if we take basic structure to include social conventions, then principles of justice would have to make demands on individuals in everyday private behaviours. I will argue that this claim presupposes a particular understanding of the relationship between agency and structure which is informed by Cohen's commitment to methodological individualism. I argue that Cohen relies on an implausible assumption about the ability of private individuals to shape social conventions. By clarifying this aspect of his criticism and contrasting it with Rawls's own view on the relationships between basic structure and individual agency, I develop a defence of Rawls's restriction of the principles of justice to the basic structure of society.

Knudsen, Nicolai - Shared Ethical Demands: Trust and Responsibility in Unorganized Groups

Human beings cooperate in organized ways by committing to unifying decision-making procedures; they cooperate in unorganized ways by tracking and responding to each other's behavior. This paper presents a novel argument that unorganized groups—groups without a unifying decision-making procedure—can be morally responsible for their actions and omissions. More specifically, I argue that unorganized groups become morally responsible by being exposed to what I call a shared ethical demand.

A shared ethical demand exists when it is salient to a plurality of agents that another agent depends on them to perform a morally desirable group action, no matter their degree of organization. Exposure to a shared ethical demand renders an unorganized group morally responsible because the shared ethical demand institutes a network of reactive attitudes between the moral patient (or trustor) and the group members as well as between the group members themselves, assuming, with Strawson, that reactive attitudes trace moral responsibility. Drawing on the moral phenomenology of the Danish philosopher and theologian K.E. Løgstrup, I argue that these reactive attitudes are essentially

networks of trust in the sense that they are interconnected attitudes between agents who depend on each other where this dependence gives each agent a normative and motivating reason for caring about those agents that depend on them. Discussing fictional accounts of moral responsibility in unorganized groups, I show that once we understand the role of trust in shared ethical demands, we also understand what motivates members of unorganized groups to take part in group actions and what makes negative reactive attitudes appropriate when unorganized groups fail to satisfy the shared ethical demands imposed upon them.

In Section 1, I illustrate how shared ethical demands give rise to reactive attitudes within and towards unorganized groups with reference to a scene from Ian McEwan's novel Enduring Love. In Section 2, I argue that current accounts of group responsibility fail to capture what is essential about these reactive attitudes. Section 3 draws on Løgstrup to spell out the intimate connection between ethical demands, trust, moral responsibility, and reactive attitudes. Finally, in Section 4, I show that shared ethical demands institute networks of trust and that these networks of trust render unorganized groups morally responsible in the sense that these relations of trust provide (4.1) a framework for determining which potential group action is morally desirable, (4.2) an account of why each member has a sufficient reason to take part in a morally desirable group action when no organization and no doxastic evidence assures them that others will also join, and (4.3) the basis upon which we can morally evaluate both the group as a whole as well as the contribution of each member in a way that aligns with the moral psychology found in Enduring Love.

Kobow, Beatrice Sasha - Background, Interbeing and Nothingness – Collective Intentionality from an Intercultural, Ecological Perspective

In this contribution, I present my latest ongoing research. After having done substantial work on the notion of the 'background' as a feature of contemporary work in Social Ontology (and linking the semantic-pragmatic-analytical with the phenomenological-continental root of this branch of philosophy), I now turn to demands for a non-ideal Social Ontology (presented from a feminist angle). The (applied, real-world) issues which demand our attention today (and are pointed out by the feminist critique), such as equality, social cohesion and solidarity, can be rendered comprehensively as 'ecological concerns'. (For example, the quest for global justice as economic equality from north to south is voiced and understood today as the concern of 'climate justice'.) A comparison between the 'background' and the notion of 'nothingness' in Eastern thought (in Shizuteru Ueda's work, for example) shows the remarkable congruence of these two models. I stipulate that a transposition of answers might be feasible. Thus, the idea of 'interbeing' might be useful for Western Social Ontologists in allowing them to adjust their notion of 'collective intentionality' to an ecological perspective.

Koch, Heiner - Structural Domination

There are many things that limit our freedom. Sometimes people are not responsible for these limitations even if they collectively cause them in some way. Climate change, effects of capitalistic markets, pandemics like SARS-CoV-2 or global injustices are just some examples. But if we cannot identify people who are responsible it is not immediately clear who has to change behaviour in order to rectify these limitations.

Three main approaches can be identified to deal with this problem:

In republicanism Lovett and Pettit see these limitations as structural, background conditions or as "vitiation" that are problematic if they lead to domination between agents. "Structural domination" is only used to refer to structural causes of interpersonal domination. While republican critics argued

for theorizing the role of structures more intensively only Hayward (2011) thinks that structures themselves can actually dominate.

Many theorists instead try to develop theories that allow them to hold people responsible for their behaviour, even if their behaviour does not make a difference to the problematic effect. Participatory intent (Kutz 2000), causal contribution (Hohl 2017) or consequences (Kagan 2011) are assumed to be sufficient.

A third approach consists in avoiding the attribution of responsibility for past behaviour. Young (2011) instead attributes responsibility for future behaviour to rectify structural injustices. Haslanger (2004) writes about structural oppression and identifies structures as political problems and not so much individual behaviour.

Structural limitations are central to some of the biggest challenges we face in society. Contrary to people like Dowding (1996), Lovett (2010 and 2018), Pettit (1997 and 2012) or Vrousalis (2021) I will argue that structures can actually dominate us. Two assumptions will be at the core of my argument: (i) there are limitations to our freedom, for which no one is (collectively) responsible and (ii) at least some of them can be rectified. These limitations can be called "structural domination" and they are characterized by mechanisms that lead to missing (collective) normative accountability and to a missing (collective) control of social processes. If we understand these mechanisms, we can rectify structural domination and the limitations to our freedom that come with them. One of the main mechanisms that is responsible for a lack of control and accountability is a missing collective subject that is capable of exercising control.

But there is also a problematic solution to structural domination: personal domination. Habermas (1981) and Mommsen (1974) argued that Weber already saw this tension. The voluntarism of authoritarian economic leaders ("Voluntarismus autoritärer Wirtschaftsführer") for example can reduce economic contingencies. But transforming structural into personal domination is often not the only solution available. Social processes can also be organized in a way that self-determination is not restricted. Unfortunately this is often harder to achieve.

In the end I will argue that strategies that try to identify responsible agents for structural domination are less likely to succeed in abolishing it. Instead I argue that solidarity and the involvement in alternative practices will have a bigger chance to motivate a behaviour that rectifies structural domination.

Kohler, Jan - Definitionsmacht und Parteilichkeit - Von Epistemologie zu Machtkritik

In recent years the concept of Definitionsmacht (power to define) has become subject to increasing debate among feminist groups. Shifting the power to define violence to the people affected by it, it entails a radical criticism of seemingly universal definitions. However, criticism has been raised concerning the epistemic focus of the concept of Definitionsmacht. In anti-sexist support work the alternative concept of Partiality has gained ground, focusing not on the quest of a universal truth but rather on overcoming suppressive power structures and their adverse effects on individuals. An analogous discussion has taken place between Susan Hekman, Nancy Hartsock and Patricia Hill Collins on Feminist Standpoint Theory (FST). In this paper I compare these two discussions and thereby attempt to gain a fuller understanding of both FST and its application to anti-suppressive support work.

Hekman shows the need of FST for an epistemically privileged position of suppressed groups to justify their authority in social analysis and its shortcomings in justifying this privilege. Furthermore, she

argues that FST cannot accommodate diversity of forms of suppression and identity. This criticism is shown to also have been raised against the concept of Definitionsmacht.

The responses to Hekman's article from Hartsock and Collins, accusing her of wrongly reducing FST to an epistemic theory while neglecting its focus on overcoming suppressive power structures, are shown to correspond to the concept of Partiality in anti-sexist support work. Their positions can therefore be used to justify practices of Partiality that focus on support of persons affected by suppressive power structures and the overcoming of those.

The concept of Partiality stands in clear contrast to our moral intuitions which are shaped by the ideal of impartiality. In the last section of this paper, I attempt a defense of Partiality focusing on one of the most influential objections – that of "false conviction". To defend practices of Partiality against this objection, I try to show that it relies on specific concepts of justice, action and truth that are criticized by the concept of Partiality and therefore cannot not be used as an argument against it. Using works from Michel Foucault as well as from Iris Young I show that impartiality is not only impossible but ideological. Referring to Geoffrey de Lagasnerie I further show that modern justice systems desocialize and decontextualize actions by forcing them under the idea of individual responsibility. Deferring from Lagasnerie's analysis I propose that practices of Partiality must neither reduce individual to collective responsibility nor vice versa but accommodate both.

Thus, to reject the objection of "false convictions" practices of partiality must not fall back to those justice practices criticized by it but radically rethink justice. This paper both applies debates on FST to emancipatory justice and support practices focusing on perspectives and needs of those affected but also highlights the challenging radicality that sets the bar for those practices to not become subject to their own criticism. It therefore contributes significantly to debates on applied perspectives of feminist theory.

Kőszeghy, László - Towards an Ontology of the Algorithmic Society

I will be making the case that current analytic social ontology unduly neglects socially significant classifications of people generated by machines. Today, both public institutions and private companies have the digital means to accumulate large sets of data through tracking people's behavioral traces and then use machine learning algorithms to organize them, creating dynamic, correlation-based categories of people which are fed back to us in the form of, e.g., insurance and credit scores, advertising, recommendations, or search results. I will call these categories "algorithmic kinds" (AK). I argue that if AKs are taken to be social kinds, it brings into question a widely shared claim regarding social kinds: that all social kinds are, in some interesting sense, mind-dependent. I will first give an exposition of mind-dependence theories of social kinds and the criticism the view received. Then I show why AKs present an even stronger case against mind-dependency as a necessary condition for social kinds than hitherto mentioned counterexamples.

The mind-dependency of social kinds is sometimes (Searle 1995; Ásta 2018) spelt out in terms of what I call Attitude Dependency (AD), according to which for X to be social kind, X needs to be believed, perceived or lexicalized as such. This implies that social kinds are self-referential or "transparent" in the sense that be what is believed or perceived to be the case comes logically prior to what is the case. Critics of AD (Thomasson 2003; Khalidi 2015; Burman 2019) bring examples of "opaque" social kinds, that is, kinds which do not require that anyone would have mental attitudes regarding their existence or nature, such as class, racism or recession. These counterexamples imply that the scope of AD is narrower than intended and thus AD cannot provide a comprehensive metaphysics of the social world by specifying a necessary condition for social kinds.

I will further shed light on the limitation of the scope of AD through providing an even stronger case which supports criticisms of AD theories. This is because, as I will show, AKs, unlike the examples usually brought to show that there are "opaque" social kinds, meet two challenges that defenders of AD may pose to critics. First, I show how AKs meet the "The Reducibility Challenge" (Burman 2015), according to which opaque social kinds are reducible to social kinds which satisfy AD. Second, I argue that AKs meet the "The Vague Boundaries Challenge" (Franda 2021) which denies that any social kinds could have "natural boundaries" about which everyone could be ignorant and/or wrong. If these challenges are met, AKs form an even stronger case for criticizing the scope of AD.

Ultimately, I make the case that an ever-increasing part of the social world is made up of "opaque" social kinds; accordingly, the next task for both social ontology and social theory, is to spell out the different ways in which social kinds can remain unknown to members of a society and the respective senses of "opaqueness" at play.

Kramer, Max - Grief: A social identity approach

A number of philosophers (Marušić, 2018; Moller, 2017; Schönherr, 2021) have recently argued that the fitting reasons for grieving deceased loved ones hold in perpetuity; that is, that it would be rationally appropriate (if not necessarily "all-things-considered" rational) to grieve for the dead indefinitely. We can avoid this counterintuitive result by drawing on a prominent line of research from social psychology that emphasizes the relationship between social group membership and self-understanding.

Self-Categorization Theory (Turner, 2007; SCT), emphasizes the role of social group concepts in predicting and understanding individual behavior. It was originally offered as an explanation for how disparate individuals operate as a cohesive group, but its main contention is that individuals cognize themselves in specific situations using social identity concepts ('American,' 'middle manager,' 'nonbinary person,' etc.) and that categorizing oneself differently produces different behavior.

These social concepts are crucial to an individual's self-understanding or self-concept. My membership in the MLB makes it the case that I am a baseball player, and insofar as I see myself as a 'baseball player' (among other things), I have a stable concept of my own identity. Although each of an individual's group memberships may play a role in their self-concept, certain memberships are salient across a wide range of contexts and are therefore more central to the self-concept than others. Primary among these are memberships in dyadic personal relationships such as friendships, romantic partnerships, and biological relations. These are what we choose to include in our obituaries as core to our identities – "friend to Tim," "father to Eric," and so on. These are complex concepts under which we categorize ourselves in forming a self-concept, along with their corollary group-level concepts: 'friend,' 'father,' etc.

When a loved one dies, one is faced with an identity crisis (or, more accurately, a crisis of self-concept) that manifests in grief. The categories used most reliably to understand oneself suddenly no longer apply – one goes to bed Jack's spouse and wakes up no spouse at all. This approach to grief captures phenomenological reports from bereaved persons; specifically, that they feel as though some part of them has been lost (Garland, 2020; Ratcliffe, 2019). More crucially, it identifies the mistake made by the defenders of "forever-fitting" grief. Individuals who are valuable to us unfortunately pass out of our lives, and their passing is fitting cause for intense bouts of grief as we are left unable to conceive of ourselves without them in our lives. But we remain the same numerical entity and the same mind underneath these fluctuations, so the flood of emotion that marks the changes in our self-concept eventually subsides as we come to accept the new qualitative identity we have taken on in its wake.

This view therefore also illustrates the dependence of our identities on the individuals with whom we consociate while respecting the fundamental individuality of persons.

Krzykalska, Zuzanna - What Does the Rule of Recognition Have to Do with the Anchoring Conditions?

The paper concerns two theories of social phenomena: Brian Epstein's theory of social facts and HLA Hart's theory of law and their coherence with one another. Although Epstein's account is constructed in accordance with Hartian picture of law, I show that it is unclear whether the two theories are really in agreement with one another with respect to one crucial aspect.

Both Hart and Epstein not only propose a mechanism of constructing artificial facts, but also give accounts of the ontology of said mechanisms. Both theories explain the phenomena they deal with by evoking two levels of rules. Epstein's general account of social facts and his distinction between grounding and anchoring (setting up the former) offer a universal and very operative framework for accounting for all social facts in a way that avoids the 'ant trap'. In Hart's theory law is a 'union of primary and secondary rules'. He distinguishes between the primary rules—the legal rules that guide behavior and create rights and obligations—and the secondary rules, that say how the fromer can be created, eliminated, changed and ascertained. One of the secondary rules is the rule of recognition which determines how to identify valid legal rules.

Epstein's theory was designed as a universal framework for the metaphysics of social phenomena and the Harian theory of law was to be its special case. Thus, for every Harian second degree rule it should be the case that it is a principle that frames the anchoring conditions in Epstein's terms. Nevertheless, an analysis of how anchoring conditions are said to apply to laws challenges the straightforwardness of the parallel.

In particular, it is not clear if the constitutive rule can in fact be a frame principle providing anchoring conditions for legal rules (vide: Epstein 2015, p 94). For example, if legal codes serve as anchors that (usually together with other legal provisions, judicial acts etc) hold the frame principles (which state the grounding conditions of legal facts; the primary principles) in place (Epstein 2015, p. 93), then it seems that the anchors determine the content of law. In this way the anchors are sources that express the primary rule itselves rather than serving as a meta-rule. In Hart's theory, secondary rules have nothing to do with the content of primary rules, but rather its ascertainability as the law itself. In this case it should rather be said that Hart's secondary rules are what makes it the case, that it is judicial decisions, legislative acts, legal codes etc. that anchor laws.

I propose how best to coordinate the theories' terms given the character, role, content and scope etc. of the rule of recognition and the anchoring. Even though this inconsistency does not threaten either of the theories' structural integrity or theoretical value, I show that there is an important meta-theoretical reason for seeking coherence between them.

Kurata, Tsuyoshi - Rethinking a Unified Social Ontology

Nobody would deny that "institutions matter" in social ontology. The concept of institution and its related concepts (social norm and convention) have been much discussed both in J. Searle's "standard model" (Searle 1995; Searle 2005) and the game-theoretical models inspired by D. Lewis's Convention (Lewis 1969). Recently F. Guala and F. Hindriks, reconciling two different approaches concerning the nature of institutions—rule-based account and equilibrium-based account —put forward a "unified social ontology" (Guala and Hindriks 2015; Guala 2016). This approach formed the idea of rules-in-equilibrium by taking institutions to be correlated equilibria of coordination games. The question whether institutions are rules or regularities of behavior seems to be solved, since according to this

approach, institutions appear as equilibria for external observers, while they function as rules to be followed for players who are involved in the games. With this approach, we enter a new phase in the development of social ontology.

The unified theory, however, contains a radical claim against Searle's theory: constitutive rules are redundant and only regulative rules are needed for the existence of institutions. It also says that the former is reducible to the latter.

In this presentation we will consider whether this claim is defensible. We begin by examining the idea of rules-in-equilibrium and the reduction of constitutive rules to regulative rules. Next, we discuss a difficulty in such a reduction. The difficulty consists in the view that no constitutive rules are needed. That view seems to be questionable because many institutions cannot emerge / be maintained without those rules or our anchoring frame principles in B. Epstein's term (Epstein 2015). In addition, institutional terms (social kind terms) such as 'private property' are not as easily eliminable as Guala and Hindriks think they are. We then point out that a game-theoretic explanation of institutions, including that of Guala and Hindriks, remains unsatisfactory to the extent that it only explains institutions as the result of individuals' rational choices. Finally, we argue that the "unification" of social ontologies must be done in a way that gives proper place to the theory of collective intentionality.

Lasagni, Giulia - Objectual, collective, and corporate dimensions of group identity in social ontology

My talk presents an integrated perspective for identifying and keeping track of social groups over time. By providing a systematization of the debate in social ontology, I will highlight three dimensions of group identity – which I will refer to as objectual, collective, and corporate dimension. Despite acknowledging the scope of separate analyses, I will maintain that the complexity of social groups requires that such investigations be related.

The issue of group identity is indeed a controversial topic in social ontology. While recent accounts in social metaphysics have discussed the identity and persistence conditions of social groups as entities of some sort (objectual dimension), other approaches focusing on collective intentions and actions have related group identity to the members' shared attitudes (collective dimension), and, in the field of group agency, group identity has been understood as the rational unity of the whole (corporate dimension). Relying on Epstein (2015), I will contend that, although each dimension provides relevant criteria to individuate social groups, the investigation of group identity would benefit from an integrated account. I will show the shortcomings of each approach by examining especially the limitations of neo-Aristotelian perspectives in social metaphysics (Passinsky 2021, Ritchie 2020), the role of shared attitudes and commitments in the study of social groups as plural subjects (Gilbert 1989, Mathiesen 2003), and the functionalist conception of social groups as corporate agents (List and Pettit 2011). My proposal is to vindicate the complexity of social groups by arguing that group identity depends in part on the group's objectual components, i.e., members and pattern of relations, in part on the members' shared attitudes, and in part on the rational unity of the whole. I will neither assume that each of the partial grounds applies to any social group nor that the list is exhaustive. My point is that narrowing the conception of group identity to one single dimension entails blinding the account to the properties that are grounded in some other dimension and so losing track of group identity (over time) whenever continuity is secured by such obscured properties. With my contribution, I want to provide arguments in support of a non-reductive conception of group identity, which treats social groups not only as material objects, plural subjects, or corporate agents but as relational units grounded in heterogenous dimensions.

The talk is in three parts. The first part draws attention to three trends in social ontology to examine the problem of group identity, each regarding the objectual, collective, and corporate dimension, respectively. The second part discusses the limits of approaching group identity from one-sided perspectives. In the third part, I offer a cross-cutting account and illustrate how the view overcomes the inherent limitations of separate analyses. In this talk, I will focus mainly on corporate groups – i.e., groups that exhibit all three identity dimensions – and mention how the view applies to different kinds of groups.

Leferman, Alexander - The Puzzle of Solidarity

The frequent appeal to solidarity made in both theory and daily life might suggest that we have a clear understanding of solidarity's nature. However, beyond these appeals, there is relatively little theoretical work on the nature of solidarity, save, for instance, (Bartky 2002; Harvey 2007; Shelby 2007; Scholz 2008; Kolers 2012; 2016; Taylor 2015). Unsurprisingly, there is even less inquiry about the criteria for a good theory of solidarity. This paper establishes a criterion of adequacy for theories of solidarity by elucidating a puzzle. The puzzle arises from the fact that solidarity takes two distinct forms, and the criterion claims that a theory of solidarity must account for their unity.

Consider this example: in 2017, women marched together in solidarity in D.C. against Trump's misogyny, in particular, and patriarchal oppression, in general. Women marched in solidarity in virtue of the oppression from which they suffer. Moreover, some men joined them in solidarity and yet are not the subjects of patriarchal oppression or Trump's misogyny.

The two forms of solidarity are (1) intra-group solidarity, which occurs amongst members of the same group, e.g., women, indigenous folk, etc., and (2) cross-group solidarity, which occurs amongst people who do not share group membership, e.g., men in solidarity with women. There is a puzzling tension between these two forms that is not recognised in the literature. On the one hand, if intra-group solidarity is explained by some feature that each member of the group shares, then that feature cannot serve to explain cross-group solidarity, given that individuals outside of the group would not possess it. On the other hand, if cross-group solidarity is explained without appeal to a group-based feature, then it erases the significance of intra-group solidarity since it renders their special bond irrelevant. The puzzle of solidarity, then, arises from the fact that its two forms seem incompatible—each form requires an explanation that rules out the possibility of the other. At the same time, they are related in an important way since cross-group solidarity seems to attach itself to intra-group solidarity.

After elucidating the puzzle of solidarity, I survey two representative theories, empathetic (Bartky 2002) and expressive (Taylor 2015), in order to exhibit how puzzling the puzzle really is. In general, theories either annihilate one form of solidarity or, if they accommodate both forms, cannot explain what unifies them. In the first case, the theory fails to do justice to the varied appearances of solidarity in our world. In the second case, the theory fails to do justice to the cohesion at the heart of the concept of solidarity.

I then argue that the puzzle leads us to this tripartite criterion of adequacy for theories of solidarity: A theory of solidarity ought to explain (1) how a group of people can be a solidary group, (2) how those outside of a solidary group can be in solidarity with them, and (3) how intra-group and cross-group solidarity are instances of the same general phenomenon.

Lefler, Olof - Agent-Switching, Plight Inescapability, and Collective Action

Defenders of ontologically robust forms of collective action (or agency) often think that individuals may switch between participating in different forms of action, such as individual and collective,

without irrationality (e.g. List & Pettit, 2011; cf. Gilbert, 2000). And if there are many kinds of agency – they may multiply in the case of games (Nguyen, 2020) – switching appears common.

Constitutivists, however, argue that the commitments of individual agency are inescapable (e.g. Korsgaard, 2009; Velleman, 2009). Inspired by Korsgaard, I shall argue that individual action is plight inescapable. This rules out agent-switching to forms of agency (e.g. collective) with commitments that differ from those implicit in individual agents' own and suggests that we should think of collective agents reductively. Here is an argument against agent-switching:

(1) Individual agency is plight inescapable.
(2) If individual agency is plight inescapable, individual agents are continuously faced with fully exercising their own agential capacities (absent limits external to agency).
(3) If individual agents are continuously faced with fully exercising their own agential capacities (absent limits external to agency), they cannot switch into participating in other forms of agency (e.g. collective) if their commitments differ.

(C) Individual agents cannot switch into participating in other form of agency (e.g. collective) if their commitments differ.

Premise (1) is inspired by Korsgaard (2009, pp. 1-2). Her point is that agents continuously are faced with performing new actions, so even choosing not to act is still to act. That, too, involves choosing. Hence action is inescapably our plight. This holds at least for individuals – whether it also holds for collective agents will not matter for my argument.

Premise (2) extends plight inescapability. It is fully exercising agential capacities which is plight inescapable (absent limits external to agency, meaning things like blows to the head that leave agents unconscious). Why? Facing acting is to face acting fully successfully, and acting fully successfully involves making full use of one's capacities. For example, if following the categorical imperative is a capacity implicit in agency, like Korsgaard thinks, agents are faced with acting on its demands, not with acting on them to 50% or failing to act.

Premise (3) holds because the commitments of individual agency are plight inescapable. Collectives often make commitments that participating individuals do not endorse: a business may aim to lie to customers while an employee values honesty. But individuals cannot fully exercise their agential capacities if their commitments differ from those of collectives and they enact the decisions of the collective agent. Then they would not adhere to the commitments of their own agency – which they are faced with fully exercising. They cannot switch while maintaining their inescapable commitments.

(C) follows. However, if collective agents are not treated like separate entities but are treated reductively as constituted by individuals' attitudes, individuals need not switch when acting collectively, for their commitments constitute the collectives. As collective agency is possible, the argument against agent-switching supports thinking of it reductively, for example like Bratman (2013).

Leuenberger, Stephan - The social construction of collective intentionality

The piece of paper in my pocket is money because we take it to be money, according to what we may call a "social constructionist" view. Moreover, money is seen as representative of many phenomena of our social world. (For a rigorous statement of such an account in terms of response-dependence, see Passinsky 2020.) The wide acceptance and scope of such view prompts the question whether it might apply to collective attitudes as well---they are social phenomena too, after all. If a group believes that P, does it believe that P because we take it to believe that P? On the face of it, a positive answer

would appear to face a regress objection, since the collective attitudes are themselves doing the social constructing. Specifically, "we take it to be" refers to a collective attitude; so if collective attitudes are socially constructed, our taking the group to believe that P would itself be in need of social construction.

My paper explores how the regress objection can be resisted---even if we deny that facts about collective attitudes are reducible to any facts that do not involve collective attitudes. On the resulting view, which we might call "semi-reductionism" or "impure individualism" about collective intentionality, the concept of group belief is not reducible to individual belief. However, facts about group beliefs are grounded in facts about individuals' belief.

This position represents a via media between reductionism and antireductionism about collective intentionality.

The key move is to draw a distinction between reductionism concerning the collective attitude and concerning the content in claims of the form "if X is Y, X is Y because we take X to be Y". Concerning money, reductionism about content would have to insist ``we take this piece of paper in my pocket to be money'' is short-hand for something like "we take this piece of paper in my pocket to be is taken to be a medium of exchange, a unit of account, and a store of value''. According to anti-reductionism about content, the concept of money does figure in the content of the collective attitude. Turning now to a toy example involving collective intentionality, consider: "if a group believes that P, it believes that P because the group members believe that the group believes that P'. According to this (unrealistically simple) account, facts about group belief reduce to facts about individuals' beliefs. However, given anti-reductionism about content, they do not reduce to facts that do not involve collective attitudes, since the individuals' beliefs are about group belief.

After sketching and motivating the view, I shall present models from doxastic logic in which facts about collective attitudes supervene on facts individual attitudes, but not on "purely individualist" facts that do not involve collective attitudes. After arguing for the formal coherence of such a response-dependent view of collective intentionality, I shall try to make a case for its plausibility.

