Social Ontology 2023 - Abstracts for parallel sessions

Harry Ainscough. *Gender Classifications and Trans-Inclusive Social Structures*.

Like other areas of philosophy that draw on marginalised perspectives, the goal of a better, more just and inclusive, social world is the overarching aim for work on trans-inclusive social ontology. However, the literature so far is dominated by how we should classify gender through accounts of gender terms, concepts, or kinds. The impulse behind this is clear: the aim is trans-inclusion, so we ought to engineer our concepts, as an example, such that trans people are classified correctly. In this paper I argue that to make progress, we ought to abandon the focus on classifications as the central problem of analytic trans philosophy.

The social world, including socially intelligible meanings and social structures, is constructed in far more complicated ways than how we classify. I argue that where some contexts – such as trans subcultural contexts – have already enacted social structural change within them, we should turn towards these contexts as the basis from which to move towards broader social structural change (following Dembroff: 2018, Haslanger: forthcoming). Philosophical work that aims to make social structures more trans inclusive should turn to look at how trans subcultural contexts have successfully changed these structures, and how this can be incorporated in more mainstream contexts. In making this argument, I draw heavily on the work of Bettcher (Bettcher: 2013, 2020) and Dembroff (Dembroff: 2018), as both adopt a methodology embedded in both mainstream contexts and trans subculture. Through doing so, both reveal some of what can be gained from turning to trans subcultural contexts.

Focusing on how we classify gender will not be enough to understand firstly, how trans subcultural contexts have developed an alternative social structure, or secondly, how these social structural changes could be brought to a wider range of contexts. I argue that we ought to focus on how resistant social structures were constructed through developing alternative, discursive and non-discursive, social practices. Whilst Dembroff's approach (Dembroff: 2018) for example, makes progress, I argue that their argument to import trans-inclusive classification practices has two significant, intimately connected, limitations. Firstly, classification practices are still not enough to change a social structure, and secondly, they still adopt the parameters of the "trans-inclusion debate" as it has been set up in dominant contexts, which seems to miss something that could have been gained by acknowledging the full extent of the structural differences between trans subcultural contexts and dominant contexts.

In more recent work, however, Dembroff seems to be making a similar turn themselves. In 'Reimagining Transgender' they 'advocate for recentering transgender on the experience of costly and wilful gender deviance' (Dembroff: forthcoming) Though their focus is questioning the value of 'transgender' as a term used to delineate a category of identity, I believe their argument resonates with the argument I make here: the experiences and needs of the trans community might not centre on their categorisations – whether as a particular gender, or as 'trans'.

Christian Airikka and Simon Helperin. *A "Science First" Approach to Social Ontology.*

It is often said that social ontology deals with entities studied by sociologists. Inspired by recent developments within the philosophy of physics we propose a "science first" approach, wherein one first examines case studies from the field of sociology and then describes the ontology the sociologist is committed to. We find that we discover entities that defy easy categorisation by current theories of social ontology. We begin by looking at research currently being done on status inequality between and within romantic relationships. At this stage, we remain silent on whether or not the entities under investigation are best understood as groups, kinds, categories, or any of the above. In sociology and economy we find concept-pairs such as endogamy/ exogamy, homogamy/heterogamy, and hypergamy/hypogamy. Focusing on the latter, hypergamy refers to partnerships where a woman "marries up" in terms of e.g. educational status, while hypogamy refers to the opposite. Empirical research indicates that changes in the rates of different relationship types over the last decades are driven by selection on partner status, and not by structural factors such as changes in the sizes of different status groups. For instance, the relative number of hypergamous partnerships grows faster than societal changes would suggest, indicating that we ought to consider these concepts social entities that exert influence on the social world.

What must the world be like for talk about these concepts to make sense? For a sentence such as "there are hypergamous relationships" to be true, we need to satisfy the following: $\exists x \exists y (P(x, y) \land Q(x, y))$, where $P(x, y)$ = x and y are in a relationship, and $Q(x, y)$ = x is of a higher social status than y. Depending on what data the sociologists are drawing from, the domain of discourse can often be defined as something like the following: $D = \{x | x$ is a citizen of Sweden$\}$. $P(x, y)$, then, needs to range over $P = \{x, y \in D | x$ is in a relationship with y$\}$, and $Q(x, y)$ over $Q = \{x, y \in D | x$ is of a higher status than y$\}$. For the statement to be true, there needs to exist at least two citizens of Sweden, that form a pair in both P and Q.

P and Q gives us two sets. P is simply the set of all pairs of people in a relationship. Q, however, is much more problematic. We are not dealing with a simple case where groups are treated as collections of people with common interests. Q contains both the pair (The King of Sweden, Princess Victoria), (The King of Sweden, Bob from work), and (Bob, his toddler). It is hard to find any commonality in Q that gives us grounds for positing the ontological existence of Q. But we have reasons to believe that hyper- and hypogamy are genuine social entities, given the fact that they inform our understanding of the social world, and Q is exactly what separates these from the other concepts above!

We proceed to discuss the "ontology of the sociologist" from both a philosophical and sociological perspective, hoping to draw attention to both ontological commitment and the description of normativity within contemporary sociological research.

Tobias Alexius. *Socially constructed objects and de re ontological indeterminacy.*

The standard view on statements of the form "it is indeterminate whether A exists" it is not that, when they are true it is because there is an object – A – such that it is indeterminate whether A exists, but rather that, when they are true it is because it is semantically indeterminate which object "A" refers to, where some of its candidate referents exist and other don't (see e.g., Sider 1997). In other words, the standard view is that such statements are not instances of de re ontological indeterminacy, but rather instances of referential indeterminacy.

However, it sometimes seems indeterminate whether an individual social object exists. For instance, it seems indeterminate whether certain historical nations, clubs, and corporations still exist today. In this paper, I argue that some such cases of "social indeterminacy" are cases of genuine de re ontological indeterminacy. That is, that they are cases where it is indeterminate of a particular object whether that objects exist, with no referential indeterminacy involved. If I am right, these cases are counter-examples to the standard view.

More specifically, I argue that (a) the standard view holds up only in cases where it is indeterminate whether a given social object has been successfully introduced/created (since such cases arguably yield referential indeterminacy), and (b) the standard view fails in cases where a social object is successfully introduced/created and then changes so that it ends up being indeterminate whether the resulting objects is numerically identical to the original. For in such sorites-like cases our names/singular terms do successfully anchor reference to the original object, and the indeterminacy is the result of it being indeterminate whether that original object is identical to any objects from a later time.

Throughout the paper I show how my view avoids traditional challenges to the possibility of de re ontological indeterminacy. These include the problem of establishing reference to something that exists only indeterminately, the problem presented by the intuition that existence is a binary matter, and the claim that de re ontological indeterminacy is a form of worldly indeterminacy (for an overview see Parsons 2000). My response to these challenges is, in order, that stable reference to indeterminately existing objects can be established because the objects in question determinately existed at a previous point time, that my proposed view is compatible with the claim that, for any one moment in time, the ontology of the world is entirely determinate for that moment, and that de re ontological indeterminacy among social objects can still have its source in our representations of reality, even though it isn't referential indeterminacy. I also briefly discuss Gareth Evans' famous (1978) argument against the possibility of de re ontological indeterminacy.

Franz Altner. *Two Faces of Group Agency.*

Philosophers have argued that groups, such as corporations, universities and states, can be interpreted as agents that can form beliefs, desires, goals and intentions and act on them. Proponents of this view also subscribe to the position that these group agents are moral agents that can participate in our practice of responsibility, which is shaped by the reactive attitudes such as guilt, indignation, resentment and anger. Strawson, in his paper "Freedom and Resentment" has famously argued that the reactive attitudes express how much we care about each other's quality of will. Thus, theories of group agency are committed to the claim that groups can display a good or ill will, although none is provided in the literature.

There is an important further aspect that these analysis of groups like corporations miss, namely that these groups are perceived as tools by economists, legal scholars and the wider public. Tools that have an externally specified function which, unlike human agents, they cannot easily shed and which is baked into their very agency. How to square these two aspects, the moral and tool face of group agents

In this presentation I will argue that we can make sense of these two faces by developing a novel theory of a group will that is inspired by David Velleman's constitutive theory of agency. Constitutive theories of agency try to ground the normativity of reason and rationality in what is essential about agency. Velleman has argued that the constitutive aim of action, that allows us to act intentionally, is self-intelligibility. I will build on this insight and argue that for a group to act intentionally, it has to aim at self-intelligibility. This means that group members have to come up with a shared narrative that makes sense of what the group is doing from the group's perspective. This process is essentially a social endeavor. It is social not only insofar as such a narrative depends on the organizational structure of the corporation and the shared commitments they have, but also on externally anchored social facts that determine the group's institutional function in society, the way the group is perceived of in society (a public corporation for example is conceived of as an entity that ought to maximize profits, a university as an entity that ought to distribute knowledge, a state as an entity that ought to be just). If we model these institutional functions via constitutive rules, what emerges is a theory that can make sense not only of a group's capacity for autonomous action and a good or ill group will, but also of the idea that in coming up with a narrative, in forming a group will, groups like corporations are restricted by certain institutional facts. It is this aspect that turns groups like corporations into tools.

Ásta. How to Do Social Metaphysics: a Manifesto

There has been considerable new work on the metaphysics of sex and gender, race, sexuality, and disability The methodology employed in this work varies considerably. In this talk I advocate for a certain conception of doing social metaphysics. This conception involves a descriptive task and a critical task; it requires that we always keep in mind what we want the theory for; and it involves meeting certain epistemic and ethical demands, although I will not get to that in this talk.

Zachary Auwerda. *Humean Collective Identity*

Within social ontology, Hume is known for his thoughts on convention as Hume uses convention to explain many topics that interest social ontologists, such as promises, justice, property, and government. However, there are additional resources in Hume's corpus, besides convention, that social ontologists have largely overlooked. In the section "Of personal identity" in *A Treatise of Human Nature*, Hume argues for what is often referred to as the Bundle Theory of Self. Hume deploys the bundle theory to argue that the identity in ourselves and objects is nothing but a bundle of perceptions that we glue together by an act of the mind. This paper seeks to trace collective identity according to Hume's bundle theory model. I aim to show that Hume provides some useful tools for thinking about group identity and persistence. More specifically, I hold that Hume provides unique answers to why some groups maintain their identities through change while others do not. This paper starts with an examination of Hume's analysis of personal identity in the Treatise. There are two components of Hume's thoughts on personal identity: the negative or skeptical component and the positive or natural (sometimes called psychological) component. Hume's positive account explains why we group various perceptions into a bundle to which we attribute identity. I call these different methods of grouping unifying mechanisms. Some of the unifying mechanisms apply to vegetables, animals, and persons. Others apply only to persons. The second section extends Hume's bundle theory of the self to collectives. While this might seem like pure extrapolation, there is some evidence in the Treatise and the Dialogues Concerning Natural Religion that suggests Hume thought personal and collective identity were produced by analogous mechanisms. I argue that many unifying mechanisms that yield individual identities also produce collective identities. In the final section, I present two related ways in which an account of Humean collective identity is relevant for contemporary social ontology. First, the belief in collective identities is a natural belief or a belief that we have a strong natural propensity to have. A peculiar thing about social entities, such as groups, is that their features, and perhaps their own existence, are intimately related to our beliefs. Second, thinking of collective identity as a natural belief affects how we should think about group persistence. The persistence of a group can be questioned in many ways. Groups can change members, fuse with other groups, split into smaller groups, change their internal structure, and so on. Humean collective identity provides some guides for when people will cease to believe in a persisting group in the form of unifying mechanisms. Furthermore, recent literature on group persistence focuses primarily on organized groups over unorganized groups. By placing the persistence of a group on the beliefs that people have about the group rather than the features of the group itself, Humean collective identity has the advantage of explaining the persistence of organized groups as well as some unorganized groups.

Timothy Aylsworth and Clinton Castro. *The Duty to Protect Collective Autonomy from Addictive Technology.*

There has been much discussion of the moral and prudential reasons we have to restructure our relationship with technology in virtue of the harmful effects it has on us as individuals. The literature on these harms encompasses a wide range of issues — everything from the use of racially biased algorithms in the criminal justice system to the diminished capacities of self-regulation that result from problematic smartphone use. But if we restrict our focus to the ways that technology can harm us as individuals, we overlook morally significant harms to groups qua groups. We argue that addictive technology weakens our capacity to act autonomously as a group. We defend this claim by arguing that the certain features of the attention economy (e.g., that it contributes to polarization) threaten to undermine the legitimacy of political institutions.

We begin in section 2 by explaining what is distinctive about group-level harms. We hold that as a group collectively pursues goals (and acts on the basis of shared intentions), they are vulnerable to being harmed in ways that undermine the group's capacity to achieve those ends. These are harms that cannot be fully explained without reference to a group agent. By contrast, there are many cases where a harm to a group is both constituted by (and fully reducible to) harms to individuals. For instance, a group of pensioners might be harmed by embezzlement because the pension fund balance is reduced. This is not a group-level harm, however, since there is no harm to the group over and above the harms to the individuals (e.g. each pensioner receives a smaller monthly disbursement). Group-level harms, on the other hand, involve harms to structured groups. In section 3 we show how trust and trustworthiness play an important role in preserving a democratic state's legitimacy. Many of the state's aims can be accomplished only if those who are subject to its rule see it as trustworthy. This means that undermining public trust (and/or the state's trustworthiness) would hinder the state's ability to fulfill its responsibilities. We will argue that states are vulnerable to group-level harms insofar as their group agency is susceptible to being undermined by threats to public trust.

In section 4, we show how trust and trustworthiness play an important role in preserving a democratic state's legitimacy. Many of the state's aims can be accomplished only if those who are subject to its rule see it as trustworthy. This means that undermining public trust (and/or the state's trustworthiness) would hinder the state's ability to fulfill its responsibilities. And given the nature of democratic legitimacy, trust and trustworthiness are key components of the state's agency. Without trust, the government is unable to achieve its aims or fulfill its commitments. Various features of the attention economy threaten to undermine trust in the government and the government's trustworthiness. Thus, the attention economy not only harms us individually, as many critics of it have argued, it harms us collectively as well.

Theodore Bach. *The Social Scientific Identification of Real Kinds of Humans.*

There are many social kinds of humans: women, men, mass shooters, analytic philosophers, born-again Christians, and Generation Z teenagers, to name just a few. The epistemic project of accurately identifying, predicting, and intervening with these kinds is often morally urgent. We want to predict and intervene with teenagers who have suicidal ideations, to explain accurately and then rectify gender inequalities, to identify and stop mass shooters, and so on. Our most effective methods for identifying and understanding real kinds of humans derive from the social sciences. However, social scientific investigation is notoriously difficult. This is in part a consequence of the underlying nature or character of the human kinds targeted by the social sciences. These kinds change over time, overlap and intersect with one another, and they inconsistently manifest their characteristic properties. The result – and this is made clear in the first part of the talk – is that the form of epistemic access or conceptual reference to real human kinds that social scientists typically achieve is partial and diffuse. Textbook cases from the history of the social sciences in which investigators unknowingly conflate distinct real kinds – kinds of memory, kinds of intelligence, sex and gender – should be viewed as the rule rather than the exception.

This de-romanticization of social scientific reference has several implications for how we (social scientists, but particularly philosophers and other armchair theoreticians) should understand and move forward with the epistemic and moral project of identifying real kinds of humans.

First, mistaken views (or more common, the sidestepping of messy questions) about how social scientists achieve epistemic access to real kinds of humans underwrite counterproductive proposals for how best to categorize kinds of humans. In particular, theorists often mistake common instances of (undetected) partial reference as invitations to impose or stipulate or "conceptually engineer," perhaps under the direction of background values, the meaning or inclusion criteria of human categories. This is generally a mistake. Episodes of partial social scientific reference require the opposite tactic. They require greater investment into causal interactions with the world so as to focus reference on the targeted kinds. Above all, they require maintaining open-ended categories and deferring to ongoing empirical investigation.

Second, we should be mindful of the difference between property classifications, on the one hand, and real kinds, on the other. Much social scientific discourse surrounds classifications as defined by a shared property, for example "mass shooter" or "suicidal teenager." But these classifications often obscure and even misdirect us about the real kinds – each with distinct sources of causal homeostasis – that in fact comprise these categories. Property classifications should be treated as interim place-holders – as epistemic artifacts from a juvenile phase of the project of achieving reference to real kinds.

To make these claims more concrete, I consider several case studies in the social scientific investigation of human kinds for which there is both epistemic and moral urgency: gen Z teenagers prone to self-poisoning, mass shooters, and economic labor utilization.

Pawel Banaś. Limits to legal personhood

According to a standard picture of the legal domain, it consists of legal persons (subjects of legal relations) and legal things (objects of legal relations). Only legal persons have duties and hold rights. The concept of "legal personhood" is, thus, central to any theory of ontology of law. In my presentation, I wish to focus on some limitations in relation to the content of this (legal) concept. According to Ngaire Naffine, one can differentiate between: (a) those who claim that, when it comes to providing an account of any legal concept, law does not and should not operate with a natural conception behind that concept (=legalists) as well as (b) those who insist that it should and it does (=realists). According to Naffine's realists, there are clearly some limits to the concept of legal personhood. E.g. J. Jowitt (whom I see as a strong realist) claims that it is impossible for legal personhood to be seen as a thing separate from a metaphysical criterion of personhood (e.g. being a moral agent) and he sees views that argue otherwise are demonstrably false. Another realist, V. Kurki, also claims that whether something can be a legal person depends on whether it can be held responsible, exercise legal competences (i.e. perform certain acts), hold claim rights, and be wronged. A strong interpretation of realist claims goes like that: satisfaction of some metaphysical criterion of personhood is both sufficient and necessary for something to be a legal person. I argue that this approach to legal personhood is inconsistent with a radical version of the artifact theory of law that consists of the following claims: (a) something is a legal kind if it is declared or recognized as such by the relevant community; (b) something is of a legal kind if it is declared or recognized as such; (c) there are no metaphysical constraints on what can be recognized as a legal kind or being of a legal kind. I also argue that legal personhood is a paradigmatic example of a legal kind. It may seem that a supporter of a radical version of the artifact theory of law, being Naffine's legalist, does not allow for any limitations imposed on the content of legal concepts (including the concept of legal personhood). This may lead to implausible conclusions such as the very possibility of T-shirts or cubes of ice being legal persons. I wish to argue that the lack of metaphysical constraints on the concept of legal personhood still allows for extensive nomological constraints as well as those associated with some general requirements of rationality.

Saba Bazargan-Forward. *Institutional Racism Without Racists?*

Put roughly, an institution consists at least partly in roles and rules enabling and regulating cooperation in furtherance of some specified end. Sometimes these roles, rules, or ends (or side-effects thereof) wrong members of a racialized group. This might warrant attributing racism to the institution itself — what is known as "institutional racism".

The harms of institutional racism are hard to overstate, in part because the racist effects of multiple institutions can synergize absent any coordinated attempt to do so. Some refer to this as "structural racism" — a term also used to refer to the systemic and ongoing racial inequality resulting from racist practices in the recent past. Here, though, I am concerned with institutional racism only; I will focus on the accountability of the members in these institutions who, individually, have little control over the institution's roles, rules, or ends. Are they accountable for the institution's racism? On the one hand, we might think that insignificant influence yields insignificant accountability. Yet, at the same time, the institution's racism is possible only because such individuals implement its problematic roles, rules, and ends. How, then, do we make sense of accountability for institutional racism?

It is characteristic of institutional racism that many of the individuals currently constituting the institution might not themselves be racist. For instance, Blacks in the US routinely pay mortgage rates higher than what Whites pay, not because (or not just because) lending agents covertly adopt racialized accreditation criteria, but because mortgage rates depend on the economic risk of lending credit to the applicant, where that risk is analyzed by reference to the neighborhood in which the applicant is purchasing a residence. Hence, residential segregation can result in a disparity in mortgage rates. This is, of course, just one example. All such examples share this feature: the institution in question exacerbates racial inequality even absent any intention to do so.

In many such cases, racists once operated the institution in question; in doing so, they established norms with the overt or covert purpose of achieving racist ends. Even when the racist individuals leave, the problematic norms sometimes persist. The result seems to be a racist institution absent any racists. I will argue, though, that if an institution is racist, then at least some of its current members are acting in a racist way. Contrary to what others have maintained, it is conceptually impossible for institutional racism to exist absent any racism in that institution. That is, the effects of an institution qualify as racist only if those effects flow from the racism of its members. At first, this might seem to narrow the extension of 'racist institution'. But I argue that an attitude of indifference toward racial injustice itself counts as a racist attitude. The result is that racist institutions remain prevalent, even given the view that an institution is racist only insofar as its members are racist.

Cordelia Belton. *On Your Inclusion Problem's Inclusion Problem: Why Externalist Social Concepts Necessarily Fail Transfeminist Ends.*

Analyses of the inclusion problem in feminist metaphysics uniformly suffer from a key issue: they neglect to treat the category of transness with the same conceptual-analytical care they extend to the concept of woman. And without an explicit account of who has been wrongfully excluded and nevertheless must be included for our political desiderata to be met, we are unable to make meaningful judgments about the extensional adequacy of the conceptions at hand. In service of filling this lacuna, we offer a taxonomy of the received accounts: all received accounts are found to be externalist, in the sense that at least one of the predicables to which they refer is not accessible purely through introspection (for instance, chromosomal status, or first gender assignment). Further, the predicables to which they refer are found to be some combination of prior sex category membership, prior gender category membership, current sex category membership, and current gender category membership. From the foregoing taxonomy we demonstrate these accounts are extensionally inadequate, insofar as they consider trans people who neither consider themselves nor are considered by others to be trans, and equally fail to include others who consider themselves trans, and lack compelling strategies for addressing this problem.

But we argue there is another compelling concern. For in developing arguments in favour of our paying attention to the inclusion problem, the literature has also brought about novel arguments about the moral and political salience of taking someone to be a member of the wrong category. In a broad sense, these arguments can be considered in the lineage of work on epistemic injustice; the accounts we take as paradigm cases are Dembroff & Wodak's content-focussed epistemic injustice, Jenkins' ontic injustice, and Kapusta's work on misgendering. When brought to bear against the aforementioned taxonomy of received accounts of transness, each taxon is found to necessarily fail on moral grounds for reasons in excess of the merely extensional. In trying to determine why, as well as how we may fashion a new concept of transness that avoids these issues, we offer a scheme for grounding these conceptual-ethical objections, with regard to whether the harm entailed is or is not contingent on others performing a specific act in accordance with the categorisation practice, and whether the harm entailed is or is not sensitive to consent to construction in the category. We ground these theories of harm, and again discuss how a conception of transness may circumvent them.

The result of the foregoing analysis is that no externalist conception of transness thus articulated is extensionally adequate, and no externalist conception of transness on the main can be found adequate for our political desiderata. Further, this line of analysis generalises to a broader set of social categories, which, as they stand, are incompatible with the grounds on which we mount conceptual-ethical critique. Strategies for formulating novel internalist conception are discussed, alongside a theory of how these categories can perform the same work of their externalist counterparts in social coordination.

Matteo Bianchin. *Domination, Reasons, and Ideology: On the Epistemology and Metaphysics of Noumenal Power.*

The theory of noumenal power has been recently advanced by Rainer Forst to connect power and reason so as to allow social critique to get a grip on power relations. The epistemology and metaphysics of noumenal power, however, are far from trivial. In this paper, I assess the latter and discuss two related question concerning domination and ideology.

First, I discuss noumenal power as a social ontological concept and argue that distinguishing between first-order and second-order noumenal powers – the power to be motivated by reasons to accept first-order power relations involved in social norms, legal rules, bargaining threats etc. – is both necessary and sufficient to enable the theory to account for structural power.

Second, I contend that the theory cannot accommodate the conception of domination as arbitrary power it advances and suggest how it can be emended. According to the theory, "bad" justifications must still count somehow as justifications in order to account for social relations that are not justified, but look nonetheless legitimate. This is problematic when it comes to conceptualize domination. On a harmless reading, bad justifications are justifications that are worse than others, but still provide some (partial, weak, inconclusive) reason. Yet this does not square with the idea that domination is arbitrary power. On a stronger reading, they are failed (attempt of) justification that fall short of providing reasons for a claim. Yet this is hard to square with the view that domination is still an order for which there is nonetheless a justification that legitimate it.

A possible way out is modeling justification as a second-order noumenal power and distinguishing sharply between real and apparent reasons in order to detect domination as any power that lacks justification and only appear to be justified. Apparent reasons are not "bad" reasons, they are no reason at all. They are rather whatever agents treat as a reason because of entertaining some beliefs whose truth would give them a reason. This makes sense of domination as arbitrary. Domination occurs wherever first order noumenal powers are not backed by second-order noumenal power.

The implication, however, is that domination is not a social order legitimated by a somehow defective justification, but a social order for which there is no justification at all – an order governed by naked first order noumenal power, whose apparent justification plays a stabilizing ideological role.

Third, I discuss how the theory of noumenal power fares with explaining ideology. A sensible reading is that ideologies non only provide apparent rather than real reasons to accept unjust social arrangements, but are generated by distorting mechanisms whose working causally depend on the (first order) power relations they undergird, and perform the function to stabilize them.

The upshot is that ideology cannot be accounted for by noumenal power only. A critical theory of power needs to be supplemented with conceptual resources that come from mechanistic, structural, and functional explanation to make room for the functional properties of ideology and for the causal mechanisms that explain how it originates and persists.

Nathan Biglietti. *Sharing the impersonal: a theory of collective indignation.*

Since Peter Strawson (1962), many authors have drawn attention to a distinctive property of indignation, namely its indirect and impersonal character. In fact, this emotion is instantiated in a triadic structure (Elster, 2009), within which an observer appraises an external action as a wrongdoing, even though his interests and dignity are not at stake. Indignation is thus felt on behalf of a victim through an empathetic resentment directed toward the wrongdoer. This specific form of detachment, enabling this emotion to be felt "from the moral point of view" (Darwall, 2009), distinguish indignation from basic emotions, like anger, rooted in personal concerns.

But according to the concern-based theory of collective emotions, it is precisely this last component that makes emotional sharing possible. Indeed, according to Salmela (2012), an emotion can be said to be collective when it bears on an appropriate relationship to the emoter's group identity, namely when the situation appraised by the emotion involve concerns that are constitutive of its identification to the relevant group. The emotion is thus felt in we-mode (Tuomela, 2007), because the individuals co-participating in the shared emotion experience it from the point of view of the group they belong to and because of the collective concerns that such identification imply. Because of its impersonal concern, it thus seems that indignation cannot be shared in this sense. In fact, Indignation requires a detachment from identifications and its associated concerns, and therefore cannot be felt in their name.

I want to offer a solution for overcoming this prima facie challenge to the concern-based model of collective emotions, suggesting that indignation can in fact be shared in strong sense when its "sub-focus" (Helm, 2001) is both constitutive of the relevant group's ethos and part of more general and impersonal concern. In other words, I will defend that indignation can be shared when group identification implies a concern for a victim or a group of victims, as a sub-part of the general concern for persons as such. I will first present the concern-based theory of collective emotion and compare it to other rival accounts such as Schmid (2009) phenomenalist approach and Gilbert (2002) cognitivist model. I will next discuss the impersonal character of indignation and defend an empathetic account of this emotion, according to which it consists in an ideally-regulated empathetic resentment. Finally, I will present the challenge emerging from the confrontation of these two theses and propose to overcome it by showing how an impersonal concern can in fact be shared. I will discuss implication for social movement research regarding the interplay of collective identity and collective indignation.

Nathan Biebel. *The Group Justification Thesis: On the Culpable Ignorance of Group Agents*

Individual moral agents are often responsible for what they do, but they also often possess an excuse. One of the most common excuses is ignorance. But ignorance does not always excuse for sometimes ignorance is culpable and culpable ignorance is no excuse. But what about group agents? We often talk of group agents as both being subject to responsibility ascription (e.g., BP is responsible for the oil spill), and ascriptions of belief (e.g., Phillip Morris knew that cigarettes are linked to cancer). There has been a lively and growing discussion about how to make sense of these ascriptions, but, with the exceptions of Hormio (2018), Schwekenbecher (2020; 2021), and De Haan (2022), not much has been said regarding when and whether group agents are culpably ignorant. This paper attempts to fill that gap by offering the beginnings of an account of group culpable ignorance. I argue that whether a group's ignorance (understood as a lack of true belief) is culpable depends entirely on whether that group's belief is justified. The intimate connection between justified group belief and group culpability has been recognized by Lackey (2021) as a crucial motivation for examining justified group belief, but so far, no comprehensive explanation of the connection between justification and culpability has been offered. I argue for two conditional claims that together constitute what I call the Group Justification Thesis, which is an adaptation of the Justification Thesis put forth in Biebel (2018) for group agents: (i) A group agent is excused because of ignorance only if that ignorance is justified, and (ii) a group agent is culpable despite being ignorant only if that ignorance is not justified. I suggest that a proper account of group justification that grounds culpability must include three necessary features: 1) the resultant belief must be sufficiently supported by the evidence actually possessed, 2) the group has met all of its intellectual obligations, which are epistemically relevant actions done by the appropriate group members, such as careful consideration by expert members, and attempts to gather more evidence (e.g., Peels 2017 and Silva 2019's 'believing responsibly'), and finally 3) some reference to the pragmatic stakes—the risks of being wrong—which play an important role in determining the threshold beyond which one's evidence and efforts are sufficient (Fantl and McGrath 2009). In short, if acting on a false belief could have very bad results, then it requires a degree of certainty that is much greater, and therefore the threshold for evidence is much higher. I argue that a failure to adequately address these risks makes it appropriate to blame the group. Surprisingly, because the stakes for the group can come apart from the stakes of the individual members, one upshot of this view is that a group agent can be culpably ignorant even though all the individual members ought to be excused in virtue of their ignorance of the very same proposition, and vice versa.

Stina Björkholm. *A Response to the Triviality Objection against Contextualism about Gender Terms.*

Philosophers have struggled to find a definition of what 'woman' means that applies in all contexts and captures all individuals we want to call women (and correspondingly for 'man'). One conclusion to draw from this is that 'woman' does not invariantly refer to any single kind at all. Instead, the term has different meanings depending on the context of utterance, as contextualism maintains. This allows us to accommodate that when a trans-woman says that she is a woman, her claim is true insofar as the relevant contextual parameters at the context of utterance determine that the extension of 'woman' is trans-inclusive. However, some have argued that contextualism does justice to trans-inclusive claims only in a trivial sense, because in contexts that exclude trans-women, it will be false that a trans-woman is a woman.

To see how contextualism might meet this challenge, we first need a clearer idea of what it means for a semantic theory to 'do justice' to the claims of trans-women. According to a first interpretation, the challenge is to accommodate that trans-exclusive claims can never be true. I argue that this is asking too much of contextualism. By comparing to a related discussion about slurs, I argue that the fact that an utterance is offensive or derogatory does not mean that it must be false. According to a second interpretation, the challenge is instead to accommodate that trans-exclusive claims are inappropriate, even in contexts where they are true. I argue that this interpretation of the challenge is more plausible and that contextualism can do justice to the claims of trans-women in this sense. In a nutshell, I argue that there are meta-linguistic factors – that is, information about the context in which a conversation takes place – that render trans-exclusive language inappropriate.

Gunnar Björnsson. *Derived group obligations and abilities.*

Here is a familiar puzzle in collective ethics, concerning groups that do not themselves constitute fully-fledged moral agents:

On the one hand, many such groups seem to have obligations that are in some ways independent of the obligations of members. A group of bystanders might have an obligation to prevent an assault even though no individual bystander can do that. The affluent alive today might have an obligation to prevent global climate catastrophe even if no individual affluent person is able to do this.

On the other, it seems to many that groups like these lack the sort of abilities and other properties that we take to be preconditions for individual obligation bearing. It is unclear what it means for them to grasp moral reasons in the absence of the sort of structure that makes it plausible to say that the group, and not just its members, believes that those reasons obtain. They also seem to lack self-control in the absence of anything resembling a self (Björnsson 2020), and are not obviously able to themselves make decisions (Collins 2019; 2022).

My concern in this talk is with a specific kind of response to this puzzle. This response acknowledges that the groups in question have all the properties and abilities that we rightly require of individual moral agents, but takes these groups' obligations to be derived, somehow, from the moral agency of their members. Versions of this response have been offered by, among others, Aas (2015), Björnsson (2014, 2020), Schwenkenbecher (2014, 2021), and Blomberg & Petersson (forthcoming). Call this the derivation response.

Though popular, the derivation response faces challenges. Here, I will focus on two in particular.

The first challenge concerns the relationship between obligations and demands. Our moral obligations, it seems, constitute demands made on us by morality, and we have obligations only insofar as we have the capacity to respond to such demands. Indeed, standard requirements on moral agency correspond to such capacities, both to grasp the moral demands and to control one's actions in light of them. The problem is that the derivation response accepts that the relevant groups lack these capacities.

The second challenge concerns the relationship between obligations and blameworthiness. Failures to live up to all-things-considered obligations are standardly understood to give rise to blameworthiness in the absence of excusing conditions. But moral blameworthiness, many think, is tightly connected to the fittingness of agent-directed moral indignation. Furthermore, many have argued that such indignation is communicative (Watson 1987; McKenna 2012; Macnamara 2015; Shoemaker 2015), seeking uptake with the blameworthy party in the form of guilt, or the pained recognition of fault. But such communication again seems to presuppose exactly the sorts of capacities that the relevant groups lack according to the derivation response.

In response to these challenges, I argue that given the right account of derived obligations, groups like the bystanders and the affluent have the abilities required to be proper targets of demands as well as blame and accompanying reactive attitudes.

Olle Blomberg & Erik Malmqvist. Exploitation, shared intention, and our everyday notion of cooperation

Jules Salomone-Sehr (2022) has recently argued that a token activity is cooperative in "our everyday sense" if and only if it consists of several agents' actions that are (i) coordinated in the service of a common purpose (ii) in ways that do not undermine the agency of any of the agents. While we rarely talk of an action or activity being cooperative outside academic discourse—rather than of agents cooperating with each other— Salomone-Sehr implicitly assumes that agents cooperate with each other in performing a joint action if and only if that joint action is cooperative.

According to Salomone-Sehr, it is neither necessary nor sufficient that an activity is coordinated by the agents' "shared intention" for (i) and (ii) to be satisfied. This is because he assumes that agents can coordinate their actions with respect to a common purpose without at all representing that purpose—it may be merely externally imposed on them by other agents or by a social practice (cf. Ritchie 2020). A shared intention is therefore not necessary for condition (i) to be satisfied. Furthermore, since guidance by a shared intention can occur in contexts where one party to the shared intention exploits or oppresses another, a shared intention is not sufficient for condition (ii) to be satisfied. Thereby, Salomone-Sehr takes himself to "topple an orthodoxy of shared agency theory".

In this talk, we defend the allegedly orthodox view: Guidance by a shared intention is necessary and sufficient for the agents' joint activity to be cooperative in an everyday sense. If agents do not represent the common purpose of their coordinated actions, then condition (i) is not satisfied, and the agents are not cooperating in our everyday sense. A suitably generalized account of shared intention, which allows the parties to be unaware who the other parties are (Roy & Schwenkenbecher 2021), and that allows them to represent their common purpose differently (Blomberg 2016), arguably gets putative counterexamples right. Furthermore, Salomone-Sehr's condition (ii) fails to provide a clear contrast between his own account and the alleged orthodoxy and makes the presence or absence of cooperation hinge on irrelevant factors such as the distribution of benefits and burdens generated in the activity. In agreement with e.g. Seumas Miller (2001) and Christina Friedlaender (2018), we argue that cooperation is compatible with exploitation—exploitative arrangements arguably often boost rather than undermine the agency of those exploited, and is thus compatible with Salomone-Sehr's own condition (ii). Indeed, for some purposes it is important that our notion of cooperation is not evaluatively loaded in a way that rules out exploitation. Cooperation has been able to play a significant role in human history in part because it has withheld often enough even in extremely unequal and exploitative Holocene societies (see e.g. Sterelny 2021).

Thomas Brouwer. *Patchwork Roles.*

The metaphysics of social roles is of interest intrinsically – given how profoundly they shape our lives – and for further theoretical purposes, particularly explaining organised collective agency. The metaphysics of roles has received increasing attention in social ontology (e.g. Miller 2001, Mallon 2003, Ludwig 2017, Kisolo-Ssonko 2019, Ritchie 2020), but remains relatively understudied nonetheless. I will try to make progress on some basic metaphysical questions about roles: what sorts of facts determine the features and occupancy of roles, and what gives them their normative heft? In this talk, I focus on roles within organisations, rather than broader societal roles such as gender roles.

I'll start by discussing a first-pass metaphysical account with some appealing features. On this view, we start with a group that has some shared goals best pursued through division of labour. Any workable division of labour, once found, raises the question of how it is to be applied to the members of the group. The task of assigning individuals to roles is a coordination problem, and to solve such a problem in a satisfactory and stable way is to develop a convention. The existence of a set of related roles within a group boils down metaphysically, then, to the existence of a division-of-labour convention among the members of the group.

This view has genuine attractions. It delivers a reductive metaphysics of organisational roles, and reduces them to something that's already well-theorised: conventions. It also has a story baked in about why group members have reasons for playing their roles: roles, when treated as equilibrium strategies in a coordination game, will be motivationally self-sustaining as long as group members continue to share their goals (Lewis 1969).

It is, unfortunately, too simple a view to be adequate, though it may fit certain cases. Its most obvious problem is that of alienated participation; real-life organisational roles are often played by people who have little stake or interest in the overall group goals, which would undercut the convention-based motivational story. There are further issues: not all aspects of organisational roles plausibly arise from a need to divide labour, and positing organisation-wide conventions may place implausible cognitive demands on participants. A convention-based view can be finessed to overcome some of these challenges (cf. Ludwig 2017) but I'll suggest we take them to motivate a deeper theoretical revision.

I'll set out a view on which organisational roles are put and held in place by the simultaneous operation of multifarious social mechanisms, including conventions, norms, and customs (in the sense of Bicchieri 2017). Even for a single organisational role, explaining different aspects of the role may involve appealing to expectations and preferences among distinct pools of people, which may be only small subgroups of the organisation, or extend beyond its membership. This 'patchwork' view retains the selling points of the convention-based view, but is considerably more flexible. I'll end by considering how this metaphysics of roles fits within a wider metaphysics of social facts.

Dylan Brown. *Friend, (Not) Food: Livestock as a Social Kind.*

Constructivist debunking projects in social ontology attempt to bridge the gap between metaphysics and social activism. By revealing the unjustified ideological assumptions baked into our social categories, theorists show how certain social categories perpetuate injustice and oppressive constraints. Although these projects have contributed to a growing literature on gender, race, disability, childhood, and sexual orientation, there have been fewer attempts to extend this methodology to the treatment of nonhuman animals. In this paper I will explore the social construction of nonhuman animals as the social kind 'livestock.' I will gesture toward similar debunking projects in feminist philosophy and define 'livestock' according to the aims of nonhuman animal activism. Specifically, I will propose an ameliorative concept of 'livestock' as an oppressive social kind:

W is livestock in context C iff:

1.   W is an animal

2.   W's flesh will have the social property 'eatable.'

3.   W's being raised to be eatable marks W within the dominant ideology of W's society as something whose role is to be consumed by humans.

4.   Satisfying 2 and 3 create certain constraints for W that contribute to W's oppression.

Understanding livestock through this ameliorative lens has a few explanatory benefits. First, it explains the diversity of animals considered food across different contexts. Cows and pigs, for example, might be socially constructed as food in certain cultures yet not be consumed in places with different dominant ideologies. Additionally, animals of the same biological kind can have a different social status even within the same context. A pet pig, for example, will not be the social kind 'livestock' even if its owners regularly eat bacon for breakfast.

In addition to its explanatory power, my ameliorative concept of 'livestock' also aligns with the tactics and aims of nonhuman animal activists. By revealing how 'eatability' operates in certain contexts, nonhuman animal activists can target the primary ideological mechanism contributing to the abusive treatment of nonhuman animals. For example, popular activist tactics, such as undercover footage of nonhuman animal abuse and exploitation, can be understood as attempts to undermine the 'eatability' of nonhuman animal meat.

My argument will proceed in three parts. First, I will develop an account of 'eatable' as a causal and constitutive social property that is conferred onto nonhuman animal flesh according to certain ideological assumptions. Second, I will show how in both the causal and constitutive cases the 'eatability' of meat perpetuates harmful conditions for nonhuman animals raised as 'livestock.' Third, I will explore how understanding 'livestock' as a social kind can assist the political and moral goals of nonhuman animal activists. Ultimately, nonhuman animal activists can abolish 'livestock' by challenging a nonhuman animal's 'eatability.'

Sebastian Brumfield Mejia. *Mystical Self-Identities and Gendered Zombies: An Intervention in the Social Ontology of Gender.*

The pervasive intuition that self-identification ought to significantly determine gender identity, especially for transgender identity, motivates social ontologists of gender to impose agency as an ethical constraint on any plausible definition of gender. Nevertheless, in their attempts to define gender in non-circular, non-essentialist ways, social ontologists of gender variously fail to satisfactorily account for self-identification. Some render self-identification superfluous or deny it altogether by strictly ascribing gender through social positions and norms. Other insufficiently ground self-identification in a tacit, mystical inner sense of one's gender. Using ontological theories of gender by Sally Haslanger and Katharine Jenkins as examples, I will demonstrate how social ontologists of gender struggle to balance the criteria of non-circularity and non-essentialism with the need to respect and adequately ground self-identification. In doing so, I hope to clarify why social ontologists of gender fail in this way and suggest some strategies for approaching gender ontology which accommodate these three necessary criteria.

Haslanger famously defines gender strictly according to binary social positionality, or gender class. Accordingly, many object that it issues incorrect gender verdicts for trans people. In this paper, my critique of Haslanger will deepen this objection to explain why her model issues the wrong gender verdicts, not only for trans people. In particular, I will argue that amendments to make her model more intersectional insufficiently address the objection because she categorically denies a role for self-identification, instead treating us like gendered philosophical zombies. I will argue that achieving the correct gender verdicts requires taking self-identification seriously in our ontological theories of gender.

Jenkins builds on Haslanger's theory yet incorporates agency to overcome critiques of trans exclusion. Rather than conflating gender identity with gender class, Jenkins considers gender identity as the product of agential judgments regarding the relevancy of internalized social norms corresponding to one's gender class. I will claim that Jenkins' failure to adequately specify the grounds for judgments of norm-relevancy makes her theory circular. However, I will demonstrate that any possible attempts by Jenkins to specify such grounds leave her vulnerable to objections of essentialism or a hollow notion of self-identification. First, if one's gender class grounds claims of norm-relevancy, then individual agency in determining norm-relevancy becomes superfluous. Second, her actual response—that judgments of norm-relevancy are grounded by an inner sense of gender "locatedness" distinct from one's actual social position—implicitly affirms essentialism by positing an inner sense which remains vague and mystical. Consequently, my critique of Jenkins' norm-relevancy account of gender reveals the difficulty in grounding self-identification through non-essentialist means.

This paper is part of my larger project to develop a positive ontological theory of gender which satisfies all three necessary criteria. However, my aim in this paper is merely to intervene in previous failed attempts by social ontologists of gender to achieve the same goal. By clarifying both the necessity and difficulty of reconciling self-identification with gender ontology, I hope to demonstrate why previous attempts have been unsuccessful and help guide social ontologists of gender towards more promising theoretical ground.

Alex Bryant. *Unilateral Break-ups: What Dissolution Conditions Can Tell Us About Romantic Partnership.*

Romantic partnership (whether dyads or more complex groups) looks like an exemplary case of joint commitment—they seem to happily fit the Gilbertian metaphysics, for example, insofar as they involve members common "we" thinking about a joint project that they pursue together. However, there's a common intuition (at least in Western thinking about romance) that challenges this neat picture of romantic partnership as joint commitment; namely, that individual membership of romantic partnership can unilaterally rescind their participation at any time. Independent institutional constraints (e.g. marriage), unilateral break-ups seems both wholly possible and unfortunately common: it would seem odd, for instance, to think that one could reject a break-up. If this is so, romantic partnerships can't be joint commitments in the classical sense, because on that view individual members cannot unilaterally extricate themselves from the commitment. Hence the puzzle this paper addresses: given joint commitments cannot be rescinded unilaterally, are romantic partnerships joint commitments? If they are, what is happening in instances where it appears that one membership of the partnership unilaterally breaks it up?

On one accounting the answer to this puzzle is simple. We hold onto our view of joint commitment and let go of our hunch that romantic partnerships are joint comments. Given the construal of non-rescindability as a necessary condition of joint commitments, romantic partnerships (at least on our initial intuitions) are not joint commitments. In this paper, I'll argue that we shouldn't take this way out. Rather, I provide two ways out.

The first way out already exists for a reader of the joint commitment literature: some joint commitments include rescindability conditions sufficient for romantic partnerships to be unilaterally rescinded. This might the case, but ultimately hangs on an empirical assessment of the actual normative constraints people introduce to their partnerships. It seems, though, that the operative concept of romantic partnership usually in circulation around the West is one by which all romantic partnerships are conditional (inc. at least a rescindability condition). The puzzle, it seems, can be dissolved if we provide a more nuanced account of extant romantic partnership. What, then, of unilateral break-ups? This is the second prong of the paper.

People clearly act as though unilateral break-ups happen (that is, they act as though the partnership has ended). We have a Gilbertian story about this too: whatever the normativity of the commitment, the persistence conditions of the partnership fail, and so the commitment itself dissolves. If there is no rescindability condition in place, other members of the partnership might reasonably attempt to intervene against the person instigating the break-up by, e.g., rebuking them—they might not however. It may be that the person instigating the break-up simply steels themselves against the prospective consequences of their action, and in so doing accepts that their partner has a reasonable claim against them that they will violate. In a minimal, commitment-based sense then, the person instigating the break-up wrongs their partners.

Johan Brännmark. *Social Ontology, Ideology, and Nonideal Theorizing.*

In his seminal paper "Ideal Theory" as Ideology, Charles W. Mills criticized traditional political theory for how its employment of idealizations could play an ideological function in masking existing injustices. He also highlighted the social ontology underpinning mainstream liberal theorizing as problematic. In political theory, that ontology is often implicit rather than clearly articulated, but arguably it is still largely in line with many of the more developed approaches that can be found in the field of social ontology itself. Even though social ontology typically does not have any explicit political aims, Mills' argument raises a worry about how social ontology can still play an ideological role, helping to maintain oppressive structures by making them appear more natural or innocent than they really are. Mills himself advocated nonideal theorizing instead, in order to better address existing injustices, with racial injustice being his main concern. In the last decade or so, several social ontologists have raised similar worries and sought to develop ways of doing social ontology that would enable critique of problematic practices rather than risking covering them up. Sally Haslanger is the most influential theorist here, and the one most clearly focused on problems with ideology, but authors like Ásta, Åsa Burman, and Katharine Jenkins have also explored alternative approaches to social ontology, which can be identified as forms of nonideal theorizing.

There are however at least two general questions here, (1) just how the idea that social ontology does or can play an ideological role should best be understood, and (2) how nonideal social ontology should best be done in order to steer clear of, or at least minimize, the problem of ideology. This presentation will address both questions. On (1), it will be argued that the worry about ideology should be understood as a two-part argument, starting from (a) an observation of comparable neglect with respect to certain injustices and then, through abductive reasoning, (b) identifying a plausible candidate mechanism for this neglect. While this reasoning will not allow us to determine just how significant the possible ideological role for a certain type of social ontology is in causing the relevant neglect, it can still give us sufficient ground for exploring alternative ways of doing social ontology. On (2), one approach that can be found in the literature (e.g., Haslanger and Jenkins) is inspired by classical critical theory: to understand one's inquiries into social phenomena as both explanatory and emancipatory, thus integrating a normative component into social ontology. It will be argued, however, that this approach faces a dilemma in fleshing out its idea of emancipation, either it is a thin account that will not provide enough guidance for theorizing or a fuller account that can guide theorizing, but that needs to decide on normative issues where social ontology should be open-ended. An alternative form of nonideal social ontology is proposed instead, which is negative in character and focused on eliminating possible mechanisms for producing ideological effects.

Åsa Burman. *Ideal and Nonideal Social Ontology*

This talk starts from the observation that there are two different research frames within contemporary social ontology. It argues that the key questions and central dividing lines within contemporary social ontology can be fruitfully reconstructed as a clash between two worlds, referred to as ideal and nonideal social ontology. Ideal social ontology is characterized by consensus and cooperation, while nonideal social ontology is characterized by conflict and contestation. I characterize ideal social ontology by developing the standard model of ideal social ontology (the dominant version of ideal social ontology). The standard model is exemplified by the works of Margaret Gilbert, John Searle, and Raimo Tuomela. This model thus synthesizes central assumptions from the three works that shaped the research field of ideal social ontology and shows their explicit and implicit assumptions about social reality.

This standard model has a crucial implication: it has shaped what social ontologists understand the social phenomena to be analyzed to be—direct, transparent, and deontic social phenomena built on consensus. Consequently, this model offers only a partial view of the social world while claiming it is general.

The relevance of characterizing the standard model is twofold. First, it is part of presenting a more general and systematic critique of ideal social ontology than has hitherto been offered. To this point, objections have been discussed in a piecemeal fashion against one theory at a time. By showing that some objections apply to all the main theories in ideal social ontology and examining the central objections at once calls ideal social ontology itself into question. Second, by showing that most fundamental assumptions of the standard model merit interrogation, the paradigm shift from ideal to nonideal social ontology becomes discernible. Questioning the fundamental assumptions of the standard model is also part of my argument that the shift from ideal to nonideal social ontology ought to be total.

Vittorio Catalano. *Normalizing Things with Words: On Speech and Oppressive Norms.*

A popular thesis in the debate concerning the speech-oriented approach to group-based injustice is that certain speech constitutes, rather than merely causes, harm aimed at some socially marked groups. Mary Kate McGowan (2019) has developed an account for which ordinary hate speech would constitute harm by enacting norms that prescribe that harm in a social interaction. In this paper I argue that such a proposal does not fully meet the challenge that every supporter of the Harm Constitution Thesis has to face, namely, that of showing how an ordinary hate speaker can have the power to alter norms for others in a non-cooperative social interaction. For this reason, I propose an extension of the model where the enacting of oppressive norms is naturalized, using Bicchieri's (2006) conceptualization of social norms, and intended as a form of normalization (Simpson, 2021) brought about by: (i) the hate speaker's implicitly conveying of empirical and normative expectations regarding harmful behaviour in a social interaction and (ii) the bystanders' accommodating silence (Langton, 2015a).

The first section outlines the Harm Constitution Thesis (HC) and its related main issue, often discussed under the label of "Authority Problem" (Maitra, 2012) but which is reframed as a General Normative Issue to make it independent from authority-related considerations. The second section sketches McGowan's account of HC, based on the idea of "covert exercitives" as "parallel acts" (McGowan, 2019) through which we constantly enact norms in several norm-governed activities, and shows how such a model works perfectly with conversations where participants have an incentive in remaining cooperative, but has some troubles when extended to broader social interactions, especially the conflictual ones involving a hate speaker. Since the model is shown not to meet the General Normative Issue, the third section digs deeper into the problem and shows that the best way to interpret the Harm Constitution Thesis is through Simpson's (2021) idea of "legitimization as normalization", which puts the power to enact norms for others not in the speaker but in the common practice of conforming to what is perceived as normal in a social context. McGowan's proposal can, then, account for such a version of HC if it is extended as to meet the further challenge of showing how a lone bigot speaker can present a behaviour as normal in a social context. Such an extension, it is argued, should draw from Bicchieri's naturalization of social norms (2006) and from Langton's (2015a; 2015b) remarks on how norms can be created or triggered through a process of accommodation, to sketch a picture in which a hate speaker performs the parallel act of enacting oppressive norms in a social interaction by implicitly conveying empirical and normative expectations regarding harmful behaviour that, if accommodated by the bystanders' silence, may affect, in different degrees, people's reasons for action. This, in conclusion, would dissolve the General Normative Issue and also provide a framework for further empirical work regarding how individuals' expectations are influenced by hate speech and which forms of counter-speech may be more efficient in constructively affecting them back.

Deborah Cocheo. *Institutional Abstractions.*

Individuals, plurals, groups, institutions - when we speak of any of these not merely as numbered bodies in particular organizational clusters but as actors, agents, or, generally "things with intentions," we speak of them essentially as selves. To be an agent or to have an intention implies something about the thing to which we are referring – namely, that it is conscious and has the capacity to make choices, plans, to have beliefs and desires, etc. In order to address concerns about group agents - specifically, institutional group agents - being taken as entities "over and above" individual agents, I present a model for understanding talk about group agents qua agents which utilizes Daniel Dennett's theory of the "self." Dennett's claim is that the "self" at play in human experience is not an existent thing over and above an individual's body - it is rather, much like a center of gravity, an abstraction that is beneficial for understanding complex objects (e.g., human beings) and their behaviors. In turn, I argue that these formal group 'agents' are nothing more than narrative abstractions that we employ in everyday discourse to represent and make sense of complex multi-individual phenomena in a facilitative manner.

To create this model, I first present a functional conception of abstraction (as distinct from the ontologically-loaded concept of 'abstract objects'). I suggest that this is what is at play when we make attitude attributions to institutional groups (particularly in cases where none of the members of the group need bear the relevant attitude). I then draw upon Kirk Ludwig's account of agents qua agents (such that to be an agent the entity must be capable of having psychological states) to consider whether or not groups and the like can be understood to have psychological states in a somewhat analogous way to the way human beings do. After determining that institutional group agents qua agents cannot be understood in this way, I suggest that when certain actions and/or affective states are attributed to a formal group rather than to any subset of its members, we can understand what is really going on as the group being postulated as the "central node" around which our expectations, predictions, judgments, and interpretations "congeal" in our imaginative architecture.

Finally, I aim to highlight that what this affective-state ascription seems to do in such utterances is to put information about complex entities and events in terms of individual agents. It is not just that we are inexact, lazily gesturing creatures when it comes to describing and understanding social phenomena. Rather, we are constrained by nature of being embodied creatures, our processing, storage, and production capacities controlled to some degree or other by the physical limitations of, for example, our neurochemical firings, our sensory apparatuses, and impinging forces from our environments. It is therefore a highly naturalistic proposal to suggest that we employ cognitive tools such as familiar discourse mechanisms to parse through the onslaught of information we are required to make sense of in everyday discourse.

Samuele Chilovi. *Anchoring, Grounding, and Explanatory Laws.*

Social metaphysics has become an increasingly active field of research in recent years. One of the key questions it deals with concerns the way in which particular social facts – including facts about what one socially ought to do, and facts about the instantiation of social properties and relations by particular items – are metaphysically explained.

In this area, two leading and competing frameworks for modelling the explanation of social facts have emerged, one appealing to grounding relations only, the other to a combination of both grounding and anchoring relations. On a grounding-only model (see, e.g., Griffith 2017, Schaffer 2017, 2019), social facts are explained by their determinants by means of being metaphysically grounded in them. On the anchoring-grounding framework advocated by Epstein (2015), by contrast, an additional relation of metaphysical determination called "anchoring" is deemed to be indispensable to understand the way that social reality depends on the more fundamental entities that generate it.

Epstein (2015, 2019a, 2109b) presents a powerful argument for anchoring-grounding models of the explanation of social facts and, correlatively, against identifying anchoring with grounding. In a nutshell, the argument seeks to establish that anchoring is not grounding by showing that they have different properties: anchoring "exports" whereas grounding does not, as it is "world-bound". That anchoring "exports" means that facts about the instantiation of a kind K can obtain at worlds where its anchors do not exist. To say that grounding is "world-bound", by contrast, means that it only relates world-mate entities, viz. entities that obtain at the same world. Consequently, anchoring and grounding have different extensions at different worlds (different intensions), since they relate different things, and so they must be different relations.

The aim of this paper is to defend the grounding-only model from Epstein's argument. First, I outline a way in which the claim that anchoring exports can be resisted. Faced with any putative case of exportation, it is always an option to apply a divide-and-conquer strategy and show either that the social fact in question does not obtain at the relevant world, or that it does, but its putative anchors do not play any role in metaphysically explaining it. This strategy, however, while potentially promising to handle some cases, is not entirely satisfactory, for it provides no general reason to think that exportation never occurs.

Then, I turn to examining the contention that grounding is world-bound. Even though world-boundedness is "merely" an extension of the widespread principle that grounding is a factive notion, I introduce cases that appear to counterexample it. Despite this, I notice how various restricted versions of the principle, immune from counterexamples, may be introduced and used to reformulate the argument, so it is unclear whether the claim that grounding is world-bound ultimately stands.

Finally, I elaborate my favorite diagnosis of the argument's problem, which differs from extant replies in the literature (see, e.g., Guala 2016, Hawley 2019, Mikkola 2016, 2019, and Schaffer 2019). In a nutshell, Epstein's argument fails to establish what it would need to be successful, namely that anchoring, unlike grounding, holds cross-worldly. Therefore, its conclusion may well be false even if its premises are all true, or so I argue.

The result, if cogent, is significant. For the right lesson to be drawn from Epstein's reasoning is not that anchoring is not grounding. Rather, it is that general social rules connecting social kinds with their explanantia do not in general ground facts about the instantiation of the kind.

Justin Clardy. *Black Love: A Social Ontological Response to Anika Simpson.*

Abstract. In this paper, I offer a social constructionist account of Black love. The philosophy of love has not recorded many contributions from Black philosophers on the subject. As a result, despite the growing popularity and importance of the notion 'Black Love' among Black folks inside and outside of the academy, it has been woefully under theorized by Black philosophers. To this point, philosophers like Anika Simpson have pointed out that there is a tacit acceptance among Black lovers (and perhaps Black philosophers alike) that "Black love is dead." In her paper on the subject however, Simpson, like other Black thinkers before and after her, conflates matters of Black love with matters of Black marriage. This conflation also appears in work that archives the historical trajectory of intimate relationships among Black folks in America. For example, Dianne Stewart and Tera Hunter have both recently discussed Black love as it pertains to marital relationships among Black folks. One shortcoming of this approach, as Justin Clardy has pointed out, is that it renders the erotic love experienced by some Black lovers—such as Black polyamorists—illegitimate and invisible. Thus, the knowledge gleaned about Black love in discussions of Black marriage are, at best, incomplete given this limited scope. In this paper, I ask "What is Black love if it is something more than monogamous romantic love and marriage?"

Drawing on Tera Hunter's notion of the third flesh—a reconfiguring of the idea that through marriage "two become one flesh", that indexes the superior relationship of master to slave in the antebellum United States—I argue Black love is essentially a non-monogamous notion rooted in rupture. For example, the intimacies among Black people in bondage were necessarily subject to interventions by their master's participation in the domestic slave trade, thereby making "normal" monogamous relationships virtually impossible. Many Black intimacies were fragmented, fractured, broken, and non-dyadic. My argument centers the ways Black love has been constrained by racist social institutions, traditions, and practices in America and argues for a more comprehensive notion of "Black love" that includes the erotic love experienced among Black folks in non-marital relationships—including Black polyamorists. On my view, Black love characterizes intimate caring relationships among Black relata not excluding relationships of erotic love and sex.

Finally, it is worth pointing out how the account challenges the ways we think about romantic love and complicates how we think about race in America. A primary corollary the paper establishes, for example, is that as Black love and "romantic love" were shaped differently by racism and America's institutions and practices, romantic love (i.e. a notion that centers a loving subject who is an autonomous and dignified individual) and Black love are ontologically distinct.

Stephanie Collins. *Collectives' Culpability Through Time.*

Existing accounts of group agency and group responsibility have paid little attention to how group agents are affected by the passage of time. Group agents commonly undergo fissions, fusions, and transformations that affect the identity of the group: corporations undergo mergers and splits; nation-states undergo unions and secessions; and all kinds of organizations can change their procedures and structures sufficiently radically that the later organization is non-identical to the earlier organization.

The present paper asks what implications this has for collectives' moral culpability for historically distant wrongs. The argument pays particular attention to historical injustices committed within colonial nation-states.

The paper begins by outlining a picture of nation-states' agency on which states are indeed liable to moral culpability. The account here is broadly familiar to social ontologists, drawing on Peter French, Christian List and Philip Pettit, Brian Epstein, Stephanie Collins, Frank Hindriks, and others.

The paper then asks: do contemporary nation-states bear moral culpability for centuries-ago wrongs? If so, which contemporary nation-states bear moral culpability for which wrongs? The paper considers, and rejects, two possible answers to these questions: (1) culpability transmits from a past state's action to a present state just if the states are identical under international law; and (2) culpability transmits from a past state's action to a present state just if the two states have substantively similar structures, procedures, and/or values. Both of these accounts fail to attribute culpability where they should, and attribute culpability where they shouldn't.

Finally, the paper argues that culpability transmits from a past state's action to a present state to the extent that the present state 'internally descends' from the culpable action of the past state. The relationship of 'internal descent' is one in which the existence of the present state and its 'agential resources' (a term defined in the paper) is the result of the autonomous exercise of the 'agential resources' of the past state.

One upshot of this argument is that the collective agent 'Australia' is culpable for the 18th-century invasion of the Australian continent by Britain, in the sense of morally owing redress for this action, in a way that cannot be captured by the two rejected theories of collectives' culpability through time.

Rachel Cooper. *Social Construction as Joint Intentional Mechanistic Explanation.*

A major aim of the debunking social constructionist is to reveal as social kinds that are widely held to be natural (or, in some cases, to reveal as more deeply social kinds that are already widely recognized to be social) (Ásta, 2013; Ásta, 2018; Diaz-Leon, 2019; Haslanger, 2012; Mallon, 2016). The prominent approach to such debunking has been to make a case for thinking that the individuation conditions for membership in the kinds in question are in fact social (or are in fact more deeply social than has previously been recognized). Showing a kind to be more social than has previously been recognized is meant to show that the circumstances members of the kind find themselves in are more within human control than has previously been recognized (and so to show that such circumstances require further justification than has so far been given) (Ásta, 2018). In every case, it is argued that belonging to the social kind in question is a matter of being taken to have certain traits (regularly or for the most part), rather than of having certain traits. For these are the conditions that determine which constraints and enablements we receive and so (for the purposes of the debunker, at least) may be seen as appropriately determining the referent of the kind terms in question. On the sort of view just described, social kinds are kinds that depend for their existence on social structure (Haslanger, 2012; Ásta, 2018; Barnes, 2017; Ritchie, 2020).

In this paper, I argue that adopting the prominent approach to debunking prevents one from doing two things that the debunker ought to be able to do 1) it prevents one from answering the implicit question being posed by the debunker, namely, the question of how a plausibly socially constructed kind can come to appear more natural than it in fact is and 2) it prevents one from being able to make sense of a social kind that has fully natural individuation conditions. I make a case for thinking that this appearance question is best answered with a mechanistic (as opposed to a metaphysical) explanation and posit a kind of mechanism that 1) explains the cases of primary interest to the debunker (when a plausibly socially constituted kind comes to appear natural) and 2) enables us to deal more easily with what seem to be especially tricky cases on the prominent approach, namely, cases that intuitively ought to be captured by an account of social kinds that nevertheless do not seem to have social individuation conditions. I argue that the kinds of interest to the debunking social constructionist are not kinds of interest in virtue of how they are individuated, i.e., not due to sharing the same sort of "metaphysical explanation," but rather in virtue of featuring in the same type of mechanistic explanation: a joint intentional mechanistic explanation.

Matthew Cull. *Engineers and Wrecking Crews: Contemporary Gender Abolitionism.*

The idea that we should abolish gender has seen a renewed interest from across the political spectrum over the past five or so years. Variously, far-right 'anti gender' activists, gender criticals, communizers, afropessimists, gender nihilists, liberal feminists, analytic materialist feminists, and transgender Marxists have all assented to the claim 'we need to abolish gender' but it is unclear whether (a) they all mean anything like the same thing as one another when they claim that they want to abolish gender, and (b) whether their vision of gender abolition is at all desirable.

In this talk I develop a taxonomy of gender abolitionism, distinguishing abolition of gender concepts from abolition of gender as social kind. I will further distinguish abolition as elimination versus abolition understood using the Hegelian notion of Aufheben. Thinking through the various abolitionisms that have been put forward, I suggest, reveals massive differences between various positions that all characterize themselves as abolitionist.

I'll argue that the most attractive disambiguation of gender abolition, abolition as Aufheben (as put forward by Xenofeminists such as Hester and transgender Marxists such as Belinsky and Bjegunac) actually ends up collapsing into gender pluralism. This is the idea that we should proliferate genders, not attempt to get rid of them. I argue that this surprising result allows for the beginnings of a rapprochement between this tradition and more mainstream analytic philosophy of gender.

Alice Damirjian. *Is 'Arsenal' a Rigid Designator? Rigidity and Names for Social Groups.*

In *Naming and Necessity*, Kripke advanced the influential view that some terms are rigid designators, in particular, proper names. Some paradigmatic examples are: 'Hesperus', 'Nixon', 'Mt. Everest', 'England', and 'T'. It is notable that 'England' stands out from the rest of the names in our list. It does so because nations are social entities, whereas planets, individuals, mountains, and tables are not. This observation is in itself a reason to wonder whether names such as 'England', and names for social groups such as 'The Beatles', 'the Supreme Court' and 'Arsenal', really could be rigid designators. What social groups are is a debated question, thus it far from clear what these names refer to, if they refer to anything at all. In order to address this issue, we shall have to turn our gaze toward social ontology and look at what has been said about the metaphysics of social group. We can then ask: Are social groups really the type of objects for which rigid designators can be introduced?

In this talk, I argue that names for social groups are indeed rigid designators. First, I argue that social group names behave syntactically like proper names in the language, and thus should be regarded as proper names. Secondly, I argue that these names are non-empty, and I show that this claim is, in different ways, compatible with a large variety of views on the ontology of social groups. Here, ontological issues that pertain to social group identity and persistence are also addressed, and I argue that the apparent difficulty of producing satisfactory identity and persistence criteria for social groups is not a reason to suppose that social group names are non-rigid. Thirdly, I argue that speakers can successfully introduce names for social groups, both ostensively and by description. In relation to this, I argue that social groups pose a particular challenge for causal theories of reference, given that we can quite easily construct arguments to the effect that speakers are never in a position to causally ground a particular name in a social group, but only the group's members. Lastly, I address some new semantic and ontological issues that arise once we accept the thesis that names for social groups are rigid designators, such as: Can we rigidly designate social groups that currently lack members? If the answer is yes, that would seem to entail the controversial claim that there are memberless groups.

Julian Davis. *Dimensions of Shared Agency in Organized Institutions*

Human institutions can be broadly categorized into two types: organized institutions (such as universities, religious institutions, and governments) and systematic institutions (such as marriage, property, or money). The idea that shared intentions play a crucial role in both types of institutions is intuitive and plausible. A reasonable conjecture is that organized institutional activity involves shared intentional agency and that organized institutions maintain systematic institutions. For example, a central bank maintains a monetary institution, and religious and governmental organizations maintain institutions of marriage and property. However, understanding the nature and scope of shared attitudes in organized institutions is not straightforward. One of the main challenges to conceiving of shared agency writ large is to understand how models of modest social interactions can "scale-up" to help explain large-scale institutional activity. (See Bratman, 2022).

Many contemporary theories of collective intentionality include requirements for shared agency that cannot plausibly scale-up to explain institutional activity. These requirements include the Collectivity Condition, the Universality Condition, the Horizontality Condition, and the Specificity Condition. In the collective intentionality literature, these conditions are represented by 1) special "we-mode" attitudes … 2) shared by everyone in the group … 3) involving mutually responsive intentions … 4) with specific and narrowly overlapping propositional contents. Jointly and severally, these conditions raise forceful objections to the need for shared intentions in institutions. They present a "hypercommitted" view of shared intentional agency that cannot plausibly be applied to large-scale institutional activity involving hierarchy, authority, and alienation. (See Shapiro, 2014). More than other authors, Christopher Kutz (2000a, 2000b) and Scott Shapiro (2011, 2014) have recognized the need to account for authority and alienation in organized institutions. In this paper, I rebut the necessity of the above conditions and present an account of shared intentional agency that is both consistent with authority and alienation and avoids criticisms of hypercommitment.