Loddo, Olimpia Giuliana - Red Light Green Light. The Role of Meta-institutional Concepts in Deontic Artifacts

Deontic artifacts are physical artifacts designed and built to regulate human behaviors, such as road signs or traffic lights. They need to be installed in a particular place in order to exercise their function. Unlike other material artifacts (i.e. technical artifacts), deontic artifacts perform a specific symbolic function; they have a 'non-causal function', to use Searle's (1995, 2010) terminology. Deontic artifacts are material objects with a symbolic function—a status function—ascribed by collective intentionality. In other words, they do not perform their function solely under their physical material structure; rather, they presuppose a normative background (consisting of constitutive rules) that ascribes a certain normative function.

However, there is an additional element that defines the social meaning of deontic artifacts. Since they are institutional objects, they take on a particular meaning thanks to the meta-institutional concepts they presuppose. Meta-institutional concepts go beyond the institutions of which they are conditions of possibility. Examples of meta-institutional concepts are defeat, victory, and competitive games.

What is the relationship between the material dimension of the artifact, constitutive rules and meta-institutional concepts?

This paper will explore the role played by meta-institutional concepts in deontic artifacts and show that deontic artifacts characterized by the same rules and similar meta-institutional concepts can be radically different. More precisely, the paper will compare two artifacts linked by a connecting element, since they tend to produce the same effects: they give people a reason for stopping (or moving) in the context of a competitive game.

The first artifact is the children's toy Red Light Green Light, which uses motion sensing. If the toy detects a player movement while the light is red, when players are supposed to stop moving, a siren will signal the elimination of that player.

The second artifact appears in the Netflix Squid Game, which brutally revisits the children's game. A doll-like motion-sensing artifact stands at the end of a field, and players can move when the doll says "Green light," but must stop when it says "Red light." Moving when it says "Red light" will result in being eliminated. In this case, unfortunately, anyone caught moving is shot dead by the artifact. Initially, since they think they are acting in the context of the traditional game, the players rely on the relationship between the meta-institutional concept and the rules of the game, where "elimination counts as defeat" and defeat as "exclusion from the game". Therefore, they panic when facing the brutal reality of "defeat as physical elimination".

The paper will show that both deontic artifacts presuppose a similar normative framework, but they differ because of the distinct ways in which the artifacts' constitutive rules incorporate the meta-institutional concepts they presuppose. There is a bilateral relationship between meta-institutional concepts and constitutive rules for constructing the social meaning of deontic artifacts. On the one hand, meta-institutional concepts are a condition for the possibility of deontic artifacts' deontology; on the other hand, constitutive rules define meta-institutional concepts within the operating framework of the deontic artifacts.

Lossau, Tammo - Is Knowledge a Social Kind?

On a view derived from Edward Craig, knowledge is a standard by which we evaluate information that flags information as "safe" for use in a wide range of decisions. Such a standard allows us to share information that can be assumed to meet this standard and to store information that meets this standard, because we can assume that it will be useful in future decisions. I argue that these features allow us to view knowledge as a social kind. To make this case, I point out that these features bear a striking resemblance with money, a paradigm example of a social kind. The social kind money creates a standard for items that guarantees that these items will be accepted by others in exchange for goods or services, and that this will continue to be the case in the future. The acceptance of this standard allows us to enter into economic exchanges that would otherwise not be possible. In analogy to that, knowledge can be seen as a standard for information that requires information to be useful to a wide range of circumstances. This standard allows us to simply share information with others, because it will be assumed that the information provided will be useful in the way encoded by the standard. It also allows us to expect that information that is shareable by this standard will generally still meet that standard in the future. In essence, knowledge is a socially created standard that allows us to directly exchange information we would otherwise not be able to share, and it provides us with an expectation that this information will continue to count as knowledge in the future. In these respects, knowledge is highly similar to money, giving us reason to view knowledge as a social kind.

In closing, I provide two examples of how this account can provide us with explanatory benefits. First, it can provide a deeper understanding of the idea that knowledge is the constitutive norm of assertion (put forward by Timothy Williamson). If knowledge is the socially established standard for sharing information, then it follows directly that we subscribe to a norm that requires us to only share

information that meets this standard – and it makes sense to say that the knowledge norm is constitutive or primary epistemic norm of assertion. The idea that knowledge is a social kind is also relevant to Miranda Fricker's idea of testimonial injustice. Fricker suggests that there is a specifically epistemic form of injustice that occurs when somebody is treated as less credible due to prejudice. Viewing knowledge as a social kind can help us pin down this injustice: it may consist in a failure to recognize a person's metaphysical status as a knower. That is, if a person who has information that meets our socially established standards, but is nevertheless denied the right to share this information, they are not being classified to a social status that they would have earned.

Ludwig, Kirk - Is the Distinction between Principal, Accomplice and Accessory Morally Significant?

English common law and legal traditions that look back to it draw a contrast between those who are principals in a crime, on the one hand, and accomplices and accessories, on the other. The accomplice actively participates in the commission of a crime without participating in the actual criminal offense. A lookout or a getaway driver for a bank robbery, for example, is an accomplice because he actively participates in the enterprise but is not among those who enter the bank and demand the money. One may also be an accomplice through failing to perform a legal duty to prevent a crime or through urging someone to commit it. The difference between an accomplice and an accessory is that the accessory either provides aid before or after a crime has been committed or encourages another to commit a crime but is not present at the time of the crime. 'Accomplice' and 'accessory' are legal terms and the exact definitions, and even whether these terms are used, varies across legal jurisdictions, as well as whether a distinction is drawn with respect to degree of culpability between being a principal in the first degree of a crime and a principal in the second degree (an aider and abettor). (I will use 'principal' alone to mean 'principal in the first degree'.) In some jurisdictions, those aiding and abetting a crime, which covers both accomplices and accessories, are treated in the same way as the principals; in others they receive lesser punishments. Presumably these differences in legal culpability are grounded in different views of moral culpability. My concern is with the theory of moral culpability which should guide, ceteris paribus, decisions about legal culpability. In general, I am concerned with the question of the moral significance of the distinction between aiding and abetting and participating in a moral crime and, within the category of aiding and abetting, the moral significance of the distinction between accomplice and accessory (before and after the fact). I approach this question from the standpoint of a general theory about responsibility of individuals in the context of collective action—since helping another to do something entails joint action. And I approach a theory of collective responsibility from the standpoint of a general theory of the nature of collective action. The legal categories of accomplice and accessory include a mix of different things that it will be useful to distinguish. I distinguish four main types of contributions.

1. Role Participation. Role participation is playing a role in the overall plan that a group intends to execute which involves bringing about some harm (or the commission of a crime). We will distinguish between roles for principals with respect to bringing about the harm (those committing the crime) and aid roles.

2. Incidental aid. One provides incidental aid when one intentionally contributes to a group's carrying out a plan to bring about some harm (commit a crime) but does not share an intention with the group to carry out the plan, and, hence, does not have a role in executing the plan that they intend to carry out together.

3. Solicitation. Solicitation is one or another form of intentional instigation of others to bring about a harm or commit a crime.

4. Failures of Duty. One may contribute to a harm coming about, not through aid or solicitation, but through failure to execute a duty to intervene.

There is much ground to be covered here, and this paper can only attempt a preliminary investigation. I argue for the following tentative conclusions: (1) When someone shares an intention with a group to commit a moral crime, the distinction between principal and accomplice or accessory before or after the fact is morally irrelevant, and accomplices and accessories along with everyone else in the group are fully liable for the harm that occurs. (2) This conclusion extends to incidental aid when the agent providing aid knows or can be reasonable expected to know that the aid contributes or is likely to contribute to a moral crime. (3) Solicitation is by its nature intentional. The solicitor is fully (but not solely) liable for the harms that result from his actions. (4) Finally, failures of duty that are intentional make the agent fully liable for the harm which he or she could have prevented; failures that are due failures to realize one should act are fully excusable only if one could not reasonably have been expected to realize the conditions for exercising the duty obtains. In sum, having the status of only indirectly aiding a moral crime, through commission or omission, provides no responsibility shelter.

Luong, Jay, & Stephania Donayre Pimentel - Gender Against All Logic

Like other discourses on the metaphysics of social kinds, the discourse on gender is superficially centred around the paradigmatic dichotomy between biological essentialism and social constructivism. Yet, upon closer examination, there is a substantial diversity of viewpoints on subtle realist and naturalist theses, especially among more constructivist perspectives on gender. At the same time, there is disagreement over the priority of ethics or metaphysics in philosophical accounts of gender, and the relative consideration given to either normative or descriptive adequacy (Saul 2012, Barnes 2016, Díaz-León 2018). Such meta-metaphysical considerations have bearing on the methodologies and arguments that carve out the theoretical topology of the metaphysics of gender.

In this essay, we propose to examine a canonical challenge within the metaphysics of gender– the normativity problem (Butler 1990, Haslanger 2012)– and its tractability on metaphysical and epistemological grounds. We formulate the normativity problem as such:

N. Defining a gender G according to some set of features F counts individuals who have F as being G but excludes those who do not have [enough] F, yet who nonetheless ought to be included among the extension of G.

We will argue each of the following points in turn:

I. The normativity problem is not a fundamentally unique metaphysical problem, but an instance of a rather common kind of metaphysical puzzle which we call extension problems. These are a species of metaphysical quandary that arises from the attempt to establish an ideal extension by way of specifying an ideal set of criteria.

II. As an extension problem, the normativity problem is inherently symptomatic of the definitionist approach in analytic metaphysics– a paradigm whose methodology consists in first attempting to articulate the universally necessary and sufficient criteria that really make a thing what it is, then testing these candidate definitions against counterexamples & intuitions.

III. The attempt to solve the normativity problem– that is, to delineate the proper necessary and sufficient criteria for gender– should be abandoned in light of problems both internal & external to the broader definitionist paradigm: on the one hand, metaphysical or epistemological intractability; on the other, postmodern scepticism. In other words, there are metaphilosophical reasons to doubt the resolution of the normativity problem according to the terms presupposed in its formulation.

IV. Setting aside the normativity problem, we ought to look towards heterodox approaches to understanding gender.

The upshot of this analysis is twofold. First, we hope to give a metaphilosophically informed ontological account of why gender has been so difficult to capture in a definition. We also aim to direct attention towards more promising ways of talking about gender (rather than by starting with definitions).

Marabello, Marco - Modalism, Neutrality and Constructed Items: When Essence and Intrinsicality Part Ways

In this paper I show that a recent amendment to the classic modal analysis of essence that construes essential properties as those that are intrinsic and necessary falls short of being satisfactory. To reach this aim, I first briefly sketch the modalist amendment that I call Intrinsic Modalism, (IM) for short. I then present two challenges that artifacts and social groups pose to (IM).

First, "author intention based" (Koslicki 2018) accounts of artifacts (Baker 2007, Evnine 2016, Thomasson 2003) hold that an artifact essentially depends on its author and her intentions. Thus, given an artifact a and its author m, the property of being intentionally produced by m is essential to a. But if this is the case, then (IM)'s friends have a problem: being intentionally produced by an author does not seem to be an intrinsic property of an artifact.

Second, structured groups such as the United States' Supreme Court, The International Criminal Court, and a university's budget committee present a similar problem for (IM). Consider the United States' Supreme Court and its power of judicial review. A well-known theoretical role of essence is that of explaining the other properties of an object (Teller 1975). If this is the case, then there is a property or properties that can explain the powers of the supreme court such as that of judicial review, and that property or properties will constitute the essence of the Supreme Court. But none of the properties of the members of the Supreme Court taken individually nor taken collectively can provide such an explanation. In other words, no property intrinsic to the court can do the work essences are supposed to do. A much more plausible candidate to fill this role is, for instance, the extrinsic property of being established by article three of the United States constitution. If this is the case, then (IM) fails to deliver the correct result in the case of social groups such as the Supreme Court.

Having sketched these two challenges to (IM), I introduce the principle of neutrality of a theory of essence (NTE). (NTE) states that an account of essence "should not settle, as a matter of definition, any issue which we are inclined to regard as a matter of substance" (Fine 1994, p.5). I conclude that any possible strategy that the intrinsic modalist might take to resist the above challenges goes against (NTE) and therefore, if this latter is as plausible as it seems, (IM) should be rejected.

Martin, Laura - An Expressivist View of Women's Autonomy

Can a woman who embraces patriarchal roles do so autonomously? Feminists disagree. Some focus on critical reflection as the mark of autonomy; others focus on the content of values and desires. This paper looks at cases neither view adequately explains, in which women strive for autonomy by enacting patriarchal practices. I argue that to understand the nature of autonomy in these cases, we must see them as a particular kind of social activity I term 'expressive activity.' The key idea is that we express our values through categories and meanings our culture provides; an oppressive culture that gives women only limited or flawed ways to express autonomy will interfere with their ability to actualize this value.

The case I explore is anorexia. One feminist interpretation of anorexia is that it is an inchoate attempt to reject social meanings that cast female embodiment as incompatible with autonomy. The exercise of control over bodily desires and the eradication of signs of female embodiment is one way women try to reject patriarchal ideas, yet it is ultimately self-undermining. This is a case, then, in which women value their autonomy but express it in a way that ultimately reinforces their subordination. To understand this case, we must see it in particular socio-ontological terms: as expressive activity, which refers to the act of expressing something, whether an idea, emotion, or value. It has both epistemic and ontological dimensions. If I am trying to express an idea, I do not know the exact shape it will take until I express it; this is the epistemic dimension. More importantly, the available social medium - whether journal article or Twitter thread - partially constructs what I come to express. This is the ontological dimension, and it reveals the social world to be constitutive in shaping our self-expression.

By seeing the initial cases as expressive activity, we can understand how patriarchy thwarts women's autonomy. The women try express their autonomy in the world, but have only limited or flawed cultural vehicles through which to do so. Autonomy is often represented as incompatible with female embodiment (as when women are sexually objectified) or something women attain only by assuming the status of sexual object (as when scantily-clad pop stars voice messages of women's empowerment). Because the cultural vehicles for expressing female autonomy are oppressive, women's expressions of autonomy take subordinating, self-undermining forms. This expressivist view demonstrates how patriarchal culture can inhibit women's ability to actualize their autonomy and, in contrast to other dominant accounts of women's autonomy, how the social world is constitutive of women's autonomy.

Mellor, Rowan - Team Reasoning, Good and Bad

Theories of team reasoning are supposed to resolve puzzles of coordination in ethics and game theory. According to the traditional approach to these puzzles, agents should each pick the best option open to them individually. By contrast, theories of team reasoning tell agents to identify the best combination of actions open to them collectively, and then to pick their individual component of that combination. In this talk, I probe a problem for theories of team reasoning, and suggest how to avoid it.

Team-reasoning approaches face a dilemma. On the one hand, it seems they cannot issue unconditional prescriptions to agents. To illustrate, suppose that these theories tell agents that they unconditionally ought to do their parts of the best available action-combination. Now suppose that, for whatever reason, some of these agents will not do their parts. Given this, if the remainder were to do their parts of the best action-combination, the result could be catastrophic. Nevertheless, since its prescription is unconditional, the theory insists that these agents ought to do their parts: an unintuitive result. Yet on the other hand, if team-reasoning theories merely tell agents that they ought to do their parts of the best action-combination conditional on others doing theirs, then they fail to distinguish themselves from the traditional, individualistic approaches which they had initially set out to criticise.

I suggest that this problem arises from interpreting team-reasoning theories in an overly individualistic way. Rather than reading these theories as issuing prescriptions to each of several individuals, I suggest that we read them as issuing an irreducibly joint prescription to the plurality: the plurality, 'we', jointly ought to pick the best available action-combination. This avoids the dilemma's first horn by denying that an agent unconditionally ought to do her part; and it avoids the second by introducing a new concept which traditional approaches lack: an irreducibly joint 'ought'.

However, my view faces a challenge of its own. Agents should be able to reason from an ought-statement to an intention. According to existing team-reasoning theories, team reasoning leads agents to intend to do their parts of the best action-combination. But it seems I cannot endorse this claim. Sometimes, on my view, an agent ought not to do her part in the best combination, even though the plurality jointly ought to do it. So, if team reasoning always leads an agent to intend her part, then it could lead her from true beliefs to an intention which she ought not to have; team reasoning, then, would be bad reasoning. I meet this challenge as follows. Intending to do one's part in what 'we' jointly ought to do is impermissible only when some group members lack intentions to do theirs. Thus, if the output of team reasoning is always several intentions, 'our' intentions to do 'our' parts, then it will not lead agents from true beliefs to impermissible intentions. This result can be achieved, I suggest, by conceiving of team reasoning as a joint activity.

Menge, Torsten - Powerful Dualism: Power, Autonomy, and Agency in Amy Allen's The Politics of Our Selves

Philosophical conceptions of power often insist on a sharp distinction between causal and normative domains. Within this dualist picture, power is understood either as a causal ability to affect the behavior of others in ways that are continuous with the use of force. Or alternatively, it is understood as a deontic ability to change how others ought to act, an ability that is taken to be radically different from the use of force. Such dualisms reflects everyday understandings of power, which distinguish, for example, between persuasion and coercing. The problem is that dualisms make the relationship between the distinguished items unintelligible, with the result that dualist views of power cannot adequately account for how power comes to matter, in one way or another, in our practices.

In this talk, I will critically examine Amy Allen's argument in The Politics of Our Selves (2007), which aims to overcome dualist understandings of power. Despite this aim, her conception ultimately remains committed to a vestigial dualism of power and autonomy, or so I argue. Allen takes on a theoretical problem that has vexed discussions about power since Foucault's argument that power is not merely restrictive but rather produces subjects. If subjects are always a product of power, how could they become critical, autonomous agents? Allen attempts to work out "how to understand autonomy such that it is compatible with an understanding of power in all its depth and complexity." Her solution is based on a weak reading of Foucault's claim that "power is everywhere"; we should, she suggests, read it not as the claim that power is present in all social relationships, but as the more innocuous contention that power is an ineradicable feature of human social life. But this means that Allen remains committed to the view that insofar as an agent is subject to power, they cannot be fully autonomous.

Allen's view, like many others, contrasts power with a sphere of autonomy that is free from power. Based on insights by Thomas Wartenberg, Clarrisa Hayward, and Joseph Rouse, I argue that such views take autonomy to be non-relational, with the implication that any kind of dependence is deficient. These views are both conceptually incoherent and normatively problematic. All forms of power–including the power of self-determination–require that we align our actions with those of others and with the environment in which we act. Such alignments create distinctive capacities as well distinctive normative concerns, that is, what can come to matter to us. To properly assess any kind of power, we need to recognize this dependence, which includes the dependence of human organisms on their non-human environment.

Mensik, Josef - Process and structure in social ontology: the case of Tony Lawson

After criticisms of the French structuralism for being ahistorical, holistic and universalistic, from 1970' on, social ontologists tried to include both agency and structure into their picture. Beginning with

Bourdieu, Giddens, and Bhaskar, social ontologists have been trying to marry the static principle of structure with the dynamic principle of process (in the guise of agency) into one coherent whole. To what extent is a synthesis of two such seemingly opposite principles possible at all? This general ontological question is immensely important not least in view of recent attempts to place one of the principles as the fundamental ontological principle of some sciences: viz structural approaches in the philosophy of science (Ladyman, Ross, Worall), while the other one as the fundamental ontological principle of others: viz the processual views in the philosophy of biology (Dupré, Nicholson). Any potential answer to this question carries serious ramifications for research in respective areas (i.e. the use of mathematics). The (in)compatibility of static and dynamic principles having been discussed (at least) since Antiquity (cf. e.g. Heraclitus vs Parmenides), have social ontologists finally succeeded in finding the answer to the ancient enigma?

Building on the Transformational Model of Social Activity of Bhaskar, Lawson aspires to combine the dynamic aspect of agency and the static aspect of structure in one ontological picture. He claims his social ontology to be both processual and structural (relational). The way in which Lawson proposes to marry these two (seemingly opposite) principles of change and order is through his concept of organizations-in-process: processual entities, representing (relatively) stable features of processes, which are being "build up from" other "lower level" processual entities, by the way of their ("emergent") relational organization. What gives such entities-cum-processes existence, as well as their (causal) properties, is the structure by which they are being internally organized ("structured"). There is some "organizing principle" supposed to be in operation here, which gives every processual entity both its cohesion as well as its characteristic ways of behaviour in its (external) interactions with other entities. "External" properties of the processual entities, apart from being derived from their internal structure, are structural also in the sense of being stipulated in relation to other processual entities -- within the network of the various organized processes that form the relevant realm.

The aim of the paper is to place Lawson's structurally-processual approach into the context of the recent developments of processual approaches in the philosophy of biology and structural approaches in the philosophy of science, and to assess to what extent Lawson succeeded in combining the fundamental ontic principles of process and structure in his social ontology. Specifically, the relation of the internal and external structural relations will be considered, as well as the domain and function of the supposed organizing mechanisms. Lawson's elaboration of the concept of emergence and its relation to that of several other social ontologists (Searle, Archer, Elder-Vass) and philosophers of science (Ross, Ladyman) will also be examined.

Merwe, Ragnar van der - Demarcated versus graded ontologies: On tricky cases at the boundary of social and physical reality

Philosophers of ontology commonly distinguish between social and physical reality (not to mention moral and mathematical reality for example). Those who do so do not however always appreciate the challenges involved in demarcating social from physical reality. The boundary is not as clear-cut as is often assumed. It is, I propose, important to deal with this issue, since we should surely have some grasp on the nature of social reality before we develop theories about it.

Institutional reality – related to for example economics or geography – is sometimes presented as an example of a boundary case residing between the social and the physical domains. In this talk, I will however focus on tricky cases at the boundary between putatively socially constructed human properties (e.g. being black or being a woman) and putatively physical or biological human properties (e.g. being bipedal or being warm-blooded).

William James argued that the properties of being healthy, being wealthy and being strong do not easily fit into either a realist (ante rem) or anti-realist (post rem) conception of reality. Ian Hacking likewise categorizes the properties of being fat, being anorexic and being a genius as "looping kinds" that do not seem to be either strictly socially constructed or strictly physical human properties. I will however discuss the property of being gay. I argue that being gay does not fit neatly into either the social or the physical ontological category.

The above suggests that we either need some intermediary category – e.g. Hacking's looping kinds – or a graded ontology where ontological domains have fuzzy boundaries. The latter, I argue, leads to a kind of Zeno paradox since our new third category will create tricky boundary cases of its own. I therefore suggest one possible way to develop a graded ontology that tolerates fuzzy boundaries.

All supposed ontological categories –mathematical, moral, institutional, social, physical (and others) – are, I propose, partly socially constructed and partly physically constituted to different degrees. This suggests an ontological continuum where, on the one end, moral reality for example is largely socially constructed but nonetheless moderately physically constituted; while, on the other end, even physical reality contains some small aspect of social construction.

Michael, John, & Alessandro Salice - The Sense of Commitment: Towards a New Normativism in Joint Action

In the philosophical literature on joint action, there has been a lively ongoing debate about whether joint action necessarily involves normative relations. On one side of the debate, Margaret Gilbert (1990; 2006; 2009) argues that joint action constitutively involves the joint commitment of the participating agents. This, in turn, entails that each agent has an obligation to act until both parties are satisfied that the goal has been achieved -- or at least, if one desires to stop before reaching the goal, to request permission to be released. By the same token, each agent has the right to expect her partner to continue until reaching the goal, and the right to rebuke her if she does not do so. On the other side of the debate, Michael Bratman (1997; 2014) denies that joint actions necessarily involve joint commitments or the attendant rights and obligations (though he agrees that they typically do, in particular insofar as they lead agents to rely on each other). In recent years, there have been several empirical studies probing people's attitudes about whether joint action inherently involves such normative relations. The results are mixed. For example, Gomez-Lavin & Rachar (2019; 2021) report evidence (consistent with Gilbert) that people tend to judge that to the extent that two agents are acting jointly, those agents are under normative pressure to continue acting until the goal of the joint action has been reached, or at least to notify the other agent in the event that they do not intend to continue – but (contra Gilbert) not that they are under normative pressure to ask permission to stop. Michael & Butterfill (Under Review) provide evidence of potential conceptual links between commitment and joint action, but do not find evidence in support of the view that commitment, or obligation, is essential to joint action. In light of these results, Gomez-Lavin & Rachar (2021) conclude that a "new normativism" is needed. In the present talk, we argue that the foundations of the new normativism have already been laid by earlier research showing that basic cases of joint action often do not elicit judgements of obligations, but do elicit signs of a sense of commitment ("SoC"): e.g., leading agents to persist until a goal is reached, to expect others to do so, to be annoyed and to expect an apology if others do not do so (Michael, Sebanz, & Knoblich, 2016; Székely & Michael, 2018; Bonalumi, Isella, & Michael, 2019). Building on this previous work, our talk will advance theorizing on the SoC in two ways. First, it elaborates on the psychological category SoC belongs to by drawing upon the concept of pushmi-pullyu representation (Millikan, 2005). Second, it clarifies the relation between SoC and group identification: this is a cognate mechanism that, similarly to SoC, has been argued to

motivate joint actions and to serve to maintain behavioral standards in the absence of judgments of obligations (Salice & Miyazono 2020).

Miksch, Cyrill - Forms of power in Searle and Marx

In this paper I want to discuss and compare forms of power outlined in the works of John Searle (power-to, power-over) and those implicit in the writings of Karl Marx (property, relations of production). By relating both accounts to one another I argue for a holistic ontology of structural power that allows for an emancipatory perspective.

For the project of a critical theory of society, certain foundational ideas of intentionalist social ontology seem very promising. If it is people that by means of their collective actions constitute the social world, it would follow that even repressive power structures that frustrate their interests could be described as self-imposed. Thus it would further follow that people would have the ability to liberate themselves from these structures, once certain ideological misconceptions guiding their behavior would be recognized as such.

Although the concept of power is central to the social ontological account of John Searle, the very possibility of structural power, however, is strongly denied. In his book The Construction of Social Reality institutional power is introduced as the result of collectively imposing a status function to an object or person. This power is conceptualized as power-to, the ability of a person to do something. In later works his line of reasoning shifts towards a concept of power-over, the ability of one person to get another person to do something. Since it would be impossible in cases of structural power to tell who exactly is exercising power on whom, Searle dismisses the very idea.

The concept of structural power, however is central to Marx' critique of society. Capitalist relations of productions are described as oppressive, in which the capitalist class dominates the working class. This certainly cannot be understood as the action of one social group over another in the sense of plural subjects. Rather relations of production in Marx are constituted merely by the fact that one side owns the means of production, whereas the other side does not. Following G.A. Cohen property is understood non-legally as the ability of someone to effectively use something, hence as power-to. Following Thomas Wartenberg's explication of power-over as the ability of one person A to structure the action field of B in a way, that it becomes rational for B to act in favor of A, I will argue that structural power can be understood as the unequal distribution of power-to in such a way, that it becomes rational for some people to act in favor of others, as if those were exercising a power-over-relation.

This concept can be extended to other social areas. Since every person's powers are manifold (collectively imposed and other), structural power can only be made sense of holistically. Emancipation would thus be conceptualized as a gradual shifting of the field of power.