A minimally sufficient account of shared intentional agency in which shared intentions scale-up for inclusion in large scale institutional activity provides support for: 1) the intuitive and plausible idea that shared intentions play an instrumental role in human institutions, and 2) an inference to the best explanation of institutional activity as one that involves shared intentions. In these respects, I diverge from philosophers who reject the need for shared intentions in institutions. Instead, I draw on insights from Scott Shapiro's evaluation of Michael Bratman's influential approach to shared agency and take a step toward defending a multi-dimensional theory of shared intentional agency. Once objections based on Horizontality, Universality, Specificity and Collectivity have been answered, a positive multi-dimensional account emerges in which (horizontally or vertically) interlocking, (modularly or universally) distributed, (specific or general) plural intentions are instrumental in coordinating and guiding organized institutional activity.

Alexis Davin. *Sally Haslanger's epistemic conception of ideology.*

In this presentation, I aim to critically evaluate Sally Haslanger's work on ideology, and argue that rather than treating it as a primarily epistemological phenomenon, we would be better served by understanding it as an ontological phenomenon: a concept of ideology should identify how social objects themselves are implicated in and transformed by the ideological conditions we are subject to. I will therefore argue that the nature of, and relationship between, the products of metaphysical inquiry into ideologically contested social objects - our manifest and operative concepts - must be modified.

Haslanger's conception of ideology is of 'cultural technēs' gone wrong. Technēs are normative scripts which dictate how features of the social world are valued as resources (Haslanger 2018). In the cases where we misunderstand or misvalue these resources, we are led to carry out social practices which allocate these resources such that we maintain systems of oppression. 'Going wrong' in this sense can be seen wherever our concepts of the social world in ordinary language and intuition separate from an accurate conceptual representation of reality - we observe a gap between the manifest and operative concepts of objects such as genders. Ideology, then, is an epistemological phenomenon: a force which, through manipulating our processes of understanding and conceptualising social reality, leads us to misunderstand the world in nefarious ways. In Haslanger's terms,"ideology functions to sustain injustice by masking or distorting what is good, right, just. It fails us both morally and epistemically, and fails us morally by failing us epistemically" (Haslanger 2019). This closely follows the first sense of ideology as pejorative identified in Raymond Geuss' (1981, 13-5) taxonomy of uses of the term. I argue that this concept of ideology leads us to the problematic conclusion that the epistemic practices of understanding and valuing social resources and the material practices of coordinating and allocating these resources are disconnected. We find that we cannot distinguish these as moments in the process of distributing our resources: we discover what we value only through observing the concrete allocation of resources in reality. The same social practices both do the work of allocating value to social objects which manage our understanding of how they are valued. However, treating ideology as an epistemic failure exclusively introduces a gap between these two aspects of the social world where there is none. This is best exemplified by the problem of relating manifest and operative concepts - operative concepts are meant to identify the more accurate understanding of the workings of the social world, but one of the crucial features that must therefore be captured when analysing an oppressive social structure is therefore how the gap between manifest and operative concepts are created and maintained. I believe that this task, usually construed as one of epistemic unveiling, ought instead to be a part of the descriptive analysis, and will discuss the changes to descriptive analysis that would enable us to analyse both social reality and its ideological mystification as conjoined processes.

Niels de Haan. *Shared Reasons and Shared Duties.*

Collective moral problems concern cases where some morally weighty outcome must be generated or prevented, but no agent has direct control over the outcome in the form of actions that are sufficient to prevent or generate that outcome. In cases where there is no group agent, there is nonetheless a strong intuition that the non-agential group is morally required to refrain from the collective harm or to generate the collective benefit together. Individualists argue that we can explain the duties of non-agential groups in terms of a complex conjunction of individual duties (Collins 2019; Goodin 2012). Collectivists deny this. If the group is the bearer of a collective duty, as some argue, then we must reconsider (the extent of) the Agency Principle: A can have a moral duty only if A is a moral agent (Aas 2015; Blomberg 2020; Cullity 2004; Wringe 2016). If the agents have the duty to φ jointly, as others argue, then this requires amending the Ability Principle: A can have a duty to Phi only if A is able to Phi (Björnsson 2020; Pinkert 2014; Schwenkenbecher 2021). All collectivists postulate an additional group-level duty that is analytically and/or ontically non-reductive.

In this paper, I develop a novel evidence-relative account of shared duties that is analytically and ontically reductive, which avoids conflict with the Agency and Ability Principle. While my aim is individualistic in spirit, I argue that there is an important sense in which these duties are genuinely shared that existing individualist accounts cannot explain. I first focus on shared reasons. I argue that when faced with cooperation problems or contribution problems involving a collective benefit, each agent's pro tanto moral reason to perform a relevant contributory action is conditional on sufficient others having an interconnected pro tanto reason. This is importantly different from act-based or group-based reasons that are conditional on other people's (expected) behavior (Kagan 2011; Nefksy 2011; Parfit 1984; Woodard 2017). These pro tanto reasons interlock, and constitute a genuinely shared reason, which generates a shared moral duty. This shared duty is nothing else but individual duties that are conditional on each other:

At t1, abc have a pro tanto shared duty to φn at tn if and only if

1)   At t1, each member of abc has a conditional pro tanto individual duty to

(a)   perform any necessary preparatory actions in order for abc to φn at tn; and/or

(b)   do her capacity-relative part of any necessary preparatory shared actions in order for abc to φn at tn; and/or

(c)   do or contribute her capacity-relative part of φn at tn.

2)   at t1, sufficient members of abc have a pro tanto duty to (a), (b), and/or (c) given abc's shared ability to φn at tn.

Finally, I argue that neither overdetermination (Schwenkenbecher 2020), moral phenomenology and explanatory power (Wringe 2016), multi-realizability (Schwenkenbecher 2021), non-compliance (Björnsson 2020), nor team reasoning (Blomberg 2020; Blomberg and Petersson Forthcoming) provides us with good reason to think these shared duties are analytically or ontically irreducible.

Louis Derosset. *Legal Grounds.*

It is overwhelmingly plausible that part of what gives individuals their particular legal or institutional statuses is the fact that there are general laws or other policies in place that specify the conditions under which something is to have those statuses. For instance, suppose that Joe drives a car at 80 mph down a street in my town. Joe's particular, dateable act a is illegal. Part of what makes a illegal is that, under applicable law, any act of driving 80 mph down the street in that jurisdiction is illegal.

At least, this is how matters seem. But a problem for this apparently plausible view has recently come to light [Berker, 2019]. The law sometimes specifies necessary and sufficient conditions for particular individuals to have various legal statuses. So, for instance, the law in my jurisdiction provides that an agreement is a contract iff it meets certain conditions. A desideratum on any systematic account of what makes something a contract is that the law encode an explanatory asymmetry: the conditions in question make the agreement a contract, rather than the other way around. We can satisfy this desideratum by accepting that, according to the law, an agreement is a contract iff and because the relevant conditions are met. But, since the law itself is part of what makes the agreement a contract, we now face a difficult choice: either the law specifies explanatory conditions that refer to that very law itself; or the law's specification of those conditions is incomplete.

Previous commentators on this difficulty have suggested grasping the second horn of the dilemma. Here I argue for grasping the first horn instead: we should recognize an element of self-reference in the law's specification of what gives things their legal statuses. Proposals of this sort have been characterized as "disastrous" [Berker, 2019] and "procrustean" [Rosen, 2017]. I suggest, by contrast, that the relevant kind of self-reference is a familiar part of the legal and procedural world. I argue that self-reference of the allegedly problematic sort, for instance, is exhibited when the facilitator of an official meeting pronounces it adjourned, saying

(1) This meeting is hereby adjourned.

Of course, this particular case does not provide an example of a self-referential general principle, but it does exhibit the kind of self-reference that critics claim would make appeal to self-referential general principles objectionable. This opens the way to a view, herebyism, which takes such cases as a model. The paper shows that herebyism appeals to a kind of self-reference immanent in legal practice. It also contrasts herebyism with extant alternatives, which avoid self-reference at the cost of appealing to relatively difficult and unfamiliar essentialist notions. Thus, we can solve the problem for the account of what gives individuals their legal statuses without appealing to metaphysical ideas that go beyond extant legal practice.

Esa Diaz Leon. *Epistemic Injustice and Social Construction.*

In this talk I would like to discuss Miranda Fricker (2007)'s claim that hermeneutical injustice is wrongful in part because it is associated with a form of social construction. In particular, she argues, when a subject suffers from a form of hermeneutical marginalization, this can involve being interpreted as being a certain kind of individual, that is, as having a certain social identity, where being conceived to be a member of that social group is harmful to the individual. Fricker distinguishes between two ways in which an individual might be harmed in this way: by (merely) being interpreted to be a member of that social group (when in fact the subject is not a member), or by being caused to be a member of that social group (where this is in part caused by the former, incorrect understanding). In order to explain how hermeneutical injustice has social constructive power, Fricker introduces two notions of social construction, namely, constitutive and causal construction, where the former is merely a matter of being conceived to be a certain way, regardless of whether one is actually a member of that group or not, and the latter is a matter of actually instantiating that property, as a causal result of being understood to be that way (this is what Hacking calls 'interactive kinds'). In this talk, I would like to argue that in order to make sense of the claim that hermeneutical injustice has social constructive power, it would be more useful to appeal to a different pair of notions of social construction, namely, what Haslanger, Mallon and others have (also) labeled 'causal' vs. 'constitutive' social construction, but where these are understood differently. In particular, a property is causally socially constructed when social factors are causally relevant for bringing it about, whereas a property is constitutively socially constructed when social factors are (not only causally but also, and crucially) part of the definition, or the nature, of what it takes for an individual to instantiate that property. Therefore, according to these notions, a property can be causally socially constructed and yet not constitutively socially constructed, in case it is caused by social factors but it could still be instantiated independently of social factors.

In my view, we can better understand the distinction Fricker is after as follows: a subject is caused to be something they are not, in the sense that they are caused to be a certain kind of individual (or is caused to instantiate certain properties) by means of being interpreted as having certain properties that they do not originally have, but where that new understanding has certain causal effects, so that the individual will eventually come to instantiate those properties. In this case, we can say that those properties have been causally socially constructed. In addition, in some cases the individual might be caused to have some properties, which are such that it is part of the property's nature (or their definition) to stand in a certain relation to certain social factors. Then, the individual will be caused to be a certain kind of individual, at least in part by means of being understood to be that kind of individual, where being that kind of individual requires that the individual stands in a certain relation to certain social factors (such as being represented in certain ways). This way of understanding the social constructive power of hermeneutical injustice has several advantages: (i) we can clearly distinguish cases in which the subject eventually comes to instantiate the property in question, from those in which she is merely thought to have such a property, and (ii) we can clearly distinguish between those cases in which the subject is caused to instantiate a property that is in itself not social, from those cases in which the subject is caused to instantiate a property that is in itself social (or socially constructed in the constitutive sense).

Kevin Doherty. *Ameliorating 'Mental Illness'.*

Ameliorative philosophy, popularized by conceptual engineers like Sally Haslanger and Elizabeth Barnes, consists of the identification and reason-driven improvement of concepts. From the stance that social kind concepts do not possess ontologically necessary conditions, these entities can be altered for alethic, practical, and moral reasons. This paper applies this method of theorizing to 'mental illness', arguing that a psychological condition is a 'mental illness' iff it meets three criteria: a social criterion of harm, an evolutionary criterion of dysfunction, and a consent constraint that requires informed consent for ethical and accurate diagnosis. These criteria are inspired by a normative re-conception of Jerome Wakefield's Harmful-Dysfunction Analysis of mental illness (HDA) and the anti-psychiatry movement's (APM) justified epistemic and ethical concerns of 'mental illness'. While HDA and APM each present an objection to ameliorating mental illness, they serve as the conceptual backbone of the ameliorative proposal. The consent constraint is of note, for the notion that a diagnosis is accurate if and only if the diagnosed individual accepts the diagnosis is a radical yet intuitive reimagination of 'mental illness' that supports willful participation in the therapeutic process. If accepted, the ameliorative proposal grounds the practice of psychiatric diagnosis in philosophical reason, therapeutic practicality, and the dignity of diagnosed people.

Dominik Duell, Catherine Hafer, and Dimitri Landa. *Identifying Team-reasoning in the Lab.*

Behavioral evidence suggestive of team-reasoning has been ambiguous, and team-reasoning interpretation is confounded with other accounts consistent with I-mode reasoning. In the laboratory, we implement a coordination game that allows us to cleanly identify when and whether individuals reason in the self-regarding I-mode or a group-regarding We-mode. In a 4-player Stag Hunt game, we vary the threshold needed to be reached for successful collective action from 3 to 4 players need to choose stag. We also induce group identities for the individual subjects (ID vs. no-ID treatments), elicit beliefs about others' behavior, and measure risk preferences and strategic sophistication. Assuming that individuals hold a combination of I - and We-concerns and that inducing identities increases the weight on the We-concerns - holding fixed the beliefs about other players, the sensitivity to the threshold change, should come at the I-mode reasoning margin, rather than at the We-mode margin, and so be no greater (and possibly smaller) in the ID treatment than in the no-ID treatment (a difference-in-differences test).

Our laboratory results show that we can reject the hypothesis of the significant incidence of We-mode reasoning. The effect of varying the success threshold from more to less strict on players' propensity to play stag is not different from zero in the no-ID treatment but it is significantly positive in the ID treatment. However, we also find evidence that subjects believe that there are some members of the group who will, indeed, reason in We-mode. In particular, they believe that others are more likely to play stag when they all share a group identity than when they interact in mixed groups. Best-responding to that belief can lead to I-mode behavior that is observationally equivalent to the We-mode behavior.

We implement an additional (modified ID) treatment to help us further identify the individual subject-behavior effect from the effect via the subjects' beliefs about others. In the ID treatment, we alert subjects that there may be a chance that they all share a group identity within the group, but only one of the subjects will be told whether they, indeed, share a group identity. For those who are not told whether the identity is shared, there is no difference between ID and no-ID treatment, and so no effect of the treatment on their own behavior due to the beliefs of those who are told. We then compare behavior of the subjects who are told of the shared identity to those who are not. The conjunction of no difference in behavior between these groups of subjects, and the difference in subjects' behavior between the ID and the modified ID treatments confirms our interpretation of no pure individual subject-behavior effect from the main treatment.

The experiment provides a well-identified test of the theory of team-reasoning that has been used to explain a number of pro-social behaviors, including voter turnout and private provision of public goods. It points to the need to revise existing accounts of team-reasoning to focus on participants' beliefs about each other as a primitive element in their reasoning.

Yaren Duvarci. *A Dilemma for Social Construction as Grounding: Grounding Necessity or Physicalism.*

Jonathan Schaffer proposes an account of social construction in his paper "Social Construction as Grounding; Or: Fundamentality for Feminists, a Reply to Barnes and Mikkola" based on his grounding framework. He begins by saying "Feminist metaphysics is guided by the insight that gender is socially constructed" and that a grounding framework can help clarify the idea of social construction. After debating on why the grounding framework is helpful for feminist metaphysics, he proposes his now famous account of social construction: "To be socially constructed is to be grounded in distinctive social patterns." (2017, pp.2449-2450).

While socially constructed phenomena appears on the top of the grounding schema, distinctive social patterns that generate these phenomena are relatively on the bottom. The relation between the social pattern and the socially constructed object does not have to be an immediate grounding relation, as far as I interpret Schaffer's framework. However, according to the widely accepted principle of grounding necessitation (GN), each grounding relation between different phenomena has to be a necessary relation. If, for example, X is a social construct, somewhere in the middle of α and X will be a distinctive social pattern that grounds X. However, that social pattern that grounds X is also grounded by the previous phenomena since social patterns are not fundamental and they do not come into existence out of nowhere. If, for example, you are a physicalist; you'd say that the physical is fundamental and the social phenomena arise out of the physical. In this case, we might say that α, as the fundamental physical structure of the world, is what grounds everything else. In this case, if someone accepts grounding necessity and holds that everything is grounded in the physical they should argue that every social construct came into existence from the fundamental physical structure of the world necessarily. Moreover, they should also say that it could not have been otherwise given the fundamental physical structure of the world.

While GN is a widely accepted claim, many people also hold that socially constructed phenomena is not determined by the nature of things, i.e. they are not inevitable. Hacking proposes this thesis in "The Social Construction of What?". He argues that ""Social constructionists about X tend to hold that:

(1) X need not have existed, or need not be at all as it is. X, or X as it is at present, is not determined by the nature of things; it is not inevitable. (1999, p.5)

Interpreting (1), Hacking states that "X was brought into existence or shaped by social events, forces, history, all of which could well have been different". Moreover, Díaz-León also claims that "Therefore, the point of (1) is rather to claim that the instantiation or distribution of X is contingent upon certain social events and social arrangements: if those social events and arrangements were different, then facts about X could be different." (2015, p.1139)

In this talk, I will be arguing that accepting GN and (1) will lead to contradictory conclusions about the social phenomena. In this case, we have two opposing views on social construction, granted that social is grounded in the physical and that grounding necessity holds for social construction. Therefore, we have two options: either we reject grounding necessity or we reject the claim that social is grounded in the physical.

Dominik Döllinger. *How Is a Non-Mechanistic Social Ontology Possible?*

The notion of the mechanism is one of the most popular and widely used concepts in science, and the social sciences are no exception. While it has traditionally been associated with the natural sciences — in particular physics and physiology — social scientists have been eager to adopt mechanisms for their own theories and conceptualizations of the social world. From the mechanisms of social regulation to mechanisms of social reproduction and control there seems to be no social phenomenon that is able to escape a mechanistic social ontology. This, of course, begs the question if social scientists truly believe that the social world is a mechanistic one or if mechanisms have simply become a habit of thought that speaks to a lack of imagination on behalf of social scientists? In my paper, I am first going to present a philosophical critique of a mechanistic social ontology and briefly historicize mechanistic thinking in the social sciences. I then take up the question if alternative social ontologies are possible and how we can think about society without also subscribing to the mechanistic natural philosophy of seventeenth century physics. Drawing primarily from debates within sociology, philosophy, depth psychology and quantum physics, I am going to experiment with different ways of theorizing, investigating and thinking about the social world outside of the mechanistic paradigm.

Kenneth Ehrenberg. *A Social Ontology Attack on Inclusive Legal Positivism.*

This paper will show that social ontology considerations can settle the heretofore intractable debate in jurisprudence between inclusive and exclusive legal positivism. Legal positivism is the view that social facts are the determinants of law (as opposed to an anti-positivist view that non-social facts such as moral values can be the determinants of legal norms).

To say that social facts are the determinants of law leaves open whether those social facts can introduce non-social norms into the criteria of legal validity. The criteria of legal validity are the norms that pick out which supposed legal norms are the bona fide members of a given legal system. Inclusive legal positivists say that the social facts determining law can make it the case that non-socially sourced criteria can be included among the criteria of legal validity. In other words, a given legal system can, by the choice of certain officials, make it the case that putative legal norms must accord with some moral norm in order to be valid members of that legal system (assuming here that moral norms are not socially sourced). Exclusive legal positivists deny this and say that any attempt to introduce a non-social norm merely introduces a criterion of belief about that non-social norm as a condition for legality, rather than successfully introducing that non-social norm as a criterion.

One way to see the point at issue in this debate is to understand how the different sides would treat a mistake in the application of the validity rules to a determination about what putative legal norms are legally valid in that system. According to the inclusive legal positivist, it is possible for officials to be mistaken about the correct application of the non-social criterion. According to the exclusive legal positivist such a mistake is impossible (at least at high enough levels of officialdom) because the official determination about the application of that norm is constitutive of its legal validity.

Understanding law as an institution (such that the criteria of legal validity are the institution's membership conditions), together with two apparently universal features of legal systems, argue in favour of exclusive legal positivism. While some validity conditions are gatekeepers in that they specify necessary conditions that must be met for legal validity, others are serving as enabling or sufficient conditions for membership. About those sufficient conditions official determination cannot be generally mistaken since the collective belief about what constitutes those sufficient conditions makes it the case that those conditions are sufficient for membership (a point I borrow from Amie Thomasson). The first feature is then that any exclusion that a supposed failure to meet a necessary condition would perform is powerless (moot) in the face of an official determination that the sufficient conditions for inclusion are met. The other feature is that ALL applications/interpretations of law involve the application of such sufficient conditions and are treated as valid by the system until officials of superior jurisdiction change that. Hence inclusive legal positivism, which invariably sees the non-socially determined fact introduced to a system's criteria of legal validity as a necessary condition, excluding norms that don't meet the moral demand of that criterion, is not actually showing that the non-socially determined fact is among the criteria that determines legal validity.

Maryam Ebrahimi Dinani. *Social Institutions, Second-Personal Oughts and Institutional Oughts.*

The aim of this paper is to introduce a distinction between second-personal oughts and institutional oughts, as governing social institutions. The suggestion is that we have to distinguish between oughts rooted in the second-personal aspect of human social relations and those which are attached to specific institutional statuses.

I will start by making a triangle of three authors who hold, each in his own way, that humans are capable of [essentially-]social acts, as acts involving second-personal, or joint, engagements: Thomas Reid, Adolph Reinach, and Michael Tomasello, with different philosophical projects and from very different backgrounds, each have a conception of act[ivitie]s/practices that can be performed in a second-personal way without presupposing any conventions or institutional settings. Reid and Reinach introduce a notion of social acts of the mind as those which can have no existence without the intervention of some other [intelligent] being, but which are intelligible independently of the existence of human conventions/institutional structures. Tomasello hypothesizes on the capacitates for joint intentionality, as a human-unique form of second-personal relationship with specific others in face-to-face interactions before the rise of cultural and institutional forms of cognition and sociality. All the three authors take capacities for such second-personal, or joint, engagements as a prerequisite for conventional/institutional activities; moreover, all the three hold, each in a different way, that there are rights and obligations originating in such second-personal social act[ivitie]s/practices. Based on Tomasello's two-step account of the evolution of human social cognition, I will reformulate the distinction between social act[ivitie]s/practices, on the one hand, and institutional ones in general, on the other hand, in terms of a distinction between activities which are, in principle, possible by mere capacities for joint intentionality and those which can only exist at the level of collective intentionality.

In a second part, I will tentatively introduce a distinction between oughts linked to essentially-social act[ivitie]s/practices qua second-personal engagements and oughts attached to institutional statuses, which are built on top of this, and I will call them second-personal oughts and institutional oughts, respectively. I will finish by making some suggestions with regard to the implications of this distinction especially for debates on communicative [speech] acts. With regard to my purposes, and in line with Reid's intuitions about good faith and trust, I suggest that, specifically, the norm of trustworthiness is a second-personal ought, which in particular governs all our communicative acts, be they institutional or non-institutional.

Michael Eigner. *Collective Moral Agency: Robust or Fragile?*

We regularly blame organizations (both public and private) such as ExxonMobil for morally wrongful acts, even though their responsibility remains a disputed factor (Herzog 2018). According to Frank Hindriks (forthcoming), two extreme views on the moral status of such collective agents dominate the philosophical literature in the field of social ontology: necessity and impossibility views. In this paper, I position the notion of collective moral agency (CMA) between those extremes and argue for a conditions approach.

Feelings play an essential role for morality (Velasquez 2003). Collective agents lack this feature and must substitute their function by using members' capacities within the collective. Therefore, CMA is dependent on the interplay of individuals' capacities and the collective structure to allow these capacities to play a role in the decision-making process.

To defend this thesis, I argue that five conditions are sufficient for a collective to become a moral agent. Depending on the internal structure of a collective, this agent can either be a robust or a fragile moral agent. CMA is robust when the moral concern of members plays a consistent and effective role in the decision-making process of an organization, being able to transform collective values without endangering the existence of an organization. It is consistent if it necessarily leads to the collective deliberation of morally relevant features, being brought to the attention by individuals in the decision-making process and being weighed against other reasons relevant to the collective. It is considered effective if moral reasons are not significantly valued less than other reasons (chance of success).

The conditions for CMA deal with the problem of amoral agents (Hindriks 2018) through (1) suitable role occupation. The collective must also (2) feature a sufficient level of collective moral engagement to deal with problems like moral disengagement or compassion fatigue (Ashforth and Schinoff 2016). An (3) adequate deliberation process secures an effective normative perspective. This perspective is essential to (4) transform deliberation outcomes into actions, synthesizing moral and other reasons into a collective moral policy. This policy must in turn (5) sufficiently foster an environment for robust CMA, establishing norms on a meso-level of social life which safeguard a sustainable environment for CMA.

The paper begins by explaining the two extreme views on collective moral agency before I turn to the topic of robustness. In my third section of the paper, I discuss the conditions for CMA, and I end the paper by discussing possible objections and threats to CMA.

Imo-Obong Emah. *Masculinity as Categorical Imposition: An "object-oriented" approach to gendered recognition.*

The discourse pertaining to personal identity and the politics of identity is a quagmire of divergent claims and positions. Part of the problem lies in the fact that the social theory of "categories", whether descriptive or critical, are to some extent creative interventions within identity politics discourse. That is, they continue and extend the categories they are critiquing. One can see this affect within the field of "masculinity" studies, as new theoretical constructs simply lead to the creation of new modalities of masculinity. They do not critique the premise that "masculinity" itself can be straightforwardly identified as a descriptive quality of such and so. Different theorists disagree on how to classify masculinity, but they do not disagree with the claim that "masculinity" is a meaningful category that can be operationalized to make sense of thoughts and experience.

Using findings from an interview study of men in "feminized" healthcare professions, I offer a critique of the taken-for-granted premise that "masculinity" is a categorially intuitable quality. Rather, the term constitutes a placeholder to leverage existing understandings of contextually mutable and socially conveyed ideals which serve to contain and constrain a multiplicity of individual positions. To illustrate this, I bring together object-oriented ontology (OOO) and critical theory into dialogue to argue that the duplicitous nature of reality is ontologically constitutive of categorial impositions. In phenomenal experience, we confuse the real and sensual (subjectively appreciable and interpreted) qualities of a thing. Concerning persons, we conflate our subjective paraphrase of a person's qualities - in this case, a gendered ideal - with their withdrawn real being, and these paraphrases become discursive elements in collective intentionality. This politically leads to ideological interpellation, where we impose categories on other persons as to reproduce the extant social order.

I argue, focusing on "masculinity", that gendered interpellation is ontologically (and ethically) disrespectful. That is, the singularity of human beings (or any singular thing for OOO) is disrespected when it is undermined or overmined by social categories. In effect, when one reductively describes a person as "masculine", they fall prey to the myth of the gendered given. A recognition of this tendency necessitates a critical approach to social ontology that deflates reified categories through a reflexive questioning of categorical imposition practices, and a re-orientation of understandings towards individuals as social "objects".

Gen Eickers. *Scripts, Norms, and Social Appropriateness.*

Every day we engage in social interactions that are based on various norms and criteria of appropriateness (Spaulding, 2018; Haslanger, 2020). When we consider something to be socially inappropriate, we usually mean that there is a mismatch between expected behavior and actual behavior. Accordingly, social appropriateness refers to the social norms that regulate social behavior via their prescriptive power (Bicchieri, 2006; Bicchieri & McNally, 2018; Andrews, 2020). It might be assumed that such norms are applied universally, but that is not the case. Norms can vary, and they can change.

Ideas about what is appropriate are usually not shared by everyone, but only by members of particular groups (Tajfel & Turner, 1986), and they are applied differently to and by different individuals as a function of group membership, roles, social locations, and situations. For example, it is appropriate to raise your hand before speaking in a seminar, but the same behavior would be odd for the instructor of the seminar, and even more surprising at a family meal. In such contexts, hand raising is inappropriate, or "off".

Upon changing our point of view and looking at appropriateness criteria via social identities or members of certain social groups, it is possible for us to consider and critically assess group- and identity-specific appropriateness criteria. We are, then, able to ask specific questions about appropriateness, such as: Is my social behavior – for example, my emotion performance – appropriate for the gender I identify with or rather appropriate for the gender assigned to me at birth? From such a group or identity-specific point of view, it seems evident that there are different notions of social appropriateness depending on which group one belongs to or which social identity one inhabits, and the respective social norms can be contested and negotiated. As norms are challenged, conceptions of what's appropriate can change: group-specific assessments of social appropriateness may extend outside the respective group (while homophobic slurs are considered inappropriate now by a majority of society, they used to only be considered inappropriate by the affected group).

In order to understand how that works, we need a theory about how guidelines about appropriateness of social behaviors manifest in individuals.

Here, I argue that (1) these different notions of social appropriateness are based on often conflicting but simultaneously existing social norms, and that (2) those social norms become manifest in individuals' social behavior through scripts. In order for a social norm to become manifest in an individual as a script, the respective behavior needs to be considered as appropriate in context X. That way, scripts are able to serve as guidelines for social behavior that specify expectations about others' behavior as a function of their identity, situational context, the cultural setting, and respective roles in that context (cf. Schank & Abelson 1977, Bermúdez, 2005). Scripts, I argue, are plastic and combinable structures and, thus, they are also able to account for changing conceptions of appropriateness or appropriateness conditions.

James Ewing. *Ethical Non-Naturalism and Social Non-Naturalism.*

The question of this paper is how to metaphysically ground facts concerning obligation, like [I ought to x]. There are two sorts of obligations that I will be concerned with, the first moral obligation and the second social obligation. To set the metaphysical stage, I adopt the distinction from Gideon Rosen between ethical naturalism and ethical non-naturalism (from Metaphysical Relations in Metaethics). Broadly speaking, ethical naturalism is the view that facts about obligation have to be grounded without remainder in non-normative or descriptive facts. Ethical non-naturalism, conversely, is the view that facts about obligation have to be grounded by non-normative or descriptive facts with remainder, specifically a bridge law that links the normative and non-normative facts.

In the first part of my paper, I develop a picture of ethical non-naturalism wherein facts about moral obligation are grounded by non-normative facts and a moral law. Here is a rough example, if you are a Kantian: [I ought not lie] is grounded by [lying treats people as mere means rather than ends] and [I ought not act in a way that treats people as mere means rather than ends]. I argue that, beyond metaphysical considerations regarding grounding and necessitation, there is a reason to posit the moral law in the grounds of facts about moral obligations because it explains something important (metaphysically) about humanity, for instance how humanity is constituted, what is essential to humanity, what is the real definition of humanity, etc.

In the second part of my paper, I develop a picture of social non-naturalism, wherein facts about social obligation are grounded by non-normative facts and a social law. Although this is a parallel case, it has some important differences. Here is a rough example, if you are a Canadian living in Canada, and it is a Canadian social norm to bring wine to dinner parties: [I ought to bring wine to dinner] is grounded by [bringing wine to dinner is a social practice in Canada] and [Canadians ought to act in accordance with the social practices in Canada]. I argue that, beyond metaphysical considerations regarding grounding and necessitation, there is a reason to posit the social law in the grounds of facts about social obligations because it explains something important (metaphysically) about particular communities, for instance how communities are constituted, what is essential to communities, what might be included in a community's real definition, etc.

In the final section of my paper, I use these pictures to explain something further: why certain obligations – moral obligations – are weightier than or have trumping power over other obligations – like social obligations. I argue that this has to do with the grounds of the obligatory facts. Specifically, I claim that because facts about moral obligation are grounded by a moral law, which is explanatory of our humanity, whereas facts about social obligation are grounded by a social law, which is explanatory of a particular community, moral obligations are weightier than social obligations.

Sebastián Figueroa. *Between conventions and convictions. Recognition and the normative traits of legal systems.*

In recent decades a number of influential legal philosophers have developed a conception of law that explains the existence of legal systems and the meaning of legal obligations on the basis of the idea of convention introduced by David Lewis in his seminal monograph "Convention: A Philosophical Study" (1969). Legal conventionalism suggests that legal systems are established by social conventions, and the most important of these conventions is the one that constitutes the rule of recognition. This specific convention is formed through the activities and interactions of officials and generates criteria for identifying legal norms. Thus, these proposals have opened a door to discuss new ways of thinking about legal normativity using the tools of social ontology (see. Marmor, Andrei. Social Conventions. From Language to Law (2014); Lorena Ramírez & Josep Vilajosana. Legal Conventionalism (2019)).

There are two key features of conventions: arbitrariness and dependence. According to arbitrariness the content of a convention could have been different from what it is without any significant changes. Given the social nature of conventions, there is no a priorí content for legal norms. Moreover, what matters is not how a specific social problem is solved, but that it is solved. As for the dependency condition, in a convention each of the individuals involved does A (a certain action) in S (a recurrent situation) because the others do it. This attitude of individuals is usually presented as a belief about other minds that allows one to predict what will happen and act accordingly. This condition, then, would allow us to understand conventions as a kind of shared agency in which individuals act because of the convention itself rather than because of their convictions.

In this talk, I will advance a critique of legal conventionalism according to which Lewisian conventions cannot adequately account for the normativity of the rule of recognition and the ubiquity of disagreement in law. To do so, I will reconstruct the point of view of a participant of the legal community and show that the dependency condition and arbitrariness of conventions are insufficient to render them good.

The main problem of arbitrariness is the historical and political constitution of legal systems. Legal systems are the product of political struggles and the content of their rules of recognition is not arbitrary. Accordingly, the actions of officials and practitioners are expressions of a commitment to this historical and political background.

Moreover, the condition of dependence is an incomplete way of showing how participants in the practice of law interpret their actions. An important aspect of law is that legal systems shelter the possibility of disagreement. This means that participants act against each other's views on various practical issues. Because of this feature of legal systems, some important social and political changes work through law. Against this background, those who participate in legal practices sometimes consciously act against what others will do and direct their behavior accordingly.

Thus, although legal conventionalism offers relevant insights in defense of legal positivism, it is necessary to understand how law works in a different way. Subsequently, in the second part of the talk, I will propose a view based on notions of second person attitudes and recognition to explain how disagreement and the normative aspect of legal norms work for those who participate in legal interactions.

More specifically, on the one hand, second person attitudes are not merely the expression of some beliefs of another's mind, nor merely a prediction of his or her behavior, but claims directed at the will of the other (see. Darwall, S. "The Second Person Standpoint: Morality, Respect, and Accountability" (2006)). On the other hand, Hegelean theories of recognition show the importance of the struggle between the perspectives of different persons in order to reconstruct the way in which the content of agreements and authoritative decisions is determined (see. Robert Brandom "A Spirit of Trust" (2019); Axel Honneth "The Struggle for Recognition: The Moral Grammar of Social Conflicts" (1992)).

The aforementioned elements help us understand the way law solves practical problems: through authoritative decisions that usually imply that a particular perspective is defeated. Moreover, this way of solving problems simultaneously promoted the possibility of changing the system itself: by proposing (new) ways of solving these problems (in the future).

The proposal highlights the importance of some practical aspects of the position taken for those working in the legal realm. This means abandoning the epistemic view favored by conventionalism and emphasizing the importance of what is expressed in the statements and decisions of practitioners and officials. The lecture will show that the normativity of law is based on a mixture of conventions and beliefs.

Miguel Flament. *Collective obligations as supervenient social properties.*

The distinction between explanatory and ontological individualism is commonplace in the literature on methodological individualism. Roughly speaking, the former is a claim about how to explain away social phenomena in individualistic terms, and the latter is a claim about what are the fundamental entities constituting those social phenomena. The former is a claim about epistemology and the latter, a claim of metaphysics. It is often claimed that ontological individualism is a relatively uncontroversial position, although some exceptions must be noted, and many in the logical-philosophical literature on group agency and group obligations (e.g., Pettit & List, 2006; List, 2019; Hindriks & Tamminga, 2020; Hein et al., 2021) have endorsed it by fiat. The debate is often restricted to affirm or deny the fact that explanatory individualism is false with respect to any class of social properties. One striking feature that most accounts arguing against explanatory individualism have in common is that they assume an epistemology-first type of approach, in which epistemological concepts are taken to be logically prior to ontological ones. I would like to suggest that there are robust reasons to believe that the strategy used is conceptually misguided and will argue in two steps that one should rather re-define the concept of individualism at play in those approaches. More specifically, I would like to use as a base case the logical-philosophical literature on the concept of collective obligation. In the first part of the paper, I will argue that collective obligations are specific social properties which supervene on individualistic obligations in some specific sense, and this seems to vindicate some weak form of ontological individualism. I will then argue that this explains away impressions of "responsibility voids" often alleged in the literature of collective responsibility and agency and show how it accounts for several concrete cases. In the second part of the paper, I will examine different logical theories that have formally invalidated a strong form of explanatory individualism. I will argue there that their criticism works because of such a strong definition but as soon as we drop this definition for some weaker ones, technical problems arise. I will then expand on these remarks by showing how the conjunction of a weaker form of individualism and of the conceptual tools of mereology offers a consistent alternative view and a reasonable defense of explanatory individualism. Overall, my approach can be taken to offer a defense of an ontology-first approach as it takes explanatory individualism to be true insofar as ontological individualism is true.

Jade Fletcher. *Ideology as a higher-order defeater.*

Consider the following belief: 'Women are good caregivers'. On the one hand, this is true. Most caring professions are disproportionately occupied by women, and women are still overwhelmingly responsible for raising children. Many of the skills young women are socialised to have are such that they develop caring and empathic capacities which are well-suited to care-work. On the other hand, the belief also seems false. First, and most obviously, not all women are good caregivers. In addition, and more worryingly, the statement is essentialising. Treating that belief as true appears to endorse the thought that it is an essential fact about the nature of women that they are good caregivers. If a community accepts this essentialising interpretation of the belief, then this may be used to justify an unequal division of social and domestic labour, and entrench spurious norms about gender differences more generally. There is an intimate and metaphysically important connection between these two different interpretations of the belief: the second, essentialising interpretation, creates and sustains the material conditions for the truth of the first, the statistical generalisation interpretation. Thus, taking the distorting second interpretation as true functions to maintain existing power structures, structure social reality, and legitimise women's social and economic subordination. Call such functional distortion of thought and practice 'ideology'.

There are two commitments which motivate this paper. First, social facts are such that they can in some sense be made true by the beliefs and actions of social groups. Second, ideology provides a fruitful theoretical framework for making sense of how our beliefs about the world and our practices have been systematically distorted by unjust distributions of power. This set-up suggests that there are a plurality of beliefs about the social world which are in some sense true, yet distorted. Ideological distortion thus presents a challenge to the method of social metaphysics: how can we arrive at accurate theories about the nature of the social world when our beliefs and practices have been subject to such distortion?

This paper investigates an epistemological challenge in the method of social metaphysics. I identify and articulate a problem for social metaphysicians who wish to take widely held beliefs about social entities to provide evidence for facts about the nature of those entities. I argue that whilst ideological beliefs and related practices do play a role in constructing facts about social entities, such beliefs also significantly distort our understanding of the nature of social entities. I then characterise and motivate how we should think about the data for metaphysical theorising under such conditions of ideological distortion. Roughly, epistemologists make a distinction between first-order evidence, which is evidence that bears directly on some target hypothesis, and higher-order evidence, which is evidence about the status of the first-order evidence. Higher-order defeaters provide evidence that a belief, or system of beliefs, have been formed in a defective manner. I argue that we should understand ideological distortion as a higher-order defeater for our beliefs about the social world.

Daniel Friedman. *Scaling-Up Shared Agency.*

Some things we do together, and some merely alongside one another—or so an important distinction in the philosophy of action holds. Models of shared agency purport to characterize this difference (Bratman, 2014; Gilbert, 1989; Searle, 1990) and they do an excellent job on a small-scale. Our shared agency extends beyond this level of scope, however. Institutions like the WHO are composed of thousands of individuals working together, as are massively distributed collaborations like CERN. Institutions and distributed collaborations are plausibly sites of our acting-together and agents themselves, but in virtue of their size or the attenuated ties between participants, difficult to capture via straightforward application of standard models of shared agency.

Indeed, this challenge of scaling-up has served as an objection to the adequacy of accounts of shared agency. There are a number of ways to respond to this general challenge. The Negative Response takes the challenge as insurmountable, requiring a move to a less committal and involved underlying model of acting-together (Habgood-Coote, 2022; Shapiro, 2014). The Concessive Response views the challenge of scaling-up as requiring some discontinuity between smaller-scale and 'massive' or institutional shared agency (Bratman, 2022). The Ambitious Response by contrast, argues that the challenge can be met head-on.

In this paper, I defend a version of the Ambitious Response. I focus on the way scaling-up challenges a prominent model of shared agency—Michael Bratman's (1992, 2014) model of shared intentional activity (SIA).

I argue that the most promising way forward is by articulating features of organizational design and structural interrelations that legitimate characterizing institutional and massive shared agency as reducible to interconnected instances of small-scale SIA. This requires articulating a notion of social trust—the rational expectation that co-participants will act in ways characteristic of smaller-scaled SIA's. I argue that this trust makes rational the treating of one's co-participants as normal co-participants in smaller-scale SIA, even when one does not know them, and cannot immediately interact with them. The crucial intervention is to articulate the features of organizational design necessary for ensuring such social trust is in place, and thus that the rational connections between interconnected SIA's can amount to a genuine scaling up.

I start in §1 by considering in further detail the challenges posed to extant attempts to 'scale-up.' I focus on worries about alienated participation, insufficient interdependence among participants' mental states, and breakdowns in common knowledge. in §2 I argue that these challenges can be met by instituting signaling mechanisms and incentive structures which communicate behavioral shifts among co-participants and ensure that on-going membership and involvement is a good proxy for thinking an operative intention is shared. In §3 I show that these mechanisms legitimate a social trust among participants, which allows us to reduce massive shared agency to instances of interconnected SIA. I articulate and defend my conception of social trust drawing on resources from social epistemology (Greco, 2021; Hardwig, 1991), social ontology (Ritchie, 2020), and business ethics (Arnold, 2006, 2016). In §4 I explore to what extent these features are found in many extant institutions and massive collaborations. I close in §5 by tying social trust to attributions of corporate moral responsibility.

Max Gab. *The Role Agency Account of Institutional Action.*

Major accounts of institutional group agency invoke the concept of roles to explain the actions of large and complex social groups, i.e. institutions. (e.g., Bratman 2022, Ludwig 2017, Tuomela 2013). I argue that the concept of roles has been underdeveloped by these accounts. They fail to explain just how exactly individuals are able to fulfill the complex functions and meet the often contradictory demands of their roles in uncertain or ambiguous situations. Therefore, I propose an alternative, supplementing role-account of institutional agency. My sociologically informed approach focusses on what I call Role Agency, a form of agency individuals can engage in when acting in institutional group that captures modes of identification with and idealization of institutional roles.

Traditionally, institutional roles are defined in terms of deontic powers, which are the rights, duties and responsibilities that individuals can posses, and which correspond with functions and tasks they need to fulfill. An institutional group's agency then rests on individuals fulfilling these functions and tasks (Ludwig 2017). Roles are further taken to be interrelated, generating a groups structure. They are also thought to be interchangeable, so that any individual can occupy a pre-defined role in an institution. This explains how the identity of a group can persist through a change of membership.

However, the standard view of roles faces the two problems of role-ambivalence and institutional stupor. First, even when the deontic powers of a role are formally established, an individual's functioning within a role can be partially impaired or even made impossible because of insufficient instructions, changing circumstances, or demands for spontaneous decision-making in uncertain situations. Second, phenomena like the „work-to-rule"-strike show that institutions can fail to function properly, i.e., have a breakdown in agency, if, or even because of, all formal aspects of a role are being fulfilled to the letter (Scott 1998).

Exploring what I call „Role Agency", solves this problem of the standard accounts and explains how individuals can act together in institutional contexts. Role Agency describes the ability of an individual to reflexively engage with and act on the role that she is assigned in a group context. To this end, Role Agency describes more than merely exercising one's deontic powers or fulfilling certain tasks or functions. It captures the ways in which individuals understand, interpret and alter their assigned roles and the corresponding tasks. As to the problem of role-ambivalence, theories in the field of social sciences have pointed to the process of role socialization to explain how individuals are able to develop a reflexive self-understanding of, and agential identification with their assigned roles (Dahrendorf 1973, Joas 1985). Regarding institutional stupor, sociological concepts like „useful illegality" or „functional rule-deviance" (Luhmann 1964, Kühl 2022) have prevailed as an explanation of how individuals shield the agency of their assigned roles against the backdrop of institutional rigidity and inflexibility.

Miguel Garcia. *From Group Agency to Institutional Agency.*

Important contributions to contemporary social ontology have focused on both the reality of institutional groups and whether they can perform (or be attributed with the performance of) intentional actions. Most recently, for example, in Shared and Institutional Agency: Toward a Planning Theory of Human Practical Organization (OUP 2022), Michael Bratman introduces a theory of institutional agency, according to which an institutional group (e.g., a non-profit medical supply organisation) can perform an intentional action (e.g., send medical aid to some country) if the relevant participants act on an institutional intention (viz., a decision output that satisfies certain rationality constraints). He takes his approach to be 'sequential' as he thinks that planning agency is the core capacity involved across these forms of human practical organisation: individual temporally extended activity, small-scale social interaction, and large-scale organised institutional action.

However, while it may be true that 'planning agency' is an important feature of individual and shared intentionality, there are good reasons to be suspicious about whether it is crucial for institutional intentionality. To motivate this, I argue that Bratman's theory itself does not appeal to planning agency when elaborating on the construction of institutional agency: it follows from his own characterisation of institutional agency (as being consistent with the absence of any form of collective intentionality) that planning agency (as being expressed in decision outputs) is not of much relevance for understanding the acting of institutional groups. Indeed, when Bratman introduces his notion of 'shared policy' (as an essential building block of institutional agency), he already assumes that there is a socially constructed rule towards which some ('kernel') participants have an acceptance (or 'endorsement') attitude. But if so, then what is relevant for understanding institutional agency is not the planning capacity of individual participants, but their capacity to create social norms – and this is something that requires collective intentional attitudes; in particular, thinking and acting as a group member. So, contra Bratman, I hold that his planning theory of agency (limited as it is to 'modest' cases of sociality) cannot be extended to institutional agency without incorporating a robust sense of togetherness (i.e., a non-reducible notion of group agency).

To show exactly how institutional agency can be constructed out of group attitudes and actions, I present an alternative analysis of institutional reality based, first, on a structuralist account of institutional groups (with internal asymmetric relations and normative powers associated to roles); and, second, on Tuomela's mode account of collective intentionality (which has the resources to explain the various ways in which people, as role holders, can engage in rule-guided activities, viz., from highly alienated to strongly committed participants). If correct, this analysis will suggest that group agency, but not planning agency, is the core element involved in the social construction of institutional agency.

Alex Gillham. *The Metaphysics of Harm and the Socially Just.*

Consider some diversity, equity, and inclusion initiative that prima facie is socially just, e.g., an academic search committee extends a job offer to a candidate who is a person of color over a white male because the search committee is trying to diversify its faculty. Does the search committee harm the white male candidate by doing this? I don't think so, but several popular accounts of harm entail that I am mistaken about this. I have four aims in this paper. First, I argue that several prominent views about the metaphysics of harm (the counterfactual comparative account, lowering well-being account, interest frustration account, etc.) entail that the white male candidate is harmed by the committee trying to diversify its faculty, and more generally that social justice initiatives are harmful to the historically privileged in some cases. For example, the counterfactual comparative account of harm holds that an event harms someone when it makes them worse off than they would have otherwise been, so that if not getting the job offer makes the white male candidate worse off than they otherwise would have been, and I stipulate that it does here for sake of argument, then the white male candidate is harmed by the search committee extending an offer to the candidate who is a person of color because it is trying to diversify its faculty. Second, I argue that an account of the metaphysics of harm having this entailment makes the account at least prima facie unattractive: a socially just initiative that promotes diversity, equity, and inclusion should not be construed as harmful to the historically privileged. Third but similarly, I argue that if an account of the metaphysics of harm does hold that this and other similar social justice initiatives are harmful in at least some cases to white males, then these accounts have problematic entailments when conjoined with commonsense moral principles, e.g., that it's not morally justifiable to harm innocents. Supposing the white, male candidate is innocent (and I consider the objection that they are not insofar as they benefit from racist and sexist power structures), then several prominent accounts of the metaphysics of harm (e.g., the counterfactual comparative), when conjoined with the commonsense principle that it's not morally justifiable to harm innocents, entail that it's morally wrong for a hiring committee to try to diversity its faculty by hiring persons of color over white male candidates. Fourth and finally, I use the implications of my first three arguments as evidence to argue that a new account of the metaphysics of harm is needed, one that does not entail that social justice initiatives are harmful to the historically privileged. So that the prominent accounts of the metaphysics of harm I discuss in this paper will avoid the unattractive entailment I argue they have, I propose to qualify them by adding "unless the otherwise harmful event is socially just."

Cody Gomez. *Essentialism, Folk Genetics, and the Ontology of Race.*

One critical and necessary aim of anti-racist efforts involves combatting, mitigating, or preventing implicit racial bias. Research in cognitive psychology shows that implicit racial bias requires race essentialism, understood as a tendency to under-attribute or overattribute a trait to an arbitrary member of a group based on their perceived membership. Given this normative goal and inherent features of human social cognition in our current "genomic age", I argue that race nominalism is most likely to undermine race essentialism and thus combat implicit racial bias more effectively than constructivist realist alternatives (as represented in Haslanger 2012, 2019; Ásta 2018; Jeffers 2019). I characterize race nominalism as the view that (1) folk race is not real or fails to refer and (2) theorists'/policy makers use of race refers merely to the folk practice of using race labels. So, we should be nominalists about race.

Public messaging that race is not biological, but a social construction, has been impactful – increasing numbers of Americans view folk race as either (a) not real or as (b) exclusively a social construction (Singer et al. 2007; Shulman and Glasgow 2010; Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011; Hochschild and Sen 2018). However, the large majority continue to see race as possessing some biological component (ibid.). In addition, as public consumption of reports on genomics research increases, public understanding of genetics lags far behind researchers claims, and individuals exhibit genetic essentialism or the tendency to infer characteristics and behavior based on someone's perceived genetic make-up (Singer et al. 2007; Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011; Outram et al. 2018). That individuals appear to (1) view race as partly biological, (2) increasingly consume misleading genomics news, and (3) essentialize based on perceived genetics, suggests that social constructivist messaging, given our current information environment, is limited in its capacity to undermine the non-biological nature of race (pace Jeffers 2019). Further, since much of the public discourse around race uses generic generalizations, which are particularly prone to essentializing (Leslie 2017; Leslie and Wodak 2018), realist constructivist messaging likely reinforces the usefulness of a category which becomes naturalized and deployed in ways which undermine our normative aim. Constructivist realism, due to both innate features of social cognition and the particulars of present mass media, exacerbates the conditions responsible for implicit racial bias.

Across different metrics of racism, race anti-realists exhibit more tolerance and less racism than their realist counterparts of any form (biological, social, mixed, etc.) (Shulman and Glasgow 2010). Anti-realism about race, therefore, seems more effective, compared to constructivist realism, in undermining the representations driving implicit racial bias even if it is not a cure. So, race nominalism should be our ontological stance towards race. Further, race nominalism of the kind I argue for is not colorblind for pragmatic reasons: denying the social practice occurs makes policies more likely to fail. The reality of racialization is maintained and deserves close attention (Blum 2010; Glasgow 2019) while the premise of the practice, race, remains fictional.

Wojciech Graboń and Marcin Woźny. *Modeling Social Phenomena: The Case of Jurisprudence.*

The topic of our talk will be the problem of modeling in the legal sciences, which belongs to the broader issue of representing social phenomena. The main aim of the presentation will be to argue in favor of the thesis that an in-depth methodological reflection on the issue of modeling in the context of jurisprudence can contribute to the integration of this field with other social sciences. This is because in many of them the very concept of modeling phenomena and the conditions of using this way of acquiring and communicating knowledge are already a recognized subject of theoretical inquiry.

Scientific models are usually representational models, which means that they represent a particular area of our reality (Frigg and Nguyen 2020). However, they are more than mere representations and fulfill many different functions depending on the area of research and the specifics of the study. Models typically allow researchers to draw inferences, formulate predictions, evaluate potential changes in the represented system or present the results in an intelligible way. Admittedly, they are also a popular heuristic device in jurisprudence.

In the first part of our talk, we would like to focus on analyzing what role models play in the practice of law. Except maybe for the case of structuring judicial reasoning (e.g. Gardner 1980), the concept is usually used intuitively and generally overlooked from a theoretical and methodological point of view, and therefore its field of application is very limited. One of the few works in the philosophy of science analyzing the role of models in this area is that of Nowak (1973) on models and idealization in the interpretation of law. The purpose of this part of the talk will therefore be to systematically present the role of models in the theory and practice of law in the context of this approach and to classify these uses in light of the literature on models in the philosophy of science (e.g. Giere 1988, 2004; Morgan and Morrison 1999; Weisberg 2016).

In the second part of the presentation, we will aim to demonstrate that modeling can provide a general platform for the integration of legal sciences with other areas of the scientific enterprise through achieving methodological coherence, and thereby increasing the prospects for interdisciplinary research. Many contemporary theories of models in the philosophy of science have been developed within the scope of social sciences, in particular economics, and thus there are related areas of scientific activity where this concept has been well researched and in fact constitutes an integral part of the methodology (e.g. Mäki 1994, Cartwright 1999). It is also beginning to be recognized in the context of research in the field of social ontology (e.g. Sarkia 2022). However, philosophers of law often overlook the explanatory and operative value of representational models, referring to less defined concepts without such promising counterparts in other areas of research.

We believe that a better understanding of the possibilities of using modeling of the social phenomena in the field of legal sciences will not only help legal theorists and practitioners, but also researchers in other areas to better understand the specifics of the field.

Katrina Haaksma. *What's Digital Sex Work? The Ontology of Sexualized Labor.*

From the early days of the women's liberation movement to the mainstream choice feminism of the current moment, feminists have been thinking about porn. While early debates were mostly concerned with porn's potential to encourage misogynistic violence, contemporary discussions often describe porn's potential as a celebration of sexual liberation and empowerment. However, there are glaring differences in the nature of pornography today and just ten years ago, let alone thirty, forty, or fifty. The system of production and distribution that anti-porn feminists targeted in the 70s and 80s was radically more centralized than it is today. I offer a Marxist feminist account of these transitions in the porn industry, especially the most recent shift toward a "gig economy" model of porn production. This shift in the nature of porn, I argue, has produced a novel category of sexual labor: "digital sex work."

The differences between digital sex work and other forms of sex work are primarily demarcated not just by modes of production but by the complexities of content ownership that make digital sex work uniquely susceptible to particular kinds of exploitation through stolen content. I argue that the contemporary feminist debate around porn largely misses the mark: the target of such analyses should be the ontology of the labor involved in the production of porn, not its content. Further, I argue that recent transitions in the nature of the porn industry since the proliferation of user-uploaded internet content, especially through gig economy models like OnlyFans, have radically altered the political economy of sex work. This calls for a labor-first analysis and a new system of classification for sexual labor. Drawing from the disparate work of feminist theorists Catherine MacKinnon and Gayle Rubin, I propose a Marxist feminist theoretical model of digital sex work.

Helen Han Wei Luo. *Gendered Material Objects.*

Ordinary material objects can exert oppressive and harmful effects regardless of agential or systemic behavior. Gendered oppression caused by material objects is not only shaped by existing sexist norms and institutions, but in turn reify them by systematically harming women and influencing conceptualizations of gender. In particular, ordinary objects that are not suited for women's bodies reinforce notions of their natural inferiority and justify their social exclusion. Paradigm cases of particularly pernicious gendered material objects include seatbelts tested only on men, prescription medication calibrated for male bodies, and personal protective equipment that do not fit women and pregnant people.These oppressive effects are not reducible to agential or institutional action. For example, consider a woman who is injured in a faultless car crash because her seatbelt was designed to fit male bodies. She does not suffer from another agent's directed harm towards her, nor is she the target of an oppressive institution. Rather, she is a victim of a gendered oppression that is partially traceable to the relevant material object. Removing all the gendered biases of the relevant system that produced the material object (i.e. the seatbelt manufacturing industry) would be insufficient in addressing this harm as there would remain work to be done in removing all the harmfully gendered objects (the ill-fitting seatbelts). Our interactions, private or not, with ordinary objects tie us to a broader social system that operates on axes of oppression.Gendered material objects can also harm women by reinforcing pernicious notions about their ill fittingness to participate in social life. Of particular interest is the effect of conceptualizing women and their bodies as fragile, weak, small, and so on, through features of material design fit for men and their bodies. Mundane examples contribute to this – shelving units are often suitable to average male height, the size of a standard brick fits around a typical man's hand, and bicycles are by default sold with seats designed for male genitals. All these objects, though not obviously gendered in the sense of being coded and marketed as feminine or masculine, nevertheless contribute to women's bodies being conceived as a deviation from normal bodies. This line of argumentation is parallel to the social view of disability, where disability is conceived of as a social construct caused by in part and exacerbated by inaccessible design and architecture (e.g. wheelchair inaccessible buildings). Much as the concept of disability is influenced by material objects that exclude the full participation of disabled people and reify their otherness, so too is the concept of womanhood constructed by material objects that reify their physical differences. This design is often carried through the guise of neutrality, where male biased objects are presented as the natural, normal iterations such that the inclusion of women becomes construed as burdensome on the status quo of material reality. By including gendered material objects in the standard feminist lexicon, the feminist egalitarian project is also able to identify solutions: namely, by improving access to objects that promote gender equality and inclusion.

Emma Hardy. *Desiderata for a Social Ontology of Food.*

Food plays an essential role in the lives and relationships of all humans, and is a distinctly social phenomenon; which edible things are food and what their social significance is is dependent on human social practices. Because of this, we should want to construct a social ontology of food that can guide us in answering questions such as why some edible things food and others not, how fine-grained our food kinds should be, and how we should relate to different food kinds and tokens. Before diving into these first-order questions, however, it is necessary to develop an account of what desiderata should guide our theory choice in answering these questions. In this paper I argue that we should want a philosophy of food to meet two distinct desiderata: it should be both individually sustainable and helpful. For a framework to be individually sustainable, it should be a philosophical view that an individual is able to take on in their day-to-day life. For a framework to be individually sustainable in this way it needs to be 1) compatible with our actual practices and 2) cognitively usable. It should not be a merely descriptive account which reflects our actual practices exactly, but it also should not be incompatible with our existing practices. For a framework to be cognitively usable, it should be such that an individual can imagine the world being structured in such a way, even if they are not convinced of the view. If both of these criteria are met, the framework should be one that an individual is able to see the world through in their daily life. A framework being individually sustainable does not entail that it be helpful; we take on many food frameworks already which are distinctly unhelpful (nutritionism, according to many). However, a framework does need to be individually sustainable if it is to meet the second desideratum—that it be helpful. For a framework to be helpful it should be such that if it is adopted, it leads to positive consequences for the individual and the world at large. That a food framework be helpful is crucial given the impact that food has on domains such as labor rights, the

environment, public health, animal rights, global trade, and many more. This is an argument for a specific brand of pragmatism about constructing a food framework—one which values an individual's pre-existing values, whatever they may be. It assumes that at a fundamental level, all (or at least most) individuals have positive values, even if not identical ones. It is also not unrestricted pragmatism; if a framework is helpful but not individually sustainable, the helpfulness of the framework is not enough to make it a viable candidate framework. A good framework, I argue, must fulfill both desiderata. Finally, I conclude by gesturing at some frameworks that I think might fulfill these desiderata, as well as other domains of social ontology where these particular desiderata might be usefully applied.

Klaudyna Horniczak. *Haslanger's Materiality of Social Systems: a Critical Look at Functional Attempts on Social Change.*

Methodological individualism (MI) was criticized and rejected by Haslanger [2022], as a current in social ontology incapable of explaining many of social kinds, or their constitution. The main flaw of MI comes from it omitting how the material world can influence or even constitute social entities. Specifically, Haslanger claims that many of what there is in the social world, exists not solely because of people's thoughts and human interactions, but because of how the physical world constrains human action. Moreover, regarding social kinds to be dependent only on people ad their minds makes it impossible to engage in social critique. In opposition to MI, Haslanger suggests a material approach that she claims is better equipped to describe, explain, and critique the social world.

Haslanger's approach is based on a claim that not only our minds, but also the material world influence the social, and that for this reason, people may not even be aware of the existence of all the social phenomena. If we want to learn about them and explain them, we must shift our attention to particular systems, such as education system. Explanation of how a given system works is possible by explaining all of his parts. This, according to Haslanger can be achieved by exploring the material limitations of the system and searching for the hidden functions of the systems (i.e., Cummins functions, relative to a given systems [Cummins 2002]) and must be done in the context of the entire system. Inference of the existence of functions within a system allows for identifying social phenomena that have not been intended by members of the society and may have unfair or otherwise harmful outcomes. Because the Cummins functions are relative to a system, their distinguishing is a theoretical decisions performed by experts [Hardcastle 2002], to explain (and not to create) social kinds. This approach is set to explain the social world fully, including the social facts we are yet ignorant of, observe the bad effects of well-intentioned social creations, and allow for critique.

In the paper I intend to argue that Haslanger's material approach to social ontology is not free of flaws and may prove to be counter effective to the pragmatic aims of her project. The tracing of functions relative to the systems and establishing social kinds on their basis is supposed to be performed by experts. The experts themselves can be, however, biased as well, because they themselves don't exist in a vacuum; they are too part of multiple social systems and may be influenced by dominant ideologies. For this reason they may create superfluous social kinds that have no exploratory use, but rather perpetuate the existent unjust social arrangements. On the example of one of such social kinds, autogynephilia, the flaws of Haslanger's account will be discussed. The paper will conclude with two possible solutions to the expert problem: a solution of 'explanatory excess', and a solution based on removing experts from the role of creators of social classifications.

Jack Himelright. *Nominalism Against Capitalism.*

Capitalism is shot through with commitments to abstract entities. It has been the standard for decades now in the United States that all stocks are "book entry" only, meaning no physical medium is produced for the stock. Securities in general do not usually have physical corollaries. Corporations, if they exist at all, are plausibly regarded as abstract particulars of some sort. The same goes for money itself: while there is physical currency, the total amount of dollars circulating in the economy exceeds the printed currency due to fractional reserve banking. There are more dollars registered in bank accounts than physical dollars.

In "Nominalism Against Capitalism," I will make the following argument:

1.   If there are no abstract entities, there are no corporations, stocks, bank accounts, etc.

2.   If there are no corporations, stocks, bank accounts, etc., then capitalism is morally illegitimate.

3.   Therefore, if there are no abstract entities, capitalism is morally illegitimate.

In other words, nominalism undermines capitalism. The points I made in the first paragraph support premise 1. In support of premise 2, I will argue that if claims that are indispensable to some moral framework turn out to be false, then the moral framework is illegitimate.

I will consider two key objections to the argument. Both attempt to undermine premise (2).

The first is that the ontology of capitalism can be paraphrased away in a manner that leaves capitalism intact. The ontology is not indispensable. Saying that a person owns a share in the Coca-Cola Corporation is just a convenient way of saying that person partially owns Coca-Cola Corporation, to degree x (where x = 1/y, where y is the total number of shares in the company). Saying that a corporation exists is just a convenient way of saying that some people are collectively pooling some means of production and hiring workers to use it to produce something. I will argue that the paraphrase strategy is not enough to salvage capitalism, for there are claims that cannot be paraphrased away. An example is corporate speech: it doesn't appear true that the shareholders are collectively saying whatever Coca-Cola Corporation says. And in general, it doesn't appear true that the shareholders are collectively taking whatever actions Coca-Cola Corporation takes (indeed, this separation seems crucial to the justification of limited liability).

The second is that the ontology of capitalism is just a useful fiction, and the justification of society indulging this fiction is that it serves as a means to some greater end. The fiction of capitalism is justified by capitalism's positive consequences on society. Against this, I will argue (a) it's not clear that even a capitalistic society with a robust welfare state leads to the best consequences for society, and (b) the presupposed consequentialism is already questionable on purely ethical grounds: standard forms of consequentialism face well-known, serious objections.

Matthew Hoffman. *Who's Afraid of Adaptive Preference? – Compulsory Heterosexuality and Autochthonous Preference.*

In "Disability and Adaptive Preference," Elizabeth Barnes criticizes models of adaptive preference that overgeneralize, those that categorize as adaptive the preferences of disabled people and discount their testimony about their own lives. However, to do this, she argues that we are warranted in judging a preference to be adaptive only if that preference has been formed because of a "social distortion," or where one's preference has shifted because of extrinsic features. We have warrant for adaptive preference only where those preferences are not intrinsic features an agent would have were social circumstances different. So, on Barnes's account, Stockholm Syndrome is an adaptive preference, but being gay is not, because she thinks it is not formed in relation to other people or social conditions.

This is a bad result. Sexual orientation is not, pace Barnes, something we could know alone on a desert island. It does depend on social relations, both our relations with other people, and our knowledge of and relationship to heteronormative social norms. We need to broaden Barnes's notion of social relation to capture this. Once we do, many preferences will look adaptive, including many deeply felt desires. For example, heterosexuality looks like an adaptive preference, existing as it does in a society in which treats being straight as normal and good. But considering heterosexuality as a desire which depends on social circumstances and pressures should be a familiar idea – it's Adrienne Rich's concept of compulsory heterosexuality.

This conclusion, far from being unwelcome, is exactly what we should want out of an analysis of adaptive preference. I argue that we should not care whether our preferences are what I label autochthonous: preferences that arise from us alone, and which we would still have were all relevant social circumstances different. We cannot know what our preferences would be were the world so radically altered. Moreover, a preference being adaptive in this sense does not mean it is not really one's own. Adaptive preferences are not lies we tell ourselves, or falsely attributed to us. They are merely preferences we have as beings who exist in a social world.

Säde Hormio. *Collective responsibility of national oil companies.*

The structure of an organisation, be that a corporation, a government institution, or other collective agent, affects how the responsibility we attribute to them distributes or does not distribute to individuals. It also affects who are viewed as the main duty-bearers. For example, corporate responsibility debates usually centre around shareholder and stakeholder theories, whereas when it comes to democratic states, there is debate over citizen-exclusive and citizen-inclusive models. But how about when the collective agent is hybrid in a sense that it contains elements from different kinds of collective agents, like in the case of national oil companies, i.e. state-owned fossil fuel producers? I will argue that this question has direct bearing for climate change responsibility.

States are widely perceived as the main actors in tackling climate change. As a global problem, climate change is inextricably linked to the realm of international politics, where states are the core political entities, agents that take – or fail to take – action. In a national oil company (NOC), the government controls the company, usually through special ministers appointed to oversee its operations. Many biggest polluters are either fully or partially state-owned. States can be designated as either citizen-inclusive (i.e. the democratic state acts in the name of its citizens) or citizen-exclusive (i.e. the government understood as including all the elected office-holders and employees in the key branches of government). Parrish (2009) likens the responsibility of citizens of democratic states to that of shareholders; citizens own their state in a certain sense. Pasternak (2021) describes state policies as a product of 'massive collective action', where citizens intentionally participate in their democratic state by willingly orienting themselves around the state's authority. However, the situation is different in non-democratic authoritarian regimes, where such willing orientation is harder to gauge, so responsibility seems not to distribute much wider than to the ruling elite. But what is the responsibility of citizens of democratic states for the impact on the climate through NOCs? More broadly, how should we conceptualise the collective responsibility of NOCs?

Clint Hurshman. *A Taxonomy For Artifact Function Pluralism.*

This paper aims to motivate and structure a pluralist view of artifact functions.

Theories of artifact functions diverge in the role that they assign to designers' intentions (see Preston 2009) and, relatedly, in the kind of property that they take functions to be, viz. whether they depend on ascription or not (van Eck and Weber 2014). Unsurprisingly, they have also used the notion of function to perform a variety of kinds of discursive work, including: describing the phenomenology and social epistemology of artifact use; justifying the use of artifacts for given purposes; explaining the etiology of the forms and uses of artifacts; and explaining malfunction. There is little reason to think that a single account of function in this context will be adequate to perform such varied tasks, giving us some reason to follow Perlman (2009) in accepting a "pragmatic teleo-pluralism" about artifact functions. However, the structure of such a pluralistic view has not been explicitly elaborated: what will the parts of such a pluralism be—and what "functions" will they serve?

This paper aims to contribute to the literature on artifact functions by pulling apart these discursive tasks and comparing how existing theories address them. It takes an ameliorative approach, asking: how does the work that the notion is being used to perform inform the function that should be ascribed to the artifact? Focusing on the tasks of describing the social epistemology of artifact use and explaining the etiology of artifacts, I examine the implications of different accounts for these discursive tasks, depending on whether they are intentionalist or nonintentionalist and whether they treat functions as depending on ascription.