Miller, Ryan - Artifactual Kinds as Social Kinds

Philosophers have generally divided artifacts into two classes: ordinary kinds like tables and social kinds like laws. Both are human-made, but the former presumably have independent existence after their creation (Koslicki, 2021) while the latter depend on collective intentionality in some way (Searle, 2010). Unfortunately, this division rests on what Amie Thomasson (2015) calls "hard ontology" and is consequently subject to seemingly intractable disputes. First, there are borderline cases: in which category does a dollar bill belong? Second, some artifacts—like a piece of driftwood appropriated as a table—have independent existence but not as artifacts, and so are ordinary objects whose status is dependent on collective intentionality (Juvshik, 2021). Third, the two aspects can come apart, as when a new ship is dubbed Ship of Theseus without any wood whatsoever having crossed the Peloponnese

(Zimmerman, 1995, 2002). Fourth, artifacts can seem to move from one to the other without any internal change, like the fiber-deposited acrylate copolymer microspheres created by Spencer Silver in 1968 that Art Fry dubbed "Post-It Notes" in 1974.

I propose resolving these difficulties by substituting Thomasson (2015)'s "Easy Ontology" approach, where the question of whether there are Fs depends only on whether the application conditions for the sortal concept F are met. Unlike Thomasson's own prior treatment of artifacts (2003, 2014), this yields a very simple definition:

x is an artifact if, and only if, x falls under a dominant sortal concept K and the application and co-application conditions for K respond only to human purposes.

Under this definition all artifact kinds are social kinds, because absent private language the application conditions for concepts are products of collective intentionality, and absent Robinson-Crusoe scenarios human purposes are also collective. Questions about what artifacts exist are questions about the collective intentions of a culture, to be performed by anthropological and philosophical conceptual analysts. Artifacts can be created not only by ordinary engineering, but also by conceptual engineering, or even "natural engineering" (see Ennos, 1998).

The major objection to such an "Easy Ontology" approach has been that it is inadequately realist (Marschall, 2021), but this objection is toothless in the case of artifacts. We need not worry that conceptual engineering yields superfluous objects, both because conceptual engineering is hard (Cappelen, 2018) and because conceptual engineering is clearly capable of creating artifacts as in the institutional cases like laws (Thomasson, 2019) or the appropriated cases like driftwood tables (Juvshik, forthcoming). Nor need we worry that our sortal concepts ignore extant artifact kinds, because artifacts are created intentionally (hand-axes are artifacts while discarded flakes of flint are mere byproducts), and so always fall under human concepts. Realist ontology for artifacts is easy because of the close epistemic connections between human agents and their intentional products (Thomasson, 2003). We should therefore be happy to take the easy route when it comes to artifact ontology, even if it dissolves the traditional distinction between ordinary and social kinds.

Miller, Seumas - Epistemic Institutions

Contemporary social institutions include complex organizations, or systems of organizations such as governments, police services, business corporations, universities, welfare institutions and the like; it also includes, criminal justice systems (comprised of a police organization, courts, correctional facilities etc.), legal systems (comprised of a legislature, the law, courts, legal firms etc.), financial systems (comprised of retail and investment banks, a stock exchange, regulators, auditing firms etc.) and so on. Accordingly, there is a need for a general theory of social institutions and, on the other hand, a need for special theories of particular institutions, e.g., a theory of universities. Moreover, we need here to distinguish between descriptive and normative theories. So far so good. However, there is a further distinction that needs to be, accommodated, namely, that between epistemic institutions and non-epistemic institutions. The raison d'etre and core business (so to speak) of such institutions, at least normative speaking, is epistemic, e.g., knowledge acquisition and dissemination. Epistemic institutions include universities, news organizations and intelligence agencies.

Issues that need to be addressed in relation to epistemic institutions include: (1) The characterization of epistemic institutions in both descriptive and normative terms; (2) The epistemic concepts in play in the characterization of epistemic institutions, e.g. knowledge, understanding, information, theory; (3) The distinction between epistemic and non-epistemic institutions, given that epistemic activity is conducted in all institutions and that epistemic action is implicated in non-epistemic (behavioral, so

to speak) action. Do, for instance, epistemic institutions necessarily serve, ultimately, non-epistemic ends?

This paper seeks to contribute to a normative general theory of epistemic institutions, firstly, by demarcating epistemic from non-epistemic institutions (normatively speaking) and, secondly, by contrasting two different underlying models, namely, what might be referred to as an atomistic rational choice model and a teleological (or perhaps functionalist) model.

On the atomistic rational choice model, epistemic actors engage in regularities in epistemic action in accordance with, for instance, epistemic norms such as truth-telling. Moreover, these regularities in action are not simply a single person's regularities in action; rather there must be interdependence of action such that, for example, agent A only engages in truth-telling, if other agents, B and C do likewise. One question that now arises is how such interdependent, individual epistemic action is to be scaled up so as to constitute an epistemic institution and, indeed, how ought it to be scaled up (given our concern with the normative dimension of epistemic institutions).

On the teleological (or functionalist) model, by contrast, the starting point is the epistemic purpose or function of a structure of institutional roles that are occupied by individual epistemic actors. This purpose or function provides the normative basis for the institution. However, questions arise as to the relationship between this structure-with-a-purpose/function, on the one hand, and the epistemic actors who occupy the constitutive roles of this structure.

Modak Chowdhury, Subhasish, Anwesha Mukherjee, & Roman Sheremeta - In-group versus Out-group Preferences in Intergroup Conflict: An Experiment

Individuals participating in a group conflict have different preferences, e.g., maximizing their own payoff, maximizing the group's payoff, or defeating the rivals. When such preferences are present simultaneously, it is difficult to distinctly identify the impact of those preferences on conflict. In order to separate in-group and out-group preferences, we conduct an experiment in which human in-group or out-group players are removed while keeping the game strategically similar. Our design allows us to study (i) how effort in a group conflict vary due to in-group and out-group preferences, and (ii) how the impact of these preferences vary when the two groups have explicitly different social identities. The results of our experiment show that the presence of in-groups enhances concern about individual payoffs. A further presence of out-groups moderates the concern for individual payoffs through an additional concern for own group payoffs. The negative effect of the in-group preferences and the positive effect of the out-group preferences are weaker when group members have a common social identity.

Moens, Lars - Collective Agency and Positive Political Theory

Positive political theory provides formal models of collective decision-making based on a view of individuals as rational actors. Political outcomes are understood as results of individuals' rational decision-making. The main target is to construct models that predict how these individuals combine to produce collective outcomes. In these models, there are only individual agents, no group agents.

Aggregation problems in social choice theory are understood to support this view. Different majorities within the same group can contradict one another, and we therefore cannot ascribe attitudes—that is, beliefs and desires—to the group based on aggregates of its members' attitudes. The group appears incapable of forming consistent attitudes, and therefore cannot be considered a rational agent. Riker (1982) rejects collective agency on these grounds and looks at individuals' strategic behaviour in his analysis of collective decision-making. Shepsle (1992), similarly, stresses that Congress is a 'they', not

an 'it'. 'Individuals have intentions and purpose and motives; collections of individuals do not. To pretend otherwise is fanciful', he writes (Shepsle 1992: 254).

It is therefore interesting that List and Pettit (2011) take similar aggregation problems to lead to the exact opposite conclusion. It is because a group cannot function on aggregations of individual attitudes that we must treat it as an agent. Since the members' attitudes may not add up to a coherent collective will, a group-level procedure must be applied to ensure coherence. And this procedure, in List and Pettit's view, is the procedure of a group mind reflecting on the input from the group members to produce a coherent set of attitudes. Groups studied by positive political theorists, such as legislatures, political parties, and collegial courts are therefore agents with their own minds, they argue. We cannot understand these groups by looking at individuals' attitudes; we must instead treat the groups as rational agents with their own irreducible attitudes.

In this paper, I consider whether List and Pettit's group-agent realism should lead positive political theorists to soften their eliminativist view of collective agency. By showing how the social-choice results List and Pettit rely on do not, in fact, bring group minds into existence, I defend positive political theory's reductionist view of groups. If we see collective-level procedures as autonomous group minds, as List and Pettit do, we shall fail to understand how individuals can use these procedures to their advantage. An agenda setter can effectively determine the outcome of a collective decision procedure, and so can other group members' strategic voting. Unless we reduce groups to individual agents, then, and consider their rational behaviour within the group structure, we miss out on important insight into how groups function. Group-agent realism is therefore an obstacle rather than an asset to the analysis of collective decision-making.

Möller, Paul Nicolas - Beyond the social/political distinction: Theorizing collective action with Hannah Arendt

For decades, theorists have struggled with the interpretation of Hannah Arendt's distinction between the social and the political (e.g., Pitkin 1981, Benhabib 2000). The interpretations put forward have led to the exclusion of Arendt's work from the theorization of social and collective action in various ways.

In my paper, I offer a generous reading of Arendt's work that considers posthumously published material. I carefully delineate the social and the political in Arendt's work with the help of conceptual pairs that deepen our understanding of Arendt's conceptual framework. I want to show that the distinction between the political and the social concerns first and foremost specific attitudes rather than subject matters. Consequently, any topic can be politicized in Arendt's framework and her distinctions, as Philip Walsh (2011) has suggested, are proposals for a general social ontology. Through this re-interpretation a new perspective on Arendt's distinction between the social and the political is generated that deepens our understanding of Arendt's key concepts for collective action: equality, difference, plurality, and freedom. Arendt's dismissal of the social and insistence on the political then take the shape of a critical standpoint concerning how collective action is realized.

I show this by the example of feminism as a socio-political movement. Feminism combines gender as part of the ontology of the social world and collective action. Feminism is often believed to be totally dismissed by Arendt because: If the categories of women and gender, as the key categories of feminism, belong to the social realm that Arendt dismisses, is there anything to be learned from Arendt's writing? I suggest that with an attitudinal understanding of the distinction between the social and the political we can understand feminism within Arendt's framework as collective action that is based on the plurality of persons in the public realm. From this plurality, interests emerge that are the basis for collective action Arendt's theory highlights our fundamental uniqueness and differences in

which we are qual. Her radical plurality anticipates current debates on intersectionality (see also Jones 2015) and contrasts with current trends in a feminism that is often based on identity rather than interests. All in all, my paper attempts to highlight Arendt's significance for theorizing collective action and explicates its critical perspective using the example of feminism.

Moltchanova, Anna - Social ontology behind María Lugones' notion of "the limen" and how to resist institutional discrimination through complex communication

Some instances of institutional discrimination involve group acceptance of an institutional role performer's contribution that is not accompanied by the corresponding attribution of the outcome to the contributor due to the agent's marginalized group membership. The specific oppression involved in these cases of 'mal-attribution' could be described as involving, in María Lugones' terms, other members of the institutional group "grafting the substance of the marginalized individual onto themselves" without perceiving the individual as "substantial." In this paper, I will consider Lugones' idea of how the liminal space, in which oppressed individuals find themselves as 'invisible' to the rest of the group, can, through complex communication by the marginalized individuals within this space, prepare them for resistance to institutional discrimination. I focus on social ontology behind the practices of resistance that follow from Lugones' view of complex communication, and use the notion of institutional status role with acceptance distortion, which I developed elsewhere, to explain one way in which marginalized individuals can position themselves to start reclaiming the group standing that is being denied to them but which is due based on their institutional contributions.

Lugones emphasizes that individuals in the limen may not understand each other, because there is no overarching identity of the oppressed, all oppressions are experienced as different and particular. She advances a weaker claim –"if [individuals] recognize each other as occupying liminal sites, then [they] will have a disposition to read each other away from structural, dominant meaning." As a matter of fact, perceiving themselves as similar and transparent to each other through being oppressed opens the possibility of perpetuating oppression, because this generalized expression of their existence affirms the oppressive monological understanding of them simply as different from the dominant group membership and thus insignificant outside of this relation. The occupants of the liminal space exercise polyglossia to affirm each other directly via breaking the monologism through which their exclusion occurs. Because they don't understand each other via their relation to the dominant membership that excludes them, but instead affirm one another directly by viewing others in the limen as substantial in their own terms rather than constructed by domination, they develop self-understanding that they are not reduced to what they presently made to be within the institutional structure. Thus, due to the support they receive in the limen, marginalized group members can begin seeing that their oppression results from the dual status they occupy; that is, their performance in the institution is not reflected in their marginalized membership and they can demand measures that would ensure they possess the membership status that is due to them based on their performance.

Murray, John - Exploring the Underpinnings of Interpersonal Trust: Experimental Studies in Human Behaviour and Social Exchange Theory

In this paper, we discuss some of the key features of interpersonal trust, which may be defined as "a willingness to accept vulnerability or risk based on expectations regarding another person's behavior". [1] Such trust is a core driver of human behaviour, as it influences our interactions with others, be they competitors or collaborators. In particular, we may observe that interpersonal trust is responsible in part for enabling opponents to become allies or, in the case of betrayal, motivating friends to become adversaries.

For a long time, the nature of interpersonal trust has been a focus area for researchers in various disciplines, including sociology, social psychology, behavioural economics, organizational management, etc. [2] More recently, the topic has also attracted interest from cognitive neuroscientists investigating the brain processes that may be involved in trust and trustworthiness. However, for various reasons, researchers have found it difficult to design experimental conditions that can approximate corresponding real world conditions, where potential gauges of trust may have significantly meaningful, and often severe, consequences.

Individual differences play a substantial role in these types of studies. The propensity to trust varies considerably from person to person and from condition to condition. It is also influenced by factors like past experience, social norms, and community differences. Cultural influences may affect trust appraisals and decisions, and shape how social information is perceived and encoded. Since interpersonal trust requires two participants, the personalities of each one and the nature of their relationship affect the degrees of trust and trustworthiness between them. Characteristics such as agreeableness, benevolence, and perceived competence influence and motivate aspects of the trustor-trustee relationship. If the individuals have a long history of trust and reciprocity, they will naturally trust each other more than two participants with little or no such prior history.

Social exchange theory (SET) hypothesizes that people make decisions about their behaviour in interpersonal interactions based on their assessments of benefits, and the costs relative to those benefits. [3] A number of social factors, such as pro-social behavior, positive emotion experienced toward others, and approach-type motivations, reduce the perceived costs of interaction, which thereby should enable trust and enhance trustworthiness.

This paper discusses a research program to study trustworthiness that was motivated by SET. Associated with the various social factors are a number of neurophysiological responses, which we postulated would be present when trust-linked behavior occurs. The experimental protocols involved sets of face-to-face dyadic interactions between participants, during which they made several economic decisions that entailed "trusting" (or not "trusting") each other. Survey questions captured self-reports of perceived trust, and audio/video was recorded during the sessions.

Over 750 GB of data was collected in over 320 hours of human participant experiments, which provided the opportunity to correlate the level of behavioral trust with the signals produced by each individual. The protocols involved simultaneous collection of data across multiple measurement domains (neural, physiological, psychological, and behavioral), with a population of 168 working-age male and female participants from multiple cultural backgrounds, which included pairs of acquaintances as well as complete strangers. To our knowledge, these studies represent the first time that all of these factors were incorporated in a single coordinated research project.

Neog, Bhaskarjit - Interplay of Responsibility in Collective Context

In talking about moral responsibility of individuals in collective contexts writers of collectivist persuasion often tend to focus on the nature and possibility of collective wrongdoing as collective's wrongdoing before analyzing the individual members' individual contribution or lack of it in bringing about the collective outcome (Pettit 2007, French 1979, 1995). This method of analysis seems to work well for the cases where collective outcomes are causally connected with what the collective in question agentially wants or intends as one entity. But there are cases of wrongdoings in collective contexts where there is no straightforward collective agential involvement and yet the collective is under the moral pressure to own up to the responsibility because of the actions or omissions of certain individual members in bringing about the blameworthy outcome. Even though cases of this kind are analyzable in terms of the intentional involvement of those individual members, there is a distinct

moral residue that is left unaddressed at the level of the collective. This residue does not get resolved either in disowning the individual acts as the acts of the collective or suspending the individuals from their primary membership of the collective. The is so especially because the rationale of the residue hinges on the presence and prominence of collective agential identity under which the individual members exercised their individual agency.

So, how do we substantiate the nature of this moral residue at the level of the collective? What kind of causal link can we invoke to make sense of it as a form of substantive responsibility, given that the collective agential involvement is here more of representational in nature? And what kind of moral excuse, if any, needs to be granted to the individuals, given that their culpability is constitutively intertwined with the agential identity of collective in which they are parts? This paper aims to shed lights on some of these questions from a collectivist standpoint that talks about the possibility of collective agency by retaining the agential autonomy of the constituent individuals.

Nicoara, Laura - A puzzle about the metaphysics of intersectionality, and how to solve it

Intersectionality is a framework for studying social kinds and identities built on the view that membership in different social categories, such as "woman", "Black", "working class" or "transgender" intersect and overlap in such a way as to create new, irreducible forms of oppression and/or privilege. While intersectionality is a widespread research program in the social sciences, and a fruitful framework for practicing activism, the metaphysics of intersectional kinds remains an underexplored area in analytic social ontology.

In the first part of this paper, I put forward two equally plausible, but apparently incompatible, views about the metaphysics of intersectionality. The first view is what is often called in the literature Non-Additivity. Non-Additivity lies at the very heart of intersectional theory. It holds that what it is to be a member of an intersectional kind of the form xyz is not reducible to what it is to be a member of the coarser-grained kinds that make it up x, y, and z - e.g., the property "being a Black woman" is not a mere conjunction of two more primitive properties, "being Black" and "being a woman". On the contrary, intersectional kinds are at least as fundamental as coarse-grained kinds, and cannot be decomposed into ontologically prior constituents.

The second view I will call Conjunctivism. Conjunctivism holds that intersectional kind properties such as "being xyz" do have coarser-grained components, namely "being x", "being y", and "being z" - and the latter are perfectly respectable, joint-carving properties in their own right. Conjunctivism is prima facie supported by the naive syntax of kind terms (e.g., "Black woman" seems to aim to track two properties rather than one), as well as by the tendency of many intersectional theorists to talk about the "parts" or "components" that "make up" intersectional kinds. Moreover, Conjunctivism alone can explain why the following are not mere coincidences: (i) membership in any intersectional kind xyz necessarily entails membership in the coarser-grained kinds x, y and z; (ii) any intersectional kind xyz is dependent in an important way on the coarser-grained kinds x, y and z - the former cannot come into existence before the latter do; (iii) (iii) if xy and xz are intersectional kinds, the members of both kinds that are appropriately described as Xs share distinctive forms of oppression or privilege among each other that they do not share with either Ys or Zs.

I next argue that the conflict between Non-Additivity and Conjunctivism is only apparent, and comes from a mistaken tendency to think of social kinds as properties. I propose a distinction between membership in a kind, which is indeed a property of individuals, and social kinds as such, which, on my view, are concrete objects with historical origins. Since intersectional kinds have their own independent genealogy, commitment to which is essential for explaining a variety of social

phenomena including some irreducible forms of oppression, they are at least as ontologically fundamental as coarser-grained kinds; this vindicates Non-Additivity. On the other hand, the emergence and persistence of intersectional kinds both require causal contributions from other, antecedently existing social kinds, including some coarser-grained kinds; this makes a version of Conjunctivism right.

Nörenberg, Henning - Deontological Feeling as Socio-Ontological Category

The paper introduces the category of deontological feeling as a conceptual tool in social ontology. Deontological feelings are involved in the subjective and intersubjective recognition of desire-independent reasons for action ("deontic powers" according to Searle). They are modelled in a manner similar to Ratcliffe's account of existential feeling, i.e. as bodily background orientations that predispose individuals or groups to recognize some forms of deontic power and not others.

In the first part of the paper, I illustrate the category by the deontological shift implicated in a particular bodily background orientation that goes, among other things, under the name of "profound boredom" (Heidegger) or "perverted selflessness" (Arendt). The shift in questions consists in a palpable desensitization regarding usual forms of deontic power as well as an increased responsiveness to demands imposed with rigorous authority. I argue that the relevant shift is underpinned by the particular properties of the bodily background orientation in question which include radical unrest, the sense of decreased self-efficacy and the felt muteness of the world. From this rather pathological case example we can draw conclusions about how such usually inconspicuous phenomena function in general.

In the second part of the paper, I suggest an account of how deontological feelings can be shared by two or more individuals. The approach consists in discussing the way in which deontological feelings as bodily background orientations can involve a pre-reflective, unthematic we-orientation of the kind suggested by Schmid. Roughly, the intended we-orientation is grounded in – and pragmatically verified by – the overall style of interaction shaped by the relevant bodily background orientation. This is also illustrated with the case of profound boredom. If the argument holds, it is conceivable how deontological feelings can be more than idiosyncratic phenomena. They, thus, can be part of a shared background and thus be involved in the intersubjective recognition of deontic power.

Okamoto, Noriaki - Hierarchy and Heterarchy in Organizations: An Ontological Analysis of Institutions from the Social Comparison Perspective

Social ontology has successfully developed as an interdisciplinary area, and drawn the attention of scholars from different disciplines. Former social ontology studies have established frameworks that explain how social concepts and institutions exist. For instance, the key concepts used in these studies are collective intentionality, collective acceptance, and we-attitudes. Nevertheless, this cannot answer an important question: How do they shape individual behaviors and construct actual social institutions? For the question, the concept of rationality on which modern economics has developed, has some advantage in explaining actual individual and organizational behaviors, as it is founded on the premise of an actor's calculation/estimation of costs and benefits. However, this assumption appears extremely instrumental and mechanistic.

To tackle this issue, this essay relies on the essence of social comparison theory. Human beings inherently compare themselves with each other when in a pair, a group, or an organization. Through such social comparison, commonalities and differences are made visible. To compare themselves more effectively and efficiently, systematic tools are required, among which language plays the foundational role. In other words, by using language, we can create numerous social constructs that

enable tremendous comparisons. In Searlean terms, status functions are assigned to social constructs through the system of language. This viewpoint also complements the social positioning theory that the Cambridge Social Ontology Group has recently developed.

Placing social comparisons at the center of analysis, this study introduces a perspective of hierarchy and heterarchy in order to explain the dynamism of status function declaration. In an organizational setting, hierarchical comparison tends to be vertical and relatively objective as numbers are often used to make differences more visible and clearer. In contrast, heterarchical comparison tends to be more abstract and flexible, placing greater emphasis on the commonality in the organization. This supposition is illustrated in a specific case of institutional shift in the area of finance. More specifically, actors' recent movement toward impact finance is regarded as the shift from heterarchy to hierarchy as those heterarchical attempts to identify social impacts are being replaced by more quantifiable hierarchical metrics.

All in all, this essay makes two contributions. First, it applies the essence of social comparison theory from the field of psychology to explicate social ontology theory. Second, the dual perspective of hierarchy and heterarchy can explain how social institutions are constructed within the framework of social comparison.

One reason, then, for investigating what it is to act on a collective attitude is to see it as a part of a project vindicating a form of social understanding – one that takes seriously the widespread attribution of psychological attitudes to groups, institutions, etc. in both theoretical as well as ordinary day to day discourse.

Pagano, Emilie & Dan Lowe - A Functionalist Account of Class

A preliminary search in PhilPapers reveals that recent work in social ontology focuses on race and gender – with 569 and 269 results, respectively – to the exclusion of class – with 43 results for the nearby "ontology of finance." As a result, it's time to ask: What is class?

The most obvious accounts of class face counterexamples. For instance, one's class doesn't consist in one's income – such that the "upper" class corresponds to the highest, the middle to the middlemost, and the lower to the lowest percentage of earnings – since one might inherit great wealth and, so, give up work altogether. Similarly, one's class doesn't consist in one's wealth since one might have an artificially high net worth as a result of experiencing homelessnes. However, one's class doesn't consist in more obviously social features – for instance, in one's education – since one might be e.g., an adjunct philosophy professor but make poverty wages.

Nonetheless, income, wealth, and education are clearly relevant to what class is. But how? We propose a functionalist account of class according to which classes are groups of particular functional kinds. This account implies that classes are clusters of social roles that determine one's options (Cudd (2006), Haslanger (2016), Asta (2018)). In particular, it implies that one's class consists in one's ability to obtain particular material goods that enable one to have a decent life. As a result, though wealth, income, and education play a causal role with respect to one's ability to obtain these goods, they aren't constitutive of one's class.

Importantly, we see our account as part of a Marxist tradition (Lukacs (1923), Cohen (2011)) which claims that commodities merely masquerade as things we have when in fact commodification is a form of social power. Likewise, our functionalist account of class implies that class isn't something we have but something we do.

Palermos, S. Orestis - Responsibility in Epistemic Collaborations: Is It Me, Is It the Group or Are We All to Blame?

The notion of responsibility plays central role in debates on collective mentality and collective agency. For example, a common way to argue that collectives cannot qualify as cognitive agents in themselves is to point out that collectives cannot be held responsible in themselves (Giere 2006; Hubner 2013; Michaelian and Arango-Muñoz 2018).

In response, Palermos (2020) has recently argued that epistemic collaborations such as scientific research teams and Transactive Memory Systems (TMSs) (i.e., groups of individuals who collaboratively encode, store and retrieve information (Wegner et al. 1985)) can manifest—at the collective level—the kind of epistemic responsibility necessary for generating knowledge. Thus, epistemic collaborations can qualify as epistemic agents, meaning that any resulting (collaboratively produced) knowledge can be attributed at the collective level. If correct, this claim should be good news for proponents of collective knowledge.

However, a potential problem, concerning individual responsibility, might lurk beneath the surface of this account: If epistemic collaborations can be held in themselves responsible for their failures and achievements, what does this mean with regards to their members' individual responsibility? Can we not hold the participants of epistemic collaborations individually responsible? Or, if we can, in what sense must we hold them responsible and to what extent? Additionally, how does their individual responsibility relate to the epistemic responsibility associated with the collective? These are the questions I address in this paper.

I start by explaining how the notion of responsibility has been at the forefront of the debate on collective mentality and by summarising Palermos' account of epistemic collaborations. Then, I move on to offer two responses to the questions regarding the sense and the extent to which we can hold the members of epistemic collaborations individually responsible. The first explores whether it is possible to trace collaborative shortcomings back to individual failures. As I explain, this approach might not always be applicable and when it is there are specific limitations to it. The second response looks at individuals' responsibility for breaking joint commitments necessary for the effective coordination of epistemic collaborations. Though this might explain why ascriptions of individual responsibility within epistemic collaborations might be justified, it is worth noting that such responsibility ascriptions are of the moral rather than the epistemic kind.

Palider, Kye, Paul Patton & Hakob Barseghyan - An Ontology of Scientific Change

Any general theory that attempts to describe or explain changes in some domain must first identify the entities and relations undergoing those changes. That is, it must formulate a standard ontology. Yet, when trying to make sense of various episodes in the history of science, historians and philosophers use their own idiosyncratic terminologies – an unfortunate result of the lack of a commonly accepted ontology in the field. Specifically, it is unclear what types of entities and relations undergo change in the process of scientific change. Historians and philosophers customarily speak of theories, beliefs, ideas, methods, hypotheses, frameworks, paradigms, research programs, etc. while leaving their readers guessing whether and how these various types of entities are related to each other. The same goes to epistemic stances (cognitive attitudes) that one can take towards these entities. Kuhn, for instance, is notorious for using a wide variety of different terms that presumably refer to such epistemic stances, e.g., "universally received", "accepted", "acknowledged", "committed", "pursued" etc. This confusing morass prevents the students of the history of science from recognizing common entities, patterns, or recurring general themes that might exist in the history of scientific thought.