Finally, I argue that another task warrants further attention, namely informing intervention. The way that the function of an artifact is delineated entails prescriptions about how to intervene when artifacts have undesired effects. This "interventionist task" of functions has been acknowledged in the context of biological functions (e.g. Garson 2010), and less explicitly in the context of artifacts by Preston (2009) and Van Eck and Weber (2014). I argue that performing this task adequately requires a non-intentionalist, function-as-property account.

By mapping out a pluralistic picture, this paper aims to facilitate further conversation between accounts often seen as competing.

Andres Hurtado. *Power and management, a perspective from social ontology.*

In The evolution of management thought Wren and Bedeian (2020) point out that Mary Parker Follett, inspired by Hawtome research and Gestalt theory, challenges a strong belief about social structure and the group-individual relation: the idea that the individual thinks, feels, and acts independently. Follett proposes the "Group Principle" that is based on the idea in which groups and individuals simultaneously exist in reality, the individual potential is released through group activity, and individual interests might be harmonized and performed from the collective dimension (p. 253).

Follett recognized that her cooperative model needs a different power conception from the "power over"; i.e, a conception that is not featured by the construction and relationship maintenance of domination between managers and employees. Follett, in contrast, proposes the concept of "power with". Those orders are derived from the situational context, that is, from specific requirements in every situation through which the team is found in a determined moment in time. The "power with" fosters integration and furthers better inter-personal relationships within the company as it builds and boosts an environment where the main objective is that the team-work, as a whole, can overcome obstacles and challenges that the company might face.

Follett's ideas are more relevant than ever before due to the increasing complexity, diversity of knowledge disciplines, and functions that are built within organizations as well as requirements of social dynamic in which are unfolded. In that context, management teams require mechanisms that allow them to control, and keep the group-unity to manage the organization.

Within social research tradition, the debate on power's problem is back on the theoretical conversation just at the end of 1950's (two decades after Follett's work). Chronically, some of the most representative advancements are found at the end of the 50's and during the 60's in Robert Dahl's ideas; between the 60's and 70's in Peter Bachrach's and Morton Baratz's ideas; and finally, between 70's and 80's in Steven Lukes'ideas. They would be recognized as the "the three faces" theorists. Later in 2004, Clarrisa Rile's contribution appears, and provides a renewed vision of the same problem's treatment.

Generally, the theories about power concept make emphasis in how it is expressed rather than its nature, and project power as an available instrument for certain people to submit others. In this lecture, I will argue that the conceptualization line is neither sufficient to explain the integrated view that managers need, nor to contribute to its development whatsoever. In contrast, it will be argued that the proposed conceptualization, from Searle´s and Kirk Ludwig´s social ontology theories, does not only acknowledge the power as a social phenomenon linked ontologically with the institutions, but also it allows for moving forward in the empirical application of the Mary Parker Follett's integrated vision.

Improving the comprehension about the power concept in general and its specific application in the workplace ought to foster more reflections, and with them, to present better-new ways of exercising power within organizations.

Onni Hirvonen. *Social ontology of private property: Hegel's folly.*

In this talk I discuss Hegel's interesting two-dimensional account of the ontology of private property. The main argument is that both dimensions – labor and collective acceptance – that Hegel identifies are important for an ontology of property, but at the same time Hegel's approach is flawed and his metaphysics of property should be turned around.

How can a person justify that a certain object in the world belongs to her? Private property is one of the central institutions of contemporary world, and in the contemporary thinking there are two prevalent views about property and its acquisition. The first spells out the assumed link between labor and property. As most-famously formulated by John Locke in his Second Treatise of Government (1690), according to this idea, property is acquired through working or exerting one's will upon external nature. This is an idea that is still very much alive in the ideas of merits and deserts. However, the "labor theory of property" has been criticized for overlooking the social elements of the constitution of property. Indeed, the second view of private property, expressed for example in Immanuel Kant's The Metaphysics of Morals (1797), ownership is a legal relation or a right. In more contemporary discussions this idea has been extended beyond legal sphere to state that, for something to be considered as property, it needs to be collectively accepted or publicly recognized as such.

Interestingly, Hegel combines these two seemingly contradicting views of his predecessors in Philosophy of Right (1820). On the one hand, property is created through putting one's will into things: making them determined by the will. This, for Hegel, is the absolute right of appropriation that human beings have over things (PR, §44). However, in a civil society property gets a new form as a contract between persons and as a protected right, whereas the original immediate modes of property acquisition are "abandoned in civil society, and occur only as individual accidents or limited moments" (PR, §217).

In this talk I argue that Hegel has identified a fruitful approach in his attempt to combine the Lockean and the Kantian intuitions about private property. Although contemporary thinkers commonly see property as legally and/or socially constructed, labor, effort, and merit still play a large role in the practical normative justifications of property ownership and its distribution. The main argument is that Hegel catches something important in his combination of the two intuitions about the nature of private property but, relying metaphysically on the labor theory of property, his account is nonetheless fundamentally flawed. Instead of relying on labor theory, we should turn Hegel on his head. However, even if we accept that the metaphysical basis of property resides ultimately in contracts and social acceptance, it is still important to acknowledge the role of work and public recognition of contributions: they are interwoven to our understanding of private property in a way that makes property essentially political.

Tracy Isaacs. *Imperfect Veganism as an Individual, Social, and Socially Responsible Ethical Practice.*

vegan /ˈviːɡən/ n. A person who abstains from all food of animal origin and avoids the use of animal products in other forms. (Oxford English Dictionary)

Veganism has long been regarded as an extreme approach to lifestyle and eating, even by those who think the arguments concerning the environment and animal suffering in industrial farming are compelling. Many vegetarians are especially troubled, knowing that their ethical reasons for being a vegetarian easily extend to the production environment for dairy and eggs. I offer a different approach whereby ethical eating is taken up as a practice that has individual, social, and socially responsible dimensions. This approach takes seriously the well-known fact that human beings are imperfect.

In my paper I develop and defend three claims:

1. A moderate and more accessible approach to veganism is possible, and it is distinct from vegetarianism because it is guided by vegan principles that seek to exclude the use of animal products for ethical reasons. I call this "Imperfect Veganism."

2. We should understand the pursuit of imperfect veganism as a practice more than as a theory.

3. As a practice it has individual, social, and socially responsible elements.

To develop the first claim, the main strategy is to carve out a legitimate position that falls short of vegan perfection but remains vegan in its underlying principles, goals, and aims. I argue that an imperfect vegan is still a vegan. And vegans remain distinct from vegetarians since, presumably, vegetarians consistently pursue a different principled course of action, considering some animal products to be well within the range of morally defensible choices.

To develop and defend the second claim, I maintain that as a practice, we can think of ethical eating as something that is regularly or usually done (Cambridge Dictionary). This is a familiar idea when it comes to many dimensions of our life. People practice yoga, meditation, sports, the piano, and any number of other activities that they might incorporate into their daily lives. When we embrace something as a practice, we understand that it is something we will get better and better at. And yet we also understand that we are not going to become perfect exemplars of whatever it is we are pursuing. So, I argue, we should understand "imperfect vegans" not as a special class of vegans, but as vegans who are involved in an ethical practice.

The third claim establishes that, though I urge us to understand imperfect veganism as a practice, it is not just an individual habit or routine for the sake of "moral purity" or "clean hands." Eating itself is an enormously socially embedded activity, loaded with cultural meaning, woven into the very fabric of our social lives. While eating itself is a social practice, ethical eating is that and more: it is a socially responsible practice that makes important contributions to a significant collective effort, namely, large-scale agricultural reform.

Daniel James. Partial Racialisation

In 2022, Whoopi Goldberg, the famous actor and co-host of the US-American TV show The View', stirred public controversy. During the discussion of a Tennessee school district's decision to ban the graphic novel Maus, she stated that the Holocaust (the horrors of which Maus depicts) "isn't about race". Instead, it is merely about "man's inhumanity to man" insofar as it involved "two White groups of people." On the other side of the Atlantic, commentators expressed dismay over what they considered a parochial US-American view of race. For instance, in the Swiss online humanities magazine Geschichte der Gegenwart, historians Hans-Christian Petersen and Jannis Panagiotidis concede that "for the US debate, from which the focus on the category 'whiteness' emerges, the legacy of the 'colour line' is undoubtedly constitutive". However, they contend that "such a dichotomous understanding is insufficient for understanding German racism" (Petersen & Panagiotidis 2022, my translation – cf. Du Bois 1952; Ludwig 2019: 2735). To account for varieties of racism that – like anti-Semitism or anti-Slavism – are particularly salient in the European context, some theorists of race (both in philosophy and social science appeal to the idea that whiteness comes in degrees (see Mills 1998: 79 f.; Moraşanu, Szilassy & Fox 2012; Safuta 2018; Schraub 2019; Kalmar 2022, 2023; Lewicki 2023).

But how do we understand that idea? To spell out this insight, I will proceed from an idea popularised by philosopher Lawrence Blum (2002, 2010): the idea of partial racialisation. Building on Blum's idea, Adam Hochman (2017, 2019) claims, moreover, that such partial racialisation can also occur covertly, as in the case of religious or ethnic groups such as Jews or Muslims. However, if we seek to apply this idea to the phenomena mentioned above, two shortcomings become apparent. For one thing, although both authors highlight that such partial racialisation is best understood as a (socio-historical) process, neither elaborates how such processes must be constituted such that they can come about (as opposed to merely going on) to a greater or lesser degree. For another, with regard to the covert racialisation of ethnic or religious groups, neither elaborates how processes of racialisation interact with the formation of such groups.

To address the first shortcoming, I will draw on recent theories of processes in metaphysics and philosophy of science (e.g., Seibt 2004a+b, 2009, 2018; Nicholson & Dupré 2018) to outline an account of racialisation as a process of development that can be accomplished to a greater or lesser degree. To address the second shortcoming, I will identify that accomplishment with full racialisation, which I will characterise in terms of racialism: the view that races are distinguished in terms of bio-behavioural essences (Appiah 1990). I will then suggest that we can characterise varieties of partial racialisation, such as culturalism concerning Muslims, in terms of different elements of racialism – in this case: (cultural, as opposed to biological) essentialism. I will illustrate both aspects of the account hereby outlined by way of what Aleksandra Lewicki (2023) has called "the ambiguous racialisation of 'Eastern Europeans'".

Marija Jankovic and Kirk Ludwig. *Three Tiers of Collective Belief and Their Significance.*

We will use 'collective belief' as an umbrella term for any of the things we ordinarily have in mind in an ascription of belief whose subject term is, in surface form, a group, and whose main verb implies belief. Examples are:

1. The American electorate believes that voting matters.

2. The stock market believes the US Federal Reserve is going to need a bigger number of rate hikes to try to slow demand and control inflation.

3. One of the most cited examples of the Wisdom of Crowds is a group's collective ability to accurately guess the number of jelly beans in a jar.

4. Cultural feminists believe that a woman's perspective should receive more credence.

5. Conservatives believe that abortion should be illegal.

6. Our family does not consider calling someone 'stupid' acceptable.

7. Racial minorities believe that law enforcement officers engage in racial profiling.

8. The jury realized the defendant was lying.

9. Tesla believes its real competitors are not electric vehicle makers but cars powered by internal combustion engines.

10. China thinks its time has come.

We will argue that these ascriptions fall roughly into three tiers. Two of these tiers correspond to what Christian List ("Three Kinds of Collective Attitude" 2014) called aggregative and corporate belief (though our understanding of the corporate category will diverge from List's). List's middle tier includes, however, only common (i.e., public) belief. But not all of our examples fall neatly into the categories of aggregative, common, and corporate belief. 1-4 are aggregative. (Aggregative beliefs are attributed on the basis of an aggregation rule applied to relevant beliefs of the members of the group. We distinguish summative and composite aggregation rules. Summative beliefs are attributed on the basis of some majoritarian rule (e.g., all/most/more than half). 1 and 2 are summative. Composite aggregation rules are functions from attitudes to a collective attribution which are non-summative. In 3, the aggregation rule takes the average of the guesses of members of the group.) 8 plausibly expresses common belief. 9 and 10 are corporate. However, while 4-7 plausibly entail distributions of attitudes over members of the group, their significance is not exhausted by this, and it is not clear that they all entail common belief. The goal of this paper is threefold. The first goal is to clarify middle tier collective beliefs, which we will call 'group beliefs'. We will argue that middle tier or group beliefs are summative + X for some X, where what goes in for X is one or another binding relation among members of the group that positions them for collective action with respect to shared or common interests. The second goal is to assess the significance of each tier of collective belief for our understanding of collective and institutional action and to defend their utility. The third goal is to explore the relation of the structure of three tiers of collective belief to attributions of other collective attitudes.

Ben Jenkins. *The Role of Individual Cognition in Ontological Wrongs.*

Sometimes the nature of a social property can give rise to distinctly ontological wrongs (cf. Jenkins, 2020; Dembroff, 2018). In this talk I outline two ways in which this can happen before arguing that one role taken by individual cognition in both cases is that of a bias. I'll close by discussing the practical benefits presented by this argument, namely that that my conclusion allows us to identify options for and obstacles to combatting ontological wrongs.

Take the example of 'being obese'. When someone comes to exhibit this social property, part of what this change consists in is an alteration to the enablements and constraints placed upon that person. One type of ontological wrong – ontic injustice (Jenkins, 2020) – occurs when these enablements and constraints are wrongful for those that exhibit the constituted social property. Consider the context of a hospital or culture in which members of this social category are not taken seriously for the purpose of medical diagnoses. This constraint is wrongful, and so in this context 'being obese' would be a site of ontic injustice.

Ontological oppression is another type of ontological wrong (Dembroff, 2018); it occurs when the criteria for exhibiting a social property (or the lack of criteria in some cases) are wrongful. For instance, if the criteria for 'being obese' reflected harmful beauty standards rather than medically relevant parameters, then this social category would be a site of ontological oppression.

In order to identify options for combatting ontological wrongs we need to know more about the means by which social properties are constructed. Brännmark (2019) and Ásta (2018) have both argued that the actions and attitudes of individuals construct social properties. It is significant that the relevant actions and attitudes need not be beliefs endorsing the ontological arrangements, or intentional actions to enforce the relevant constraints, enablements or criteria. Rather, the nature of a social property can also be determined by the accrual of millions of micro actions and subtle (perhaps implicit) attitudes. Despite these insights, options for combatting ontological wrongs have remained unclear and largely untheorized.

Here I advance efforts to combat ontological wrongs by identifying the role played by bias in constructing social properties. Johnson (2020) describes bias in functional terms, with social category attributions being input and predictions about the target being output. This might mean that a target is first attributed 'being obese' as a social property and then, through the mechanism of the bias, attributed 'unreliable testifier'. I argue that, so understood, biases play a significant role in producing the actions and attitudes which determine the constitution of social properties.

Applying this argument to cases of ontological oppression requires an amendment to Johnson's definition. Namely, that bias' function be seen as bi-directional – biases sometimes outputting attributions of social properties, and utilising other properties that the target has been attributed as inputs. Having motivated this amendment, I draw two lessons for combatting both varieties of ontological wrong from the experimental psychology literature on bias (cf. Chang et al., 2022; Madva, 2020).

Diane Jeske. *Friendship, Plural Selves, and Shared Good.*

Friendship has been part of our shared social ontology since Aristotle, in the Nichomachean Ethics, famously described a friend as an 'other self.' In the rebirth of philosophical interest in the topic of friendship in the past several decades, some philosophers have attempted to offer novel understandings of what it is for a friend to be an other self by drawing on new metaphysical tools. Some, most notably David Brink and Jennifer Whiting, have drawn upon the psychological reductionist conception of personal identity through time in order to offer new ways of understanding the connection between self-interest and concern for friends. Others such as Bennett Helm have drawn upon the work of Margaret Gilbert and others on joint agency in order to understand friends as constituting plural agents with 'shared deliberative perspectives.'

In this paper I show that these novel attempts to understand friendship fail in so far as (i) their ontological presuppositions are both unnecessary and misleading in that they deviate too far from our ordinary, lived understanding of at least the vast majority of our friendships, and (ii) attempts to unify friends as plural agents have unpalatable normative presuppositions and implications. I argue that in attempting to give friendship both its appropriate moral and rational significance, these philosophers have tried to force it into the cultural trope of the type of relationship that underlies a good marriage: the notion of union or of two people coming to form one is familiar from both non-philosophical and philosophical understandings of romantic and/or conjugal love. But in being guided in both their ontological and normative projects by the cultural presupposition that somehow, the closer friendship is to marriage (and that the ideal friendship is that between spouses or romantic partners), the better it is as friendship, these philosophers erase the great diversity that friendship as a relationship can exhibit. In some friendships the distinctness and independence of the friends contributes to its meaning and value. We ought not to conflate a deep concern and commitment to another person with a shared good or a shared deliberative perspective. In fact, the great achievement of some friendships is that the friends are able to recognize and respect each other's distinct interests and perspectives on even their shared projects. In fact, I will argue, perhaps surprisingly, that preserving a genuine sense of unity between friends requires continuing to appropriately accommodate their distinctness.

Alana Jolly. *The Role of Agency in Undermining Injustice: Reclaiming Our Identities in Pursuit of Fulfilling Our Collective Responsibility.*

Much of recent discourse on issues of injustice within social and political philosophy accept the claim that structural injustice is a serious threat to the pursuit of social equity. The more complex the systems and institutions that organize our societies are, the more nuanced and collaborative our approach to rectifying these injustices must be. This is thanks to the fact that injustice produced by structures are a result of collective participation within these systems. As such, many philosophers argue that varying approaches to correcting these structural pitfalls must rely on collective action as well. This action, however, must be informed by an understanding of how this type of injustice operates, and how each of our identities are treated by the systems that produce it.

Kimberlé Crenshaw's theory of intersectionality highlights how intersecting aspects of our identities influence our relative advantage or disadvantage by different systems. It was initially developed to highlight the nuanced reality of black women but can fruitfully be extended to demonstrate how injustice operates along the lines of identity markers that, together, compose the whole of an individual's identity. The goal of this paper is to examine how these same identity markers that are a source of discrimination by different systems can also be a source of productive collective action to undermine injustice. To achieve this aim, it builds on the work of Iris Marion Young, particularly her final work Responsibility for Justice.

Unlike most models of responsibility, Young's social connection model insists that everyone who participates within systems that produce injustice hold some measure of responsibility for remediating the resulting harms, including actors who suffer these harms. I propose that centering the experience of identities that incur harm from these systems produces a valuable resource for collective action. The aim of this research is to demonstrate the role of harmed identities in undermining the structures that produce their experience(s) of harm. This role is part of the broader collective project Young encourages us to undertake together, in response to our shared responsibility. By respecting agency in this way, the social connection model provides an approach that originates from the experience of harm itself. In addition, this process allows for a reclamation of power by these identities; power that structural injustice has attempted to strip away. Ultimately, this project aims to defend the claim that while identity is certainly the source of discrimination, it can also be the spark that ignites a reclamation of power that structural injustice has attempted to dominate and constrict.

Colton Karpman. *Conceptual Ignorance and Social Enlightenment: a Critique of Fricker's Hermeneutical Injustice.*

We owe the concept of 'epistemic injustice' to Miranda Fricker (2007), who uses it to refer to injustices that wrong a person qua knower. Fricker identifies two types of epistemic injustice: testimonial injustice and hermeneutical injustice. This paper concerns the latter type. Hermeneutical injustice occurs when "when a gap in collective interpretive resources puts someone at an unfair advantage when it comes to making sense of their social experience." (2007: 1) The general idea here is, in virtue of lacking access to the practices via which social meanings are produced, marginalized peoples are forced to work with tools too crude, too blunt, and too coarse-grained to allow for understanding and communication of their social experiences. For example, Fricker cites the case of a woman subjected to (what we would today call) 'sexual harassment' at the hands of a superior in the workplace. Lacking the concept of 'sexual harassment', the woman suffers due to the inability to articulate and understand the harms inflicted upon her, and this inability results from uneven access to the means of hermeneutical production.

This paper challenges an assumption that undergirds Fricker's account of hermeneutical injustice: that awareness of the social categories and concepts under which one and one's experience fall is a necessary condition on self-knowledge and understanding one's social experience. I argue that one can understand one's social identity and social experience without having the conceptual tools to articulate that identity or experience, and that, in some cases, additional conceptual resources can hinder one's understanding. This is not to discount the value of conceptual genesis: it serves an indispensable practical and political purpose. However, that purpose isn't distinctly epistemic.

Pelin Kasar. *Social Construction as Grounding: Demarcating the Covert Cases.*

The notion of social construction is central to many debates in feminist philosophy, the philosophy of race, and social ontology; yet it is still not very clear what should we understand when we say something is socially constructed. A lot of things are said to be socially constructed: money, borders, corporates, nations, gender, race, etc. As Hacking puts it, the metaphor of social construction has 'become tired' (Hacking 1999, p.35). In social ontology, there are several attempts to clarify the metaphysics behind the notion. I think the grounding framework does well in giving an analysis of the notion of social construction. However, it confronts at least one big problem: according to the simple-ground theoretic analyses of social construction, all cases grounded in the social are social constructions, even mathematical sets, and artifacts. There is no doubt that those are not social constructions, but what about borders, corporates, and nations? Many social ontologists accept them as paradigmatic examples of social construction and build their theories to include them. However, I am skeptical about this move. I think that they miss the point of social constructionist claims: to show that some kind we ordinarily take to be natural is, in fact, social (Haslanger 2003). For instance, when the social constructionist claims "Motherhood is socially constructed", the aim is to show that kind motherhood is not fixed and inevitable, as it is commonly supposed, but the product of historical events, social forces, and ideology. This is called the debunking project, and those cases in which a social kind is taken to be inevitable, such as gender and race, can be called covert constructions. I argue that the notion of social construction cannot be fully analyzed without taking into account the aim of the debunking project. We need a framework through which we can distinguish covert cases of social construction from other cases grounded in the social. There are two steps that need to be taken: (1) understanding social construction in terms of grounding relation, and then (2) distinguishing important/covert cases of social construction from other cases. In this way, we can integrate the notion of social construction into a more general metaphysics without forgetting the aim of social constructionist claims.

Laszlo Koszeghy. *On a New Form of Social Power: Algorithmic Modulation.*

The field of analytic social ontology often unduly neglects theorizing the notion of social power. As noted most famously by Åsa Burman (2007, 2015, 2023), this may be explained by a consensus-based and cooperative view of society assumed by several prominent social ontologists (e.g. Searle 1995, Tuomela 2002). Moreover, whenever social power is in fact in the focus of analysis, as Burman points out, the cooperative model leads theorists to focus mainly on deontic social power. These criticisms, then, led beyond the analysis of transparent deontic social power, to the enrichment of the field with notions of social power which, while being dependent on collective intentionality in some sense, capture non-codified and implicit forms of "normative reasons" and opaque forms of structural power which members of a society may be unaware of (Burman, 2007, 2023, Haslanger 2012, Searle 2010).

This contribution aims to further Burman's project of focusing on conflict and contestation in the ontological analysis of society by introducing a new kind of social power, made possible by the recent technological advancements in large-scale data collection and computerized classificatory methods. In the past decades, there has been a radical development in the digital means available for both government institutions and private companies which has enabled them track people's behaviour at an unprecedented scale and depth, to store this information and process it computationally into dynamic, correlation-based categories used for various predictive purposes (e.g., insurance and credit scores, advertising, recommendations, or search results). I will call the power created by such technologies Modulatory Algorithmic Power (MAP).

Using the conceptual toolkit of analytic social ontology and inspired by Foucault's (1994) and Deleuze's (1992) investigations of social power, I will show that MAP satisfies the criteria for being a form of social power as put forth by Searle (2010, 147) and Burman (2007, 154), being an ability of an agent to intentionally get their subject to do what they want them to do. At the same time, and this is main point of my talk, MAP differs from every form of social power hitherto examined in the analytic tradition of social ontology in two important ways. First, through an analysis of various forms of mind-dependence, I will show that, unlike all other forms of social power, MAP, while being-mind-dependent in some sense, is not dependent on collective intentionality. Second, while other forms of social power exert their influence by imposing "conformity" or "constraint" through an essentialist conception of social categories, e.g. through sharp boundaries, immutable membership, and relative stability over time, an analysis of MAP allows us to conceive of the power of social classifications even if driven by a system of anti-essentialist ideals such as graded boundaries, dynamically alterable membership, and malleability or non-stability.

Minna-Kerttu Kekki. *Edith Stein on the state: A community independent of other communities.*

This is a historical review of an often ignored, yet truly interesting and original, mid-war social philosopher Edith Stein. In this paper, I present her main lines of thought concerning the constitution of the state as special kind of a community. For Stein, our social experiences of groups can be divided in three main categories: mass, community, and society. Stein uses these categories to investigate how different social groups, collectives, or institutions are constituted and exist in relation to other groups, institutions, or collectives. For her, a community is a collective, an institution or a group that exists for the sake of itself, not as an instrument for achieving something else. She argues that states must be communities, because to be sovereign—that is, independent of other states or institutions—they must act and make decisions based on their own will. This means that a state also cannot be a means to accomplish the aims of a nation. Rather, for Stein, a state must act and exist independently of any nation, be it an ethnic majority or a minority.

I argue that despite having published her works 100 years ago, Stein's work sheds light to the philosophical problems concerning the national state and the state as an agent. While her analysis is philosophically not fully unproblematic, it provides insight of the contemporary problematics concerning these topics and the position of ethnic minorities. Unlike many of her contemporaries, Stein spotted the inherent contradiction in identifying the state and the nation; while they are two wholly different kinds of communities, identifying a state with a nation also risks the equal position of ethnic minorities. Even if we did not agree with all her conclusions today, her analysis provides us original conceptual and argumentative means to study our contemporary (mostly European) societies.

Investigating the works of Stein also functions as work for recognition within academia. During her lifetime, she was first refused the right to do research in the Weimar Republic as a Jew and a woman, and after having died in Auschwitz during the II World War, her work has been mostly discarded as uninteresting or simply a study or a commentary of her doctoral supervisor and colleague Edmund Husserl's work. As Antonio Calcagno has argued, the ignorance of her work is, frankly speaking, sexist. As my paper demonstrates, investigating Stein's social ontology has many advantages for both contemporary social philosophical research and the understanding of the history of the 20th century philosophy.

David Killoren and Robert Streiffer. *Relationships, Obligations, and Groups: A Total Relationalist View.*

The ambitious aspiration of total relationalism is to use relationships (in the folk sense of 'relationship'—as in the relationship of parent to child, of neighbor to neighbor, of colleague to colleague, etc.) to account for all directed moral obligations. In this paper, we present and defend a total relationalist view.

Our theory contains an account of the emergence of relationships from groups, and an account of the emergence of directed moral obligations from interactions between relationships and reasons.

A group structure is our term for a property that enables the emergence of relationships among group members. In the paper we use paradigm examples of relationship-enabling groups such as families, teams, and nations to propose a series of negative and positive claims about group structure. We argue that group structures are partially but not fully under group members' control: voluntary arrangements among members can alter a group's structure, but some such arrangements fail to realize an intended structure.

We argue that any two individuals are in a relationship if and only if and because there is some structured group such that both individuals both have places in that group. Further, we argue that directed moral obligations emerge from an interaction between relationships, on the one hand, and relationship-independent moral reasons provided by others' interests, on the other. Specifically, we argue that for any two individuals X and Y, X has a directed moral obligation to Y to φ if and only if and because (i) Y's interests provide X with a moral reason to φ, (ii) X has a relationship with Y, and (iii) that relationship converts X's reason to φ into a moral obligation to φ.

After developing and motivating a total relationalist theory with these components, we argue that this theory is superior to three alternative views: (1) a view according to which the function of relationships is not to give rise to moral obligations in interaction with relationship-independent reasons, as we maintain, but rather to affect or enable reasons themselves in some way (Cullity 2013, 2018; Keller 2013); (2) a view according to which the obligations of group members are tightly linked to obligations possessed by the group (Collins 2019); and (3) a view suggested by care ethicists and moral sentimentalists according to which relationships between individuals are not ontologically tethered to group structures, as we maintain, but are instead forged by direct bonds (e.g., emotional connections) between individuals.

After arguing that our theory is superior to those three alternatives, we argue that our theory has three advantages. First, our theory plausibly explains the unity and neatly accommodates the diversity of relationships, i.e., it reveals what all relationships have in common while also allowing a multifarious range of connections between individuals to count as relationships. Second, the theory is intuitive, i.e., it aligns with much of what ordinary people believe about their moral obligations and about the moral significance of relationships. Third, the theory has critical resources, i.e., it plausibly identifies errors in certain commonplace moral opinions.

Hochan Kim. *Complexity and the Limits of Structural Injustice Theory.*

Structural injustice refers to the ways in which social structures constrain social groups in ways that generate significant harms or unjustifiable inequalities for their members. A political theory of structural injustice must satisfy two goals: (1) the diagnostic goal, and (2) the action-guiding goal. The diagnostic goal requires structural injustice theorists to engage in sociological analysis, an analysis of how social structures operate such that they leave agents vulnerable to harms and/or subordinate them to others. The action-guiding goal requires structural injustice theorists to offer practical guidance to moral agents seeking to remedy existing structural injustices, which means identifying effective sites of intervention where agents can act together to change the social structures that produce social injustice.

I argue that structural injustice theory confronts a classic and significant problem of sociological analysis, namely the structure-agency problem. The problem manifests as a dilemma. As it turns out, it is surprisingly difficult to do sociological analysis that jointly satisfies the diagnostic and the action-guiding goals, a difficulty that is increasingly apparent in the recent literature on structural injustice. There, we see that the analysis that provides the most comprehensive diagnosis of the social structures that produce injustice, namely that they are parts of broader social systems, fails to generate an actionable remedy (Horn One); meanwhile, the analysis that is the most action-guiding, namely that these social structures are reproduced by and thus dependent on the social practices of ordinary agents, fails to apprehend the more complex causes and mechanisms of structural injustice (Horn Two). These failures, I suggest, reflect deeper problems in the ontological assumptions behind the respective social theories that ground these analyses, namely systems theory and practice theory.

I argue that addressing this dilemma requires structural injustice theorists to take a different approach to the sociological analysis of structural injustice, or equivalently, to how they use social theory. Structural injustice theory can avoid the dilemma of choosing between its diagnostic and action-guiding goals by abandoning its grand theoretic ambitions and adopting instead what I call middle-range problem-solving, an approach that I argue is usefully exemplified by recent work from Elizabeth Anderson and, on the sociology side, Charles Tilly. This approach curtails some of the ambitions of structural injustice theory, but it also enables structural injustice theory to avoid the worst of the dilemma, allowing for sociological analysis of particular structural injustices that is both diagnostic and action-guiding.

Eve Kitsik. *Conceptual inflation and the ethics of attention.*

"Conceptual inflation" (or "concept creep", following Haslam 2016) means problematic expansion of normatively loaded concepts, such as 'harm', 'human rights', 'bullying', 'racism', 'sexism', 'addiction', and 'sexual harassment'. It is currently unclear what exactly the problem with conceptual inflation is supposed to be and whether there is a problem at all. I will propose a new way of rationally reconstructing the underlying disagreement between the proponents and opponents of such conceptual expansion. I suggest that the disagreement centrally concerns the ethics of attention: what deserves attention, how much of it, and what kind of attention. Terms like those listed above are particularly apt for guiding attention to the phenomena they cover. The disagreement is ultimately about whether the phenomena at the debated borders of the term's extension deserve the attention afforded by the term (possibly at the expense of attention to the central phenomena denoted by the term).

A currently prevalent idea is that the trend of conceptual expansion threatens our ability to think and communicate effectively about the narrower phenomena that were previously picked out by the terms. Liao and Hansen (2022) criticize that currently prevalent idea by pointing out, for example, that we can add modifiers like "very" and "extremely" to terms like "sexist" and "racist", to capture the narrower phenomena. However, there is a different way of construing the concern. The terms in question are easily activated in our minds and they have a way of putting us on the alert, of signalling the importance of the matter; they also have a central place in our collective practices. This makes these terms well placed to guide our attention. One might worry, then, that when the meanings of these terms expand, we become less focused on the phenomena of most concern. So, the worry is not that we cannot speak or think at all about the most central human rights or the worst cases of sexism; the worry is rather that our attention is no longer naturally guided to those phenomena by our concepts and linguistic practices.

While I thus provide a way of making better sense of the worries about conceptual inflation, I do not necessarily side with those worries: redistributing attention by concept expansion can be highly desirable. For example, one may justify purposefully extending the notion of sexual harassment to street harassment, to facilitate attention to street harassment. My aim is not to resolve these debates, but to clarify them: we need better understanding of empirical matters concerning the interaction between concepts and attention, and of normative matters about attention, to rationally address the underlying disagreements and collectively shape our linguistic environment for better patterns of attention.

Karsten Klint Jensen. *Applying Co-operative Utilitarianism.*

This paper examines how Donald Regan's co-operative utilitarianism (or rather, a slightly revised version of it) could be applied on large scale decision problems, such as various decisions to address climate change. Even if one allows for, with John Broome and others, that an individual's acts do make a difference to climate change, it must be admitted that those who deny this and instead defend collective duties in face of climate change (Elizabeth Cripps probably most radically) do have a point, when they point to the need for large-scale coordinated action in order to achieve effective results. However, as I have argued for elsewhere, I consider co-operative utilitarianism theoretically the better approach to understanding the ethics of coordinated action. But the issue of what it has to offer when it comes to practical applications has not received much attention.

Regan himself largely conducts his exposition in terms of 2-person cases. He has a few concluding suggestions, though, about how co-ordination can be achieved in somewhat larger groups. But the strong requirements on how to identify other agents who are willing and able to co-operate seems to require personal contact and therefore casts serious doubt on whether they can applied at all to large groups.

My analysis of Regan is roughly this: He is concerned with what is known as Gibbard-problems. They have a structure such that if the agents share the objective agent-neutral evaluation of the outcomes, they face a co-ordination problem with equilibriums of varying value. Co-ordination is then needed to produce the best outcome. The trouble is that, when facing the problem, there is uncertainty about others' motivation. They may be self-interested and reject co-operation.