One of the goals of scientonomy as a new approach to the integrated history and philosophy of science is to develop a standard ontology of entities and relations customarily found in the process of scientific change. We have identified two classes of primary entities, epistemic agents and epistemic elements, and one primary class of relations, epistemic stances. An epistemic agent is an agent capable of taking epistemic stances towards epistemic elements. Epistemic agents may be individual scientists, like Albert Einstein, or communities of scientists, like the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. The two basic classes of epistemic elements include theories and questions. Theories, in turn, can be descriptive, normative, or definitions. Among many types of normative theories are ethical norms and the methods of theory evaluation. Some possible epistemic stances that epistemic agents can take towards theories include acceptance of a theory as the best available answer to its respective question, pursuit of a theory (i.e. its further development), or its use in practical applications. Thus, changes in a belief system can be viewed as a series of changes in the stances taken by various epistemic agents towards various epistemic elements.

The purpose of this paper is to review the current state of the scientonomic ontology of epistemic agents, elements, and stances, and indicate some areas for its improvement. Specifically, we argue that while the current ontology is adequate for describing the epistemic aspects of the process, it should be further expanded to be applicable to the aspects of scientific change that have to do with scientific practice. If such an ontology is successful and comes into wide use, it will be of specific importance to historians, philosophers, and sociologists of science.

Parikh, Rohit - How much of a group is a group?

Consider the set of people on a subway train whose names begin with the letter P. We will agree that they are not much of a group. One the other hand a flock of geese flying in a V-shape are definitely a group and so is the set DS of those Democrats who are senators. Can we talk about the "amount" of groupiness in such a group?

Clearly if senators Manchin and Sinema were to "fall into line" then their actions would be in more of a concordance with the other senators. DS would become "more groupy" than the existing set. Can we have a measure of groupiness? The purpose of this paper is to propose a measure, however preliminary and subject to debate it might be.

Consider a group of individuals (or agents) acting in some setting. We presume that each agent has a finite number of possible actions. Let A_i be the set of possible actions of agent i and let n_i be the size of A_i. The group itself has a profile of actions where a profile P could be $(a_1,..,a_n)$ where a_i is the action of agent i as a member of the groups and of course a_i is a member of A_i. Let Pr be the set of all theoretically possible profiles which is simply $A_1 \times A_2 \times ... \times A_n$ and let APr be the set of those profiles which are actually possible. Let M be the cardinality of APr and N the cardinality of Pr. we then define the groupiness G of the set $\{1,..n\}$ to be $\log(N/M)$. Suppose for instance that agent 2 always does whatever agent 1 does then M will decrease and G will increase.

Now if the agents are completely independent then M will equal N and G will be $\log(1) = 0$. But typically, if we do have a group, then M < N. Say for example that the first agent is a dictator and whatever she chooses will have to be done by the others. Suppose also that each agent has two individual actions a and b. Then APr will be $\{(a,...,a), (b,...,b)\}$. M will be 2 and N will be 2^n. G will equal n-1.

Suppose we divide $G = \{1,..,n\}$ into two parts $G_1 = \{1,...,m\}$ and $G_2 = \{m+1,..,n\}$. We could ask how much influence do the two subgroups have on each other. Let M_1 and M_2 be the numbers for G_1 and G_2 corresponding to M above. If the two groups have no influence on each other, M will equal

M_1 x M_2. but generally less. We can define the amount A of influence between the two groups as log(M_1 x M_2/M). If the two subgroups are independent then A = 0.

Passinsky, Asya - Cryptocurrency: Commodity or Credit?

Joseph Schumpeter wrote in 1917, "There are only two theories of money which deserve the name … the commodity theory and the claim theory" (1917: 649). The commodity theory, which is often associated with Aristotle (Politics I.8–10), John Locke (Second Treatise V.48–51), Adam Smith (1776/1981: ch. 4), Karl Marx (1867/1976: ch. 3), and Carl Menger (1892), holds that commodities are central to understanding the nature of money. The claim or credit theory, which is associated with Alfred Mitchell Innes (1913, 1914), Georg Friedrich Knapp (1924/1973), and John Maynard Keynes (1930), holds instead that money is to be understood in terms of credit and debt. To this day, the commodity theory and the credit theory are regarded by many theorists as the two main rival accounts of the nature of money.

Yet in recent years, the institution of money has been revolutionized in ways that most commodity and credit theorists could hardly have anticipated. The revolution is the advent of cryptocurrency. The first cryptocurrency, bitcoin, was invented in the late 2000s. Since then, more than 16,000 alternative cryptocurrencies have been developed, and the total value of all the crypto coins in circulation exceeds $2.2 trillion. It is undeniable that cryptocurrency plays an important role in today's world of business and finance.

Given that cryptocurrency is a new form of money, the question arises whether the commodity and credit theories can adequately account for it. That is the central question that I shall address in this paper. The question is interesting and important for two reasons. On the one hand, we currently lack a good understanding of the nature of cryptocurrency. Examining cryptocurrency through the lens of the two traditional accounts of money may help us to acquire a better understanding of this new phenomenon. On the other hand, cryptocurrency can serve as an important new test case for the commodity and credit theories, which may help us to move beyond the current stalemate in the literature.

I shall argue that neither the commodity theory nor the credit theory on its own can adequately account for cryptocurrency, but that a hybrid of the two theories can adequately account for this new form of money. I begin by providing an overview of what cryptocurrency is and how it differs from standard forms of money. I then offer an interpretation of the commodity and credit theories according to which these theories are committed to differing claims about the origin of money, the ontology of money, and the function of money. I then argue that neither the commodity theory nor the credit theory thus understood can adequately accommodate cryptocurrency. I conclude by proposing a novel hybrid account of money that draws on aspects of both the commodity and credit theories, and I argue that this hybrid account accommodates cryptocurrency.

Paterson, Grace - Sock Puppets and the Credibility Economy

The topic of this study is the practice of sock puppetry -- a particular form of deception that has become increasingly common in online fora. The simplest and most commonly seen definition of sock puppetry is the use of multiple accounts or personas by the same user. This is far too broad, however, as there are innumerable innocuous ways in which individuals can make use of multiple personas both online and off. They may be used for artistic expression, to establish boundaries between one's work life and private life, or to overcome prejudice. Such benign applications of personas are not what is being referred to when discussing sockpuppetry. Instead, that title is generally reserved instead for uses of personas that are considered to be either epistemically or morally pernicious. It remains an

undertheorized question what exactly makes some uses of different personas problematic but others acceptable.

I will provide an analysis of sock puppetry as the practice of using personas to create, exploit, or reinforce credibility distortions such as credibility excesses and deficits. The analysis will allow us to distinguish systematically between benign uses of personas and cases of genuine sock puppetry by examining how the personas in question influence the credibility economy. The distortions in question can involve both perceived credibility of individuals as sources of testimony and the perceived credibility of various claims; however my focus in this talk will be with the former.

With the help of recent cases from fora such as twitter, I will consider three ways sock puppets are used to manipulate credibility. The first and most obvious technique is swarming. This is the creation of a false sense of engagement, interest, and trust through sheer numbers. Sock puppets of this kind, which are frequently bots, can simultaneously boost the visibility and perceived credibility of the puppeteer. Indeed, it is well known that bots can be used to manipulate the algorithms which determine what content other users see. The second technique I will survey is the use of so-called "digital blackface" and related forms of deception to impersonate members of identity groups. Sometimes such sock puppets are used to make claims that are only credible if they come from within the community. Other times, they are used to create the impression that the puppeteer (using a different account) has the support of members of the group. These sock puppets can be very carefully crafted and hard to detect, but can do great harm. The third and final technique I will survey is what I call "credibility boot-strapping". This is a sophisticated technique in which a sock puppet is used to infiltrate a community and then uses its credibility to vouch for the reliability and expertise of another sock puppet being used by the same person.

This analysis will help us identify specific patterns of behaviour characteristic of sock puppets, and, once identified, will allow us to understand how they work, why they are harmful, and what interventions are possible.

Patton, Paul - The social ontology of tools and agents in science

Scientonomy is an emerging approach which seeks to identify general principles in the process of scientific change. Identifying such principles requires the formulation of a standard social ontology within which modern and historical episodes of scientific change can be analyzed. Among other things, such an ontology must describe the role played by individual scientists, scientific communities, and the tools which scientists use to create and disseminate knowledge. In this paper, I offer an ontology for this purpose which defines several entities and their relations to one another.

Epistemic agent is defined as an agent capable of taking epistemic stances, such as acceptance or rejection, towards epistemic elements such as theories or questions. These stances must be taken intentionally, that is, based on a semantic understanding of the epistemic element in question and its available alternatives, with reason, and for the purpose of acquiring knowledge. An individual human being, given appropriate education and training, and adhering to social norms of epistemic honesty, is clearly capable of functioning in this role. I argue that there can both communal and individual epistemic agents. The distinctive roles played by different individual members within a scientific community, and the interactions among them, give a communal epistemic agent its own properties, that are not the simple aggregate of those of the individual epistemic agents of which it is composed. Scientonomic theory, like the earlier theories of Kuhn and Lakatos, takes communal epistemic agents to be of special importance as the bearers of knowledge; the stances taken by communal epistemic elements towards theories and questions are the main units of analysis when studying the process of

scientific change. Epistemic agents are linked by relationships of authority delegation based on their differing areas of expertise.

Tools and instruments, such as a thermometer, a text, a particle accelerator, or a whiteboard and marker, play a central role in most knowledge-generating or disseminating activities. In the current state of artificial intelligence, not even the most sophisticated such tools could satisfy our definition of epistemic agent, since such an agent must possess the capacity for semantic understanding. I argue that tools play their own distinctive role in the process of scientific change. An examination of several historical episodes suggests that scientists do not delegate authority to tools or instruments. Tools must therefore be assigned a distinctive role in our ontology, and an understanding of their distinctive relationship to epistemic agents must be foraged. We can find the basis for such a role and relationship by noting that an epistemic agent accepts and employs a method; a set of normative criteria for theory assessment. We can use the concept of a method to define an epistemic tool. A physical object or system is an epistemic tool for some epistemic agent if there is a procedure by which the tool can provide an acceptable source of knowledge for answering some question under the employed method of that agent. An agent is said to rely on such a tool whenever that condition is met.

Paul, Somreeta - Feminism and the Crisis of Intersectionality: Exploring Parallels between the Experience of Race and Caste

Race and caste, the two social constructs, one prevailing in the US and the other in India, have more than one similarities in practice than in theory, especially the position of women. My concern in this paper is to draw a comparable study between the two in order to understand the difference in the phenomenological experiences of women, not in general, but pertaining to the section of caste in India and race in the US that they belong to.

Keeping this intersectionality in mind, I intend to delineate how the experience of sexism is thoroughly intermingled with the experience of racism and casteism for black and Dalit women who cannot protest one without protesting the other. Thus, it is important to understand why it has been historically perceived that the responsibility of self-reflection and demand of action lies with white women and women of upper caste. It is also interesting why in this context of gender discrimination, upper caste and white women bears the expectation that challenging patriarchy should dominate women's ideology over racism or casteism.

In the light of this background, I would like to draw the conclusion that the hierarchy of gender and the hierarchy of race and caste are not mutually exclusive, rather their complementary manifestation not only influence the cognitive framework of a woman but also the identity that she ascribes to herself and the action she agrees to participate in. It is necessary to understand that a black woman challenges and encounters patriarchy in a way that a white woman does not, that the power structure by which a Brahmin woman in India is dominated is different from a Dalit woman.

The foundational commonalities among these women should not override the intersectional experiences of women. Casteism in India which is multidimensional with hundreds of divisions of castes, will help us to understand how one-size-fits-all approach of feminism does not take into its account the existence of a hierarchy of oppression. The inter-racial and inter-caste solidarity among women can only result from an all-inclusive objective, neither color-blind nor caste-blind. The issues of racism and sexism are not separate, and the higher degree of interracial solidarity in the US will demand just that- the recognition of collective identity which will pave the way for the realization of universal sisterhood.

Paulmann, Franziska - Not our state - The justified reactions to anti-immigration backlashes by liberal democratic states

I analyze the phenomenon of anti-immigration backlashes in liberal democracies and address the problem how states should respond to their threat. Facing a backlash, liberal democracies are confronted with a political-action-dilemma: On the one hand, liberal democracies should promote the admission of refugees as a matter of justice and in recognition of their liberal point of view. On the other hand, they understand themselves as the representatives of their citizenry and are composed of their members.

Seemingly, the state can only choose between either closing its borders to refugees and thus betraying its liberal point of view, or it can reject the demands of the backlashers and risk both the stability of its agency as well as disregard its role as a representative of its citizens.

Is there, then, a way out of this tragic choice?

I propose to distinguish two types of anti-immigration backlashes I call radical and moderate backlashes. Central to my argument is that both types of backlashes are not morally justified, but the threat of both backlashes is the same, namely destabilizing the liberal democratic state to the point of threatening its agency.

Radical backlashers demand to close borders permanently in disregard of the claims of refugees to admission. Since this is an attack on the liberal point of view, liberal democracies cannot yield to the demands of radical backlashers without self-contradiction.

On the contrary, moderate backlashers claim that migration is not problematic per se, but that there is an occurrent overdemandingness-problem with the rise in admissions. Thus, they demand that admissions be suspended temporarily. Even if the alleged overdemandingness cannot be justified empirically, the moderate backlashers' claim is neither illiberal nor anti-democratic and thus not self-contradictory for the state agent.

Thus, in order to avoid risking its agency as a liberal democratic state through the moderate backlash, liberal democracies should suspend admissions temporarily. Since a temporary suspension of admissions can resolve the actual backlash, liberal democratic states should yield to moderate, but not to radical backlashes.

Distinguishing between these two kinds of backlashes helps both to justify and criticize political action in the face of such backlashes, and supports the view that liberal democracies are not entirely facing a tragic choice but can make rationally justified decisions when confronted with anti-immigration backlashes by parts of their citizenry.

Peels, Rik, Nora Kindermann & Chris Ranalli - Normativity in Studying Conspiracy Theorizing and Fundamentalism

Conspiracy theory belief has been touted as supplementing or even replacing fundamentalist belief (Nefes, 2001; Šolc, 2019; see also Rousis et al., 2020). Conspiracy theory studies and fundamentalism studies have, however, largely been pursued in isolation of each other. We argue that this is a mistake. A dialogue between these fields will benefit both. Our paper starts from the observation that the philosophical and empirical study of conspiracy theorizing and fundamentalism is often pursued from a normative angle, sometimes with the use of pejorative definitions, or denigrating ideas.

This is visible in the conceptualizations of these phenomena, and how they are studied. When it comes to conceptualizing fundamentalism and conspiracy theorizing, both have, for example, been analyzed

as being typically irrational (see Malcolm, 2021), partly with reference to epistemic vices (Harris, 2019; Malcolm, 2021). Pejorative definitions of 'fundamentalism' or 'conspiracy theorizing' have consequences: If 'fundamentalism' or 'conspiracy theorizing' is pejorative, then the application of these terms to specific phenomena is (or ought to be treated as) pejorative as well.

When it comes to studying conspiracy theory and fundamentalism, academics in both fields have pathologized fundamentalism and conspiracy theories, for example, by explaining them with reference to a paranoid mindset (e.g. Hofstadter, 1965; Terman, 2010). Moreover, both fields have been charged with having a Western-centric outlook, either with regards to how the data is collected and analyzed (Robertson, Asprem, Dyrendal, 2018) or with regards to the assumptions that are imported from Western to non-Western contexts (Wood & Watt, 2014).

The conceptualizations and ways of studying, in turn, affect how we evaluate these phenomena. Philosophers and social psychologists have, for example, explored in detail what is epistemically and sometimes morally wrong with conspiracy thinking (see Stokes, 2018; Douglas, 2021). The intrinsic normativity of evaluation does, however, not absolve one from the responsibility to reflect on the correctness and fairness of the assumptions that form the basis of the normative evaluation, or the aptness of the goals thereof.

Often, the normative approach to fundamentalism and conspiracy theorizing is not made explicit, or critically reflected upon. This has prompted some to criticize both fields of study as being politically exclusionary or as delegitimizing political opposition (Basham & Dentith, 2016; Dentith, 2014; Harambam, 2020; Munson 2003). Therefore, the following questions must be asked: Are these concepts inherently normative? Is a normative approach to conspiracy theorizing and fundamentalism warranted? And if so, how?

In order to answer these questions, we provide an overview and critical evaluation of the ways in which normativity functions in the conceptualization, the study, and the evaluation of conspiracy theorizing and fundamentalism. We argue that, in order to determine the role of normativity in conceptualizing, studying, and evaluating these phenomena, we need to first answer the following question: What do we need these concepts for? And who gets to make this decision?

Perez Leon, Rebeca - Why Mexicans (Dis)Obey the Law: Social Norms, Legal Punishment and Pluralistic Ignorance

This paper succinctly presents the results of an experimental research project on the causes of Mexicans' law abiding behaviour. First, it briefly explains the deterrence and normative theories of law abidance tested, and singles out the key concepts measured. Deterrence theories maintain that individuals' law abiding and non abiding behaviour results from considerations of the legal punishment associated with breaking the law. According to this theory, the more widely known, severe, swift, and certain legal punishments are, the more effective the law will be in deterring individuals from breaking it. Normative theories, on the other hand, state that social and personal norms of respect for the law condition individuals to follow the law. The key concepts of deterrence theory I measured were knowledge, and certainty, of legal punishment, and of normative theory, those of social and personal norms. Second, it describes how these concepts were operationalised and the experimental survey constructed. I conducted a two-stage survey experiment. For the first stage, I designed a questionnaire which presented participants with seven common situations where a fictional character faces the dilemma of breaking or following the law, and chooses from a set of four options two of which are prohibited by the law. Regarding each of these situations, I asked participants about their knowledge of legal sanctions and how likely it is that someone will be sanctioned if caught, which measure the extent to which they are aware of the legal punishments

corresponding to determinate legal breaches, and the extent to which they believe legal punishments will follow. Also, I asked them what they believe others would do and approve of as well as the behaviour they personally approve of in order to measure the existence of consensus about others' behaviour and normative beliefs, and agreement between social and personal normative beliefs. The second stage measured the causality of the key concepts of both deterrence and normative theories using the data of the first questionnaire. Participants were randomly selected to answer one of three questionnaires describing the same situations used in the first stage, and were asked what they themselves would do, but one questionnaire added information about corresponding legal sanctions, the second added information about what others actually do or think others should do in the relevant situations, and the third one did not have additional information. The answers of the three questionnaires were compared in order to see whether the added information influenced behaviour. Finally, the paper outlines the main results obtained, draws some conclusions and indications for further research. The statistical analysis shows that neither social norms nor knowledge and likelihood of legal punishment influences law abiding behaviour. However, the analysis did show a statistically significant sharp disagreement between Mexicans' behaviour and social normative beliefs, on the one hand, and personal normative beliefs, on the other, which reveals a case of pluralistic ignorance whereby Mexicans behave illegally and believe others approve of illegal behaviour, but they personally disapprove of it.

Placencia, Nathan - Race without Racism

In recent work, I have explored a peculiar kind of thought experiment. In many religious traditions, the afterlife is conceived of as a social world like ours but with one significant difference. It is a world that is perfectly just. If such a world existed, it would, by necessity, be a world without racism. In such a world, one might wonder if race could still exist. In other words, can there be race without racism? In this paper, I explore how different theories of race might answer this question. I argue on most social constructionist theories of race; there are no races without racism. I move on to argue that on a minimalist theory of race (Hardimon, 2019), there can be races without racism. I then show that some versions of a psycho-social account of race allow for racial identity without racism too (Appiah, 2018; Placencia, 2010). Finally, I propose that the thought experiment of imagining a world with race but no racism makes it easier to see that on minimalist accounts, race is a kind of geo-ancestry. Geo-ancestral facts are facts about humans that are the result of one's ancestry, and the place one's ancestors inhabit or inhabited. Finally, I examine the renewed interest in geo-ancestry among the general public that has been made possible through a variety of DNA-ancestry services. I argue that such information about one's genetics resonates with the general public because it offers people a way to imagine their concrete (bodily) connection to their ancestors and the places their ancestors lived. Since many people-groups have been forcibly displaced and now live in diaspora, colonized and assimilated to colonial cultures, or immigrated for economic reasons, a concrete connection to ancestors and place is significant to people living in a post-colonial world.

Popescu, Andreea - Names of Institutions as Rigid Designators

This paper argues that the names of institutions are polysemous. First, relative to the framework of the world of things, we refer to Joe Biden when we say "The President rejected the law". In this sense, "The President of U.S.A." is a definite description, i.e., it individualizes a single object, but given a different state of affairs someone else could have been referred to through the definite description. Since Naming and Necessity, we know that "The President of the U.S.A." could have referred to someone else if Biden had lost the elections. I argue that the names of institutions also have a fixed reference. I argue that in the world of social facts, "The President of U.S.A." behaves like a proper name as well, and it is a rigid designator. Proper names are rigid designators, i.e., they refer to the

same object across possible worlds. In 2025 Biden might not be president anymore, and someone else will take his place. Relative to the world of things, the reference of "The President of the U.S.A." will change. However, relative to the world of social facts, something remains constant across time and possible worlds, i.e. the institution of the presidential function.

The argument I develop is more obvious when we refer to institutions not represented by a single person, such as "the Congress" or "The Supreme Court of Justice". Even though the composition of these institutions changes through time, we are still able to refer to the same object. I argue that this account for names of institutions makes sense within the framework of the world of social facts. The world of social facts is made up of individuals, groups, and the deeds of those groups. Within this framework, institutions are created, named, and referred to, and the reference of those institutions passes on from speaker to speaker. We do not only refer to the same object through time, but we also refer to the same object through possible worlds.

This paper fills a lacuna between the questions "Are there social groups", and "What are social groups", that is "To what do names of institutions (a kind of social groups) refer to?". I argue that this semantic interpretation for the names of institutions is important in paving the way to answering the question of whether we can attribute agency to institutions. Arguing that names of institutions have a fixed reference allows us to attribute agency to institutions, and treat them as an agent in their own right, different from the sum of the members that make them up.

Porkkala, Siiri - Nonbinary genders within a Haslangerian gender system

In Sally Haslanger's famous definition of 'women' and 'men' as socially constructed gender categories, S is a woman or a man if and only if S is observed or imagined to have certain bodily features that are assumed to be evidence of S's biological role in reproduction, as either female or male. S having these assumed features marks their role within the dominant ideology as someone who should occupy either subservient or privileged social role. The fact that S satisfies the previous conditions then plays a role in their systematic subordination or privilege.

The provided definition seems to apply only to binary genders, that is, to men and women, and it leaves out the people whose gender does not fall neatly under either of those categories. The aim of this talk is to examine two distinct possibilities on how nonbinary genders can be understood by using the framework of social privilege and oppression. My claim is that that non-hierarchical approach provides a better understanding of nonbinary genders than an account based on categories' place in oppressive social structures.

The first possibility is to understand and analyse nonbinary gender categories as genders that are constructed by fixing their place as oppressed within the current hierarchical structure and examining the basis of that oppression. This is done by providing a Haslangerian focal analysis of nonbinary genders as an oppressed gender category and exploring what relevant gender roles, norms, internalised roles, ideas and gender symbolisms could build nonbinary genders as a category within current gender hierarchy. It becomes apparent that while nonbinary genders as marginalised gender categories do not hold a position of social privilege, they are not oppressed in the same way as women either. This indicates that not all gender-based oppression can be analysed by relying on a binary understanding of gender-based privilege and oppression, or by assuming that oppression is always based on the assumed role in reproduction.

The second possibility questions whether providing an account of nonbinary genders by using the dominant hierarchical ideology is something that we should even wish to pursue. Instead of trying to create a new oppressed gender category within the existing system, I propose that nonbinary genders

can be understood as examples of non-hierarchical genders that stand outside the current framework. According to Haslanger, non-hierarchical genders do not include the structure of oppression based on reproductive organs and capabilities that determine subject's role in a social hierarchy. Even though in Haslanger's theory, non-hierarchical genders are seen as something that do not yet exist in our current society, I argue that this understanding of gender provides better tools for analyzing the role of nonbinary genders within our gender system than the first, oppression-based account.

Poslajko, Krzysztof - How to be fictionalist about institutional groups

The aim of this paper is to provide a coherent and metaphysically plausible interpretation of fictionalist intuitions regarding the status of institutional groups (such as parliaments and corporations) and their alleged mentality. Such intuitions are often expressed by non-philosophers, including legal theorists and theorists of the firm. In the philosophical debate, the fictionalist position is currently not very popular as philosophers tend to opt either for non-reductive realism or some form of reductionism. In my view, the rejection of fictionalism is premature, and what is needed is a charitable reading of fictionalist intuitions.

The way fictionalist intuitions are presented by both legal theorists and theorists of the firm might seem inconsistent as these formulations seem to employ two mutually exclusive fictionalist approaches: the abstract artifact view and pretense theory. On the abstract artifact view, fictional entities are abstract creations of the relevant authors; in the specific case of parliaments and corporations, these entities are taken to be intentional creations within specific legal/institutional frameworks. On the pretense theory, on the other hand, our talk about fictional entities is a mere pretense which does not track any features of reality.

These approaches are, on the face of it, incompatible: abstract artifact theories entail that parliaments and corporations exist and statements about them might literally be true. Pretense theory, on the other hand, shies away from ontological commitments and does not treat fictional statements as true. In my view, however, it is possible to provide a coherent interpretation of these pronouncements if we adopt a "two-stage" fictional approach to parliaments and corporations.

On this two-stage approach, it is postulated that parliaments and corporations are primarily abstract artifacts which are created within legal/institutional frameworks. These abstract artifacts are subsequently used as props in the relevant games of make-believe, in which they are fictionally treated as agents that are capable of having intentions and performing actions.

On this view, corporations and parliaments exist, and some statements about them are literally true (e.g., "such-and-such corporation was incorporated on such-and-such date"). Many other statements about them, however, are only made in pretense mode, especially those which ascribe actions and intentions to institutional groups. In such locutions, we only pretend to treat such abstract and artifactual entities as "persons" or "agents" that have "intentions", "beliefs" and such.

This two-stage approach might, in my view, capture certain important theoretical commitments of certain strands in both legal theory and the theory of the firm, namely that firms and parliaments are indeed real, but they lack important features of concrete entities and genuine intentional agents.

Presi, Virginia - Sources of social norms change. Dimensions and perspectives in Max Weber

Changes are irrupting in our contemporary times and some of them are related to social ontology: e.g. the change of customs, the change of cash into virtual money, the change of women's role. What is happening is that, at some point, a significant part of society does not agree with the meaning of

institutional facts anymore. The constitutive rules «we accept (S has power (S does A))» (Searle 2005: 15) or «we make the case by Declaration that an entity Y exists that has status function F in C» (Searle 2010: 132) become unrepresentative. There is a break between agents and constitutive rules, although social norms should be a scheme of qualification of reality (Deutungsschema, Kelsen 1934).

This process could be drafted as: i) causes: the breaking point between collective intentionality and the meaning of institutional facts; ii) reactions: the change is implemented within certain conditions; iii) effects: after having started the process from the bottom and having succeeded from the above (e.g. parties, judges, lawmakers), the changed social norm returns to the whole society.

Although John Searle, one of the major exponents of social ontology, studies the creations and maintenance of institutional facts (1995: 113s), he does not examine in depth the case of constitutive rules. As a matter of fact, Searle analyzes three different processes of creation of institutional facts (2010: 94-97), but the focus of his investigation is the relationship between the "status functions" and the "collective acceptance"; in other words (Peirce 1932-58): the creation of a new "token" for the same old "type". But: how does a constitutive rule change? When does the birth of a new social norm - or type - occur?

The German philosopher, sociologist and economist Max Weber in Economy and Society (Wirtschaft und Gesellschaft 1922, eng. trans. 1978) frames the topic by asking: «how do new legal rules arise?» (1978: 753). Weber suggests that, although legal norms «arise by way of legislation, i.e., conscious human lawmaking in conformity with the formal constitutional requirements», the «empirical processes in which nonstatutory norms arise as valid customary law» (1978: 753) should still be investigated when speaking of social norms. Weber examines external and internal conditions, psychological and unconscious adjustment, reorientation of behavior, the awareness of the new line of conduct, consensual understanding, consensus, expectation, coercitive enforcement.

My intention is to investigate the first part of the aforementioned process, having the theory of Weber as a starting point to understand the causes and the «source of such innovation» (1978: 755). As a matter of fact, Weber analyzes the change of social norms through inspiration and empathy (1978: 321s) and the emergence and the creation of legal norms (1978: 753s). Furthermore, Weber seems to anticipate the concept of constitutive rules (Conte 1986). Two of the main questions I will examine are: does the change require conscious involvement? Are changes always connected with the concept of development?

Rachar, Matthew and Javier Gomez-Lavin - Things We Do Together: A Study of Strategic Reasoning and Collective Action

Philosophers have argued that there is a distinctive form of sociality, characterized by the presence of shared commitment to a goal, that is not reducible to strategic reasoning aimed at reaching a social equilibrium. We develop and extend our prior experimental philosophy vignettes, measures and analyses to investigate whether folk intuitions of different collective behaviors track this distinction. Following previous empirical work, which discovered that participants are responsive to instances of collective action, as well as the norms associated with those actions (Gomez-Lavin & Rachar 2019; Gomez-Lavin & Rachar 2021), we manipulate a range of fictional vignettes depicting a collective behavior (joining a political rally) to determine whether naive participant-intuitions are sensitive to two categories of joint behaviour: Strategic Reasoning (i.e., Nash-equilibrium reasoning), and Collective Intention (i.e. shared commitment toward achieving a collective goal). In initial pilot data (n = 382) n = 382), we found a significant main effect of condition-assignment across four scalar measures: owing, seeking permission, the presence of joint goals, and joint intentions (all corrected $p < .019$). Our effects were primarily driven by the contrast between strategic reasoning and collective

intention groups. These extended interventions aim to contribute answers to a fraught interdisciplinary question: Do people recognize a difference between these kinds of joint behaviour based on differing levels of commitment or interpersonal normativity?

Raven, Michael - The Social Basis

Although social reality is of fundamental importance, few have thought that it is metaphysically fundamental. Instead, it is far more common to regard the items, groups, institutions, facts, and norms that make up social reality as somehow arising from a more fundamental nonsocial basis. There are differing views about what makes this basis nonsocial. It may be, for instance, that it is purely individualistic, or that it is purely physicalistic. These differences aside, views like these are united in upholding a "derivatist" approach on which the social derives from an ultimately nonsocial basis.

The derivatist approach, as it is usually understood, assumes that there is a special class of facts that "setup" just how the social derives from the nonsocial basis. Different versions of the approach differ over the details of what these setup facts are. They may be essentialist facts about the ultimately nonsocial natures of social items. Or they may be facts about how nonsocial facts ground social facts. Or they may be "frame principles" specifying the modal conditions under which social facts derive from nonsocial facts.

Whatever the details of the setup facts may be, merely appealing to them raises a formiddable difficulty for the derivatist approach. A setup fact connects, in one way or the other, the social to its nonsocial basis. For a fact to state such a connection, it would seem it must make reference to the social. And that seems enough to make a setup fact, at least in part, a social fact. But then we must ask whether or not the setup facts themselves are part of the nonsocial basis. If they are, then they conflict with the derivatist approach by importing the social into what was meant to be a nonsocial basis. And if they are not, then a regress looms: for then they too must derive by yet further setup facts from the nonsocial basis, and the question will arise yet again for these.

This essay introduces a novel solution to this problem. The solution relies on an unfamiliar distinction between "circumstantial" facts that are based in worldly circumstances and "acircumstantial" facts that are not. Social facts are plausibly taken to be circumstantial. And it may be argued that the setup facts are acircumstantial. If so, then the references the setup facts make to the social do not concern the worldly circumstances. It may then be argued that this is compatible with the derivatist approach, once it is properly formulated to take account of the circumstantial/acircumstantial distinction.

Although this essay aims only to outline and not defend this solution, it is worth noting that we may learn from either its success or failure. If it succeeds, it removes a significant obstacle to the derivatist approach. If it fails, its failure may suggest either a better solution or why none is possible. Either way, exploring the solution promises directly to clarify the derivatist approach, and indirectly to clarify our understanding of social reality.

Reinikainen, Jaakko - Against Constitutive Rules

Although several different definitions exist for "constitutive" rules, most of them appear to involve three key interrelated components: a) creation of new social entities, b) sui generis normativity, and c) continuity of identity through change. To exemplify, one might think of how a new game comes to exist. First, there is an invention of a set of rules that create the game as an abstract object. Second, the game is played and its rules come to be in force for the players. Third, the evolution of the game can be described as a combination of internal and external factors such that, although the individual rules of the game change, it is still considered as the "same game" in the internal, synchronic sense of

preserving some essential features and not simply in the external, diachronic, causal-historical sense in which the later stages of the game came to be because of the earlier developments.

In this paper I critically examine in detail three recent attempts to defend the idea of constitutive rules as described above, with particular focus on the generic element (b). The defenses are due to Manuel García-Carpintero (2019, 2021), Elizabeth Fricker (2017), and Corrado Roversi (2021). Although the details of the arguments will be different, the common thread of my case is that while there is a kind of phenomenon which the different accounts of constitutive norms address, as a general explanation they face a common, difficult challenge.

The challenge has two sides, methodological and metaphysical. The methodological criticism has already been levied in a more general form by Stephen Turner (2010), which I seek to deepen in the more particular case of the aforementioned authors. Briefly, the problem is that once a theory explains what it is for a constitutive rule to be in force, the constitutive rule becomes an idle wheel – it is neither necessary nor sufficient to explain what actually goes on in the practice, and why. Moreover, postulating the more or less abstract being-in-force relation comes with metaphysical baggage which can be circumvented if we instead focus on concrete processes of enforcing the rules. The baggage is due to the rule-following paradox originating in Kripke's (1982) reading of Wittgenstein's later work. The general lesson of the challenge that I argue is applicable to constitutive rules is that there are no facts as to what rules in general are in force in the synchronic dimension, and hence that rules in this sense are better seen as theoretical idealizations than causal explanas.

Ritchie, Kate & Ny Vasil - One Recipe for Two Flavors of Generics: How Contextual Restrictions and Stability give Rise to Essentialist and Structural Generics

Two important threads of recent research in psychology and philosophy have examined the ways generics, such as "Xs are aggressive" and "Ys worry about walking home at night", relate to how we represent the world. One program has argued that generics reinforce essentialist thinking, attributing observable properties to an inherent category essence (Gelman, 2003; Leslie, 2017). An alternative line of research has argued that generics can instead be a conduit for structural thinking, conveying regularities stemming from stable external constraints acting on category members ("Xs face discrimination"; Ritchie, 2019; Vasilyeva & Lombrozo, 2020). Are these proposals in conflict, or does each get something right? And, if so, do they call for two accounts of fundamentally different generic representations, or could these two "flavors" of generics be underwritten by a common set of psychological principles?

Here we develop a proposal about two interpretations of generics - aligned with essentialist and structural representations - based on a common principle of conveying robust generalizations, but differentiated based on whether the target generalization is restricted to a narrow context. Specifically, we propose that (a) generics can express two kinds of generalizations: those with relatively unrestricted scope, and those restricted to specific contexts; and that within the target context scope (b) relationships that are relatively stable across salient partitions (sets of backgrounds) are generally better candidates for generic claims than relationships that are relatively unstable. Generalizations with a relatively unrestricted scope are meant to hold in a broad range of contexts (e.g. "birds have hollow bones" holds for birds of most kinds, in most places, etc.). Such generalizations are particularly amenable to an essentialist interpretation, and have been featured prominently in research on generics. In contrast, the structural claims fall into the new category of generics that we introduce here: restricted-scope generics (or, in our preferred terminology, "wonky context generics"). Consider the generic "women don't drive", uttered in a conversation on societal conventions in Saudi Arabia, taking place in the U.S. This generic claim is felicitous because the

conversation restricts the scope to Saudi Arabia, making other salient contexts (e.g. women in the speaker's country) irrelevant. It describes a special context, a situation that is wonky in some respect - but, critically, this situation contains its own systematic regularities that license the acceptability of generics. This is precisely what structural generics (such as "Blacks face discrimination") do: they describe systematic patterns without depicting them as essential, inherent or necessary. Nevertheless, we argue, both sorts of generics favor relationships that are stable across partitions within the context scope, including possible worlds with minor perturbations. This principle screens out merely accidental regularities that may hold in a wonky context (e.g. "Supreme Court Justices have even social security numbers" is not felicitous even if we happen to discuss a context where this happens to hold; Dahl, 1975). In sum, we introduce a novel proposal for how the same underlying principle gives rise to two very different interpretations of generics identified in the literature, essentialist and structural.

Rooij, Barend de - A Functionalist Account of Group Character

In our everyday linguistic practices, we frequently use the language of virtue and vice to evaluate the conduct of various kinds of social groups. For instance, we may commend fire brigades for their bravery, congratulate a hiring committee for its open-mindedness, or blame unscrupulous corporations for their greed. Despite a rich history of philosophical analysis of such character-based evaluations in the case of individual agents, we know relatively little about the metaphysical status of character-based evaluations applied to group agents. Using novel insights about the nature of group agency, I argue that we can often characterize the collective character of group agents as virtuous or vicious in its own right – that is, qua group, independently of the character of its members. On the functionalist account of group character I defend, collective virtues and vices arise when organizations or other collective actors are organized so as to function in a virtuous or vicious way.

My argument proceeds in three stages. I first consider – and reject – a summativist analysis of group character, according to which collective virtues and vices are simply aggregates of individual character traits. I argue that summativists fail to account for so-called 'divergence cases' in which traits realized at the collective level come apart from the traits of individual members in interesting ways. This motivates the search for a non-summativist (or inflationary) account of group character, according to which group agents can be the bearer of virtues and vices as subjects in their own right. One such account has been suggested by Miranda Fricker, who argues that we can model group character using Margaret Gilbert's plural subject theory. While we find in Fricker's account a promising point of departure, I argue – in the second stage of my argument – that it faces two objections. First, plural subject accounts run the risk of making what should be a significant achievement – the acquisition of virtue (or indeed vice) – too easy for groups to realize. Second, plural virtues and vices are often unstable, and therefore no virtues or vices in the traditional sense of the word. Drawing on the work of Christian List and Philip Pettit, I conclude by showing how a functionalist analysis of group character avoids both objections and provides a compelling account of group character in its own right.

Rostek, Jan - Group minds and the mark of the mental

I propose that supporters of the thesis that phenomenal consciousness is the mark of the mental (henceforth: PCM) may embrace the existence of group minds by claiming that there is a difference in reference between individual and group uses of mental vocabulary.

Among the proponents of the thesis that groups have mental states of their own there is a widespread, vocal or tacit, assumption that intentionality is the mark of the mental. This is no surprise since the other main contender for the essence of mentality is phenomenal consciousness and groups entertaining intentional states are way more plausible than phenomenally conscious groups.

Supporters of PCM, for example those who endorse the phenomenal intentionality thesis, usually dismiss the possibility of group minds because hardly any of them would like to claim that groups may be phenomenally conscious (see Overgaard and Salice 2021, Baysan forthcoming).

However, it is disputable whether the nature of the mental states we ascribe to ourselves is identical to the nature of the mentality we ascribe to groups. Borrowing the terms from Figdor's (2018) book on ascribing mental predicates to non-humans, among the possible positions on the reference of mental vocabulary there are the literalist view and the technical view. The literalist view applied to groups claims that when one says that a group G has a belief B, then we should take "has B" as meaning exactly the same as when one says that a human H has B. Literalism seems to be accepted by major realists about group minds such as Tollefsen (2015), Huebner (2014) or List and Pettit (2011). It is the adoption of the literalist view that makes it look as if PCM stands in tension with group mentality.

Supporters of PCM do not have to accept literalism and may instead embrace the technical view. When applied to groups it says that when one claims that a group G has a belief B it might be literally true but not because G has B in the same sense that a human H may have B. According to the technical view, "has a belief B" when applied to groups refers to a different property than when applied to individuals. A supporter of PCM might say that "G has B" is true iff G exhibits certain behavioral patterns, is best interpreted as having B or fits some models made by cognitive scientists, whereas "H has B" is true iff H has some property available only to phenomenally conscious agents, and that this discrepancy is the result of "has B" being in fact two predicates which only look the same but refer to different properties. Such discrepancy is found in mental vocabulary applied to humans (see Francken and Slors 2014, Dewhurst 2021) so it should not be surprising to find it between individual and group levels. If PCM supporters embrace the technical view and find a good motivation for it, they will be able to plausibly explain the practice of applying mental predicates to groups.

Roth, Abe - What is it for collective attitudes to be implemented and acted on, and why does it matter?

Common discourse concerning groups, clubs, political parties, institutions, corporations, governments, countries, the public, etc. involves the seeming attribution to those entities of psychological attitudes such as beliefs, desires, and intentions. Some of this talk is merely meant to summarize the attitudes of the individuals within the groups. And sometimes the attributions are merely metaphoric, perhaps a useful way of rendering the phenomena, but not to be taken literally.

Other times, however, these collective attitude ascriptions are meant and understood realistically, as reflecting a genuine aspect of social world. The group, institution, etc. really believes such and such, and the corporation really values so and so. The realistic defense of this discourse would seem to require indispensability arguments of one sort or another. An argument from theoretical indispensability, for example, would hold that any compelling understanding of some phenomenon X would require the invocation of group or collective attitudes. Other forms of indispensability might appeal to practical as opposed to theoretical concerns, or invoke considerations of social construction that arguably involve an amalgamation of the theoretical and the practical.

If an indispensability argument is invoked to defend the idea that groups really do have psychological attitudes in anything like the sense in which individuals do, then we are in need of an understanding of what it is to act on such attitudes. Psychological attitudes of the sort that are familiarly attributed to groups are the sort that figure in intentional, rationalizing explanations of action. So if groups genuinely have psychological attitudes in anything like the sense in which individuals do, then those attitudes are presumably indispensable to a form of intentional, rationalizing explanation of action.

One reason, then, for investigating what it is to act on a collective attitude is to see it as a part of a project vindicating a form of social understanding – one that takes seriously the widespread attribution of psychological attitudes to groups, institutions, etc. in both theoretical as well as ordinary day to day discourse.

But what is it to act on such collective or group attitudes? This paper explores a number of different approaches and possibilities including (i) the approach that treats group agency as a monolithic form of individual agency, where the agency of participating individuals is at best only incidentally related to the agency of the group; (ii) the approach that thinks of individual agents as fungible human resources for the group and which accommodates the idea that individual agents could very well be alienated from the group; (iii) the approach that appeals to a causal or functional architecture specifying roles for individuals to play; (iv) the approach that appeals to collective ascriptions of a certain kind of status on those acting on collective attitudes; and (v) the approach that models the way an individual acts on or implements a collective attitude on the way that an individual acts on or implements her own attitudes.

The discussion will be guided not only with the aforementioned project of taking seriously group collective attitudes. There will also be the aim of seeing how group cognition can serve as a substantive rational resource for the individuals acting on or implementing collective attitudes, with implications for the epistemology and ethics of trust and testimony.

Rust, Joshua - Enactivist Social Ontology

Kirk Ludwig convincingly argues that institutions are not intentional agents because they lack the background of related attitudes required to make sense of their having beliefs or desires, and, so, reasons (2017, 239). Accordingly, he arrives at the deflationary conclusion that institutional doings are fully expressible in terms of the intended actions of individual agents; talk of corporate agency is merely a "convenience of language" (2017, 218).

Michael Bratman concedes that institutions could not be agents in the way that humans are, but raises the bare possibility that there is a more "generic" conception of agency under which some institutions might fall (2018). Following Bratman's suggestion, I want to argue that if there are well-defined criteria by which non-human organisms count as non-intentional, intelligent agents, then those same criteria might reveal a sense in which some institutions might also qualify as generic agents. While this strategy has not, to my knowledge, been pursued by social ontologists, it describes the approach taken by a number of sociologists, including Niklas Luhmann (1986; 1996), Philip Selznick (1948), Sheldon Messinger (1955), and W. Richard Scott (2002).

I argue that an enactivist position within cognitive science can supply us with the required conception of generic, intelligent agency. However, seeing this requires reconsideration of a standard account of organismic agency within the enactivist approach. That standard view maintains that the activities of an organism are meaningful and/or good relative to a felt survival goal. For example, Hans Jonas writes that the "organism has to keep going, because to be going is its very existence--which is revocable-- and, threatened with extinction, it is concerned in existing" (1966, 126; see also Weber and Varela 2002, 116; Di Paolo and Thompson 2014, 73; Moreno and Mossio 2015, 121; Di Paolo, Buhrmann, and Barandiaran 2017, 121). However, I argue that, as attractive as the appeal to existential concern initially is, it is fatally flawed and that we should instead claims that organism-agents are such that they are sensitive to a history of response in a way that artifacts are not. That is, unlike artifacts, which are individuated according to their capacity to realize extrinsic purposes, organismal agents are temporally constituted in the sense that they are necessarily constrained by their own histories (see,

for example, Wallace 2019). This is what I call the "precedential account" of generic agency, which I locate within the broader enactivist tradition.

I conclude by connecting the proposed precedential account of generic agency to group-level phenomena. This enactivist account of generic agency as applied to institutions finds reflection in Christian List and Philip Pettit's claims about the possibility of a "precedent-based" priority procedure and Ronald Dworkin's view about how the law as integrity entails the law's "personification."

Ruta, Marcello - Recollection as Diachronic Collective Intentionality: A Brandomian Reading of Hegel's Metaphysics of Agency

The notion of recollection (in Brandom's words "one of Hegel's principal innovations"), together with the notion of recognition, is one of what we might call the two hermeneutical lines along which Robert Brandom, in his recently published A Spirit of Trust, interprets Hegel's Phenomenology of Spirit, and Hegel's philosophical program more generally: "At its [the Hegelian thought's] heart are the two notions of recognition and recollection, articulating the social and historical dimensions of discursive normativity" (Brandom 2019: 16 – underlinings in Brandom's original text).

In the herewith adopted perspective, Brandom's reading constitutes a striking interpretation of Hegel's notion of agency in diachronic intersubjective terms. While recognition, articulating the social dimension of agency, covers its intersubjective aspect, recollection, by explicating its historical dimension, covers its diachronic aspect.

All this seems to be confirmed by the following excerpt: "There is […] a […] striking difference between the projected Vernunft conception of agency and more familiar modern Verstand conceptions […] That difference lies in the understanding of the responsibilities the agent's recognitive community undertakes for the deeds of the agent. […] These communal responsibilities have no analogue in the modern conception. For on the postmodern Vernunft conception, the recognitive community not only has the authority to attribute the deed under descriptions in terms of unforeseen, unintended consequences; it in a distinctive way takes responsibility itself for the deed under those consequential specifications" (Brandom 2019: 733-734).

Such a taking of responsibility for the "unintended consequences" of a human action pledges for a conception of agency, fully encompassing its historical dimension, as regulated by a diachronic collective intentionality: while the action (Handlung) covers the intentional part of the individual agent, the deed (Tat) covers the intentional part of the community, which is performed by the recollective operations of single actors, but which achieves the recognition of a human action within the history of a human community, thereby contributing to the building of human traditions: "[T]he final, vernünftig form of reciprocal recognition as confession and forgiveness is essentially historical. The attitude-governing norms it institutes and acknowledges have the rich diachronic recognitive form of traditions" (Brandom 2019: 749).

While the ascription of collective intentionality to the notion of tradition should be considered much more than a simple metaphorical artifice, it is also clear that this same attribution entails a notion of collective intentionality which, in some respects, radically differs from the ones formulated within the landscape of contemporary analytic philosophy.

Rytilä, Jenni - Social grounds of mathematical entities

What is the place of mathematical entities in the metaphysical "grand scheme" of reality? One metaphysical view answers this question by locating the abstract things studied in mathematics, from the real numbers to the set theoretic universe, in socially constructed reality. The core idea of social

constructionism about mathematics is that mathematical entities are products of shared mathematical practices; without humans and their practices of counting, calculating, formulating theories, and proving theorems, there would be no mathematical entities. Still, despite their dependence on human activity, they are genuine aspects of reality in a similar way to universities, money, and other familiar parts of social reality.

But why social construction? What exactly is the role of the social in mathematical existence? In this talk, I tackle the question by making use of the notion of social construction as grounding, because the concept is beneficial in examining the ontological dependencies in play. Placing the idea of mathematical social construction within the grounding framework, the central claim can be rephrased thus: mathematical entities are real but nonfundamental entities that are grounded in mathematical practices. But if this case of grounding is to be an instance of social construction, the practices in question should be (at least partly) social practices, since following the definition from Schaffer (2016), to be socially constructed is to be grounded in distinctive social patterns. Thus, the question becomes: in what way are mathematical practices social practices? In other words, what are the social grounds of mathematical entities?

At first glance, the mathematical practice of formulating a proof does not seem to be a social practice in the same way that for example dividing children into boys' and girls' sports groups is a social practice. However, to shed light on the role of sociality in mathematics, we must recognize that mathematical practice involves the practitioners and their interactions, too. Ferreirós (2016) characterizes a mathematical practice as what the community of mathematicians do when they employ resources such as frameworks (mathematical language, symbols, methods, accepted statements and open questions) on the basis of their cognitive abilities to solve problems, prove theorems, and shape theories. This characterization is remarkable close to how Haslanger (2018) defines a social practice. In short, social practices are patterns of learned behavior that enable us as members of a group to manage a resource, due to mutual responsiveness to each other's behavior and the resource in question, as interpreted through shared meanings. The similarity brings out the role of social patterns in mathematical practice: the distinctly mathematical aspects (e.g. proofs, concepts, methods) are the resources that are employed and managed within patterns of interaction among communities of agents, and these patterns have the central characteristics of a social practice.

The conclusion is that mathematical entities are social constructions in the sense that they are grounded in mathematical practices that are a combination of distinctive social patterns and theoretical resources. Thus, partial grounds of mathematical reality are social practices.

Sahlgren, Otto - Sociotechnical Pathology

Social wrongs or social pathologies are "wrongs-with" social practices, society, or the social fabric as a whole which remain under-described by first-order ethical and political standards (see Honneth, 2007; Laitinen & Särkelä, 2020). This paper examines a significant yet underexamined aspect of contemporary social wrongs and pathologies: their sociotechnical grounds understood as their technological causes and constituents, and interactions between technological and social factors through which they emerge. The paper starts from the observation that advanced technologies (e.g., machine learning systems and artificial intelligence) increasingly mediate and contribute to global issues such as climate change (Brevini, 2020), and to exacerbate structural forms of injustice and oppression (e.g., Eubanks, 2018; Noble, 2018). Meanwhile, the vocabularies of technology ethicists and critical social philosophers appear in their own ways limited in analyzing pathologies that are in some sense sociotechnically constituted: On the one hand, calls are increasingly made to move technology ethics discourse beyond its narrow ethico-political of vocabularies (e.g., "bias" and

"unfairness") and to engage in discussion of broad societal harms (e.g., Smuha, 2021). Critical social philosophy, on the other hand, has a well-established conceptual toolkit for analyzing such harms–namely, that of social pathologies–but such diagnoses remain impoverished in their neglect of how advanced technologies configure and co-construct social practices and social wholes.

This paper aims to bridge the identified gap between critical social philosophy, critical social ontology, and technology ethics. The paper's contributions are three-fold: First, I argue for an interdisciplinary perspective and for the necessity of incorporating a sociotechnical analytic lens in the diagnosis and amelioration of social pathologies. Second, as a positive contribution, I introduce the concept of 'sociotechnical pathology' as a general diagnostic tool that addresses this necessity. The concept captures that there can be something not only morally or politically wrong but also socially wrong with algorithms and data-driven decision-making practices, for example. Lastly, I examine the best way of understanding sociotechnical pathology by sketching four substantive conceptions of sociotechnical pathology–namely, two "normativist" and two "naturalist" accounts (see Laitinen & Särkelä, 2020)–and teasing out their respective theoretical commitments and implications. The general argument for the necessity of sociotechnical systems analysis in diagnosing and ameliorating social wrongs can be accepted without committing to any one substantive conception of sociotechnical pathology outlined in the paper.

Salmela, Mikko - Many routes to many feelings of togetherness in shared emotions

Philosophers of emotion widely agree that shared emotions involve feelings of togetherness. These feelings are particularly important in theories of shared emotion that reject the phenomenological fusion account (Schmid, 2009), emphasizing that shared emotions are felt by individuals with a "plural self-awareness" or a "sense of us". Some philosophers, especially those in the phenomenological tradition (e.g. León, Szanto & Zahavi, 2017; Thonhauser, 2018; Zahavi, 2015; Walther, 1923) argue that feelings of togetherness are constitutively involved in shared emotions, whereas others have argued such feelings to be important yet contingent part of shared affective experience that may take other forms as well (Salmela & Nagatsu, 2016, 2017).

I argue that the dispute about the role of feelings of togetherness in shared emotions emerges from a conflation of two different phenomena, in part because they often occur together and intertwined even if they should be analytically separated. The first meaning of "feelings of togetherness" is what Thonhauser (2018) calls sense of togetherness: "an awareness that we are experiencing this emotion together, which amounts to an awareness of the communal subject of the experience." (p. 1011). This is a hedonically neutral experience that there are particular others with whom one is experiencing the emotion. Sense of togetherness relates to the constitution of a we-perspective that pertains to all we-experiences; shared emotions as well as other collectively intentional experiences and activities. The second meaning of "feelings of togetherness" associates with what Jasper (1998) characterizes reciprocal emotions: positive feelings that group members feel towards each other. Accordingly, feelings of togetherness in this meaning refer to hedonically positive feelings of closeness, rapport, and affiliation between the participants of a shared emotion.

Finally, I discuss how the two types of experience of togetherness emerge and relate to each other in shared emotions. I consider two routes to sense of togetherness: second-person engagement (Zahavi, 2019) and shared concerns (Tuomela 2007). I suggest that shared concerns founded on a joint commitment of the participants are capable of establishing a robust sense of togetherness even prior to shared activities, experiences, or attitudes in which the members´ we-perspective is manifested. Instead, neither second-person engagement nor weakly shared concerns are capable of establishing a robust "sense of us" among individuals, and therefore shared activities, experiences, or attitudes

are needed for the emergence of a robust sense of togetherness. Regarding feelings of togetherness in shared emotions, I suggest that they emerge from synchronization of the participants´ affective responses, together with mutual awareness of their converging affects and/or emotions. I also introduce a distinction between weak and strong type of feelings of togetherness. Both kinds of feelings are similar in terms of their hedonic valence, but they are dissimilar in terms of their intentional structure. While weak feelings of togetherness emerging from mere behavioural synchronization are experienced without a sense of togetherness, strong feelings of togetherness emerging from mutual awareness of affective convergence are felt as one of "us" towards other members of "us".