The major point of Regan's decision procedure is to ascertain the preferences of the other agents. When a (sub)group has succeeded in identifying itself, the actual co-ordination works via the salience of the best outcome and should not create problems. If Regan's procedure is to be applied on large scale problems, it is necessary to accept some indirect methods of getting to know the (probable) preferences of others. Most efficient is probably the use of incentives, which may even convince self-interested agents to change their preferences.

Concerning climate change, for a given goal there will be several complex co-ordination problems: Who should contribute and how much should each contribute? And by which methods (e.g. investments, technologies) should the goal be reached? I shall demonstrate some of the complexity by setting up some stylized examples, and discuss how knowledge needs to be distributed, and how co-ordination can be achieved through salience.

Nikolai Klix. *On dominating societal diversity with tolerance.*

In Western societies the established concept in public discourses to indicate acceptance of societal diversity and minorities in general fashion is: ´toleration´/´tolerance´.

One significant characteristic of the current common perception of the notion is the perceived ambiguity regarding its conceptual premises. In the traditional conception, toleration is based on a negative evaluation of its subject matter which is balanced out by refraining from acting against that subject matter which eventually leads to an acceptance of it. However, the gradually improved common approach on societal diversity while that approach is ordinarily denoted by ´tolerance´, seems to have made the initial negative evaluation omitted or even obsolete in many present instantiations of the concept.

Although, the negative evaluation behind the application of ´tolerance´ in societal discourses may have become less obvious and substantial in the common perception of the concept, the traditional conception that assumes the initial negative evaluation, has not lost its significance as it is currently still widely held. Thus, the condition that the negative core evaluation cannot be convincingly discarded from ´tolerance´ becomes critical concerning the utilisation of the concept in contemporary public discourses.

Prior to elaborating the repercussions of utilising ´tolerance´ as a generic denominator for the common approach on societal diversity and minorities in public discourses, however, we need to acknowledge the established status of the concept performing a certain function in these discourses. Herein ´tolerance´ has become naturalised as the standard concept to be employed in various constellations of actual or potential division. Nevertheless, ´tolerance´ also plays the discursive role of a safeguard against sliding to the looming alternative of intolerance. Thus, ´tolerance´ is being regarded a concept of sufficient generality to cover all kinds of societal diversity rather than being considered a particular concept that is but one possible option as an approach on diversity.

Concerning the stipulated commitment to a negative core evaluation in ´tolerance´, I will in the paper outline some of the pernicious ramifications stemming from the ongoing indiscriminate utilisation of the concept. Firstly, the practice of denoting the approach on various instances of societal diversity with ´tolerance´, is a form of othering. It subtly signposts that the subject matter of toleration is of inferior status or value.

I argue, furthermore, that the mere expression of ´tolerance´ actualises an implicit power relation where the tolerant subject demonstrates the assumedly legitimate right of subordinating by positing a subject matter under toleration. Thus, the tolerant subject claims the privilege for authorship of societal norms and values. Set in the framework of Ásta´s conferralism, I outline that utilising ´tolerance´ to denote the approach towards a minority social category, confers the feature of acceptance of that minority social category despite a negative evaluation of it. Here both the acceptance and the precedent negative evaluation are conferred with employing tolerance, since these two are intrinsic constituents of toleration. Hence, the practice of utilising ´toleration´/´tolerance´ to denote the public approach on societal diversity is a conceptual tool of domination for the privileged ones.

Beatrice Kobow. *Between the World and Us – On the 'Ecological Turn' of Social Metaphysics.*

My contribution consists of some disciplinary notes on critical social ontology which set the stage for a more substantive argument concerning the interrelation of linguistic arbitrariness and agential affordance.

Some key questions which demand my attention today as a philosopher and more specifically, as a philosopher interested in the social world and its ontology, such as equality, social cohesion and solidarity, can be rendered comprehensively as 'ecological concerns'. Some of these questions have been addressed by feminist philosophers in their critique on the lacunae of the discipline itself. The quest for global justice as economic equality from North to South, for example, is voiced and understood today as the concern of 'climate justice'. Some other key concerns, such as global warming, food security, but also ending new wars, also fall into this category. They all threaten the continued existence our 'oikos'. Given these far-ranging 'ecological concerns' against which we need to sustain an oikos (a place of dwelling for ourselves and our children) we can agree on the urgent need of more work in philosophy and we could call this branch of critical social ontology a 'philosophy of sustainability'.

The metaphysician, for example, is a specialist for Begrifflichkeit. She explains the mediation of form and matter (or: how the form is realized in the material) by analyzing the (linguistic) representation of order in the human realm. Yet, the relation of the material and its shape-giving ideas is complicated by the fact, that this relation determines (enables, restraints) agential potential. Wittgenstein's formal argument against private language delivers language to us as an arbitrary system open to agential manipulation. Von Wright stresses the cultural pessimism as an aim and motive of Wittgenstein's language philosophy. This might be in part because von Wright's own intention is a humanist warning against human agential hubris. Von Wright calls us to restrain agential possibility, especially in light of technological know-how. I explore some of the similarities and differences of both philosophers' response to 'ecological threats'.

The 'ecological turn' in social ontology, however, relies on both arguments, but inverts their normative uptake: The possibility of changing and manipulating representations makes us accountable to the community in which we live (and thus restrains our agency); that the lived-in world is part of a kosmos, an ordered totality (the order of which depends on our categories) and that only on this account our 'oikos' enables, and indeed: requires, our agency on behalf of this oikos.

Artur Kosecki. *John Searle's Theory of Institutional Facts in the Context of Roman Ingarden's Existential Ontology.*

Prominent representatives of phenomenology are interested in the nature and structure of social reality (Mulligan, 2001; Salice & Schmid, 2016; Szanto & Moran, 2016; Szanto, 2020). An attempt has already been made to develop a phenomenological models of social ontology (Salice, 2013; Andina, 2016). Also, comparative analyses are presented between Searle's theory of institutional facts and Husserl's ideas about the social world (Thomasson, 1997; Johansson, 2003), as well as eminent representatives of phenomenology (Mulligan, 2016). The aim of this paper is to highlight Roman Ingarden's contribution to the area of social ontology. To this end, I juxtapose Ingarden's (1947/2013, 1948/2016) framework with Searle's (1995, 2010) theory of institutional facts. I argue that Searle's approach to social reality is deflationary. When appealing to such a theory, it becomes problematic to explain the ontological status of an entity like corporations (Smith, 2003; Smith & Searle, 2003; Searle, 2010). I stress that Ingarden represents a position of existential pluralism in his ontology. I consider that this approach to social ontology is more promising than that represented by Searle because with it one can attempt to capture the whole range of the kinds of existence of the entities that make up social reality, including how a corporation exists.

My paper is in the field of social metaontology. I shall focus on Ingarden's ontological conceptual apparatus and describe his reflections on existential ontology, on the grounds of which he developed the position of existential pluralism. On its basis, he identified various modes of being, e.g., real (concrete), ideal (e.g., numbers, universals), or purely intentional (e.g., Geralt of Rivia). My research hypothesis is that we should adopt the existential pluralism standpoint for the ontological approach to the social domain in a comprehensive manner.

Robert Kraut. *Pragmatism, Oppression, and Ontology: Does It Matter Whether Human Kinds are Socially Constructed?*

Theorists of Race, Gender, Disability, and other Human Kinds frequently treat the study of social construction as instrumental in understanding--and in some cases remedying--various modes of injustice. Metaphysical considerations are thought relevant to sociopolitical aims of fighting institutional oppression. But it is not obvious how the ontology of gender, race, disability, ethnicity, sexual orientation, etc. bears upon the legitimacy of social agendas--oppressive or otherwise. Nor is it obvious that the contrast between social constructions and other kinds of kinds carries normative weight. Crudely: it is unclear how, if at all, the metaphysics bears upon the politics.

One strain of pragmatism sustains these puzzles by insisting that legitimacy of institutional practices resides not in metaphysical constructions but in the dynamic of ordinary human activity: the normative status of social realities flows not from kinds and their ontological natures, but from institutionally upheld attitudes and behaviors directed toward items of those kinds. Ontology is beside the political point.

The present goal is to decouple the ontology of human kinds from the normativities of justice and oppression. The theme is not unfamiliar: Louise Antony, for example, argues that "…the fact—if it is one—that such human universals as exist are due to our nature as human beings is itself of no ethical importance." Present conclusions cohere with Antony's: no plausible notion of human nature can do the normative work it is often enlisted to do. But the current argument has wider scope, drawing upon pragmatist tenets concerning sources of normativity. Granting the prevalence of social injustice, the question is whether its justificatory grounds lie—totally or partially—in the ontological nature of human kinds. Considerations offered here suggest that they do not.

Several notions of social construction—as provided by Mallon, Hacking, Haslanger, Mills, Jenkins, MacKinnon, and Ásta--are briefly surveyed. Despite their differences, a general argument is applicable: if human kinds are natural objects, they are no source of normativity; despite misleading appeals to "natural necessity," natural objects and events exert causal/nomological but not normative influence. On the other hand, if human kinds are social constructions—however that be construed—the imperatives that appear to flow from them (e.g., "Women should nurture children and not aspire to careers") have their source elsewhere: not in the kinds themselves, but in the social strictures that the kinds codify.

Crudely: social constructions—qua summaries of normativities upheld within an institutional system—lack the power to serve as grounds for moral assessment; and natural kinds have no justificatory power. It is therefore misguided to enlist metaphysics in the service of social agendas: where justice is the matter at hand, it makes no difference whether human kinds are natural or socially constructed.

Zuzanna Krzykalska: On constitutive rules and marriage

It is common in social ontological research to represent its key philosophical concept—the relation of metaphysical dependence—in a formalized way. Whether we talk about constitution, grounding or anchoring, we think of this dependence in terms of rules and we tend to represent it with '*the arrow*'. Such notation, while illustrative, can be quite problematic. In this study I show that the *arrow*-formalization leads to confusion when applied to complex examples of social construction. Nevertheless, I argue that it is valuable for social ontology to utilize a sort of *arrow*-formula. Thus, I propose to examine problems with that *arrow*. When attempting to employ *arrow*-formulas to represent the constitution of some complex institutional facts—such as legal facts—one finds themselves at a theoretical crossroads. I argue that (1.) each decision regarding the formalization turns out problematic and (2.) seemingly kosher operations on the formulas lead to very misleading results. As an example of such complex institutional fact I examine a legal rule stating a dependence of one legal fact upon a set of other institutional facts. For this purpose I utilize three *arrow*-formulas used in theories of J. Searle, B. Epstein and F. Hindriks. The example shows that—even with a well established theoretical background of the constitutive mechanism—the formal language of the *arrow* requires interpretation. The problem seems to be that the familiar appearance of the formulas invites intuitions regarding its structural patterns and the allowed manipulation of its variables. In result, the inclination to treat the *arrow*-formulas as operational might seem appropriate. However, there is little basis for knowing (1.) what the syntactical rules of the formulas' language are and (2.) how to correctly use it in further philosophical deliberations. Thus, as it should follow, no interpretation of the formula itself would be appropriate or methodologically warranted in discussing the accounts of social facts. Nevertheless, in hope to utilize the formulas as more than visual aid, I propose to consider three ways in which the *arrow* can be interpreted in a way that could allow to establish basic laws of logic or algebra for the ontological formulas representing metaphysical dependence.

Aleksandra Knežević. *Uncovering the ontology of social change.*

I start this talk with the following assumption: if we understand the ontology of social change, we are enabled to deliberately initiate it in a socially desired direction. Therefore, the main aim of this talk is to examine said ontology.

To that aim, I first assume that social change happens when there is a change in social norms. For this reason, I argue that to uncover the ontology of social change, we need to understand the ontology of social norms. Further, by understanding the ontology of social norms, I claim that we are able to understand what social actions are necessary for initiating social change.

Second, I use Sperber's (1985) framework of Cultural Cognitive Causal Chains (CCCC) to explain the metaphysics of social norms. Sperber uses CCCC to elucidate how cultural phenomena (e.g., social norms) exist. He defines cultural phenomena as long-lasting and widely distributed cultural representations. For Sperber, cultural representations are a causal complex of two different kinds of representations: mental representations and public productions. Simply speaking, mental representations include things "in the head" such as beliefs, intentions, desires, etc., and public productions include social objects that are public and include, for example, works of art, utterances, written symbols, etc. Therefore, Sperber argues that cultural phenomena exist as a chain or a complex in which two kinds of things causally interact: individual beliefs and social objects.

In the last part of my talk, my ultimate goal is to show that CCCC can be used for clarifying how causal and constitutive social construction cooperate in construing social kinds such as social beliefs and social objects. To do so, I first compare Sperber's framework of CCCC and Haslanger's (2007) ontology of social structures to demonstrate their similarities. Then, contra Haslanger (2003) and Díaz-León (2013, 2018), I state my reasons for holding that causal social construction is relevant for those who aim to design strategies for achieving social change. Lastly, I claim that social change as a change in social norms can be deliberately initiated in a socially desired direction by manipulating the social objects constituted by causally constructed public meanings.

Quill Kukla. *Dens, Packs, and Territories: Non-Human Animals' Social Ontology.*

I will explore the social ontology produced by non-human animals. It is clear that there exist kinds of things in the human world that are robustly real, but can only exist and have the concrete properties they have because of how they are caught up and sustained by complicated social practices and embedded in social institutions. Cash is a popular example of such a thing. Prison is another rich example; an enclosed space is not a prison except insofar as it plays a specific role within the criminal justice and policing system. While cash and prisons are in some sense obviously socially constructed, trying to deny their reality and counterfactually stable properties will quickly lead to a materially unhappy end. In this presentation, I argue that non-human animals have sufficiently complex social practices, and social practices of the right kind, to generate such socially constructed, real kinds of things. While it is obvious that many non-human animals are social and engage in complex social behavior, and that they act in ways that impact and shape their environment, it is less obvious that this behavior is of the right sort to generate concrete social kinds. I will explore examples of socially constructed objects that non-human animals and humans generate together, such as 'toy,' as well as kinds of socially constructed objects that non-human animals generate on their own, such as 'territory,' 'pack-mate,' 'den,' and 'gathering place.'

I will argue that these kinds of objects are not just human categories that we anthropomorphically impose upon other animals' worlds, nor are they simply natural kinds. Rather, non-human animals have the right sort of embodied, emplaced agency to populate a social ontology of their own, generating objects that have determinate properties and that can concretely constrain behavior (including human behavior). I will remain agnostic concerning what sorts of inner lives and conceptual capacities non-human animals do or do not have. The ability to generate such socially constructed objects, I will argue, does not necessarily require discursive conceptual skills, but does require systematic ecological relationships to places, and ecologically embedded social interactions. Indeed, to have social ontologies of the sort I am discussing, animals need to have institutions, and I will argue that they do. Thinking about how cats, foxes, pigeons, rats, and other non-human animals transform their environments through their actions into new kinds of things embedded in animal institutions can in turn shed light on the ontology of some sorts of socially constructed human objects.

My presentation will draw on the philosophical resources of social ontology, but also on research in animal geography and animal ecology.

Arto Laitinen. *Constitutive and Regulative Rules: Against the Transformation View.*

Frank Hindriks and Francesco Guala (2015) have argued that "constitutive rules are nothing but (systems of) regulative rules [XZ] augmented with the introduction of new theoretical terms [Y]." They distinguish (cf. Hindriks 2005, 2009, forthcoming) XY-rules (or "base rules") linking a base property or entity (X) to a status (Y), from YZ-rules (or "status rules") explicating the status (Y) in terms of "the behaviour that the status regulates", or "the rights and obligations that the status entails", or "actions that are made available" (Z).

The central idea is that dropping the Y-status from the XYZ rule amounts to an XZ-rule, which i) is a regulative rule, and ii) is (extensionally) equivalent to the XYZ rule. The transformation from XYZ-rule to XZ-rule results in a regulative rule, and is lossless; or so Hindriks and Guala hope to show.

They face a dilemma however: if the XZ-rule is formulated so that it satisfies equivalence, it does not resemble a regulative rule; and if it is formulated so that it is a regulative rule, it does not satisfy equivalence (or does so only in certain cases).

The reason is that the relevant Z-term is not always a regulation, ought, reason, obligation, or imperative or some such directly action-guiding term, that figures in regulative rules (call these ZR). When it is, the XZ-rule may well be a regulative rule.

Z-term may however (according to Hindriks and Guala as well) be a right, and as is well known, having a right to Phi is not in itself a reason to Phi (call these ZD [D for Dikaiological]). Typically someone with the Y-status has a right to Phi and a right not to Phi, and that in itself is no conflict of normative reasons. Importantly, ZDs are not ZRs.

Z-term may also (according to Hindriks and Guala as well) be "an action made available", or better, a competence to act (call these ZC – C for competences). Indeed, constitutive rules have been theorized as norms of competence (Bulygin 1992), or power-conferring rules . However, as is well known, ability to Phi is not in itself a reason to Phi (and typically someone having the Y-status is thereby able both to Phi and not Phi). Importantly, ZCs are not ZRs. An XZ-rule figuring competences or "actions made available" do not resemble regulative rules, but – because new kinds of action ZC are being enabled – are actually closer to traditional constitutive rules.

Having made this case against the Transformation View, the paper suggests a possible reason why Hindriks and Guala may have failed to notice this (as they start from regulative rules, it is tempting to focus on ZRs), and a brief reflection on where the failure of TV leaves us concerning regulative and constitutive rules: the XY/YZ -distinction is arguably helpful concerning institutional roles, but these make an ontological difference: role-terms are not mere theoretical flourishes. Further, the attention to the variety of Zs is independently fruitful.

Olof Leffler. *Desire, Disagreement, and Corporate Mental States.*

I argue against group agent realism, or the view that group agents have mental states that are irreducible to those of their individual members (Björnsson & Hess, 2017; List & Pettit, 2011; Tollefsen, 2015). Here is the argument:

(1) If corporate agents have irreducible mental states, then the best explanation of corporate agents features only (non-composite) mental states with at most one motivational function each.

(2) The best explanation of corporate agents does not feature only (non-composite) mental states with at most one motivational function each.

(C) Corporate agents do not have irreducible mental states.

I defend (1) with an argument from disagreement. On anti-Humeanism about desires (or besires or beliefs), some mental states simultaneously represent and motivate. Such states often disagree with our non-motivational beliefs, even though both aim to represent the world. But the folk-psychological properties of desire and belief suggests that this disagreement is better explained by a Humean approach, where beliefs represent, desires motivate, and no mental state does both, than by anti-Humeanism. Why?

(i) Desires are ordinarily more phenomenally vivid than beliefs.

(ii) Desires are more recalcitrant and induce wishful thinking, and hence more likely to mislead.

(iii) (i) and (ii) hold regardless of the complexity of a desire.

(iv) We may desire what we believe is normatively neutral or bad.

Hence, desires seem so different from beliefs that we should not think there are mental states that both motivate and represent.

I defend (2) using the example of fire brigades. It is plausibly constitutive of fire brigades to be motivated to quench fires upon receiving information about them. On group agent realism, this aim is best explained by attributing an anti-Humean desire with both a motivational and representational function. Alternative explanations can be eliminated:

(i) Desires to quench fires are not caused by beliefs. That view overgenerates fire brigades: the army is also likely to be motivated to quench fires.

(ii) Fire brigades do not have standing desires (or non-composite intentions) that start to motivate via separate means-beliefs caused by the sound of alarms, for then motivation and representation are still metaphysically separable, so in many possible worlds there would be fire brigades unmotivated to quench fires.

(iii) Fire brigades do not have standing composite intentions to quench fires composed of separate desires (to quench fires) and means-beliefs (that there is a fire nearby), for they do not have such beliefs unless an alarm sounds.

(iv) We should not ascribe other beliefs and desires to the fire brigade while ignoring the motivational function of their constitutive aim: the motivation to quench fires is a paradigmatic motivation for a group agent.

(C) follows by modus tollens. Corporate agents do not have irreducible mental states.

Felipe León. *Joint attention as a joint communicative action.*

Two subjects are in a triadic joint attention relation when they perceptually attend to a target object together, and not merely in parallel or unbeknownst to each other (Carpenter et al., 1998; Tomasello, 2014; Campbell, 2005; Peacocke, 2005). While philosophers and psychologists generally agree that what sets apart joint attention from other attentional phenomena is the 'mutual manifestation' or 'openness' of the common target of attention, accounting for such openness has proven to be a difficult challenge. Addressing it is important given the documented role that joint attention plays in a variety of domains, including joint action execution (Pacherie, 2015, p. 22), early language acquisition (Dunham et al., 1993), and the development of perspective-taking (Moll & Meltzoff, 2011). One approach that has gained momentum in recent years suggests that the challenge can be tackled by conceptualizing joint attention as a communicative phenomenon (Carpenter & Liebal, 2011; Eilan, 2018; Harder, 2022). Building on this approach, the aim of my paper is to put forward and motivate an account of paradigmatic cases of joint attention as joint communicative actions. In the first part of the paper, I discuss and strengthen Carpenter & Liebal's proposal that a focus on communication is the right way to develop an alternative to approaches to joint attention based on recursive mindreading (e.g. Tomasello, 2014, p. 44; Peacocke, 2005), i.e. the capacity to attribute to other subjects higher-order mental states. I argue, however, that Carpenter & Liebal's proposal remains underdeveloped at a critical juncture, and that more needs to be said in order to develop a credible alternative to recursive approaches. In the second part of the paper, I develop such an alternative, building on the collectivist account of telling recently put forward by Marija Jankovik (Jankovic, 2018, 2014). In a nutshell, I argue that joint attentional interactions have normative properties that are analogous to the normative properties of telling, and that an account of joint attention as a joint communicative action is best suited to account for those properties.

Liam Livesley. *Disability as subordination: towards a Haslangerian account of disability.*

Haslanger's ameliorative accounts of gender and race, on which genders and races are defined in terms of positions in hierarchies of subordination, have become increasingly influential in recent years. It is perhaps surprising, then, that little attention has been paid to whether a similar approach might be fruitful for giving an account of disability. Our surprise might deepen further when we consider that the popular "social model" of disability already defines disability, in part, as the social disadvantage those with so-called "impaired" bodies face. Disability involving social hierarchies might be less of a departure from our ordinary thinking, then, than for gender or race. In this paper, I sketch a Haslangerian account of disability and suggest that such an account might be an improvement over the social model. I then identify some challenges such an account will face and consider how a defender of the account might respond.

The social model of disability defines disability as the social disadvantage faced by those with "impairments". Quite what an impairment is is contested, but is often thought to be something like "a departure from normal functioning". There is a good case for reading the establishment of the social model as a kind of ameliorative project – that is, the question asked was not "what is our concept of disability?" but "what concept would best aid in ending ableist oppression?". I propose that a Haslangerian hierarchical account might be superior here, in that it allows us to dispense with the notion of impairment – which is at best murky and at worst downright problematic – while still capturing the desirable part of the social model. On the account I sketch, to be disabled is to be systematically subordinated in virtue of being believed to have bodily features that are taken to be evidence of having a defective body.

I then turn to identifying obstacles for such an account. I suggest that, unless modified, the ameliorated concept won't cover cases of "invisible" conditions we'd ordinarily think of as disabilities or cases where people "pass" as non-disabled. I am sceptical that there really are that many such cases, but the problem remains. I suggest that the best the defender of the account might be able to do here is agree that the account classifies such cases as not being ones of disability but argue that people with such conditions can still be victims of ableism and so are still stakeholders in the anti-ableist project. Conversely, I suggest that the concept will cover cases of people we'd ordinarily think of as non-disabled but who present as disabled through deception, or who have "minor differences" like vitiligo. I argue that the defender of the account can accept deception cases as cases of disability; what is important is that there is subordination going on. And, in "minor differences" cases, I suggest their inclusion might be an advantage of the account; perhaps we should have been thinking of such differences as disabilities all along.

Patrizio Lo Presti. *Individuals de-ontologised and methontological individualism.*

1. Methontological individualism. According to ontological individualism (OI), there are no irreducibly collective entities. Collectives reduce to individuals. Moreover, on the assumption that methodology should follow ontology, explanations must not posit entities not required by ontology. Thus, according to methodological individualism (MI), explanations of collective and social phenomena can and ought ultimately to refer only to individuals (possibly including their interactions). Let's call the combination of OI and MI "methontological individualism" (MOI). MOI has held sway in theory of social science for at least a century, and has until recently remained close to unassailed in social ontology (exceptions being, e.g., Epstein 2015; Haslanger 2020; Schmid 2008). As Searle put it, even if we accept an irreducibly collective mode of intentionality we must not thereby give in to posit some "Hegelian world spirit" (1995, p. 25) or other "abominable ... dreadful metaphysical excrescence" (1998, p. 150).

But what sense of individuality is MOI premised on? I argue that, on one reading, MOI is trivial, while, on another, it is far from as deserving of the almost unanimous support it has traditionally attracted.

2. De-ontologised individuals

Sellars (1962) famously distinguished between individuals considered as persons, on the one hand, and featherless bipeds, on the other (Cf., Brandom on sentients and sapients (e.g., 2001, 2009), or Baker, on a rudimentary and a robust first-person perspective (e.g., 2000, 2015)). On Sellars's approach, persons are beings of collectively instituted norms, which make meaningful discourse and propositionally articulable thought possible, whereas featherless bipeds are beings ideally exhaustively describable in the language of the natural sciences. Individuals, in the person-sense, are "de-ontologized" (Cf., Steiner 2014). Importantly, if being a person is being bound up in a network of collectively instituted norms, then the collective, or 'we,' would be "no less basic than the other persons" (Sellars 1962, p. 77). How so? Because norms that are necessary for individuals in the person-sense (arguably) presuppose a 'we' for their institution. Indeed, a 'we' can be a person but not (what would be dreadful and abominable indeed) a featherless biped!

3. The moi de we and the we de moi?

If we accept that individuality comes in these two sense, what are the consequences for MOI? On the one hand, if MOI is premised on individuality in the featherless bipeds-sense, then it is trivial. No one would claim that biochemical compounds that organisms are presuppose collectivity (other than for, say, reproduction). But, on the other hand, if MOI is premised on a sense of individuals akin to that of persons, then it is less straightforward. For, in that sense, there might be no individuality without collectivity.

Perhaps then, MOI remains at best only a half-baked scheme, to be complemented by what we might tentatively call de-methontologised individualism (DE MOI): individual persons and their activities presuppose and are explained in terms of collectively instituted norms, which presuppose individual organisms and their activities. Allowing ourselves some Frenglish, we are both moi de we and we de moi.

Antoine Louette. *Fetishism, Commodity, Sexuality.*

In Critical Social Ontology, some recent insight in the analysis of commodity fetishism as market ideology promises to offer a clear basis of resistance to the ideological reproduction of class domination. This paper argues that this insight can usefully be adapted to sexuality fetishism and the ideological reproduction of gender domination.

On the prevalent understanding of commodity fetishism, the failure of workers and capitalists to realise that they themselves participate in the commodification of workers' ability to work is due to the fact that nothing in the social milieux they frequent alerts them to their participation in this process of social construction (Elster 1986, Torrance 1995, Cohen 2000). Taking inspiration from this approach, feminist theorists have offered a similar analysis of men and women's failure to realise that they themselves participate in the (hetero)sexualisation of women (e.g., McKinnon 1983, Lahire 2001).

But both views face a similar problem. For while workers' ability to work is indeed commodified in the market, this account of commodity fetishism fails to explain why this ability should also be commodified at home or among neighbours (Sewell 1992; see also Celikates 2016, Haslanger 2017), and so why discrepancies between these social milieux do not allow workers and capitalists to notice that they participate in the commodification of workers' ability to work (Louette 2022). Likewise, I argue in this paper, women are indeed sexualised in various public settings, from Miss pageants to clubs to the streets themselves, but it is unclear why they should also be sexualised with their parents, siblings, or friends, among other milieux, and so why men and women fail to realise that they are largely responsible for the (hetero)sexualisation of women.

To rescue the analysis of commodity fetishism, it has recently been argued that more attention should be paid to the profit-maximising logic of market competition which, by encouraging workers and capitalists to commodify hitherto uncommodified milieux, deprives them of the discrepancies between milieux that would help them notice that they themselves participate in the commodification of workers' ability to work (Louette 2022). Taking inspiration from this argument, I go on to suggest that if men and women fetishize (hetero)sexuality, it is because gender domination organises its own form of competition, among women and for men's attention (hooks 1984; see also Ferrarese 2021), which by encouraging women's (hetero)sexualisation in more and more milieux deprives women and men of the discrepancies that would have them pay attention to their continuous participation in the social construction of (hetero)sexuality.

Sean Maroney. *Heterogeneous Male Shame and the Self.*

The political normativity and utility of emotions has received a lot of philosophical attention in the last decade (Nussbaum 2013, Callard 2018, Srinivasan 2018, Medina 2019, Flanagan 2021). Sandra Bartky argued that by building a political phenomenology of certain emotions at their revelatory moment, we could learn about the political structures of our society and the individuals who constitute it and are constituted by it (Bartky 1990). An especially salient emotion for this investigation is shame.

Shame is a negatively valenced emotion that is arguably constituted by the belief that one is defective, a feeling of burning or flushing, and a motivation to conceal oneself. Shame arguably presupposes that we are social beings (Sartre 1956, Bartky 1990, Filipovic 2017, Weiss 2018). Shame is essentially political because it presupposes our existence in a community: we always feel shame before-an-Other. Bartky claims that emotions give insight into their subjects' "being-in-the-world"; they give information "of their character as selves and of the specific ways in which, as selves, they are inscribed within the social totality" (1990, 84). A phenomenology of shame must always consider the social and political milieux in which the subject is embedded. This makes shame a compelling area to investigate as it can give insights into a person's social subjectivity and into how they are subjected to structures of oppression.

This presentation asks about the relationship between the embodiment of shame and the subject. It defends Bartky's claim that investigation of the revelatory moment of some emotions can give insights into the self. It does this by examining two cases: the case of shame in a homosexual man, and heterosexual man (both in a white Australian context). The paper argues that the way different subject embody shame can be declarative of their histories and values, and thus to some extent, their identities.

First, I examine the case of the gay man. For him, the political utility of gay pride requires gay shame both as an origin point, and as a continued presence in order to preserve the radical and transformative energies of the gay pride movement and collective feeling partially constituent of certain homosexual identities. Second, I examine the case of the straight white man. For him, shame is unacceptable because of an irreconcilability between the hetero-masculine norm of strength and the weakness perceived in shame's constitutive belief "I am defective." This irreconcilability catalyses the transformation of shame into humiliated fury, a novel emotion described in domestic violence literature that describes a common emotional state of men who commit domestic and intimate partner violence. Again, the investigation of shame in this case reveals certain things constituent of certain hetero-sexual identities. I conclude that the investigation of the embodiment of emotions can be revealing of identities and values, but caution generalisation because of the heterogeneity of identity-experience; such investigations require context-specific analyses.

Laura Martin. *Practices, Tacit Knowledge, and Emancipatory Social Change.*

The concept of a social practice, and the image of agency it entails, displaces a long-standing philosophical tradition of emphasizing intentional, conscious action to the exclusion of habitual action, carried out in a way that resides below the level of conscious intention. Indeed, this is one feature of a practice approach that has, in recent years, attracted the attention of theorists like Sally Haslanger, Robert Gooding-Williams, and Rahel Jaeggi, as a practice approach appears to be well-equipped to explain how it is possible for structural oppression or forms of social pathology to endure even when agents do not consciously intend for them to do so. If oppressive or otherwise pathological meanings and norms reside 'in our practices,' then by simply participating in the practices of our society, we may unwittingly contribute to oppressive social phenomena.

If a practice approach is to explain not just why oppression persists, however, but how it can change, we also need to understand how the tacit knowledge we deploy in participating in social practices can be made explicit. Emancipatory social change often involves bringing to light that which 'everyone knows,' but that had remained unspoken or unacknowledged. The social change sparked by the #MeToo movement, for instance, occurred when women made tacit elements of everyday sexual and dating practices explicit, so that they could be subject to rational critique. This process of 'making explicit' is, then, key to demanding justification for and criticizing oppressive practices.

This paper develops an account of the tacit, embodied knowledge we have of social practices. It asks: what does the process of 'making it explicit' involve, and how does it contribute to emancipatory social change? How, in the words of Michael Polanyi, can we 'know more than we can tell' - and what does it take for us to tell what we know? I argue that one dominant way of making sense of this idea - notably, in the work of Hubert Dreyfus - that focuses on 'absorbed coping' and expert skill captures the embodied nature of tacit knowledge. But this approach pays insufficient attention to its relational dimension: the way people jointly construct what is 'common knowledge' in a particular social context, and the sense in which the act of making such knowledge explicit is also a collective project. Drawing on the work of sociologist Anthony Giddens, I propose a philosophical account of tacit, embodied knowledge that incorporates this relational element, and I show how it illuminates cases in which oppressive meanings and norms are brought to light by social movements.

Anne-Sofie Munk Autzen. *On the Nature and Value of Social Resources.*

This paper examines the merits of adopting a sufficientarian approach to the distribution of social resources in a society, including people's opportunities to have social connections and their actual social connections. In several writings, Kimberley Brownlee (2013, 2016, 2022) has defended the claim that we have certain moral rights to be adequately socially included given our fundamental social nature. These rights include the right to have adequate access to decent social contact and to have the social resources to contribute to other people's well-being.

In developing her proposal, Brownlee highlights that our social rights are in tension with our right to freedom of association. She contends that when our social rights and our right to freedom of association are in conflict, our social rights should be prioritized. She argues that if everyone were to associate as they liked this could result in some people's basic social needs not being met, which in turn would pose certain risks and costs not only for the individuals falling below the social threshold but for the broader community. This, she thinks, gives us weighty reasons to care about how social resources are distributed, and to regulate these resources by adopting "a sufficientarian principle of sociability", as opposed to an egalitarian one (2016).

Brownlee's proposal that such a distributive principle best honors basic social needs has so far not been discussed in detail, but I believe it deserves careful consideration. Thus, in this paper, I set out, first, to clarify how to best account for a sufficientarian principle of sociability by considering the nature of social resources and possible commitments of such a distributive principle, and second, to provide a challenge to it.

In presenting this challenge, I will draw on the idea that the value of a person's social resources depends in part on how much this person has relative to others, and that consequently if one person has significantly less than others with respect to such resources, this can lead to social deficiencies (cf. Lasse Nielsen and David V. Axelsen 2015, 2016). Focusing on the case of discrimination, I will argue that large inequalities especially in social opportunities risk bringing individuals below the threshold of being adequately socially included. Therefore, in response to Brownlee's proposal, I will suggest that applying a principle of sufficiency might not be enough to secure that everyone's basic social needs are met. Accordingly, when regulating social resources, reasons of equality might also apply.

Jenny Magnusson. *Social categories, Injustice, and Categorical Injustice.*

The concept of "categorical injustice" was introduced by Ásta. Cases of categorical injustice occurs when an individual is institutionally entitled to perform an action, but her action is blocked by her being conferred a certain social status. A mismatch is created between the action the individual is entitled to perform and the action the individual is able to perform. This mismatch is caused by stereotypes involved in the creation of some social categories. The concept of categorical injustice is important in order to understand central injustices in society. How to account for categorical injustice has implications for how to view the metaphysics of social kinds. Ásta understands categorical injustice in light of her conferralist account of social kinds. On that account social categories are created by being conferred a social status in a context. The conferral is done either by someone with standing or authority, depending on the kind of social category. The constitution account given by John Searle is a competing account of social kinds. An important difference between these competing views is whether social kinds depend on attitudes for kind existence and kind membership, or only for kind existence. Partly based on this difference, I will argue that a combination of the constitution account and the conferralist account can give the most plausible view of the ontology behind categorical injustice. I will argue that the constitution account can offer a better explanation of what it means to being entitled to perform some actions, even if the actions are blocked. A combination of these accounts is therefore preferred instead of relying only on the conferralist account. Furthermore, I will argue that the mismatch involved in cases of categorical injustice is not in itself unjust but causes injustice. Ásta´s view of categorical injustice needs to be connected to a wider theory of how the creation of social categories can cause injustices.

Cyrill Miksch. *Marx' 'value'. On the social ontology of money.*

In this paper I want to discuss Marx' theory of value and commodities outlined in the first chapters of Capital and reconstruct it as a contribution to the social ontology of money. By comparing his remarks to the approach of John Searle, I will on the one hand point out similarities (e.g. between use value and agentive functions), and highlight aspects largely omitted in analytic social ontology on the other hand. Especially the question of (exchange) value, i.e. the specific, quantitatively defined purchasing power that goes along with a certain amount of coins or banknotes seems to point to an opaque dimension of the social ontology of money, still in need of further examination.

Money figures very prominently in intentionalist social ontology. In John Searle's approach pieces of metal or paper receive their ability to function as means of payment due to people assigning a status function to them by collectively acting as if those pieces would have the aforementioned powers. Thus, Searle can explain, how coins and banknotes can be money (almost) independent of their natural properties. In later works he has refined his theory to answer to some criticism, for example by differentiating between money tokens and types of money. And many contributions have pointed out, how his approach might be improved by addressing the institutional environment money is embedded in. Money value, however, seems to be largely neglected. But it surely is not a natural property of a certain amount of money to buy this or that amount of apples, cars or notebooks. And it seems also not to be the case that we collectively attribute those values to the commodities. So how does value exist?

For a long time the question of value was a central one in the history of economic thought. While Jean-Baptiste Say argued for it to be grounded in utility, Adam Smith and David Ricardo were proponents of a labor theory of value. Karl Marx was the last classical author arguing for the latter position. According to him a product's value is constituted by the average time socially necessary for its production. Although it may seem as if it is the property of a certain thing to be worth this or that, value actually is based on specific collective actions, i.e. the production processes. In the perspective of social ontology this notorious idea of commodity fetishism can be understood in less mysterious terms as an alternative way in which social entities can be collectively constituted.

Today only few economists would argue for a labor theory of value. But in light of a social ontological reading of Marx, the predominant marginalist theory that lets values bottom out in individual subjective preferences can also be understood in social ontological terms, for subjective preferences being intentional mental states after all, and thus objectively held.

By reconstructing these economic thoughts in terms of social ontology, I argue for the question of the existence of value to be part of a social ontology of money.

Ron Mallon. *The Many Functions of Social Forms.*

It is common to understand social forms, forms like race and gender, that have been and are involved in social domination or oppression in terms of their roles in perpetuating domination and oppression. So, for instance, we are told that racial categories function to support white supremacy (Mills 1998) and gender roles function to perpetuate patriarchal privilege (Bach 2012). This analysis, however, is incomplete.

To begin with, it fails to explain why such categories may be defended by those who are oppressed by them (Khader 2011), forcing us to resort to positing adaptive preferences or other sorts of deformed agency. It also fails to illuminate how adherence to such oppressive forms becomes moralized, even sometimes among those whom they oppress (Manne 2017). Finally, it fails to explain why they are hard to leave behind even among those who ostensibly wish to do so.

In this paper, I argue that analysis of such forms in terms of domination or power relations leaves out what such categories do for social groups, including those who are oppressed by them. I argue that when we leave out the social work such forms do, we are left without an understanding of the difficulties of changing or eliminating social forms, and of the costs and benefits of altering them.

In contrast, I argue that we understand such social forms as covert social roles that carry with them different "constraints and enablements" (Ásta 2018) that come to organize social life, imposing a set of norms that divide labor (often unequally) or order to reap the benefits of social cooperation (also often unequally). The regularities imposed by such arrangements come to be viewed as normative, giving rise to social enforcement (Bicchieri 2016), even among those who are oppressed. And the resilience of such social forms comes not only from the reticence of the powerful to abandon their privilege, but also from both the difficulty of imagining social alternatives, and from problems of collective action. I suggest expanding our analysis of oppressive social forms to see the work that they are doing offers insight into their resilience in the face of efforts at social transformation.

Judith Martens. *No plans for shared agency.*

Our planning capacities have a major impact on our capacities for shared agency. I follow Bratman's claim that human agents are planning agents and use their planning capacities for shared agency. At the same time I point at serious issues with his theory and provide reasons why we should embrace pluralism and think the consequences of this pluralism through. In this paper, I inspect Bratman's methodology and his ontological claims. This will give me an analysis of what kind of centrality he proposes, why it is problematic. It will also give me tools to reconceptualize the relationship.

Following his constructivist approach, I come to a different conclusion that Bratman. I object against his claim that his theory of shared agency is more parsimonious than other theories. This parsimony claim will only stand when we disregard the requirements for planning agency that feed into his theory of shared agency. Secondly, I argue that his continuity thesis – the idea that shared agency is a natural continuation of planning agency – stands in the way of an evolutionary continuity thesis. By emphasizing the continuity between our planning capacities and our shared agency capacities there is a tendency to cut the link between humans and other animals.

Based on my analysis and critique of his creature construction of planning agency and shared agency, I will work towards a novel proposal to integrate planning agency and other forms of agency in an account of shared agency. I will argue, against Bratman, that we should consider multiple forms of purposive agency and their interrelations. Although we are planning agents, we often act together on other agentic capacities, for example, habits, heuristics, and skills. Only by modeling, or constructing, these different types of agency we find in human agents, and thinking about how they interact and mesh, can we rethink our relation to a space of reasons.

Valeria Martino. *An Ontology of Groups: Beyond Collective Intentionality.*

The talk aims to address the traditional categorisation of groups in social ontology (e.g., Gilbert 1992; Ritchie 2013; 2015; Thomasson 2019) by comparing it with a classical categorisation in sociology (Merton 1949; Turner 2006). This allows me to criticise the usual dichotomy social group/aggregate for imprecision (in accordance with, but with a different perspective from Epstein 2019), and to add a third pole, consisting of groups that either share values but do not interact or interact but do not share values. The sharing of values per se as a field of application of collective intentionality – usually used to distinguish aggregates from social groups – will be analysed in order to give consistency to my tripartition. The latter can include more social phenomena in the analysis of the agentive capacities of groups in social ontology and, consequently, can help us to have a more explanatory theory.

Sociologically based analyses, take into account three criteria in order to distinguish kinds of groups: possessing common features, such as skin colour, religion, income, etc.; having social interaction, i.e., having significant exchanges; sharing values, i.e., a closer and more significant form of sharing than the other two.

On the basis of these three criteria, a very useful distinction can be made, namely that between social category, group, and collectivity. The former includes status aggregates without social interaction. When, however, social interaction between status aggregates does exist, so-called peer groups can form (me 2023). Collectivities are groupings of people who share values, solidarity, and moral obligation. In this sense, all groups are collectivities, but not all collectivities are groups. In fact, three criteria are necessary for there to be a group: the presence of effective social interaction, the awareness of being part of a group (i.e., the sense of belonging), and the recognition of this belonging by others, i.e., both by other members of the same group and by outsiders. Weaving together these distinctions may allow us to have a more fine-grained analysis of social groups. This in turn could help us understand some peculiar phenomena that could be missed by a simpler way to conceptualise social groups.

Torsten Menge. *An ecological account of power.*

In this paper, I sketch an ecological account of what is commonly called "social power." I use James C. Scott's discussion of the emergence of state power in Against the Grain to illustrate the account and its advantages.

An ecological account of power emphasizes the dynamic relationship between human abilities and the environments of human action. Individual and collective abilities, including powers over others, emerge from and are dependent on wider social-material arrangements, and these arrangements are in turn shaped and differentially reproduced by the use of these abilities. This account converges with conceptions that recognize that power cannot be located in individual agents or dyadic relationships but is mediated by dynamic alignments with the actions of others and with the material setting. An ecological account avoids drawing a strict line between the social and discursively articulated environment of human actions and their physical and biological settings. Human practices have dramatically changed and continue to change the physical and biological environments in which human beings live, which in turn has enabled specific forms of cooperation and hierarchy, that is, ways in which people's actions depend on and affect what others can do.

In the paper, I elaborate three major advantages of this account of power. An ecological account makes it possible to elaborate the role that material arrangements play in reproducing power—something that is neglected by many prominent accounts of power—without thereby reducing power to merely causal effects. Moreover, the account allows us to see how human abilities and normative concerns emerge together: What ways of life are open to us and what goods, values, skills, and other normative concerns we can achieve and care about depends on our abilities (including powers over others), which in turn depends on the proper alignment of human activities with one another and with the environment in which we live. Finally, an ecological account allows us to recognize the fundamental neediness, vulnerability, and lack of self-sufficiency of human beings. It emphasizes that what we can do and how we can affect one another depends, among other things, on past niche-construction, which has helped constitute our present capabilities and normative concerns but is not within our control. This feature makes it possible to center urgent questions about the complex and fragile interdependence of human ways of life and their physical and biological environments in discussions about power.

Anna Moltchanova. *On self-help for the self-centered mainstream: improving an unjust system of institutional group membership enacted over a basically just institutional structure.*

When individuals from groups previously underrepresented in the workforce of an institution join the institution, they sometimes find that either their performances or they themselves are not as valued as they should be given their fully competent and incorporated into the institution's functioning contributions or level of institutional standing, that they are sidelined in relation to their peers that come from the demographics traditional for the institutional setting in question ("the mainstream" hereafter). The level of authority and ownership the marginalized group members are perceived to have with respect to their institutional role performances turns them into agents that are not as significant as others, into "auxiliaries" to the mainstream. Thus, despite the basically just structure of institutional roles the system of membership is unjust. For example, many scientific discoveries weren't properly credited to the female scientists who made them.

I argue that the rebalancing of the system of group membership should, in addition to the proper integration of the marginalized individuals, focus on the changes to the mainstream's first-personal perceptions of group membership dynamics.

Those on the periphery of the institutional membership have, via their standing, a potential insight into how the system of membership malfunctions that the mainstream is lacking. Although the marginalized are as firmly grounded in the institutional structure as the mainstream due to both their official standing within this structure and their 'solid' institutional performances, the marginalized experience a double kind of institutional existence: they are fully integrated, through enacting their roles, into the institutional structure but "downgraded" in not receiving the corresponding credit based on their status in the system of membership. Thus, we need to make sure that the mainstream group members become aware of their own double institutional existence: they interact with the marginalized who competently and jointly with the mainstream bring about the functioning of the institution and who perceive the mainstream as co-performers, but then they treat the marginalized as less solid group members, not lacking ambition or skill, but authoritatively lower on the membership hierarchy.

I outline the transformation the mainstream group members ought to undertake that I call "de-centering." De-centering would require openness to the suspension of a regularly enacted construction of oneself and others that sustains the unjust system of membership as well as the ability to imagine how the mainstream is perceived by the marginalized, or acquiring a sort of "double consciousness." I propose several institutional methods that could help the mainstream to de-center, which include embedding certain self- and system-checks in institutional interactions, designing institution-specific methods to assess the fairness of a framework in which one perceives other institutional members as different, introducing exercises that enable one to think about how they perceive others qua group members and how they are perceived by others from the others' perspective qua group members, establishing rules of interaction that offer safeguards against reducing other individuals to one's meaning regardless of their self-perception and institutional contributions. I, finally, contrast my approach with Iris Marion Young's "asymmetrical reciprocity."

Caterina Marchionni and Marion Godman. *How should we responsibly model interactive human kinds?*

We distinguish two ways of approaching the study and dissemination of knowledge about human kinds: representational modelling and emancipatory modelling. The aim of representational modelling is to represent as accurately as possible the human kinds themselves, the generalisations in which they partake, and their explanations. The effects of moral and political values, however worthy, should be eliminated as much as possible in order to preserve the epistemic authority of science. Emancipatory modelling instead wears its social and political commitments on its sleeve and it is committed to promote emancipatory goals. We find it in many different scholarships such as within post-colonial studies, social and critical theory, critical race theory, disability, feminist and indigenous studies, and in the ameliorative projects in analytic philosophy.

An influential and often rehearsed argument in favour of representational modelling is that it is only by accurately representing the causes and mechanisms behind the emergence and persistence of the kinds that we are in a position to advance the social and political project of emancipation (Saul 2002, Bach 2009). In this paper we argue that the argument fails when we are dealing with human kinds such as gender, race and disability, which are interactive (Khalidi 2010); kinds, that is, which may undergo change in reaction to, and as a consequence of, being studied, classified, and theorised upon. Ian Hacking (1999, 2007). Interactive human kinds therefore threaten the epistemic stability of representational models.

We then argue that both researchers studying interactive human kinds have the moral responsibility to consider possible unintended effects of their models. As they trade-offs involved in fulfilling such responsibility are different in different contexts and for different projects, no general argument in favour of one approach over another can be made. Hence, once the whole range of epistemic and ethical considerations related to interactive human kinds is considered, the apparent superiority of representational modelling falters.

Thomas Moore. *Should Economics Increase the Value it Puts on Place?*

Politicians, informed by their economic advisors, regularly make important economic policy decisions that have profound effects on people's lives. Since reality is too complex for every variable to be considered in these decisions, economic policy advisors rely on economic frameworks, based on simplified models of reality, to inform them as to what the consequences of different policy decisions are likely to be (Friedman 1953: 160). Hence, for normatively preferable decisions to be made in economic policy, it is important that the simplified conceptual frameworks economists use to make policy decisions take into account the aspects of reality we deem normatively significant; in other words, it is important that economics has a sound ontology. One aspect of reality that economic decisions can have a profound effect on is place. Trade decisions, for instance, can be the difference between a thriving town and a decimated one. For example, steel imports from China have led to the decline of towns that produce steel in the UK, like Scunthorpe and Middlesborough, and are likely to lead to further decline if left unaddressed (Berwick and Stanway 2015). Hence economists must make the decision of whether to increase tariffs on imports of steel to protect towns like Scunthorpe or whether to take the laissez faire approach of non-intervention. The value economics puts on place will have a huge influence over the decisions made in cases such as this. The aim of this paper is to show that the homo economicus ontological conception of the human self, presupposed in economic frameworks, makes unjustified presuppositions that cause it to neglect the value of place, leaving current economic frameworks a normatively inappropriate basis on which to make policy decisions, such as the one above. I will illuminate the presuppositions homo economicus makes by contrasting it with the East Asian relational conception of the self, arguing the latter's alternate presuppositions allow a more appropriate level of value to be given to place. To achieve this within the confines of this paper, I will make use of Kasulis' (2002) intimacy and integrity heuristics, which respectively represent the cultural orientations of the Japanese and Americans. I make my argument in several steps. Firstly, I outline in greater detail the context surrounding homo economicus and Kasulis' (2002) heuristics. Secondly, I show that homo economicus shares integrities presuppositions regarding ontology, identity and epistemology, since it conceptualises people individualistically and only values well-defined, publicly verifiable goals and preferences; this leaves it incapable of conceptualising the value of a particular place to people. Finally, drawing on Japanese philosopher Watsuji Tetsuro, I will argue that economists have a normative obligation to attribute a greater value to place; this is because, if we consider a place to be a legitimate aspect of a person, then violating it can be regarded as a form of harm.

Kevin Morris. On Genres of Nonbeing: Antiblackness and Black Fungibility

German philosopher Martin Heidegger developed two vital concepts: in-the-world and for-the-world which distinguish between human subjects and non-subjects (objects) at the level of experience. For the human, being in-the-world consists of shaping reality to accommodate its existence, whereas being for-the-world signals a type of function and utility that helps make the world for the human. Genre, as set forth by Sylvia Wynter and later adapted by Tommy Curry, responds to the exclusion of those marked black from the narrative of the human. I argue the fracturing of the black fungible object as Calvin Warren lays out creates genres of nonbeing. It is precisely the inapplicability of human categories of difference which clarify the ontological status of those marked black in an antiblack world. These categories of difference bring into sharp relief the fungibility of those marked black and the utility of this ontological status for the linear progress narrative of Western modernity. By shifting to an analysis of genre to square the conceptual crisis of analyzing those marked black through categories of human difference, I lay out how liberal humanism has been defined and actualized through types of antiblack world-making that utilize unrelenting violence at the material and symbolic levels. Moreover, my discussion of genre as a theoretical framework makes legible the myriad ways that those marked black experience different levels of antiblack violence due to their specific positionality.

Seumas Miller. *Joint Moral Rights and DNA.*

Roughly speaking, two or more agents have a joint moral right to some good, if they each have an individual moral right to that good, if no-one else has a moral right to that good, and if the individual right of each is dependent on the individual rights of the others. Joint rights can arise in a variety of ways. Joint rights can arise by way of promises. The owner of a house might confer joint ownership rights of the house on his two sons, for example. Another moral basis for joint moral rights is joint action; specifically, joint action which produces a good, i.e., a good to which there is a joint right. Consider, for instance, two business partners or the co-authors of a book. A third potential basis is biological. For instance, there might be joint rights to DNA (see below).

While the notion of an individual moral right (or, in fact, a set of related rights, including privacy rights) to one's body, body parts, genetic data and the like is familiar, hitherto the philosophical literature and, in particular, the literature on joint moral rights, has not considered in detail the possibility of joint rights to biological material and derived data. In this paper I consider the possibility of joint moral rights to DNA and, more specifically, DNA profiles. I do so in the context of, firstly, the vast increase in DNA databases and their use by law enforcement (e.g., 140 million DNA profiles in China's databases) and, secondly, the fact that the genome of a person is not only constitutive of that person's individual-specific (biological) identity, that same genome is in part constitutive of the individual-specific (biological) identity of the person's relatives (to a decreasing extent depending on the degree of relatedness, e.g. a sibling is more related than a second cousin). Apparently, therefore, genomic data and, specifically, DNA profiles, involve joint moral rights; the right to a DNA profile is not an exclusively individual right. On the other hand, the joint rights in question, supposing they exist, are qualified joint rights. They are qualified joints right given that the genomic data of any one of the persons is not identical to the genome data of the other persons, i.e., the sets of genomic data are overlapping.

In this paper I explore the notion of a joint moral right in so far as it might apply to DNA profiles. This theoretical question potentially has important practical implications. For the joint moral right to DNA profiles, if it exists, might have legal and, therefore, law enforcement implications.

Maciej Macuga. *How can the concept of mind-dependency help us address Guala's challenge to social ontology?*

In his interesting and provocative paper, Francesco Guala claimed that our knowledge about the social institutions is a posteriori, and because of that the enterprise of social ontology is condemned to surrender for explanations provided by empirical social sciences (Guala 2010). This claim is the challenge mentioned in the title and the main objective of this paper is to oppose it. Reaching that goal will come in two argumentative phases. The first phase consist in claiming that Khalidi's thesis regarding the concept of mind-dependency being dispensable for social ontology (Khalidi 2015) is objectionable. For that purpose I will use two following dichotomies within the concept of mind-dependency utilized by Kramer in a legal-philosophical discussion: weak/strong and existential/observational mind-dependency (Kramer 2008). Those divisions allow us to successfully differentiate between entities within social realm and because of that the mentioned concept is saved from Khalidi's critical arguments. The second phase aims at addressing Guala's challenge by the usage of the concept of mind-dependency understood as proposed in the first phase. This concept divides social realm into entities and properties that are explanatorily relevant to social ontology (both existentially and observationally mind-dependent in a weak sense) and to empirical social sciences (existentially mind-dependent in a weak sense but observationally mind-independent). The author will claim that: a) the former category of entities and properties is explanatorily relevant to social ontology, while the latter being explanatorily relevant to empirical social sciences; b) properties belonging to both categories are not mutually exclusive even if possessed by one kind of entities (in other words: social institutions having causal properties and engaging in causal relations are not disqualified from being social institutions). For the purpose of a), Searle's intuitions regarding explanatory ambitions of social ontology will be discussed (the claim that social ontology is not explanatorily competitive to social sciences, but aims at providing ontological foundations of the social realm (Searle 2010)). For the purpose of b) the author will discuss consequences of status functions being mainly (except for e.g. corporations) imposed on brute facts — material entities such as pieces of paper, people and so on. If the a) and b) claims are plausible, the Guala's challenge can be seen as averted.

Martin Niederl. *Actions, Reasons, and Animals.*

Extant event-causalist theories of animal agency (Arruda and Povinelli 2016; Sebo 2017; Wilcox 2020) ascribe only a derivative kind of agency to animals. Fully-fledged agency, they hold, requires the capacity to have one's reasons in view. But since they identify motivating reasons with pairs of mental states (see Davidson 1963; Smith 1987), and since animals are plausibly incapable of forming self-referential meta-representational attitudes, animals cannot have their reasons in view. They thus fail to be fully-fledged agents.

Given mounting ethological evidence pointing towards a more robust understanding of animal agency (Pepperberg et al. 2019; Lewis and Krupenye 2021) and even cooperative agency (Samuni, Crockford, and Wittig 2021; Lemoine et al. 2022), I argue that the Standard Story's account of motivating reasons thus needs to be amended. Two types of theories of motivating reasons dominate the action-theoretic debate. While psychologistic accounts identify motivating reasons with pairs of cognitive and conative mental states (Davidson 1963; Smith 1987; Mele 1992; Radcliffe 2020), content theorists argue that motivating reasons are rather the (true) representations that make up their content (Dancy 2000; Alvarez 2010, 2018). I argue that we have good reason to be content theorists concerning motivating reasons while retaining a roughly Davidsonian theory of action. Actions are caused by pairs of cognitive and conative mental states and are thus fully explained only by reference to those states. In identifying the agent's motivating reasons, however, we merely predicate over the content of these states. In order to have one's reasons in view, one thus need only have the content of one's mental states in view – something non-human animals plausibly are capable of.

The argument proceeds in two steps. First, I argue (with Alvarez 2010, and against Hieronymi 2011) that the concept of a motivating reason is best explicated through the notion of guidance via perceived favoring relations rather than causing movement as is supposed by psychologistic accounts. Moreover, there is a theoretical motivation for this: the structural unity of motivating and normative reasons this conception caters for. Since agents are typically not guided by their mental states but rather by their content, we have good reason to be content theorists concerning motivating reasons. Second, following Radcliffe (2020), I argue that the Standard Story provides the better account of the nature and explanation of action. Theories of action that leave out mental states in the explanation of action face a systematic problem for their theory of action in that they cannot fully explain why an agent performs one action rather than another. We should thus remain roughly Davidsonian in our theory of action. Although this general possibility has already been hinted at by some recent theorists (Schlosser 2010; Hieronymi 2011; Howard 2021), my account provides a novel justification, rationale, and motivation for it. With this robust understanding of animal agency at hand, I close by exploring possible conceptual foundations for the ethological evidence we have of their acting together (Cooper et al. 2003; Lemoine et al. 2022) with Schmid's (2023) novel subject-account of collective intentionality.

Lei Niu. *Group Persuasion and Social Ontology.*

In many instances of persuasion, more than one person or a group is involved. Traditionally, a group is persuaded when the majority members or operative members of the group are persuaded. Correspondingly, persuasive technologies should concentrate on the attitudes and beliefs of the majority or operative members. This paper addresses one challenge to this point: Groups as a whole can be epistemic agents, and this implies a situation that group epistemic agents can have beliefs that none of their members hold, and act in a way that is different from any individual. If this is correct, the design of persuasive technology toward group epistemic agents will be largely different from persuasive technology toward individuals and simple groups.

According to the Fogg behavior model, three factors play a vital role in a successful attempt to change others' attitudes or behaviors, including motivation, ability, and triggers. In order to perform a target behavior, one must have sufficient motivation and ability. Apart from this, a trigger can urge people to perform an action at the right moment. In contrast, in order to prevent an agent from performing undesirable behaviors, persuasive technologies should reduce the corresponding motivation and ability, and remove the existing triggers. Nonetheless, when persuasive technology tries to successfully change group beliefs that cannot be reducible to individual beliefs, the established connection between individuals' motivation, ability and trigger cannot work. Correspondingly, persuading a group epistemic agent should establish a link between group epistemic ability, group motivation and group trigger.

This paper will articulate some neglected cases where group epistemic agents make epistemic mistakes and behave inappropriately while their members do not. In light of this, group agents rather than individuals are expected to be influenced by informed persuasion. Regarding cases of false group beliefs, this paper discusses the difference between persuasive technology toward individuals and groups. Along the way, this exploration will shed new light on social ontology and persuasive systems' designs and applications.

Maximilian Noichl and Leyla Ade. *Jumpstarting collective action through team reasoning – a simulation-based approach.*

How can group agents come into being? Group agency is a concept that is used throughout many disciplines to describe actions that can not be reduced to individuals or mere collections of individuals alone but only to proper collectives. Such collectives have received much attention in social ontology, and have been described as plural subjects (Gilbert, 1990, 1992), as having shared intention (Bratman, 1993), or being in a 'we mode' (Tuomela, 2007). A formal way of capturing this phenomenon has been proposed by Sugden,1993 and Bacharach, 1999 in the form of team reasoning. This theory captures the strategic aspect of such a group agent, which is constituted by individuals that frame themselves as members of the group. However, there might be uncertainty about membership which leads to an unclear picture of how group agents can come into being. This uncertainty might come from a lack of explicit agreements or spontaneous group formations, for example when strangers driving cars have to coordinate at an intersection (Bacharach, 2006, see p.41). Bacharach, 1999 accounts for such uncertainty in his formal model of interactive (or circumspect) team reasoning. This paper aims to analyze the connection between circumspect team reasoning and group agency through means of agent-based simulation (c.f. Elsenbroich and Payette,2020). We investigate under which conditions the emergence of groups in a network of individual and team reasoning agents becomes possible. Agents are placed in a game theoretic context defined by social dilemma and coordination games, following the paradigm introduced by Amadae and Lempert, 2015. They play with their neighbors and try to maximize their long-term payoffs. Over time, collectives of agents that stably cooperate, and expect cooperation from their neighbors, emerge. We illustrate a single run of one such simulation in Fig. 1. Over many simulations, we demonstrate, which regions of the parameter space opened up by varying social structures, ludic ecologies, and evolutionary pressures are accessible to successful, spontaneous collective action. We also suggest ways in which these methods can be used to link philosophical thought to empirical research in political science, which deals with organizational structure, e. g. in international organizations.

Alexander Noyes, Frank Keil, Yarrow Dunham, and Katherine Ritchie. *Same People, Different Group: Social Structures are a Central Component of Group Concepts.*

Social ontologists have argued that groups can be extensionally coincident and non-identical. For instance all and only the members of a basketball team might also be all and only the members of a book club or even another basketball team (Uzquiano, 2004, 2018; Effingham, 2010; Ritchie, 2013, 2020). To capture this feature, Ritchie (2013, 2020) argues that groups like teams are entities with internal structures and members that occupy positions in the structures. In this paper, we explore the possibility that group concepts, rather than groups themselves, have two components: members and social structure. We empirically investigate and find evidence to confirm the possibility that social structure is central to group concepts.

In our main studies, we presented participants with cases where two groups (e.g., clubs, departments) came to overlap completely in membership. When their social structures remained distinct, participants judged there were two groups, even though they were coincident (Studies 1-3). When their social structures merged along with having overlapping membership, participants judged there was only one group (Study 3). In further studies, we show that participants represent groups as concrete entities, not abstracta, so groups are not represented as just abstract social structures (Study 4). We also show that social structures guide normative judgments including reward and punishment (Study 5) and betrayal (Study 6).

Together, these results demonstrate that social structure is a central component of ordinary group concepts, suggesting that the best theories of group concepts ought to include social structures. Our findings here are not about groups themselves, but our representations of them. We conclude by considering ways representations matter when considering the nature of social entities and how this suggests psychological results may (or may not) be relevant to social ontology.

Alejandro Naranjo Sandoval. *The Logic of Historical Elucidation.*

Many social constructionists urge us to consider the history of a category as part of our investigation into their nature. In other words, they urge us to engage in historical contextualizing, i.e., enquiry into past practices and linguistic patterns associated with the social kind or concept.

However, a pressing question looms over this kind of project. To be socially constructed is for the existence and nature of a category or concept to be partly determined by the historically specific social and cultural facts of a society. When historical contextualization asks us to investigate our categories or concepts at times before these social and cultural facts came about, it risks changing the subject. In this paper, I investigate whether historical contextualizing can provide insight into socially constructed categories and concepts, as well as what kind of insight we can hope to attain.

In section 1, I present two kinds of historical contextualizing which do not risk changing the subject. First, there are causal-remnants accounts, whose aim is to identify causal factors which contribute to the present social construction of the category or concept, even if they did no such thing in their original context. Second, there are unmasking accounts, whose aim is to reveal that, despite its seeming essential or biological nature, a given category or concept is instead socially constructed.

In section 2, I zero in on the kind of contextualizing that does run the risk of changing the subject, namely, what I call historical elucidation. The aim of historical elucidation is to reveal that the very nature or existence of our categories or concepts partly depends on past, potentially defunct social and cultural facts. In other words, historical elucidation illuminates the very nature of our present categories, as opposed to merely showing their origin or the causal effects of past categories. As a widely held example, many theorists of race hold that the historical connection between racial classifications and the institution of slavery or other past oppressive practices suggests that present-day racial categories or concepts are inherently oppressive.

In section 3, I argue that historical elucidation is, in fact, a coherent, substantive direction of enquiry. The two most promising options for historical elucidation are conceiving of socially constructed categories as either (1) institutions, whose identity-conditions are intrinsically path-dependent, or (2) functional kinds serving a larger role within background institutions. The former option is implausible, given that the identity-conditions of institutions and those of relevant social categories come apart. For example, racist or oppressive institutions are mutable, racial categories are not. The best option for the proponent of historical elucidation, then, is holding that social categories have functions within larger systems or institutions.

In closing, I observe how this view specifies historical elucidation's epistemic benefits: it allows us to come to know – and potentially understand – the way in which our social categories contribute to larger, path-dependent societal institutions. Such benefits are irreducibly historical, i.e., could not be easily attained but by attending to the history of our social categories.

Liam O'Brien. *Social Constructionism and Metaphysical Realism: Mapping an Uneasy Relationship.*

Metaphysical projects that seek to investigate features of the social world often sit in an uneasy position relative to distinctions between realism, anti-realism, and deflationism in mainstream metaphysics. One project in social metaphysics, Sally Haslanger's structuralist account of gender and race, has attracted attention in part for the challenges it presents to popular ways of defining realism in metaphysics. Elizabeth Barnes (2017) has argued that some of the most dominant accounts of metaphysical realism threaten to exclude or give secondary status to Haslangerian structuralism for unjustified reasons. If, as Barnes argues, Haslanger's project must be understood as both social constructionist and realist, then any account of metaphysical realism that is incompatible with social constructionism will fail to account for projects like Haslanger's. Thus, according to Barnes, doing adequate justice to Haslangerian structuralism requires that metaphysicians rethink what counts as a realist project.

Barnes' arguments have raised serious concerns about whether metaphysical realism can be made consistent with Haslangerian structuralism and, more broadly, constructionist theories about social categories in general. In this paper, I argue that in order to begin answering the question of whether realism can be made consistent with constructionist projects in social metaphysics, and how, we must disambiguate two distinct senses of "realism" as it is used in metaphysics. I argue that "realism" in metaphysics is used ambiguously to refer to at least two distinct views, which I call first order and second order realism. Before we can answer the question of whether constructionist projects in metaphysics can be properly called realist projects, we must first determine which (if either) version of realism is important for constructionists to preserve.

Drawing from literature on metaphysical realism, I define first order realism as a view about the reality of entities which serve as the objects of metaphysical theorizing, and second order realism as a view about the status of metaphysical inquiries themselves. I also argue that first order and second order realism are completely independent views; one can be a first order realist without committing to second order realism, and vice versa. It follows from this distinction that there are at least three different ways in which a constructionist view in social metaphysics can be appropriately called realist and constructionist. A constructionist view about some social entity S can (1) accept first order realism about S while rejecting second order realism; (2) accept second order realism about inquiry into S while rejecting first order realism about S; or (3) endorse both forms of realism. For the remainder of the paper, I give an account of what each of these three views would look like, and their relative merits. In considering the merits of each view, I also consider how we ought to weight these merits given the particular interests of social constructionism.

Noriaki Okamoto. *An Identification of Performativity in Society: Revisiting Tuomela's Classification of Norms to Pursue the Objective of Social Ontology.*

Social ontology has successfully developed as an interdisciplinary area and drawn the attention of scholars from different disciplines. Former social ontology studies have established frameworks that explain how social concepts and institutions exist. For instance, the key concepts such as collective intentionality, collective acceptance, and we-attitudes have been proposed and considered from different angles. In addition, John Searle's late argument (Searle, 2018) has advocated deontic powers and desire-independent reasons that construct institutional reality. It seems to highlight the normativity of institutions rather than their constitutive aspects. Indeed, the essence of normative aspects of institutions is still under-researched.