Salomone-Sehr, Jules - Prolepsis in Collective Harm Cases

As defined by Julia Nefsky (2015; 2017), collective harm cases are cases where a collection of agents risks causing a harmful outcome Y, but where each agent's contribution X, by itself, makes no difference to Y. The problem, in such cases, is that, somewhat counterintuitively, each agent seems to have no reason to not X. For if the contribution of each X to Y is vanishingly small, there would seem to be no point in refraining from X-ing—a conclusion many of us want to resist.

In this paper, I will suggest a new solution to the problem of collective harm, one that invokes the notion of prolepsis. Roughly, a proleptic mechanism is a mechanism through which an agent that does not have a reason to φ yet, acquires that reason by being treated as if they already possessed it. Here is how I suggest applying this notion to the problem of collective harm. Individual agents, perhaps, might not have a reason to not X. Similarly, the collection of agents itself might not have a reason to not bring about Y—or so I hereafter assume. Yet, the central insight of the paper is that each agent of the collection has a reason to treat the collection that they are a part of as if it were agentially integrated enough to be attributed the reason to not bring about Y. For when treated as such, the collection of agents ends up acquiring a reason to not bring about Y which, in turn, makes it the case that enough agents of that collection end up acquiring a reason to not X. In short: individual agents have a reason to make it the case, through prolepsis, that enough of them acquire a reason to not X.

The rest of the paper unpacks this insight. First, I explain what prolepsis involves by presenting Bernard Williams's pioneering use of prolepsis in his account of blame (1981; 1989). Then, I show how prolepsis can solve the problem of collective harm. Lastly, I compare my solution to Nefsky's.

Sanso, Gloria - What is an investment?

Some interesting research has been recently published in the area of ontology of commercial exchange (Massin et al. 2017, Vajda et al. 2019, Merrell et al. 2021). The main aim of this paper is to make a contribution to this area of research by focusing especially on the nature of investments. An investment is typically defined as the commitment of resources in the expectation of having some future profits (Bodies et al. 2018). When, for example, I buy shares of stock, I do that because I expect that the price will increase and, accordingly, I will have a return. There are, however, at least two questions that have to be addressed in detail. The first one is: is a commitment of resource an investment only if the agent expects some return? In other words, do the agent's expectations play a role in determining whether an action is an investment? A positive answer does not seem correct for two reasons. On one hand, the agent's expectations may motivate the action of committing some resources, however those expectations cannot make that action an investment. Indeed, my expectations can be unfounded: because of my ignorance, I can expect, for example, to have a positive return by buying an object that cannot possibly offer any positive return. On the other hand, it is possible that an agent buys an object just to own it, without any expectation of positive return, but then having huge profits. I argue, therefore, that an investment is a commitment of resources in

objects having the potential to produce a positive return regardless of the agent's expectations. This potentiality is determined by the laws of the market and by the nature of the objects themselves. The second question I would like to address is: what is the relation between payment and investment? I tentatively argue that an investment is a special type of payment; more precisely, I argue that an investment is a payment that has the potential to produce a positive return.

Sarkia, Matti - Modeling the normativity of joint commitments

The question about the normativity of shared intentions (or joint commitments) has become a seemingly intractable debate in social ontology (see e.g. Bratman 2014; 2022; Gilbert 2013; Gomez-Lavin&Rachar 2019; Michael 2022). The debate is in part tied to different goals of social ontological inquiry—namely, whether researchers have the goal of causally explaining (e.g. Bratman 2014; 2022) or hermeneutically interpreting (e.g. Gilbert 2013) social behavior, whether these goals are compatible or in conflict with one another, and to the extent that they are in conflict, whether one should take precedence (which one?), or whether they should be pursued separately. While some recent approaches drawing on cognitive psychology (e.g. Michael 2022) and experimental philosophy (e.g. Gomez-Lavin&Rachar 2019) have attempted to determine whether individuals in fact view joint commitments as normative (thereby validating a Weberian-hermeneutic defense of normativity), my presentation takes a different approach. Namely, I argue that neither normativist nor non-normativist approaches to joint commitment need to be strictly tied to descriptive assumptions about the psychological states of individuals. Rather, they may be viewed in terms of the contrasting abstractions and idealizations that theoreticians introduce into their models of shared intention in order to make them simpler or theoretically more tractable. Here I follow Martin Thomson-Jones (2005, 175) in taking "idealization to require the assertion of a falsehood, and... abstraction to involve the omission of a truth". Thus abstraction consists in a "matter of complete silence" with respect to a particular feature of the real world, while idealization involves "misrepresenting how things stand in that respect" (ibid.). Applying these concepts to my subject matter, I will say that normativists idealize shared intentions by treating them as intrinsically and universally normative, while non-normativists abstract away from some features of shared intentions by treating them as not involving any forms of non-instrumental normativity at all (in the absence of extrinsic considerations, such as agreement making). While they are each descriptively false of at least some garden variety cases of shared intention, I will argue that the contrasting abstractions and idealizations that they make can be justified by the goal of isolating some aspects of shared intention for further theoretical investigation. My paper is based on research on abstraction and idealization in the philosophy of science (e.g. Mäki 2020; Thomson-Jones 2005; Wimsatt 2007), and recent approaches to social ontological inquiry that view it as analogous (in some, but not all respects) to similar practices of model-construction in science (Sarkia 2021a; 2021b).

Satne, Glenda - A paradigmatic framework for the study of collective action

Collective actions come in many forms. Group dances, performances by music ensembles, soccer matches, elections, and demonstrations, are all examples of collective actions. Some of these actions are pursued spontaneously by strangers in face-to-face situations, others are performed by groups of individuals that know each other very well, yet others are actions in which individuals, while widely spread in space and time, act in highly organized ways.

Some of these collective activities are practiced by groups of human and non-human animals alike, while others seemed to be exclusively a human affair. Some of these activities involve complex cognitive capacities and sophisticated forms of communication while for others inter-bodily coordination suffices. Some require complex social structures to be in place in the common environments, while others do not require much at all. The similarities and differences between these

cases are of interest for different disciplines; including comparative psychology, developmental psychology, evolutionary theory, social neuroscience and sociology, to name a few. Notably, current accounts of collective action tend to focus on one or other case of collective action and fail to address the significance of the similarities and differences between different putative cases of collective action. While the insights of each view are valuable, the methodology that permeates the views stands as an obstacle for providing an integrated account that respects both the similarities and differences at issue. In this talk, I present a paradigmatic methodology for the study of collective action in its different varieties. Unlike other concepts, that are characterized in terms of essential features, paradigmatic concepts do not specify necessary or sufficient conditions for all the cases that fall under the concept, instead they stipulate an open list of characteristic features that these cases share at least to a certain extent. With the help of this methodology, I proceed to discuss some key characteristic features that different paradigmatic cases of collective action share, including agency, autonomy, and normativity. I then discuss how this methodology can inform, and in turn, be informed by an interdisciplinary study of the features at issue.

Schmitz, Michael - "Go for a walk?" - Initiating joint commitments through questions

How can a joint commitment be initiated? Suppose we try to understand the initiation of a joint commitment in terms of individual conditional intentions. I intend to commit if you intend to commit and you intend to commit if I intend to commit. But it's hard to see then how either of us could ever detach the antecedent of their conditional and reach a non-conditional commitment (cf. Gilbert 2013: 43f).

A more natural and more promising suggestion is that joint commitments can be initiated through questions, for example through questions posed by means of presenting imperative sentences with rising intonation as in "Go for walk?" or "Have a drink?". But existing accounts of questions in the philosophy of language neglect such practical yes-no questions, affirmative answers to which are tantamount to directions rather than assertions. They can neither explain how an answer to a question can be a practical commitment, nor how it can establish a joint commitment.

In my contribution, I will present a new account of questions, the higher-level act account, and show how it can explain both these things. I will argue that questions are not on all fours with assertions and directions, as it is commonly supposed. Nor should we accept the force-content distinction and with it the idea that all these acts have forceless propositions as their contents. Rather questions are higher-level acts (Schmitz 2021) which put forward assertions or directions themselves in order to elicit yes-no responses, or various kind of completions in the case of word questions. And basic assertoric, directive and interrogative force indicators such as intonation contour, word order and grammatical mood themselves nonconceptually present the subject's theoretical or practical position towards a state of affairs: theoretical or practical knowledge for assertoric, respectively directive force indicators, and a position of wondering, for interrogative force indicators. Questions then have structures like "? AS (it rains)" or "? DIR (go for a walk)", where in the context created by the higher-level illocutionary act of questioning, the assertoric or directive force indicators now present knowledge positions the subjects seek rather than ones they lay claim to.

I will show how this account can explain practical commitment and how it can be naturally extended to also explain joint commitment. Key is the thought that the experience of joint attention, deliberation and communication, as manifest in eye contact, alignment, posture, attunement, again intonation contour, and so on, can also nonconceptually determine that what is being proposed or under consideration is a joint action and a joint commitment.

I conclude with some general reflections on how overcoming the force-content distinction – and thus a picture of intentionality centered around the idea that all content is propositional and conceptual – is crucial for a proper understanding of collective intentionality.

Schumann, Gunnar - Why there is in fact no philosophical puzzle about collective intentionality

As if the philosophical problem of the appropriate form of explaining individual intentional actions was not already complicated enough, the special case of collective actions adds a further difficulty: In what way can actions performed by collective agents be adequately explained? I shall confine my discussion to collective intentions. Collective intentions are attributed to individuals as a group. The main philosophical difficulty in the analysis of collective intentions lies in the tension of the expression "individuals as a group". According to Schweikard / Schmid (2013), it can be understood as a contradiction between the following widely accepted assertions:

1. Collective intentionality is no simple summation, aggregate, or distributive pattern of individual intentionality (the Irreducibility Claim);
2. Collective intentionality is had by the participating individuals, and all the intentionality an individual has is his or her own (the Individual Ownership Claim).

Many contemporary philosophers consider the correct analysis of collective intentional actions to be a real philosophical problem. They generally understand intentional actions as physical events caused by the intentions of the agent. Intentions are understood either as mental or neuronal states possessed by individuals. So conceived, how can it be that a group of agents performs a collective action when all involved agents have their individual intentions?

In my talk, I will show that the problem of explaining collective action, so conceived, is a bogus problem owing to a linguistic confusion concerning the notion of intention. Indeed, intentions are not individually possessed mental states at all, and collective intentions are not qualitatively-identical-but-numerically-distinct mental states of actors. The point of the concept of intention is that we would not ascribe an intention to an agent when she does not perform the relevant action although she has the opportunity to do so. Therefore, an intention must not be thought of as an entity, but as a way of an agent's behavior that can be understood in a context as being bound by a self-prescription. Accordingly, a collective intention is the behavior of the individual members of the group that can be understood in a context as being governed by one self-prescription. When two people intend to X together they have one and the same intention, not two very similar, but numerically distinct, mental states. It is the context of the performances of the actions that ensures that the partial actions are parts of the performance of one collectively intended action. (The context of an item of individual or collective behavior is the conceptual criterion for there to be a collective action.) To that context belongs that the shared intention was expressed either verbally (by agreement, promise or contract) or non-verbally (by the way the joint action or attempts to it were performed). As I will argue further, this also holds for more complex collective actions of larger groups of agents, so that there is no difference between basic and complex collective actions in principle.

Schweikard, David - Agential Profiling of Organizations

Reference to organizations as agents is all too familiar in common parlance. Often ascriptions of agency occur in contexts in which the organizations in question are said to be responsible or liable for some action or omission. 'Apple purchased Beats,' 'Adidas sponsors Manchester United,' 'The European Commission asks Poland to respect the decision of the Court of Justice of the European Union,' 'The UN has failed to prevent the genocide in Rwanda,' and 'BP is responsible for the

Deepwater Horizon oil spill' are among typical ascriptions of agency and responsibility. In this paper, I shall speak of organizations in a broad sense so as to include firms and corporations, committees, clubs, and nation states. Organizations are in important respects structured social groups many of which both have a recognized legal status and play definite roles in social, economic, and institutional practices. That many organizations have these features can be presupposed in many forms of informative inquiry into the social practices in which we encounter them. My interest here lies with the ontological commitment involved in the assumption that at least some organizations count as agents. That is, I want to spell out what it is we refer to when we refer to organizations as agents and what features organizations need to have in order to warrant such reference.

In social ontological debates the question "which social groups, if any, count as agents in their own right?" is somewhat central. Its centrality points to the valuable interest in finding out whether we have reason to include organizations as irreducible agents in our ontology of the social world. However, this kind of inquiry is only partly helpful in spelling out the ontological commitments underlying reference to organizations as agents both in everyday talk and in the relevant scholarship. What we should undertake with regard to this more comprehensive endeavour, I claim, is to develop differentiated accounts of the multiple agential profiles organizations can exhibit.

The profiling I have in mind involves answering the question as to which conditions organizations have to meet in order to count as agents, but it's not limited to the question of irreducibility. This is because the conditions of irreducible agency are complex and demanding, and they will thus likely be met only by rather few actual organizations. But what if an organization fulfils only some but not all of the requirements for irreducible agency? Then we have good reason to provide more differentiated profiles of its agency, that is we have good reason to be pluralists about agency — or so I will argue.

I first turn to agential profiling in general (2.) and then to the development of a toolkit for profiling organizations (3.). I claim that pluralism about the agency of organizations is most adequate in accounting for ontological commitments underlying reference to organizations. In conclusion I briefly discuss how these reflections complement more hands-on inquiries into the nature of organizations (4.).

Schwengerer, Lukas - Collective Self-Knowledge on Neutral Grounds

In this talk I build towards a theory of collective self-knowledge that aims to be neutral about the nature of collective mental states. A theory that is compatible with many different accounts of mental states for groups, such as joint commitment accounts, we-mode accounts, or aggregation based accounts. Given that these accounts have different proposals for the nature of collective mental states it is a challenge for any neutral theory of collective self-knowledge to be general enough to be applied to all of these base accounts of group states while being explanatory powerful at the same time. I take up this challenge by looking at good candidates developed as theories for self-knowledge in individuals. I suggest that both inferential accounts and transparency accounts of self-knowledge are good candidates that can be neutral about the nature of mental states. Both are therefore also well-suited to build a neutral theory of collective self-knowledge.

I sketch an account of collective self-knowledge for belief that includes features of both candidate accounts. From the transparency accounts of self-knowledge I take the idea of using the same procedure that generates first-order mental states also as a means to form knowledge of these first-order mental states. From the inferential accounts I borrow the idea that self-knowledge is primarily a result of inferences from evidence. Putting these ideas together I suggest that groups gain self-knowledge by inference based on a very particular kind of evidence: the process that generated the group's belief. The core idea is that the process generating first-order mental states for groups can

itself be the inference basis for forming a second-order belief about the group's mental state. In this general version I make no commitment to what the process generating first-order mental states looks like. Whatever this process is, it is within the group and accessible by the group. Hence, it can be used for the group as a basis for an inference. Of course, the process does not need to be perfectly accessible. The more accessible the belief-forming process, the better the inference basis will be and therefore the easier the group can acquire collective self-knowledge. Some groups might form the group's mental states in ways that are barely accessible at all. These groups will be in a bad position to form collective self-knowledge. This also entails that we can improve a group's ability to have collective self-knowledge by changing their belief-forming methods to be well structured, open and accessible.

This account is general enough to be compatible with a variety of base accounts of collective belief, but nevertheless is explanatory powerful: it can explain why collective self-knowledge is usually privileged and why its expressions in collective avowals are authoritative.

Schwenkenbecher, Anne – I-mode reasoning vs. we-mode reasoning in moral deliberation - operating in the 'wrong' mode?

Moral agents facing a collective-action problem may employ different types of reasoning in deciding how to act. Reasoning in the I-mode, she takes her individual agency and efficacy in the world as the starting point: What is the best thing she can do given the circumstances and given what others do? It is act-based, best-response reasoning. The preferences of agents deliberating in the I-mode may well be other-regarding: e.g. they may aim at furthering the group's interest or collective good. We-mode reasoning, or 'we-reasoning', in contrast, is pattern-based: we infer our course of action from what is collectively best by way of acting as part of the group rather than for the sake of the group. I-mode reasoning with pro-group preferences (pro-group I-mode reasoning) and we-reasoning will often generate the same result, in particular in so-called strict joint necessity cases – where each agent's contribution is necessary for realizing a specific collectively available option. I-mode reasoning will regularly generate socially suboptimal results in so-called wide joint necessity cases – such as voting or carbon footprint reductions. Moral deliberating agents use both kinds of reasoning and contextual factors seem to function as important triggers. But how should agents reason vis-à-vis collective moral action problems? What kind of fault do agents commit (if any) when their choice of (pro-group or other) I-mode reasoning over we-reasoning generates morally suboptimal results? On one view, agents' mode of reasoning is entirely circumstantial – situations do or do not 'trigger' we-framing and we-reasoning. On a different view, agents must actively choose between available frames and commit mistakes in moral reasoning where they operate in the 'wrong' mode. The paper takes first steps towards answering the above questions by laying out the different positions and their implications, using the current public health crisis as an example.

Sebep, Evrensel - Citizens as Collective Agents

Many philosophers hold that a collective is constituted by agents united under a group-level decision-making procedure (Collins 2019; List and Pettit 2011). Simultaneously, many philosophers either assume or argue that citizens themselves do not constitute a collective agent (List and Pettit 2011; Lawford-Smith 2019). At most, citizens are included in the state's corporate agency while lacking collective agency on their own (Pasternak 2021; Collins and Lawford-Smith 2021). In this paper, I will challenge this consensus view. I shall argue that citizens in full or flawed democracies fulfil the necessary conditions of collective agency.

Why is this important? Are there any benefits of including citizens in our list of collective agents? There are three. First, it lays the groundwork for dealing with various issues in political philosophy such as

citizens' blame and task responsibilities and the boundary problem. Second, it provides a better understanding of citizens' actions than the individualist explanations. Third, it challenges overly formal conceptions of collective agency and motivates the idea that large-scale groups with informal mechanisms can also be collective agents.

Apart from the requirement of a group-level decision-making procedure, I will list four necessary conditions of collective agency. The input condition requires the group-level decision procedure to incorporate members' inputs in making decisions, which ensures member-influence. The autonomy condition requires the possibility of a divergence between group-level and individual-level decisions. The rationality condition requires current decisions to follow current beliefs and remain consistent with past decisions. The continuity condition requires multiple actions of the same group over time, rather than one-off or episodic joint actions.

Citizens have a formal decision-making procedure, the electoral system, and informal sub-procedures, which are the reason-giving activities of the citizens in forms of deliberations, interactions, demonstrations. While the formal procedure becomes active only on the election day, the informal mechanisms remain active between the elections. This satisfies the decision-making procedure requirement. Next, I will explain how citizens satisfy the remaining conditions.

The input condition is satisfied by individual or subgroups of citizens' epistemic and motivational inputs through informal mechanisms, which also allows the collective to attend to moral considerations. Such inputs influence citizens' individual decisions, thereby influencing their formal collective decision through voting. The continuity condition is satisfied by citizens' reason-giving activities that transcend the election periods and sustain citizens' agency between them. The rationality condition is satisfied since citizens make decisions by considering the given inputs and past elections, which accounts for changes in election results and party popularity. The autonomy condition is satisfied because what the electorate has decided isn't necessarily reducible to individual preferences. An easy reduction is prevented by strategic voters who vote in consideration of other members' beliefs and whose votes may not necessarily reflect their personal preferences, citizens who choose to abstain from voting yet still influence the electorate decision, and citizens who change their preferences after voting.

Shur, Isaac - Group Polarization and Digital Property

Group polarization and property ownership are not typically analyzed in tandem. But the recent rise in prominence of digital property ownership through cryptocurrency and non-fungible tokens (NFTs) requires such an analysis. The value, stability, and legitimacy of these digital properties are all themselves the subjects of heavily polarized group disagreements in a way that the same features of traditional property and fiat currency are not. I argue that the unique features of digital property have led to such polarization and disagreement by creating insular communities of digital property owners. These communities serve as echo chambers which amplify pro-digital property messages while discrediting and dismissing any critiques of digital property.

In the introduction, I propose a working definition of digital property which distinguishes things like cryptocurrency and NFTs from both traditional and intellectual property. In the remainder of the paper, I explain how three features of digital property ownership have contributed to group polarization.

First: transactions of digital property assets rely on the blockchain and "proof of work" in a way which fails to solve the assurance problems that arise when attempting to create a trustless exchange system. This failure leads to game theoretic dilemmas that encourage fraud, which in turn polarizes

communities of digital property owners. This shows that digital property ownership is subject to intra-group polarization.

Second: because it requires an internet connection for effective use, ownership of digital property assets typically occurs alongside the use of social media. Thus, the value and stability of digital property assets are subject to the same problems of polarization and collective action that are already endemic to social media platforms. This shows that digital property ownership is subject to inter-group polarization.

Third: the environmental impact of digital property is considerable when compared to other types of property. So, its proliferation necessarily accelerates another inherently polarizing collective action problem, climate change, which itself threatens to undermine the very institutions that might otherwise stabilize and secure the digital property market. This shows that the externalities of the digital property market contribute to polarization on existing political issues.

Finally, I argue that in light of these insights we should potentially regard "digital property" as a category error. It is doubtful whether digital property can truly be 'owned' in a meaningful way.

Shussett, Daniel - Rousseau's Stag Hunt: Common Knowledge and the Transition to Trust

This paper is an analysis of the Stag Hunt Scenario from Rousseau's Second Discourse, examining the problem through an exegesis of the famous passage, and followed by an investigation of the base conditions for collaborative endeavors as identified Brian Skyrms in the context of game theory, especially the emphases on the "shadow of the future" and "learning dynamics." First, we notice that Rousseau's Stag Hunt is much more pessimistic than its use in game theory. This investigation is aided by introducing work from developmental psychologist Michael Tomasello and social theorist Margaret Gilbert. Tomasello points to the importance of language and gestures in creating "joint intentions," as well as the possibility of a "central figure," which complicates Rousseau's other political writings. The combined work of Skyrms, Tomasello, and Gilbert allows us to identify the common knowledge condition from social ontology literature as central to questions of cooperation with regard to the social contract in Rousseau's work. This enables the start of an argument in favor of a reading of a Rousseau that is aligned more with Gilbert than the work of Michael Bratman (who influences Tomasello), and this point is strengthened by reference to Christian List and Philip Pettit's example of the terrorist cell. Thus, we return to questions about the creation and maintenance of common knowledge, again relying on Skyrms and introducing the work of Michael Suk-Young Chwe, focusing on ritual, communication, and learning dynamics in Rousseau's philosophical anthropology. Finally, Rousseau leaves the background to enter the foreground, as we suggest that Rousseau's corpus does in fact adequately treat the common knowledge condition, through his description of communities in the Second Discourse, democratic procedures in The Social Contract, and pedagogical techniques in Emile. This all results in a more optimistic reading of collaboration in the Stag Hunt Scenario qua social contract than game theory might suggest, if only those who hope to bolster the strength of the general will take significant steps toward increasing common knowledge amongst the people.

Silver, Kenneth, & Sheila Cannon - The Identity of Social Enterprise

Social ontologists focusing on groups often appeal to the tools of analytic metaphysics. Whereas some of the literature concerns the role of rules and equilibria, a fair amount also concerns questions about the existence/persistence conditions for social entities. So, when we think about the 'identity' of some

social entity, we are often thinking about the identity conditions for being the same social entity over time.

Within social philosophy, however, there is a different sense of identity that is significant and has garnered increasing discussion – the sense of identifying in some particular way or as something. Someone may identify as a Philosopher, or as a New Yorker, or as cisgender. This sense of identity is not wholly absent from discussions of social ontology, but when it is discussed (as in discussions of gender or racial identities) it concerns an individual's identification as a member of a group. Much less discussed is how to think about a group's identifying in some way. We may, for instance, wonder about a township as identifying as a coastal town, or a college identifying as a SLAC, or a basketball team as identifying as a member of the NCAA.

Apart from its seeming clear that at least a certain stripe of social ontologist would accept that social entities can identify in such a way, there are sure to be many questions about which kinds of entities can identify and as what, and what the differences are between individual identity (in this sense) and group identity. Here, we aim to contribute to this line of questions by considering a challenging case important for businesses worldwide, the case of corporations that identify as social enterprises.

While certain jurisdictions have a special legal category for organizations with a social mission, these categories are not identical across jurisdictions, and many jurisdictions do not have such a legal category. Nevertheless, many firms attest to being social enterprises. They develop a public mission, communicating this mission to stakeholders, and work to see it through. It is unclear to many that they can do this or what it means for them to do this, and it is debated whether social enterprises should be categorized legally.

After an introduction, Section 2 gives background on social enterprises, much of which is found in organizational studies or public administration. Then, using the notion of 'agential identity' from Dembroff & Saint-Croix (2019), in Section 3 we argue that 'social enterprise' is an agential identity that organizations can claim, distinct from their group membership or self-identity. Using this notion helps us to think about how firms could become social enterprises, and what is essential for being a social enterprise. In Section 4, we consider what it would take for a firm to authentically express this agential identity. Finally, Section 5 confronts the awkwardness of the fact that there is a legal category for firms with a social mission in some jurisdictions and not others.

Smith, Thomas H. - The case of collective action suggests that actions are causings and not changings

Anton Ford holds that a typical action must have, internal to it, some agent(s) and patient(s). As I understand this constraint, it requires that an action is not related to its agent(s) and patient(s), e.g. by causation or representation. One way for some agent(s) or patient(s) to satisfy the constraint is by being arguments of the action. On my view, actions, like thoughts and facts, have a predicative form. An action is a concrete particular instantiation of an incomplete entity, a type, by some object(s). One possibility, then, is that a typical action is a concrete particular instantiation of a dyadic type, by, in the first place, some agent(s), and, in the second place, some patient(s).

Ford's own view fits this schema. For him, an action is not a change but a changing of some patient(s) by some agent(s). Hence, if you fell a tree, your action is a concrete particular instantiation of the dyadic type _fell_ (itself a determination of the dyadic type _change_) by, first, you, and second, the tree. As such, both agent and patient are arguments of the action, rather than things external to, and related to it. (Frege taught as that saturation is not a relation).

On Hyman's view, actions are causings of changes, changes that are in turn changes of, in or to patients. This view treats our example thus: you bear the causing relation to a change, namely the falling of the tree. This change is an instantiation of a monadic type _fall, by the tree. So your action of felling the tree is an instantiation of a dyadic type, _cause_, by, first, you, and second, the change.

Ford's view treats agents and patients more simply and even-handedly than Hyman's. On Hyman's view, agents are arguments of actions, but patients are not. Still, on Hyman's view, patients are internal to actions. For an action's patient is an argument of that action's second argument.

Ford has some ingenious arguments in favour of his view, and against views such as Hyman's. But reflection on collective action suggests that Hyman's account is in one way superior. We intentionally act together just if there is one action of which we are agents (arguments). (This is a generalization of the Neo-Anscombian thought that intentional action has a unity). On Ford's view, we act together just if there is one changing of some patient(s) by some agent(s). Of a ringer case in which we make the same movements but do not act together, Ford must say that there are several changings, each by some of the agents and each of some (part) of the patient(s). But it is not true that the difference between you and I poisoning the fish in a pond together and our doing so, but not together (e.g., in ignorance of each other's action) is the difference between us poisoning the fish, and I poisoning some of them and you poisoning the rest.

On Hyman's view, we act together just if there is one causing of some event(s) by some agent(s). Of a ringer case, he must say that there are several causings, each by some of the agents, and each of some (part) of the event(s). This gives a far better account of the poison-the-fish case.

Störzinger, Tobias and Tom Poljanšek - Social Ontology and the manifest image of man? A Sellarian Perspective on the Relationship between Social Ontology and the Social Sciences

In his seminal paper "Philosophy and the Scientific Image of Man" Wilfried Sellars examined the relationship between the so-called "manifest image" and the "scientific image". While the manifest image consists of the understanding of ourselves and the world as we encounter them in our everyday practice, the scientific image denotes the reconstruction of phenomena through the introduction of theoretical concepts. Sellars ultimate goal was to unify these different perspectives into a "stereoscopic vison where two differing perspectives on a landscape are fused into one coherent experience" (Sellars 1963: 3).

In this paper, I argue that we can use Sellar's considerations and distinctions regarding the relationship between the manifest and the scientific image to adequately define the relationship between social ontology and the social sciences, to also clarify some confusions in the ongoing debates between "individual reductionism" and more "holistic" or "collectivist" explanatory frameworks for social phenomena. Finally, I will draw some implications for political debates about collective responsibility or structural injustice.

I begin by looking at the debate on group agency as a typical example of a battleground for the dispute between "reductionism" and "collectivism." Are groups "real" agents that act according to their intentional states? While interpretivists such as Tollefsen (Tollefson 2015) argue that some collectives exhibit dispositional patterns similar to individuals and can therefore be understood as agents with intentional states, reductionists such as Ludwig "explain away" such collective states and actions by showing how they result from individuals acting together (Ludwig 2017).

I will argue that such questions as whether groups are intentional agents (or the nature and ontological status of such things as "structural injustice") can be answered much more clearly if they are reframed as questions within either the manifest or the scientific image, and that the ongoing debate is a result of the confusion of these different explanatory perspectives.

I will elucidate criteria for ontological claims within each framework and relate the various explanatory projects to each other in order to work toward a stereoscopic view of social ontology. The upshot for the debate about reductionism is roughly that reductionism should be understood as a theoretical framework that aims to scientifically reconstruct real social phenomena we encounter in our everyday practices. Contrary to the reductionist impetus, however, successful explanation does not lead to an elimination of the explained phenomena; if anything, such explanations make the reduced phenomena "even more real" (see also Bratman 2018; Lewis 1970).

Stotts, Megan - A Behavioral Approach to Social Institutions

When offering metaphysical accounts of social institutions, philosophers tend to emphasize that they depend on human beings in a deep way in which entities such as trees, mountains, and raindrops do not. Of course, this is right. Unlike trees, social institutions such as governments, languages, and religious organizations are generated and sustained by human activity.

But my project is to explore what kind of account of social institutions we arrive at if we take as our starting point ways in which institutions can be relatively less dependent on us. Ultimately, I will argue that this approach points toward a behavioral account of social institutions. On this view, social institutions arise from copied behavior that clusters into roles.

I'll consider three ways in which social institutions can fail to be as dependent on or determined by humans as is usually assumed. First, I'll discuss cases in which there is widespread disagreement among participants about an institution's nature and features. Here, the institution seems able to exist and have one determinate nature without needing all or even most of its participants to conceive of it in one particular way. Second, I'll consider cases in which participants in some institution agree about its nature, but their beliefs seem to be mistaken. These cases show that our institutions can sometimes get away from us—even though we made them, they may not be quite what we think they are, sometimes with very harmful results. And third, I'll turn to some cases in which people think of themselves as having formed an institution with features about which they all agree, but upon closer consideration the institution seems not to exist. Here it becomes clear that people thinking of an institution as existing is not sufficient for it to actually exist.

Consideration of these cases reveals that social institutions' dependence on us is a bit different in nature than it initially seems. Institutions seem to depend not on how we think or conceive of them, but rather just on our behavior. Thus, we can accommodate my examples of decreased dependence and also more paradigmatic cases of social institutions if we see social institutions as emerging from behavior that clusters into roles, which all works together to bring about some result(s).

Treating this last statement as an initial version of the account, I'll then consider a potential objection: that it is too permissive, eliding the distinction between institutional reality and mere social reality. This justifies adding two more requirements: that the behavior that clusters into roles to form a social institution is copied from other individuals, and that some of that behavior has equally accessible alternatives.

After providing the revised version of the account, I will consider the precise metaphysical relationship between the behavior that gives rise to an institution and the institution itself. Is it a grounding

relationship, or some other kind of metaphysical relationship? I will not answer this question within the scope of the talk, but I will delineate parameters for answering it.

Strasser, Anna - Joint commitments revisited

While there is agreement that the presence of joint commitments can serve as a distinguishing feature for identifying joint actions, there are ongoing controversies on whether joint commitments are a necessary condition for joint action. Reviewing debates between normative and non-normative approaches (Gilbert 2013; Bratman 2014) and considering empirical research on intuitions of naïve participants (Gomez & Rachar 2019, 2021; Butterfill & Michael under review), there are controversial answers to the question of whether there can be cases in which two actors purposefully act jointly but do not have joint commitments.

To reconcile these conflicting views, I first examine the underlying understanding of what counts as a joint commitment and show that there are different ways of how to define this technical term (cp. Löhr 2021). Thereby, I propose to distinguish a full-fledged commitment based on reciprocity and accompanied by common knowledge from various forms of minimal and potentially implicit joint commitments (cp. Michael 2022).

Moreover, I distinguish between claims related to the initiation of a joint action and claims related to the further course of a joint action. It seems obvious that no joint action can be initiated without an initial joint intention or commitment; we can only act jointly if we both intend to act jointly. However, since joint action may extend over a longer period of time, it cannot be ruled out that the underlying intentions may change, especially with respect to the specific issues of division of labor, but also with respect to whether the joint action should be brought to a successful conclusion.

With the notion of a minimal joint commitment, I offer a way of describing joint actions in which the original joint commitment has in a sense disappeared, stating that there are joint actions without a full-fledged joint commitment, but that the smell of joint commitment is nevertheless present in the room.

Sucaet, Peter - The Metaphysics of Contemporary Corporations

In social ontology we seem to make a distinction between entities, such as money, with a "thing" kind of nature as opposed to those that we consider as "agents". Corporations are an example of the latter. Corporations – as separate entities that go beyond individuals – are considered to be able to take decisions, have responsibilities and seem to carry properties that are usually associated with individual people. They also have properties that cannot be reduced to their individual constituents, e.g. corporations can go bankrupt, irrespective of the financially soundness of its constituting members. This paper investigates the metaphysics of corporate agents, using Brian Epstein's grounding/anchoring framework as a "fil rouge". Grounding conditions are the metaphysical reasons why certain facts obtain. The paper will defend the thesis that facts about the constituting members only partially ground that corporations can act as agents, even if these members have joint objectives or intentions. These facts need to be complemented with four layers of conditions about: (a) constitution and identity; (b) group decision processes; (c) organizational structures and (d) agent continuity. Besides insights from management science this paper draws upon the work of Christian List, Philip Pettit, Katherine Ritchie and Derek Parfit. Groups that meet above conditions, i.e. corporate agents, can exhibit agent-like properties. The paper will hold that, next to behaving rationally, corporate agents are capable of strategic moves by making commitments, promises or threats. Hence, they can be considered as full participants in a game-theoretical sense. Coherence however, let alone first-person consciousness, does not come naturally in corporate agents. Indeed, as any CEO will attest, robust group rationality and overcoming corporate akrasia takes a tremendous amount of

effort. Hence the risk of reifying corporate agents to the level of a Hegelian "spirit" is non-existent. Still, corporate agents are not epiphenomena but are causally real through their interaction with other social agents. That many corporate agents have a distinctive legal status is a different matter that gets addressed when discussing their anchoring conditions into social realty. Corporate agents are typically set up as "limited purpose vehicles" aiming at fulfilling a particular function. In this respect they can be considered as rules-in-equilibrium, as put forth by Masahiko Aoki, Avner Greif and Francesco Guala. The "incorporation" of such agents as a distinct legal person is a relatively recent phenomenon. Such a legal person is invested with a set of Hohfeldian rights, an operation which is best explained with status models as developed by John Searle, Frank Hindriks and Tony Lawson. Finally, the paper will conclude with a critical review of fictionalism, a theory that is popular in law and economics and that considers corporate agents as nothing but useful fictions.

Sweet, Katherine - The Sui Generis Nature of Inquiring with Others

In this paper, I describe a phenomenon which is in need of its own analysis within social epistemology. When two or more people come together to answer a question, interpret some data, examine a particular line of reasoning, or derive a conclusion from other beliefs they share, they are inquiring together. Inquiring together, which involves multiple persons working together to answer some question they share, is an epistemic activity whose social characteristics are important to its epistemic nature. I begin the paper by describing collaborative inquiry by example, detailing its characteristic features in the process. Working together is a different way of acting than working alone. Acting by oneself lacks the kinds of social features that are required when persons decide to work together, including shared plans and shared aims. This fact holds also for inquiring with others versus inquiring alone. To inquire together, participants must be open to the views held by each other, responsive to their opinions, and persistently engaged with one another in their means to achieve the goal they share. The inquirers must plan to work together, with the knowledge that the others are planning to do the same with them. Moreover, they must maintain their intention to work together throughout the activity. They must be responsive to the intentions of those they are working with, and their plans must come together to form a coherent and internally consistent set of actions. Participants rely on one another to achieve their shared goals, and this dependence is displayed throughout the activity.

I continue in the paper by offering an argument for the claim that inquiring with others requires new analysis. The main premise of the argument is that, collaborative inquiry lacks essential features necessary for being a part of any category of phenomenon currently discussed in the social epistemology literature. Given two main categories that pervade the literature, information exchange and group epistemology, I show by way of example that inquiring together is not reducible to the other phenomena accounted for already in the literature. Specifically, there are cases of inquiring together in which information exchange does not occur. And, there are cases of collaborative inquiry that are successful, yet they do not result in collective knowledge. The conclusion, then, is that collaborative inquiry is sui generis, and thus is deserving of analysis of its own.

Szigeti, Andras & György Barabás - Collectivizing Justice: Obligations Towards Grou

One way to frame the discussion regarding the moral status of collectives is to ask how it differs from those of individual human beings. Moral status is understood here to be constituted by the attributes and capacities of an entity, e.g., whether something is an agent, whether it is reasons-responsive, whether it is a person, whether it can be responsible, whether it is the bearer of rights and obligations, and so on. Collectivists argue that an ascription of at least some such attributes and capacities to groups can be made non-distributively, i.e., the ascription does not simply mean that one or more individual members of the group have those attributes and capacities. It is of course possible to argue simultaneously for such a collectivist position in one domain and an individualist one in another. For

instance, one could claim that groups can be responsible in a non-distributive sense, but deny that they have moral rights. It is also possible to take collectivist positions with regard to some types of groups (e.g., formal organizations) but not towards others (e.g., random crowds). This paper contributes to this general debate about the moral status of collectives by investigating some aspects of the obligations we have towards groups.

Using a mathematical model of intragroup dynamics as our point of departure, we argue that if a certain level of representation of a subgroup in a larger group is desirable, then reliance on a quota-based recruitment policy in favour of that subgroup will in many cases be unavoidable. This is because members of the minority subgroup are more likely to quit the large group, and so it may become difficult to achieve the desired level of representation. If underrepresentation of the minority subgroup is morally unjust, as it often is, then our model shows that merely treating individual members of the minority group in a fair and unbiased fashion will not redress the injustice. In order to adequately redress the injustice, it may be necessary to recognize the existence of a collective obligation towards the minority subgroup, namely to treat its members preferentially when hiring decisions are taken. A general theoretical lesson from this analysis is that obligations towards groups can be explanatorily prior and irreducible to obligations towards individuals because only the existence of such obligations towards collectives can explain why we ought to treat individuals in certain ways. We also argue that while our conclusion is not inconsistent with collectivism about agency or personhood, it does not presuppose these positions either, and that, as a result, our approach can steer clear of some metaphysical and moral objections raised against certain versions of collectivism. We also point to some encouraging parallels between our analysis of the obligations held towards groups, on the one hand, and the literature on obligations held by groups, on the other.

The discussion will be guided not only with the aforementioned project of taking seriously group collective attitudes. There will also be the aim of seeing how group cognition can serve as a substantive rational resource for the individuals acting on or implementing collective attitudes, with implications for the epistemology and ethics of trust and testimony.

Thonhauser, Gerhard - Collective emotions are the emotions of a collective

Most theories of collective emotion have troubles accounting for what appears to be rather simple and straightforward: That collective emotions are the emotions of a collective. In this talk, I present an account of collective emotions that allows to make sense of this simple statement. In short, a collective emotion occurs when dynamics of mutual affecting and being affected integrate individuals in a way that leads to emerging macro level properties that allow those individuals to experience an emotion together in a straightforward sense.

This account of collective emotion builds on the extended emotion framework (Krueger and Szanto 2016). In contrast to the traditional extended mind thesis (Clark and Chalmers 1998), however, this framework suggest to approach the issue in terms of dynamical self-organization rather than the parity principle. Key to this approach is a specific understanding of collectives. Collectives are self-organizing systems which emerge whenever individuals with suitable interaction patterns interact with each other in a way that leads to macro-level self-organization. Whenever this happens, individuals engage in collective sense-making, in which they coordinately perceive their environment not from their individual perspectives, but from the collective perspective emerging from their interaction. This enables them to realize collective affordances, that is, action opportunities that do not exist for individuals on their own, but only for the collective as a whole. Some of those affordances are affective affordances, providing the collective with opportunities to enact emotions together. Hence, a collective emotion occurs when collective sense-making leads individuals to perceive a

collective affective affordance which elicit an emotional response. Now, sometimes individuals perceive and react to collective affective affordance when not in current interaction with other members of the collective. In such cases, I suggest speaking of joint emotions. By contrast, collective emotions proper occur when individuals respond to collective affective affordance in a situation of mutual affecting and being affected which leads to "live", ongoing coordination of their affective responses.

Tôn, Khang - Ethnicity as Cultural Identity: Cultural Memory and Cultural Product

I adopt the ameliorative approach to the question What is Ethnicity? What is the point of having the concept of ethnicity? What legitimate purposes, if any, do we have for categorizing ourselves into distinct ethnic groups? My main thesis is that the concept of ethnicity is useful for the purpose of recognizing a group's distinctive cultural identity. I develop an account of cultural identity according to which it is a social process of transmitting cultural memory through the production and reproduction of cultural products. The first step is to motivate the idea that there is such a thing as a collective memory, a notion that is central to the field of social memory studies. I aim to show that there is a significant connection between collective memory and a group's cultural identity. The upshot is that the notion of collective memory plays a crucial role in revealing the nature of a group's identity.

Next, I introduce and explain how my account of cultural memory, as a form of collective memory, can be supplemented with another notion, cultural product, to provide an account of cultural identity that can help us better understand what ethnicity is. My usage of 'cultural product' also includes what can be described as cultural phenomena or cultural practices: language, customs, values, rituals, norms, cuisine, folklores, games, arts, etc.

My proposal, then, is that cultural identity has to do with our cultural practices, specifically, the practice of transmitting cultural memory through the production and reproduction of cultural products. This practice is something that we do together with other members in our community. We tell stories about our past to other members, we erect monuments and build museums for future members, we share food, etc. These are cultural practices that constitute our cultural identity: "Identities are projects and practices, not properties" (Olick and Robbins 1998, 122). The account I develop views cultural identity as a social process, or cultural practice of transmitting cultural memory. Thus, cultural identity is dynamic.

I then consider and respond to two potential worries of my view on cultural identity. While I maintain that ethnicity is a concept that is useful for capturing a group's cultural identity, there are many different forms of social groupings, and thus there are many different ways of understanding a group's cultural identity. Some groups are organized around an athletic activity where it would make sense to speak about the group's cultural identity. The first challenge is to explain how my account may justifiably exclude these forms of social groupings from being counted as ethnic groups. Once I succeed in responding to these objections, I defend my view by highlighting its main attractive features and gesturing at some potentially fruitful applications of the view for future works.

Townsend, Leo - The felicity conditions of speaking for a group

There are a variety of distinct phenomena that have been discussed under the banner of "spokesperson speech" or "group representation" – including speaking about the group, speaking as group member, and speaking in a group's behalf. Speaking about a group is a matter of describing the group's needs, situation, or attitudes; speaking as a group member is a matter of expressing or articulating a particular social perspective, the perspective of the group; and speaking in a group's behalf is a matter of representing and advancing the group's (perceived) best interests. But all of these

can and should be distinguished from the phenomenon of speaking for a group. When someone speaks for a group, their words count as the group's own speech, in the sense that that those words, and the speech acts performed thereby, are properly attributed to the group.

In this paper, I explore some of the pragmatics and politics of speaking for a group. I take a broadly Austinian approach, in the sense that I identify what I consider the felicity conditions of speaking for a group, in such a way that certain characteristic "misfires" – ways that speaking for a group can go wrong – can be properly identified. According the account I propose, speaking for a group involves three important felicity conditions: (1) the representational authority condition, (2) the representational intent condition, and (3) the representational uptake condition. The representational authority condition requires that the would-be spokesperson is properly authorized by the group they purport to speak for. The representational intent condition requires that the would-be spokesperson understands and accepts their spokesperson role. The representational uptake condition requires that the would-be spokesperson's speech is given uptake by the relevant audience as genuine group speech—i.e., that the speech acts performed are attributed to the group. With reference to real world examples, I argue that spokesperson speech misfires when these conditions are not fulfilled, and hence that they are necessary conditions of speaking for a group.

Tranas, Linas & Thomas Szanto - Affective Resonance and Shared Emotions

Shared emotions typically arise in situations where subjects are spatiotemporally co-present. And these are the situations in which various bodily mechanisms that synchronize and integrate individual emotional responses are active (Feldman 2007; Hove & Risen 2009; Reddish et al. 2013; Salmela 2012). However, the literature on the nature and function of embodied mechanisms facilitating the emergence of shared emotions is beset by conceptual confusions. In this paper, we aim to review and integrate findings from recent interdisciplinary research and, in particular, focus on the role of affective resonance.

Philosophers, psychologists, and neuroscientists have proposed a roster of concepts to analyze the embodied mechanisms underlying emotional sharing, such as social appraisal, attention deployment, neural mirroring, facial and motor mimicry or imitation, and emotional contagion (see Hatfield et al. 2014; Hess at al. 2014). There is a general consensus that, although these mechanisms are involved in emotional sharing to some extent, they cannot constitute shared emotions on their own. Recently, however, some suggested the notion of affective inter-bodily resonance (AIR) as a form of embodied interaction, in which, on the face of it, emotions are shared (Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009; Fuchs 2013; Krueger 2013; Mühlhoff 2019). AIR is a circular interplay of persons' affective expressions and reactions, modifying each partner's bodily state, which makes those state into parts of an overarching, dynamic sensorimotor and inter-affective system. Crucially for our purposes here, the emerging affect during such an interaction cannot be divided and distributed among them. It arises from the 'between' or from the overarching process in which both are immersed (Fuchs and De Jaegher 2009).

This seems to suggest that emotions in AIR are shared. Yet, we argue that there are several obstacles for treating the affective states in AIR as shared emotions properly speaking. We start by defining what we mean by shared emotions and suggest a concern-based affective-intentional account. We then discuss AIR in relation to the sub-personal mechanisms of synchronization. In the main part of our paper, we argue that AIR cannot constitute shared emotions on its own, as it cannot satisfy all necessary conditions for shared emotions. We argue that it is nonetheless instrumental for facilitating shared emotions, in that it facilitates the mutual awareness and intentional reciprocity between the subjects, which are conditions of emotional sharing. It also typically reinforces and builds an important basis for the bodily expression of the sense of togetherness involved in shared emotions. We close by

drawing some general lessons on how (not to) investigate the hitherto underexplored embodied dimensions of emotional sharing, pointing to avenues for future research.

Tuomela, Maj - Genuine Trust, Positional Power, and Groups

It may be clear to all that genuine trust in another person is not the same as relying on someone due to reason-based predictions. My long time-effort has been to work on the notions of "genuine trust" versus predictive "trust". In this paper I offer an analysis of these: the expectation of good-willed action grounded in mutual respect for relation-specific rights versus reason-based expectations of good-willed action.

Both kinds of reliance are important, some types of reasons for predictive "trust" being quite stable. However, genuine trust is like a gift – to be offered and accepted and is typically reciprocal. Genuine trust is grounded in a relationship of respect for mutual rights of the parties to be accommodated in specific matters. The "charter of rights" is established through time and may be unarticulated. Both parties have learned to recognize what these (personal) rights to be accommodated are. Typical cases of genuine trust relationships are long-term, with a common interest to stay together, and between parties of "equal" power.

In "thick genuine trust" there is a moral motive of seeing to the other's right. In "thin genuine trust" the rights are accommodated due to a wish to hold on to the relationship for some other reason. One could perhaps also apply the present notion of genuine trust to short-term relationships (e.g., think of a group of strangers acting together in an accident in the alps).

Also, asymmetrical relationships could harbor genuine trust. The handicapped wife may be well-cared for by her husband, having genuine trust for him to act with good-will, seeing to her rights. There are many asymmetrical relationships (e.g., employer/employee, as well as husband/wife esp. in some non-western cultures) where genuine trust may thrive. The genuine trust account should be tested in circumstances where power relations make the relationship non-free, restricting the scope of rights in the relationship of mutual respect for rights. A frame of unequal rights should be allowed, within which a charter of certain stable rights is believed to be respected. This kind of a "scope-cropped" genuine trust should be a useful notion for most societal human relations, of which only a few are between equals. Still, it is important to acknowledge that we may indeed have genuine trust in business partners, shopkeepers, employers and employees, CEO's, officers in the army etc., with dyad- or group-specific "charter of rights" consisting of both rules and social norms (even personal relation-specific social norms).

In my earlier work on trust, I have focused on the difference between genuine and predictive trust, and given precise accounts of these, and of the kind of context trust requires. I have briefly discussed how to apply the trust account for groups that can act as a group trusting other groups that can act as a group. "Trust and cooperation" is another topic I have been involved in.

Here I propose to present my previous work, and then to look into the topic of genuine trust in contexts of unequal power in various areas of societal life.

Vesga, Alejandro - Norming Assertion

A number of philosophers-—myself included—-holds that the norm of assertion is essential to the nature or ontology of the speech act of assertion. That, however, is as far as we agree. The most obvious and well-known dimension of contention concerns the content of said norm. Should asserting speakers, for instance, know what they assert, have justified belief, or just be certain? Call this question about the content of the norm the normative question of assertion. A great deal of ink has been spilled attempting to answer this question without much sign of convergence. Importantly, this

lack of convergence has been taken by some to indicate that the norm of assertion is not essential to assertion or, more radically, that there may not even be a unified act-type of assertion.

I aim to chart a path towards answering the normative question by way of addressing a second and, until recently, less discussed question. I focus here on the kind of norm at stake. 'Norm' is said in many ways. There are, to pick a few, statistical, moral, social, conventional, constitutive, and procedural norms. And a proper account of the norm of assertion should have a credible story of what kind of norm it is supposed to be. Call this the metanormative question of assertion. My wager in this paper is that accounting for the kind of norm that governs assertion will yield the theoretical grounds for answering what the content of the norm is. In other words, a coherent picture of the social ontology of the norm of assertion will clear a path towards a proper account of its content.

On the negative side of the paper, I argue against two main accounts in the literature. The norm of assertion is not Searlean (like the rules that constitute the game of chess or baseball) nor social (like the norms proscribing jumping the queue or wearing a t-shirt to your social club.) On the positive side, I argue that the norm of assertion is essentially a procedural or instrumental norm, stemming from the practical requirements of cooperative action. Assertion is best described as the act of cooperatively offering an epistemic good as means to achieve a shared goal. Thus, assertion is fundamentally subject to the social normativity of cooperative action. Put simply: if a speaker wants to cooperatively offer an epistemic good to her audience, she better have it.

The cooperative view I defend here has two main attractions. First, it offers an empirically well-founded, cohesive view of the norm of assertion and of how Searlean and social norms are related to this speech act without being essential to it. The second attraction of the cooperative account is that it charts a principled path towards answering the normative question of assertion. The kind of epistemic good a speaker should have with respect the content of her assertion is determined by the practical structure of the conversation in which she asserts. Although what I say here falls short of offering a complete contextualist account of the norm of assertion, I offer some considerations as to how such a view should be developed.

Vincini, Stefano - The Key to Communal Emotions: A Domain-General Process

The straightforward view states that participants in emotion sharing undergo one and the same overarching emotion, where the individual contributions are experienced as distinct subjective perspectives on the emotional whole. This view was originally proposed by classical phenomenologists such as Max Scheler and Edith Stein, and has been developed in various ways by some contemporary phenomenologists and analytic philosophers (Eilan 2007; Gatyas 2021; Krebs 2015; Krueger 2012; Salice 2015; Schmid 2009; Vincini 2021). The straightforward view is strengthened by anti-reductionist approaches to collective intentionality (Tollefsen 2015) and by recent analyses of the functional role of sharing in social cognition (Campbell 2011; Gallagher 2020; Satne 2021). Needless to say, the straightforward view is vehemently opposed by reductionist-individualist approaches to collective intentionality.

In this paper, I advocate the straightforward view by relying on the domain-general theory of emotion individuation articulated by Scheler and Stein, as well as by Edmund Husserl. Specifically, I argue that the key to making progress in the current debate on communal emotion is a domain-general process of individuation. For the purposes of this paper, I use the expression "domain-general" exclusively to indicate that the same process applies to both the domain of individual emotion and the domain of communal emotion. However, Scheler, Stein, and Husserl took their conception to concern mental phenomena in general and the contemporary proponents of the straightforward view explicitly develop it with regard to other communal phenomena such as collective intentions or joint attention

(Krebs 2015; Schmid 2009; Vincini 2021). In order to adequately address the emotion debate, the further scope of the domaingenerality of this theory must remain in the background.

The domain-general process of individuation is constituted by the intertwinement of different processes such as the pre-reflective experiential individuation of experiences, social perception, and ordinary language (Barrett 2017; Jussim 2017; Taipale 2015; Zahavi 2011). Taking advantage of the considerable convergence of these processes with regard to emotion individuation, I focus primarily on pre-reflective individuation ("pre-delineation"), which was considered to be the most fundamental process of emotion individuation by the classical phenomenologists.

The argument of this paper consists in three steps:

1) I present the classical-phenomenological theory of pre-reflective individuation through association by similarity of experiential components. I exemplify how it applies to both individual and communal emotions.
2) I present the classical-phenomenological distinction between "function" (the perspective on the whole) and "content" (the experiential whole) and I illustrate how it applies to both individual and communal emotions (Goldie 2011; Solomon 2007; Vincini 2021).
3) I show that a steady understanding of communal emotions as complex wholes of individual contributions (Steps 1-2) allows us to more clearly identify the distinctive effects of communal emotions on the participants, the group, and the environment. These are effects that cannot be obtained by individual emotions.

Indeed, in order to make progress on the current debate between anti-reductionism and individualistic reductionism, we need clarity on what components constitute a communal emotion and on what pragmatic effects a communal emotion brings about in the world.

Virta, Jaana - Performatives as The Constituents of Social Kinds

Social factors influence from the smallest details of people's action to the grandest life choices we make. One way it influences is that though everyone makes their own decisions, often we don't choose the pool of the options we have. The options we have, or we consider ourselves as having, are mostly restricted by and learned from our surroundings and they depend highly on what is seen as appropriate to the intersection of social kinds we find ourselves. I suggest that a useful way to study and understand the metaphysics, or to be precise the constitution, of social kinds is to use Judith Butler's theory of gender performativity and extend it to other social kinds than just gender.

Butler's theory argues that we produce gender by iterating gender performatives, and there is nothing we express with those acts. If we want to use the theory to study other social entities, we simply ignore the latter sentence and replace the concept of gender with the social kind(s) we want to study. The theory focuses on the parts the social kind consists of and what makes the action producing it intelligible to the subject and others around them.

Butler claims that gender is performative in the sense of Austin's speech act theory. Austin makes a distinction between declarative utterances that state facts, and performative utterances that create entities. Performatives are utterances "which by saying something […] we are doing something" (Austin 1962, 12). By uttering e.g. a promise, we create the promise. Butler highlights that a basic feature about performatives is their repetitive nature: They get their power to create things from their references to earlier, similar acts. (Butler 1993, 282.) Butler expands the concept of performative to include acts like gestures, tones, clothes and choices. For Butler performatives are repeated ways and habits of doing things. Many performatives are highly norm laden, and one will often be punished for performing performatives not appropriately linked to the social kinds one is conferred to.

In every society there are hundreds of different norms governing people's behavior about how a person should act in different situations. Which norms apply to whom in each situation depends on the unique intersection of social kinds that are relevant in the specific situation for the subject. By focusing on what are the normative constituents the social kinds and reading them as performatives producing the social kinds per se, we get a useful way to study social kinds, their constitution, emergence, and how they and their intersections function.

Wardle, Danny - Social Plenitude

I outline and defend a position I call 'Social Plenitude'. Social Plenitude is based on the more familiar doctrine of Plenitude: 'for any property F, there is an object x such that it is metaphysically necessary that for any spacetime point y, x is located at y if and only if y is F' (Dorr, Hawthorne, and Yli-Vakkuri, 2021: 267). Property F can be any property whatsoever, even things like 'being a point such that Batman is located at it and there is an even number of sea urchins'. There are infinitely many possible worlds with spacetime points, so plenitude entails that for every object x there exist infinitely many objects that coincide with x.

I start off by applying plenitude to social groups: for every social group g there exist infinitely many objects that coincide with g. Social Plenitude is the view that there is no principled distinction between 'ordinary' social groups and these other entities, so long as their location includes the exact location of two or more people. This is a permissive and radical metaphysics of social groups, but it still excludes some objects that are obviously non-social (e.g. a non-social group including me and a rock).

Some philosophers may be compelled to accept Plenitude but reject Social Plenitude. The ontology might be perfectly acceptable but the claim that there are so many social groups may not be. Ritchie (2020) contends that our metaphysics of social groups must adhere with the 'Goldilocks Constraint': our social metaphysics must include social groups that are common sensical or play an important role in social explanation and no more. I argue that the Golidlocks Constraint, as understood by Ritchie, is too strict. Such a constraint inevitably excludes some social groups from our metaphysics. Plenitude presents us with a myriad of bizarre but similar entities and no easy way to distinguish between real social groups and mere collections of people.

Finally, I respond to what I see as one of the key motives behind the Goldilocks Constraint: the worry that a platitudinous ontology of social groups undermines critical projects like feminist metaphysics, Marxist metaphysics, and critical race theory. This worry is ultimately unfounded. Social Plenitude uncomplicates the metaphysics behind social change. There are lots of entities with extrinsic persistence conditions and we can meaningfully say that some social groups that were previously overlooked by common sense always existed. Social Plenitude encourages us to reject ideological assumptions about which social groups exist. The plenitudinousness of social groups allows us to acknowledge how the significance of some social groups and some of their properties are contingent on present-day structures. In addition, I argue that the Marxist metaphysics of Georg Lukács relies on a form of Social Plenitude.

Werner, Jonas - The Question of Blockchain Tokens

What is a non-fungible token (NFT) and what do you own if you own some cryptocurrency? My talk proposes a novel account of the entities that depend for their existence on blockchains (sequences of compounds of data to which new compounds, or blocks, are continuously added). Central features of these entities, or tokens, is that they can be owned and that their ownership can be transferred. More generally, the owner of a token has the ability to influence how the blockchain on which the given token depends will be continued, in most cases by validly signing a transaction that will be added to the chain by the creators of new blocks. This allows to provide identity conditions for tokens on a

blockchain: To every token corresponds a partition on the possible continuations of the blockchain. Tokens are identical iff they give rise to the same partition. To own a token is to be able to determine in which cell of the partition the continuation of the blockchain that will be realised lies. Differently put, to own a token is to be able to determine the answer to a question as it is modelled by the widespread partition semantics.

This general account of tokens allows to model the distinction between different types of token. In most blockchains, the ability to partly determine the continuation of the blockchain consists in bringing it about that a text written in a programming language, which refers to a text previously added to the chain, is stored in a future block. In these texts reference to a position on a ratio scale (in the case of cryptocurrencies) or to an object outside the blockchain (e.g. a digital artwork in the case of many NFTs) might take place. I argue that my proposal also allows to account for the creation of tokens (be it the minting of NFTs or the creation of block rewards) and that it is sufficiently general to capture what is specific about blockchain token without presupposing features of a particular blockchain.

From a meta-ontological perspective, different positions seem available in light of these identity conditions. Reductionists might wish to identify a token with a partition on blockchain continuations. Friends of lightweight ontologies might wish to accept token as sui generis

entities whose existence- and identity conditions and properties are fixed by the properties of lower-level entities. Eliminativists might claim that there simply are no digital tokens, but that the way our talk about these alleged entities works can be explained in terms of partitions of blockchain continuations.

I will end by comparing my proposal to the claim that bitcoin is a fictional substance (as it has been proposed by Craig Warmke) and that blockchain tokens are digital objects in the sense of bits and bytes physically encoded in a silicon chip (as proposed for in-game entities by Nathan Wildman and Neil McDonnell).

Werner, Konrad - Locative ontology of embodied institutions – a primer

Two accounts of institutions are usually distinguished in the literature: institutions-as-rules and institutions-as-equilibria. I am not about to argue that these views are wrong, however I will show in my talk that they are missing something. Namely, there is a quite specific locative aspect attributable to institutions: just like infrastructure is devoted to re-making the geographical space we're in by creating new channels for trade, travel, communication, etc., institutions also establish and/or re-make a certain specific space or, as I prefer to say – specific locations (places, loci). For example, if I'm going to visit Vienna, I would be obliged to get a thing called "emission class sticker" for my car even if some powerful god had removed Vienna from its physical/geographical locus and moved it one thousand kilometers to the south. Many things would change in my travel plans, but not the requirement referring to the emission rule. Therefore, speaking of institutions-as-rules in this case is apt, perhaps even unavoidable, but my point is that there is also a certain notion of institution-as-a-locus in play: these rules, likely together with various other factors, constitute a specific place. We can speak, therefore, of institutional locations as distinguished from geographical or physical locations. With that in mind, institutions are portrayed in the talk as developments of habitats we construe as living creatures, especially so-called cognitive niches; hence – places making access to certain resources or goods possible. The category of the cognitive niche was first proposed in 1980s by the anthropologists J. Tooby and I. De Vore, but more recently it has gained some traction thanks to, inter alia, S. Pinker, A. Clark. Now, if institutions are higher-order cognitive niches, they must be thought of as embodied or situated beings – not as abstract laws, but as locally emerged constraints and

"enablers" (Guala & Hindriks' approach) of behavior in a specific environment. Now, the question is, what kind of a being such institutions-as-loci (as higher-order cognitive niches) are. I shall make use of selected elements of locative ontology (A. Varzi, B. Smith, R. Casati) to answer the latter question, which will be the crux of my talk.

Westgren, Randall - Collective Identity, Identity of the Collective, and Identification with the Collective

In this paper we parse out the constructs of identity and identification as components of the social glue that hold groups together, notably formal groups. The social identity perspective in social psychology has developed from the original work by Henri Tajfel on in-group/out-group social comparisons in the 1970s, through his graduate student and collaborator, John Turner, in the 1980s. Turner and his students integrated social comparison, social categorization (including self-categorization), and group norms into the social identity construct. Organization theorists extended the construct to include the organizational identity -- the construal of the group's identity by its individual members or the construction of the group's identity for internal and external (reputational) use as collective action by its members. The organizational (collective) identity construct is considered as central, distinctive, and enduring. The construed or collective organizational identity becomes part of the individual's portfolio of social identities. The degree to which the organizational identity is salient to the member's self-construal is identification (with the collective).

The meanings of identity and identification in this paper differ from their uses in philosophy (c.f. Bratman's use of identification between an agent and her desires), but they are germane to theory-building in collective agency. The social psychology and organization theory literature also examine the relationships between identity/identification and commitment, intention, and affect. Importantly, identification with the group is antecedent to commitment and the degree of identification is a function of both the level of agreement by the members about the content of the organizational identity and whether the content is legitimate, i.e. whether it conforms to norms of the social category to which the organization aspires. Moreover, when there is a significant gap between the member's construal of the organization's ideal identity and what the member perceives as the actual identity, commitment is low.

Just as individuals have multiple social identities, so do many organizations. One interesting phenomenon is the hybrid organizational identity, construed or constructed around two (often antagonistic) identities. One example is the modern university, characterized as a hybrid between cloister and corporation. The natural consequence is that members may express different levels of identification between the identities, which then causes diminished commitment.

We present recent empirical analyses of the relationships between members' identification with their organizations, their commitment to the organization, and intended individual action. We look at two voluntary collectives from the agri-food sector: farmer cooperatives (hybrid between social/normative and economic/utilitarian identities) and wine trails (collectives balanced between individual and joint actions for marketing and agri-tourism). We draw implications from these studies for social ontology, including the "unpacking" of commitment into different types.

Westgren, Randall, & Steven Pueppke - Two Millennia of Collective Governance of Water Resources: From the Practicality of Hydrology to Complex Social Structures

This paper examines two ancient water delivery systems that continue to operate more than two millennia after their installation. The first is the Dujiangyan irrigation system near Chengdu in central China's Sichuan Province. It was constructed in 256 BCE to provide flood control and divert water from

a major river for irrigated agriculture. This system still delivers water to more than 5300 km2 of highly productive fields for smallholder farmers in the region. The second is the qanat system of water capture and delivery in the high deserts of Persia. These ingenious systems tapped into underground aquafers and directed the scarce water to the surface, where it was distributed across agricultural fields. Both systems relied on enormous investments of human labor to remove massive amounts of rock and soil, as well as intricate engineering that exploited gravity to direct water to where it was needed.

The narratives of these accomplishments are fascinating, and indeed, the Dujiangyan system and eleven of the Persian qanat systems are now recognized as World Heritage sites. We focus here on a lesser appreciated aspect of the two ancient systems—the social elements that allowed these feats of engineering to function efficiently when they first became operational and to adapt over millennia as the world changed. These social elements include: (1) the governance structures for construction of infrastructure and establishment of rights to water, (2) the evolving elements that determined rights (notably access to water), specified obligations (notably maintenance of shared infrastructure), and resolved conflicts (notably to prevent misuse and overexploitation of a limited resource), and (3) the lessons that apply to modern challenges at the confluence of water, energy, and food (WEF).

Our analysis of the multiplicity of state-directed construction and control schemes, the behavior of elites, devolved rights to end-users (literally the farmers at the end of the irrigation systems), and approaches to fairly resolve disputes point to Elinor Ostrom's complex polycentric governance paradigm (see her 2009 Nobel Prize acceptance speech). We employ this lens to interpret collective governance of the ancient systems over time and as it applies to modern WEF conflicts. In turn, we draw inferences for social ontology with regard to collective governance (voluntary and involuntary; hierarchical and peer) and collective responsibility. We also draw on the theory of second-best in economics to examine these policies under physical and cultural environmental constraints.

Wilhelm, Isaac – Kinds are Groups

How are kinds and groups related? Do theories of kinds and theories of groups describe distinct, non-overlapping portions of reality? Or are kinds and groups more closely related than that?

In this paper, I argue for an extremely close relationship between kinds and groups. According to the theory which I propose, kinds and groups are numerically identical. Every kind is a group, in other words, and every group is a kind. Call this the `Identity theory' of kinds and groups.

To motivate the Identity theory, I discuss several ways in which kinds and groups are similar to one another. Both kinds and groups have members, for instance. Moreover, just as there are kinds of kinds, there are also groups of groups. Furthermore, as I explain, there do not seem to be any properties which either kinds or groups have but the other lacks. So the Identity theory is, on its face, pretty intuitive.

I also give two different arguments for the Identity theory. The first argument appeals to ontological simplicity. Basically, the idea of the argument is this: the Identity theory is much more parsimonious than theories which imply that kinds and groups belong to different ontological categories. According to a particularly prominent way of measuring parsimony, for instance, one theory is more parsimonious than another just in case the former is committed to fewer ontological categories than the latter. Given this measure of parsimony, it follows that theories which distinguish kinds and groups---theories which place kinds and groups, that is, in different ontological categories---are less parsimonious than the Identity theory. So the Identity theory is better than theories which distinguish kinds and groups.

The second argument, for the Identity theory, appeals to a certain explanatory challenge. For any kind K, there exists a group $G_{\{K\}}$ such that K and $G_{\{K\}}$ have exactly the same members. And for any group G, there exists a kind $K_{\{G\}}$ such that G and $K_{\{G\}}$ have exactly the same members. The explanatory challenge is: why is that? Why is there constant coordination between kinds and groups? The Identity theory provides a natural answer: there is constant coordination, between kinds and groups, because kinds and groups are numerically identical. Theories which distinguish kinds and groups, however, have trouble answering this explanatory challenge: those theories make the constant coordination, between kinds and groups, seem coincidental. And that is a reason to prefer the Identity theory.

Altogether, the Identity theory is quite attractive. It provides an intuitively plausible account of how kinds and groups relate. In addition, when compared to theories which distinguish kinds and groups, the Identity theory is both more ontologically parsimonious and better equipped to explain the constant coordination between what kinds exist and what groups exist. So the Identity theory is worth taking seriously.

Williams, Robert - What in Ludwig's world are institutions?

Kurt Ludwig defends an approach to social ontology according to which institutional agents (including clubs, corporations and nations) are identified with (something very like) the set of anyone who is ever a member of that institution. Ludwig also argues that when an institution acts, all of its members are agents of that action. This sparse, elegant and surprising ontology of institutions and their agential roles is backed by a rich Searle-inspired metaphysics of social roles, explaining everything from what it takes to be a member of an institution, to an explanation of how institutions may (and often do) act through the physical behaviour of proxies.

This paper presents an objection to Ludwig's identification of institutions with the set of their members (and so, implicitly, to his treatment of institutional action sentences). It offers an alternative ontology of institutions that is largely conservative with respect to Ludwig's semantics and metaphysics.

The problem cases presented involve pairs of institutions who are such that a member of one at any time is always at some time a member of the other (imagine two football clubs who regularly sell players to one another). Ludwig's ontology forces him to identify such groups, as they determine the same set of past-present-and-future members. The paper shows that these cases generate counterexamples to Ludwig's treatment of institutional action sentences (the trouble being especially pointed for existential quantified action sentences).

The conservative reconstruction offered retains Ludwig's metaphysics of social roles, but adjusts his identification of institutions, so that institutions with distinct membership conditions are distinct entities. Knock-on consequences for the treatment of institutional action sentences are set out. Comparison to analogous (statue/clay) debates in individual-focused ontology are made.

Williamson, Emily - The Master of his Oikos: what can Contemporary Society Learn from the Power Dynamics of Ancient Greece?

In this paper I consider various forms of power that people in a society can hold. I explore how these forms of power interact and how they affect the individuals as well as the society as a whole. I make a key distinction between autonomous power - the power an individual holds regarding herself - and interpersonal power - the power that one holds over others - before going on to introduce three different levels of power that arise from these two types. I call these slavery (tier 1), autonomy (tier 2a), mastery (tier 2b) and total mastery (tier 3). Those in tier 1 have neither of the two forms of power, those in tier 2 have only one of the two forms of power and those in tier 3 have both autonomous and

interpersonal power. I ultimately defend the view that the type of power each individual ought to cultivate in pursuit of a free and equal society is autonomous power. Whilst it may seem that the most powerful in society are in the third tier, as they have power over many others and seem to have no infringement upon their own actions, I explicate a distinction between autonomy and self-mastery to suggest that tier 3 is only theoretically possible and cannot actually arise.

I primarily make my exploration of power through a close examination of Songe-Møller's book Philosophy without Women (2002), with a focus on her final chapter From Pederasty to Philosophy, an analysis of Foucault's L'usage des Plaisirs (1988). I use my theory to give an overview of the power structures of the ancient Greek Oikos, focusing on the role of power in Greek sexuality, which I compare to the power structures of the society as a whole. I then compare Foucault's reading of Greek sexuality and the power dynamics therein to Hegel's (1807) master-slave dialectic. This comparison highlights the untenable nature of a society with imbalanced interpersonal power dynamics ever being equal. Finally, I close by looking to the future, concluding that we must learn from the power dynamics of the Greek Oikos that the only route to true equality is to cultivate the autonomous power that was so lacking in ancient Greece.

Winokur, Benjamin - Self-Knowledge and Interpersonal Reasoning

Self-knowledge of one's current mental states seems interesting—if not outright puzzling—for at least two reasons. First, such self-knowledge often appears to be privileged, for it often appears to be more epistemically secure than our knowledge of other minds. Second, it often appears to be peculiar, for it seems that we often know our mental states in a way that is different from how we know others' mental states.

In this paper I argue that privileged and peculiar self-knowledge (PPSK) of our current propositional attitudes—such as beliefs and (some) desires—plays an important functional role in the lives of social-epistemic creatures such as ourselves. Specifically, I argue that PPSK helps us to reason interpersonally. The key claim is that having PPSK prevents one from being "held epistemically hostage" by one's interlocutors in the process of interpersonal reasoning. In other words, having PPSK ensures that one cannot be easily tricked into thinking that one shares an attitude with a bad faith interlocutor who is trying to deceive one about oneself. This, in turn, enables interpersonal reasoners to focus on the first-order contents of their attitudes rather than their attitudes themselves: it enables them to proceed directly to interpersonal debates about P's truth or the goodness of φ-ing, rather than second-order debates about whether they even disagree about P's truth or the goodness of φ-ing in the first place.

After differentiating my account of PPSK's functional role from some others in the self-knowledge literature, I will defend it against several objections. These are: (1) that my argument only demonstrates the importance of privileged self-knowledge for interpersonal reasoning, not also peculiar self-knowledge; (2) that PPSK is not uniquely important for interpersonal reasoning if privileged and peculiar access to other minds is possible; (3) that PPSK is not uniquely important for interpersonal reasoning if each participant reasoner enjoys a practical rather than epistemic warrant to believe that they know their own attitudes better than they know their interlocutor's attitudes, and; (4) that PPSK is not uniquely important for interpersonal reasoning if we can reliably express our attitudes to our interlocutors, whether or not we also have PPSK of the attitudes thus expressed.

One upshot of my account is that skeptics about PPSK's existence ought to explain why we are not, as a matter of fact, often or ever held as epistemic hostages by our interlocutors.

Wringe, Bill - Collective Intentions, Consequentialism and Community: What Sellars Could and Should Have Said

In Science and Metaphysics elsewhere, Wilfrid Sellars proposes an account of moral judgments which builds on an understanding of collective intentions which anticipates more recent work on collective intentionality (Koons 2019). At the end of Science and Metaphysics he sketches an argument for consequentialism based on his conception of moral norms as the we-intentions of an idealised community. In this paper, I argue that Sellars attempt to derive consequentialist conclusions from formalist considerations about the nature of morality fails, but that his position contains resources which could be developed to support a more Kantian view of the content of morality.

Sellars account has both formal and substantive dimensions to it. He suggests that moral judgments should be understood as having the form

It shall (we, CRB) be that Phi,

where 'It shall (we, COMM) be' is understood as an individual's expression of an intention shared by the community 'comm', CRB is the community of all rational beings, and the notion of collective intention is taken to be the following constraints:

1) Where I am a member of the community COMM, and 'it shall (I)be that Psi' expresses an individual intention to Psi, 'it shall (I) be that Psi' should be inferable from premises of the form It shall (we, COMM) be that Phi and further premisses detailing how my Psi-ing is required for the realizing of our Phi-ing

2)The account of shared intending should be naturalistically acceptable

Substantively, Sellars suggests that correct moral norms can be derived from the particular instance of this form: It shall (we, CRB) be that our welfare is maximized, which he takes to be 'categorically rational' that is to say, to be of a kind that can and should be endorsed by any rational being. In doing so, he commits himself to a form of consequentialism.

I argue that although the formal dimension of Sellars account is highly promising, his substantive proposal – and in particular the proposal that 'It shall (we, CRB) be that our welfare is maximized' is categorically rational involves a straightforward fallacy of aggregation. I also argue that considerations about the kinds of collective intention that can rationally be endorsed by an individual with projects of their own might have led Sellars to a more Kantian conception of the content of morality including analogues of Kant's formula of Universal Law and his notion of a Kingdom of Ends. However, this position is more modest than Sellars' in one key respect: instead of attempting to demonstrate that there are categorical we intentions, it tells us only that if there are any categorical we-intentions, they must take a particular form.

Wu, Yixuan - Does Gender Change across Contexts?

In everyday life, it is usually taken for granted by institutional authorities as well as lay people that gender is one of the core features of one's identity, and it is immutable. In the recent literature, some authors foreground the feature of 'gender' being a social construction, and that it may not be as stable a category as it appears. This leads some (e.g. Dembroff (2018) and Ásta (2018)) to posit a kind of pluralism about gender, which suggests that different gender kinds are operative or salient in varied contexts.

This paper questions the legitimacy of this kind of gender pluralism and argues that it is implausible that gender changes upon changing contexts. I contrast examples of pluralist views that are legitimate

(e.g. being an athlete) with those that are not (e.g. having a certain personality, drawing from the person-situation debate in social psychology), and I contend that gender kind pluralism aligns more closely with cases of pluralism that are illegitimate. This indicates the tension between context-dependency and the legitimacy of gender as an individual property, as opposed to a property of the context.

I demonstrate that the ways to navigate this tension are (i) to postulate commonalities among individuals instantiating a social kind in different contexts, thereby weakening the pluralism, (ii) to do away with purely externally defined, pluralistic gender kinds, or (iii) to deny the dichotomy of gender being an individual property or a property of the context. To preserve the thrust of social construction, I investigate the third option further. I draw from Althusser (1970)'s notion of 'interpellation' and the idea that individuals become subjects in the symbolic system as they are interpellated by ideologies. I propose an alternative way to think about the metaphysics of gender, where the social categories of genders are not conferred on individuals, and the different operative gender kinds across contexts can be explained by the variations in the operation of the interactive process of interpellation.

This issue has implications for constraints on an appropriate account of gender, and it sheds light on the assessment of pluralist accounts in social metaphysics in general.

Zachnik, Vojtěch - Institutional Agent Selection

Social Institutions are general structures typically described as rules that specify what individuals – having a specific role, position, or idiosyncratic characteristics – ought to do in a particular context. Whereas many current accounts of institutions focus on the specification of the action prescription, i.e., what is required or demanded (North 1990, Hodgson 2006), and how various institutional factors influence motivations of individuals to coordinate their behaviour (Sugden 1986; Binmore 2010; Hindriks & Guala 2015), the issue of what type of agents is selected or influenced by the institutional rules remains unanswered (cf. Searle 2010). Typically, many current theories assume that relevant individuals have a full understanding of the situation regarding their position or role, or, at least, that they have acquired some dispositional capacities to behave competently in the institutional context. However, there are many cases of pathological institutional behaviour based on misidentification, avoidance, or strategic misplacement. These and many other instances reveal the need for a comprehensive approach concerning institutional agent selection.

In my talk, first, I want to provide an analysis of the various types of agents who are involved in the institutional context. Starting from the informal social norms, where groups can be based on the minimal criterion of identity (Tajfel & Turner 1979), one can distinguish several various categories such as agents, enforcers, observers, and beneficiaries (Legros & Cislaghi 2020). They have different roles and may be eligible to perform various actions. I suggest that this initial investigation can be further refined in terms of institutional roles and powers based on the assignment of the status or acknowledgement of authority granted by the complex normative system (e.g., law or organizational regulations). Therefore, second, I build upon this preliminary description of the norm roles to extend the typology to other institutional cases. The initial investigation of informal norms needs to be amended to include specific relationships between these types of agents and relationships with specific functional aspects for the social institutions. And last, I argue that based on this typology of agents, it is desirable to identify possible scenarios of institutional violations that have origin in intentional, or unintentional error in identification or selection. All these cases have significant importance for policy-making and institutional design, yet little has been said about them from the perspective of social ontology. This talk intends to correct this omission.

Zanghellini, Aleardo - The role of attitudes and affect in constituting law's social ontology

Taking as its starting point Hart's and Raz's accounts of law, this paper aims to develop a systematic precis of the concepts of a legal system's 'existence', 'being in force', 'validity', 'authority', and 'legitimacy', and to clarify their interrelationships. Among other things, attention will be paid to the questions of whether the attitudes of different classes of agents (legal officials, addresses of primary rules) figure in these concepts and, if so, how they are constitutive of the states of affairs that these concepts reference. The question of whether such attitudes figure in the concepts will ask if the relevant concept can only be usefully or accurately clarified by reference to such attitudes. The question of how such attitudes are constitutive of the states of affairs that these concepts reference will interrogate the mode in which these attitudes are so constitutive – whether severally or collectively and, if the latter, in what sense of 'collectively'. To this extent, the paper aims to be a contribution to scholarly debates on law and collective intentionality (see eg Carlos Bernal, 'Austin, Hart and Shapiro: Three Variations on Law as an Entity Grounded in a Social Practice' (2013) 44(2) Rechtstheorie 157; Richard Ekins, Facts, Reasons and Joint Action: Thoughts on the Social Ontology of Law' (2014) 45 Rechtstheorie 313; Damiano Canale, 'Is Law Grounded in Joint Action?' (2014) 45 Rechtstheorie, 289; Carlos Bernal, Collective Intentionality and the Ontological Structure of Law, (2014) 45 Rechtstheorie 335). Finally, the role of affect in constituting those attitudes – and hence, in a mediated way, in constituting a legal system's existence, being in force, validity, authority, and legitimacy – will be scrutinised. Time permitting – and in accordance with the conference organisers' specific invitation to contribute applied perspectives – the conclusions of this analysis will be used to illuminate the social ontology of the short-lived constitutional experiment attempted by Italian poet Gabriele D'Annunzio (1863-1938) through the promulgation of the Carnaro Charter in Fiume (present-day Rijeka) in 1920. Those conclusions will also be compared to D'Annunzio's own Hegelian way of conceiving the role of collective intentionality in constituting and legitimating the new constitutional order, as emerging from the Carnaro Charter itself.