In this regard, Raimo Tuomela (1995, 2002 and 2003) proposed his systematic classification of norms that supports his theory of collective acceptance of social institutions. The classificatory framework basically consists of the dichotomy of agreement-based r-norms (rule norms) and belief-based s-norms (proper social norms). This pertinent distinction has not drawn many scholars' attention since Tuomela ambiguously tried to distinguish formal r-norm from informal r-norm, which was not evenly applied to s-norms.

This essay develops this typology of norms by classifying s-norms further into explicable s-norms and interpretative s-norms. The former can be verbalized and less context-specific because they are widely accepted belief-based norms, whereas the latter are more context-dependent and observer-relative. For instance, moral rules such as "Do not cut in a cue" or "Do not steal others' property" is an example of explicable s-norms, while more abstract norms such as fairness, inequality, and SDGs are context-dependent and interpreted differently. This study argues that one of the important objectives of social ontology is to identify and consider such interpretative s-norms. It is useful because, if interpretative s-norms become more collectively acknowledged, they are highly likely to be institutionalized. Put differently, it enables the ontological analysis of interpretative s-norms to explain constitutional dynamics. As Tuomela argued, different types of norms are dynamic and interact with each other, and interpretative s-norms can be explicable s-norms, some of which might be institutionalized as formal r-norms.

This essay also analyzes the norm transition process from the perspective of performativity. The concept of has been spotlighted particularly by sociology-oriented social scientists to understand the mechanism of institutional changes. The analysis of normativity of interpretative s-norms leads to an exploration into performative forces (Nealon, 2021). All in all, the thesis of this study can be an interdisciplinary bridge that covers both social ontology and social scientific institutional studies.

Björn Petersson and Olle Blomberg. *Faults and guilt feelings in unstructured groups.*

On a number of accounts of collective moral obligation, an unstructured group can have a moral obligation that is not reducible to a set of individual moral obligations (see e.g. Cripps 2013; Björnsson 2014; Blomberg & Petersson 2023). When the group members fail to live up to such a collective moral obligation, it is possible on these accounts that one or more members may not individually be at fault or have a substandard quality of will even though the group is blameworthy---they may have done everything in their power to get the rest of the group to do their parts of what is needed for the group to act in accordance with the obligation. In this talk, we sketch an account of collective blameworthiness, and address the following questions: What is the appropriate stance for blamers to take toward such individually faultless group members? And how should these individually faultless group members appropriately respond to blame directed at their group? Drawing on work in social psychology on group identification and collective guilt, as well as our account of collective moral obligation, we argue that it is at least rationally permissible for group members, including those not individually at fault, to feel guilt from the group's perspective, in light of the group's failure to act in accordance with its obligation. Similarly, it is rationally permissible to blame the group members, qua group members. We compare and contrast this view, and argue that it is superior to, views according to which collective guilt is fitting because guilt simply does not imply fault (Morris 1987; Sepinwall 2011), or according to which some other moral emotion than guilt is fitting, at least when it comes to individuals who are not at fault or whose quality of will is not substandard (e.g. Oshana 2006; Björnsson 2021; Telech 2022), as well as accounts claiming that assignments of collective guilt have no implications for individual members' guilt (Gilbert 2000; Cooper 2001).

Virginia Presi. *"The Past" as Roots of Normativity of Customs: A Temporal Category with Coercive and Deontic Power.*

This paper deals with the impact that the temporal category "the past" has on the justification of normativity of customs. In fact, it is a commonly shared opinion that custom-oriented behaviour is grounded in the reverence for "the past" upheld through the imitation of a reiterated pattern of behaviours and conducts (Tönnies 1909). In a way that is not always explicit, "the past" operates on individuals, driving them into behavioural decisions, often through the formula "it is always have been done like this" (Weber 1922; Petrażycki 1955; Wright 1963). Moreover, The English language uses the expression "to be accustomed" suggesting the amount of the stretch of time that customs require.

This paper goes into details within the normative point of view on this topic arguing that the temporal category of "the past" does not only play a role in the justification and the foundation of the normativity of customs, but it also assumes deontic powers (Searle 2019, Conte 2021). In fact, the statutory law often approaches customary practices as a source of law (Bobbio 1942; Kelsen 1945; Leiser 1969; Bederman 2010). Nevertheless, as soon as "the past" is acknowledged as a binding reason for action, it becomes a source of normativity of customs with deontic powers rather than simply a source of statutory law. Therefore, "the past" is both coercive and constitutive of the present custom-oriented behaviours.

This hypothesis of "the past" as a source of normativity of customs with deontic powers paves the way for several questions that this paper will analyse. First, regarding the nature of the entity "the past": what is the ontological status of the entity "the past" in comparison with the entity "the tradition"? Under which circumstances and properties could an entity and an action could be qualified as "traditional" (Weber 1922)? To what extend does "the past" has the authority to determine the values of a given society (Assier-Andrieu 2011)? Second, epistemically, and semiotically speaking, how can the shape of "the past" be grasped? What do we imitate when we imitate "the past"? Third, regarding the normative expectations based upon long-established customs, can the category of "deontic power" explain the constraining force of habits? In fact, within the domain of customs, a social normative expectation (Galtung 1959, Luhmann 1969) forces agents to act in accordance with the customs norms and punishes a violation of this coercive regularity with a social sanction. Nevertheless, it will be analysed the case of those norms of customs which could not be violated, or which do not require a social sanction (Leiser 1969).

Belen Pueyo-Ibanez. *The Sense of Community and the Possibility of Cooperation: Joint Attention, Common Ground, and Emotional Sharing.*

In "The Philosophy of Sociality," Raimo Tuomela makes a crucial distinction between I-mode and we-mode collaboration. Importantly, he explains, this distinction denotes not a difference in the behavior of the individuals involved—or at least not necessarily—but a difference in their mental attitude. When thinking and acting in we-mode, participants are moved not by private reasons but by reasons they view as collectively instituted. Those taking part in a collaborative process can be said to have adopted a "we-mode" attitude when they are able to perceive themselves and the other participants not as single individuals performing a certain activity in which all of them happen to be involved, but rather as members of the same team and, therefore, as working together toward the achievement of a shared goal.

Importantly, as Tuomela and other social ontologists have argued—including Margaret Gilbert and John Searle —this "we" governing we-mode collaboration (or "cooperation," as I will refer to it in my paper) is irreducible in the sense that it is the group represented by that "we," the group as a whole, and not the individual members comprising the group who acts as the true and only subject of the intentions and actions involved. This suggests something of critical importance, namely, that a sense of "we"—indeed a sense of community— must already be established and operative for individuals to be able to engage in cooperation in the first place. Indeed, cooperation does not merely entail a notion of "we" but in fact presupposes and requires it.

But then, what is the nature of that sense of "we" to which cooperation appeals? And, what are the necessary conditions for it to emerge and, therefore, for cooperation to be possible? These are the specific questions I intend to address in my paper. To that end, I will analyze three phenomena—psychological, epistemic, and affective—that I take to be indispensable for the possibility of the sense of "we" to emerge and, hence, for the possibility of cooperation, namely, joint attention, common ground, and emotional sharing.

Joint attention is defined as that phenomenon in which the attention of two or more subjects is directed toward one and the same object—physical or conceptual—this being manifest to and recognized by all. Due to its peculiar structure, joint attention has often been described as involving a triadic type of interaction in which the individual participants simultaneously focus on the object and on each other.

Following psycholinguist Herbert Clark, I describe common ground as that phenomenon in which two or more individuals recognize themselves as sharing a common basis of knowledge, beliefs, and suppositions—a shared "expertise"—about a given object, event, or state of affairs.

Finally, drawing on Dan Zahavi's analysis as he provides it in "You, Me, and We: The Sharing of Emotional Experiences," I define emotional sharing as a form of triadic emotional engagement in which participants integrate the emotions of the other/s into their own emotional experiences.

Zach Peck. *An ontology of collective agency for the information age.*

The ontology of collectivity ought to be informed by at least two general scientific projects: the study of life broadly construed (e.g., biology, evolutionary theory, biophysics, etc.) and the study of social systems broadly construed (e.g., sociology, economics, political science, etc.). In short, there are both natural and social systems, and our ontology ought to reflect this. In this paper, I propose a general ontology of collectivity informed by both the biological and social sciences. From a biological perspective, I draw on research on the origin of eukaryotic life, holobiosis, and group selection to argue that prototypical biological individuality is collective. And from a social perspective, I draw on research on collective responsibility, social system theory, and enactivism to argue that human individuality is fundamentally constituted through collective, social processes. I argue that these two conclusions strongly suggest that we ought to reconceptualize our understanding of prototypical ontological individuality to reflect the underlying collectivist nature of biological and social processes. In particular, I suggest that this has two implications: 1) we ought to broaden the extension of our concept of agency to include processes typically considered to be mere collections of ontologically distinct (yet highly interdependent) individuals, such as social networks, ecosystems, etc.; and 2) we ought to reevaluate our understanding of individual human agency to reflect our underlying nature as biologically diverse collectives fundamentally constituted through collective, social processes. The upshot is that we ought to reconceptualize the nature of agency in collectivist terms. Instead of treating the traditional conception of the human individual as the prototypical case of an agency and

treating collective agency as a peripheral case, I argue that we ought to build our ontology of agency from a general ontology of collectivity. To demonstrate the practical significance of this ontological revision, I consider its implications for how we ought to think about social networks as technology increasingly influences such systems' dynamics. I conclude that we ought to seriously consider the possibility and the normative implications of emerging hybrid, socio-technological systems as collective agents.

Costanza Penna. *Binding the Present and the Future: Transgenerational Social Actions as Joint Commitments.*

Most social phenomena are designed to outlive their original members through transgenerational social actions, which involve some form of cooperation between present and future generations. Philosophers agree that the parties currently involved in these actions have obligations and rights towards their successors, who are expected to carry them on; however, it is less clear what kind of normativity should bind them and how it could work diachronically.

In the paper, I seek a resolution to this puzzle by arguing that transgenerational social actions are collective in a strong sense and should be framed as long-term joint commitments, with the caveat that future generations can only participate when they are concrete groups that exist in the physical sense.

Among the scholars who have most contributed to social ontology, Margaret Gilbert is credited with connoting the collective dimension with a normativity that is neither moral nor legal, but properly social. Thus, I say, her framework is crucial for grounding transgenerational obligations and rights in a way that complements moral claims of responsibility towards future generations.

In Section 1, I consider joint commitment diachronically and confirm its general plausibility in a transgenerational sense, as members can join over time and the original commitment can be modified.

In Section 2, I observe that the relationship between generations develops through different epistemological and ontological stages, which are structurally asymmetrical but on the whole not unbalanced. I then support Tiziana Andina's shifting ontology of future generations as abstract artifacts created by present generations and that will become concrete groups at given space-time coordinates.

In Section 3, I ask whether abstract artifacts of future generations can be counted among the members of a transgenerational joint commitment. After considering two different interpretative models—the virtual and the physical membership hypotheses—I resolve against the claim, thus ruling out that the normativity of transgenerational social actions as joint commitments can be shared by non-overlapping generations.

In Section 4, I distinguish two senses in which obligations and rights are transgenerational, one that is strictly social and another that is best understood as moral in nature. By recalling Emmanuel Levinas' phenomenology of vulnerability, I provide grounds for the latter in accordance with the epistemological and ontological asymmetry between generations. I then recover the role of joint commitment by noticing that predecessors practically assume moral responsibility of their successors by engaging in transgenerational social actions as joint commitments.

Three desiderata are met: (i) parties have sufficient reasons to preserve the future even in the absence of a personal recognition of the moral duty to do so by virtue of the normative constraints of joint committing it; (ii) responsibility for the future is elevated to the collective level and is properly carried out as a relationship between generations as plural subjects; and (iii) interests do not influence transgenerational normativity, thus avoiding paternalism.

The paper offers joint commitment as a novel framework for exploring transgenerationality and suggests enriching the contemporary debate by linking social ontology to supposedly alternative philosophical traditions and methodologies.

Siiri Porkkala. *Epistemic injustice, invalidation, and nonbinary experiences.*

How do different forms of epistemic injustice shape our understanding of marginalized gender identities, and do they effect theories about the metaphysics of gender? I aim to answer these questions by focusing on nonbinary experience and analyzing different forms of epistemic injustice that pertain specifically to nonbinary people. I also explore the influence that different forms of epistemic injustice have on our understanding of nonbinary genders both on an epistemic and on an ontological level. I argue that in addition to the marginalization that nonbinary people share with binary trans people, there are unique elements of oppression that concern specifically nonbinary genders.

First, I introduce the concept of epistemic injustice. Fricker (2007) differentiates different forms of epistemic injustice: testimonial and hermeneutical injustice, and additionally, hermeneutical marginalization. Testimonial injustice occurs when speaker suffers from an unjust deficit of credibility due to prejudice, whereas hermeneutical injustice pertains to an unjust deficit in intelligibility due to hermeneutical marginalization - someone is hermeneutically marginalized when they under-contribute to the shared hermeneutical resources. Fricker and Jenkins (2017, 271-272) describe the relationship between the three elements in a following way:

(1) Socially patterned testimonial injustice tends to produce (2) hermeneutical marginalization in relation to one or more areas of social experience; which in turn tends to produce (3) hermeneutical injustice in relation to the intelligibility of those areas of experience.

Fricker and Jenkins (2017) lay out different injustices that binary trans people face in especially in clinical settings, where all three different elements of epistemic injustice are acutely present. Traditionally, medical approach to transition has operated under strictly normative settings, and in addition to other prejudices, trans people have not been seen as reliable sources of their experiences, or intelligible contributors to knowledge about trans issues. These injustices also expand beyond medical settings to non-institutional interpersonal relations. I claim that nonbinary people face similar issues as binary trans people when dealing with epistemic injustices pertaining to their identities.

I argue that nonbinary people face additional issues concerning epistemic resources around their identity. Whereas it is not uncommon for people in marginalized to experience testimonial injustices in the form of non-affirmation of identity, nonbinary people additionally experience invalidation of identity across multiple social contexts, where the whole existence of nonbinary genders is questioned, and not seen as 'real' or 'credible' (Johnson et al., 2020). Invalidation happens on institutional and interpersonal levels, and strikingly, also within LGBTQ communities.

The non-availability of some gender categories is based on the perceived lack of credibility in testimonies and on insufficient hermeneutical resources. This has potentially interesting implications for metaphysical theories of gender that are based on externally given group memberships, such as ones presented by Ásta (2018), where gender conferrals depend on the resources available to conferrers, or by Haslanger (2012), where the metaphysics of gender depend on existing oppression. To mitigate the harms created by credibility deficits and lack of collective hermeneutical resources, it is important to understand the mechanisms creating these injustices.

Tom Poljanšek and Tobias Störzinger. *The Navigational Function of the Manifest Image. Social Ontology and the Status of Social Sciences.*

In our paper, we defend two claims. The first claim is exegetical and asserts that Sellars' "stereoscopic view" of the relationship between the "manifest image" and the "scientific image" of man-in-the-world entails that the manifest image facilitates successful and cooperative navigation of the world, while the scientific image aims to describe and explain the world. Sellars' stereoscopic view does not negate the manifest image but instead changes our understanding of it while adhering to the sciencia mensura principle. i.e., the claim that concerning the question of what exists, all things considered, natural sciences are the measure of all things.

Now, arguably, the typical objects of social ontology are not part of the scientific image of the world as Sellars envisions it. Instead, as they are dependent on our human perspective, they belong to our manifest image of the world. This raises concerns that 1) social ontology is a subgenre of perennial philosophy (which aims at systematically explicating the manifest image of the world) and that, accordingly, 2) social sciences merely aim at describing and explaining processes and mechanisms within the manifest world, not with regard to the things that exist all things considered. Our second claim takes this consequence seriously and views it as a distinctive feature of the social sciences rather than a flaw. We argue that social ontology is a fundamental component of Sellars' stereoscopic view and that social sciences are valuable precisely because they provide a unique type of knowledge distinct from the knowledge we gain from a purely scientific image of the world.

In contrast to the "ideal type" of natural science, social sciences do not possess a purely objective epistemological orientation, whose boundaries are delimited only by the human capacity for understanding. Rather, the social sciences seek a form of knowledge of observable processes within the manifest image of the world that, like the manifest image itself, serves a navigational function for humans. The navigational function of the social sciences does not aim to provide a comprehensive or objective description of reality as such, as the scientific image does. Instead, it serves to guide human action concerning processes within the manifest world itself. To explain this thesis, we draw on Max Weber's conception of "ideal types" and his notion of "interpretive sociology," which play an often-neglected role in Sellars' essay.

In conclusion, our paper contributes to the debate on social ontology by emphasizing the significance of the manifest image of the world and its navigational function. We argue that the social sciences offer valuable insights into observable social processes, which enable us to navigate the world successfully and cooperatively. We believe that our paper presents a novel and important interpretation of Sellars' work and that it will enrich the ongoing discussion on social ontology and the status of social sciences.

Krzysztof Poslajko. *Institutional groups are not material entities.*

The claim that institutionalized groups/organizations, like corporations and parliaments, can have sui generis, non-reducible mental states hinges on the idea that organizations are material entities somehow composed of their members. If institutional groups were not material things, then they could not be considered candidates for the functional realizers of mental states.

In my talk, novel arguments against the view that organizations are material entities, composed (in some way or other) of their members will be presented. I will also sketch an alternative view on the metaphysical status of institutionalized groups, according to which such groups are abstract artifacts created within a given institutional context; on this view members are role-holders within the groups, but not material parts of them. Institutionalized groups/organizations differ from small, informal, ad-hoc groups because they are formally created in a given institutional framework, their existence is independent of the specific members, and often they are granted the status of legal persons.

I will present two arguments against treating the said institutionalized groups as material entities: one which appeals to the notion of parity, and the other which appeals to the problems with synchronically determining the group members. The argument from parity is based on the idea that institutional groups should be (and in many important contexts are) treated on a par with legal persons/institutions, which cannot be straightforwardly said to be groups in the usual sense. Two important examples are shell companies and 'foundations' (as defined in many civil law systems).

The other argument relies on the idea that in many cases of complex institutionalized groups, it might be hard to discern who should count of the members (disregarding the problem of change of membership in time). For example, in the case of corporations, the issue is that neither employees nor shareholders nor any combination of them will work. In case of parliaments, it is tempting to see them as groups of legislators, but I will provide reasons for scepticism. The alternative view (inspired by the abstract artifact theory of law) holds that such entities should be seen as non-material abstract artifacts. Individual persons, rather than being mereological parts of organizations, should be seen as role-holders, i.e. persons holding certain status functions with the normative framework in which the organizations are created. This account treats organizations as metaphysically primary with regard to their members, understood as role-holders. This view allows us to treat ordinary organizations on a par with the memberless ones. Furthermore, this view allows for individuals to have different role-levels with respect to a given organization, thereby eliminating the need to delineate between "genuine members" and "non-members". However, this account blocks any attempts to formulate a genuinely realist view on institutional group mentality and leads to a fictionalist alternative.

Sara Purinton. *Indeterminate Disability: A Dilemma.*

Many disability theorists acknowledge that their accounts admit of vagueness; cases where it is unclear if the individual in question is disabled. While the possibility of such cases is frequently mentioned, their nature and normative significance is under-theorized. This paper attempts to make headway on these issues.

I argue we face a dilemma centered on the role that indeterminacy ought to play in our conception of disability. The dilemma is that we have significant reasons for and against making the category more determinate. The paper's structure runs as follows. Section I. argues that our current conception of disability is indeterminate. Section II. moves from the descriptive project of understanding how we currently use the concept, to the normative project of determining how we ought to use it. It's in light of the latter project that a dilemma arises around whether to precisify the concept.

I.

There is often vagueness around whether one has the kind of impairment that's relevant to disability, and/ or whether one is sufficiently disadvantaged in virtue of one's impairment to be disabled. For example, only sufficiently severe and long-term impairments are relevant to disability. But it's frequently unclear how long individuals will be impaired (think: conditions like long Covid), and whether an impairment is severe enough to be the kind that's relevant (e.g. whether one's lower back pain or depression prevents one frequently enough from engaging in daily activities).

II.

I just argued that our current concept of disability is vague. When we turn to the conceptual engineering question of which conception of disability we ought to use, we face a dilemma, since we have weighty reasons in favor and against sharpening the predicate's extension.

II. a. Against Indeterminacy.

A central function that the concept of disability ought to play is to help distribute certain rights. Indeterminacy makes the concept worse at performing this function, since it's unclear what people are owed when they fall in the borderline. Indeterminacy also leaves a gap in one's hermeneutical resources, since it's unclear whether (or how) to apply the concept to oneself when one is in a borderline position. This can lead to feeling that there is a gap one's practical identity, or that a part of one's identity is in limbo.

II. b. Against Determinacy.

There is a significant body of research within psychology indicating that people are more likely to essentialize groups that have sharp boundaries, which is a weighty reason to retain vagueness. Additionally, adopting a determinate conception seems descriptively inadequate, since the features relevant to disability really do seem to admit of vagueness i.e. it really does seem like there's no precise degree of suffering, or social disadvantage, that one must possess in order to count as disabled.

III.

This Section draws on Delia Farra's interest-relative theory of vagueness to argue that we can mitigate the force of the dilemma by adopting a contextual view of disability. Contextualism allows us to be sensitive to the considerations in favor and against determinacy, since we can shift the predicate's extension by shifting the standards of use from context-to-context.

IV.

My goal isn't to prove that contextualism is true, but rather to show one way that we might make progress on this dilemma. Whether one thinks it a plausible strategy, I hope to have convinced readers that indeterminacy around disability gives rise to pressing ethical issues that deserve greater attention.

Quyen Pham. *Social groups, structure, and change.*

Social groups are, roughly, entities with members who engage in social interactions. The ones we are most often concerned with—clubs, teams, and bands—are generally relatively complex and organized, or structured: the members fill distinct roles with respect to each other and to the group as a whole. Indeed, structures, as complex properties of collections of individuals, seem to play a central role in providing the existence conditions, identity conditions, and classification criteria for organized social groups.

Call any view that takes this idea seriously and individuates social groups primarily in terms of their structure, as opposed to only in terms of their members, a structuralist view about groups. A structuralist may think of groups as material realizations of structures (call this the Realization view) or as immaterial structures themselves which may be realized (call this the Structure view).

These basic structuralist views, however, are unable to accommodate changes in group structure as well as changes in membership. Organized groups notably often undergo such changes—they may gain or lose a member, they may gain or lose a role in their structure, some members may switch roles, and so on. The problem lies in the apparent tension in these views between, on the one hand, the idea that structure is somehow central to groups and, on the other hand, the idea that groups can change in structure. Both views must be refined in order to accommodate such changes.

Two salient corresponding options emerge: we may modify the Realization picture and think of a group as a material, either four-dimensional, perduring or three-dimensional, enduring object, which is composed of or constituted by a realization of a structure at each time at which it exists (call these the Four-Dimensional Realization view and Three-Dimensional Realization view, respectively); or we may modify the Structure picture and think of a group as an immaterial determinable structure exemplified by a more determinate structure at each time at which it exists (call this the Determinable Structure view).

In this paper, I will (1) elaborate on the notion of structure in the context of social groups, motivate structuralism about groups, and outline two initial forms of structuralism, namely, the Realization view and the Structure view; (2) raise the question of persistence for structuralism about groups (How do organized groups persist through both changes in membership and structure?) and show that the Realization view and the Structure view both have trouble answering at least one part of the question; (3) offer refinements for each view that enable them to accommodate both kinds of changes, namely, the Four-Dimensional Realization and Three-Dimensional Realization views, on the one hand, and the Determinable Structure view, on the other; (4) describe a case study that puts these refined views to work with respect to a further question (What are the limits of change in membership or structure that organized groups can undergo?); and finally, (5) offer some preliminary considerations in favor of the Determinable Structure view.

Chaeyoung Paek and Jun Young Kim. *Doing Things Together with God.*

In this paper, we show how a view about collective action could shed fresh light on one of the problems of early modern philosophy, i.e., the problem of divine concurrence in Leibniz's philosophy. According to divine concurrentists, when a creature such as a person engages in a causal activity, both God and the creature are the direct causes of the resulting event. Divine concurrence has been favored by Leibniz, along with other theistically-minded early modern philosophers, given that it upholds two theological principles. The first principle states that God is the immediate and direct cause of all things in this world, and the other says that creatures have and exercise real causal powers. The problem is that it is unclear exactly how God and a creature concur as the direct and immediate cause of a given event.

The current views about this tension between two principles within Leibniz's philosophy are at a stalemate. We point out that these existing solutions to the problem of divine concurrence are not satisfying because of a common assumption about collective action—namely, the assumption that collective action (or concurrence) should be cooperative. In other words, they assume that God and a creature should exercise their agency as two equal agents. Instead, we propose that multiple agents can do things together in a non-cooperative way. By adopting a view about collective action that allows a possibility of non-cooperative collective action, we can find a new way to understand and solve the problem of divine concurrence. More specifically, we use a theory in which collective action is treated like an artifact made out of individual actions with an intention to "make" the collective action in question. Based on this particular view about collective action, we argue that God and a creature do things together by a creature being the source of the actions and providing the individual actions, and God "making" the action with his intention out of the creature's actions. After examining our proposal against the established views, we conclude that our proposal shows that social ontology may offer a new and fruitful approach to the issues in the history of philosophy.

Nathan Placencia. *Race after Racism: Why geo-ancestral identity might matter in a post-racist world.*

My recent work focuses on post-racist theories of race. A post-racist approach begins with a thought experiment. It asks us to imagine a world without any form of racism (no structural, systemic, implicit, or explicit racism); what would race be in such a world? Or, to put the question more directly: Can there be races if there is no racism? In the paper I presented at Social Ontology 2022, I explored how different theories of race might answer this question. I argued that on most social constructionist views of race, there are no races without racism. I moved on to show that on a minimalist theory of race, there can be races without racism. A few comments from that session suggested that I had not considered a number of social constructionist accounts of race that do not appear to require racism to construct racial identities. So in the first part of this paper, I revisit the question of whether there can be races without racism, but I look specifically at the accounts of Chike Jeffers, Ron Mallon, and K. Anthony Appiah. I conclude that all three have the resources to construct racial identities without racism.

In the second part of the paper, I utilize the constructionist approach to articulate a successor concept to racial identity appropriate for a post-racist world, namely geo-ancestral identity. A geo-ancestral identity is roughly race minimalism plus identification. That is, someone has a geo-ancestral identity just in case they identify with being from the region of the world their ancestors once inhabited.

In the final part of the paper, I explore why it's important to maintain geo-ancestral identities in a post-racist world. I suggest that we'll need these identities to maintain our connection to our ancestors, even if we no longer share phenotypical traits with those ancestors. We'll also need geo-ancestral identities to help us remember the past racist practices our ancestors once endured, to encourage post-racist norms in the present, and to prevent our community from returning to a racist social order in the future.

Alicja Pietras. *Construction of the self in social rituals.*

Starting from the tradition of symbolic interactionism (George Herbert Mead, Charles Horton Cooley and Erving Goffman) and German transcendental philosophy (Fichte, neo-Kantianism, Nicolai Hartmann and Hans Wagner) I would like to provide the theoretical framework to describe how the self is created and preserved in everyday social interactions between individuals. The aim of my speech is to present the relation between reflective and facade aspects of self and our everyday practices called as a rituals of interactions.

Both, symbolic interactionists, and German transcendental philosophers claim that the self is a dynamic structure which arise in the act of reflection in which person start to be an object to herself. Therefore, the first condition of the self to arise is human ability to reflect. But to make herself an object individual need to reflect herself in the eyes of other individual members of the social group. This process of making ourselves an object by reflect in the mirror of other people's eyes Cooley illustrated by his concept of looking-glass self. Thus, Cooley looking-glass self, which can be also called reflective self (my concept of what other people think about me) should be understand as a first source of our subjective self (the concept which I have of myself). But, because of the tendency (shared by all psychical healthy individuals) to improve our image of ourselves, these two concepts are followed and complemented by a third element which is facade self (the ideal concept of myself which I want to present to other people). These three aspects of self are in constant interplay provided by the participation in everyday social interaction.

The main thesis of my speech is that there is a strict relation between the self (understand as such triadic dialectical structure composed from reflective, subjective and facade self) and social actions called by Erving Goffman as rituals of interaction (which are: presentation rituals and avoidance rituals). Presentation rituals (such as greetings, compliments, or gifts) and avoidance rituals (such as keeping a distance to strangers in public places, polite inattention, or respecting taboos) have two mutually related functions: (1) function of deference and (2) function of demeanor. It means, that by acting in accordance with these ceremonial rules (1) on the one hand we are creating the positive reflective self of other's people (they can believe that they are respect by others) and (2) on the second hand we are creating our own positive facade self (we present to others as a polite). Not following these rituals causes destruction of positive reflective self of others and destruction of our own positive facade self, and if it occurs on a regular basis, it can lead to interaction disorders and therefore also to conflicts.

Andreea Popescu. *Discussing the Nature of Social Groups.*

This paper deals with the (meta)metaphysical problem of the nature of social groups. What are social groups? What is the nature of social groups? To answer these questions, I aim at providing an alternative view to the popular approach in terms of spelling out the necessary and sufficient conditions for why certain entities are social groups. To do this, I propose taking a step back and conceptually engineering the very concept of the nature of social entities.

Defining an entity as a social group in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions is meant to show which features provide a clear cut between social groups and a random group of people. Such approaches treat essence and nature synonymously, and search for properties an object must have and no other object can have. My approach takes nature to be something more liberal than essence. Instead of judging the right nature of social groups as adequate or inadequate in terms of scrutiny to counterexamples, my paper argues that there is no single nature of social groups (and social entities generally). I argue that nature is a revisable concept according to specific contexts. This revision of the concept is particularized to the problem of social groups. However, the proposed (meta)metaphysical framework can be generalized to other social entities.

The present proposal teams with bottom-up approaches to social groups, and argues against top-down approaches. For top-down approaches, the nature of a given kind of entity is usually defined in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions, or genus-specie definition (see Uzquiano 2004, Effingham 2010, Ritchie 2015). Bottom-up approaches are, on the contrary, focused on the versatile nature of social groups (Epstein 2019, Thomasson 2019). In line with Epstein (2019), I give up parsimony and allow for an over-generation of social groups. As Thomasson (2019), I propose a function-oriented characterization of social groups. In addition, this proposal makes a step back by discussing the concept of nature (of social entities) itself, by engineering a dynamic concept of nature that allows for a pluralist take on social groups.

I propose both a pluralist approach to nature and an artifact-like definition of nature that can be designed for different theoretical purposes. The proposal aims to re-engineer a strong metaphysical concept, in a way that, I think, would be more adequate for our theoretical aims. The proposed revision consists in replacing a genus-specie approach with a definition designed for specific contexts or purposes. The resulting concept of nature is more versatile and adaptable to our purposes, it is context- and purpose-sensitive. The proposal does not definitely eliminate definitions in terms of necessary and sufficient conditions but adds other purpose-oriented characteristics which are context-sensitive. I argue for a pluralist approach and I claim there is more than one (proper) nature of a group.

Matthew Rachar. *Conditional Intentions and Shared Agency.*

Shared agency is a distinctive kind of sociality that involves interdependent planning, practical reasoning, and action between participants. Philosophical reflection suggests that agents engage in this form of sociality when a special structure of interrelated psychological attitudes exists between them, a set of attitudes that constitutes a collective intention. I defend a new way to understand collective intention as a combination of individual conditional intentions. Revising an initial statement of the conditional intention account in response to several challenges leads to a specification of the properties these intentions need to have in order to be genuine commitments. I then show how a structure of conditional intentions with these properties settles a collection of agents on engaging in social interactions that display all the features typically associated with shared agency.

Robert Ragsdale. *Tribal Beliefs: A Social Doxastic Model.*

How are facemasks – seemingly innocuous artifacts of the biomedical industry – currently embroiled in cultural wars? What motivates popular rejections of scientific consensus and messaging about the reality and consequences of anthropogenic climate change or the COVID-19 virus and vaccine? The puzzle is that (a) despite its being in everyone's rational interests to have a well-informed public and body politic about collective threats, and (b) despite the public availability of accurate and reliable information, scientific messaging and public discourse surrounding climate change, COVID-19, and vaccine hesitancy, nevertheless, tend to be hijacked by political interest. Yet, if belief is essentially truth-directed, as many philosophers have supposed, then ameliorating anti-scientific attitudes should be a simple matter of explication: effectively communicating the relevant evidence and reasoning that supports the judgments about which there is scientific consensus. Yet, not only are such socially significant beliefs irresponsive to counterevidence and argumentation but oftentimes the presentation of such evidence produces more extreme or polarized beliefs. I propose a solution to this challenge: anti-scientific beliefs gain traction not in spite of their perceived epistemic cost but because of it. Their epistemic costliness is a strategic cost that ultimately incurs greater social utility for the believer, modifying the payoff matrix with respect to her ingroup membership. Such logic suggests at least one piece of the puzzle in understanding the reasons causally responsible for the proliferation of anti-scientific beliefs. Many popular rejections of scientific messaging are motivated by social – not epistemic – aims and enact social rather than navigational functions. My aim in this paper is twofold: (1) to advance a Disjunctive Signaling Model (DSM) of social beliefs and explore how such a model explains motivated rejections of scientific messaging, specifically the motivated rejection of messaging about Climate Change and COVID-19. And (2), to motivate positing the category of tribal belief into our psychological ontology. DSM specifies two distinct kinds of social signaling strategies, each of which is informed by its own distinct logic: (a) shibboleth signaling and (b) commitment signaling. Beliefs which perform a shibboleth signaling function signal ingroup identity or allegiance (Funkhouser 2020), while beliefs which perform a commitment signaling function implicate a "burning-bridge" strategy that involves selective reputational damage among outgroup members so as to enhance perceived commitment and loyalty to ingroup members (Mercier 2020; Williams 2021). If DSM is accurate, it motivates opening up the psychological space to a subspecies of social beliefs, plausibly delineated by their selected-for proper functions, such as signaling socially strategic information, independently of any veridical functions, and which are neither constituted nor governed by a norm of truth. One important application of the DSM is that it can be used to explain the why people believe certain conspiracy theories, the nature of conspiratorial beliefs, and the why conspiratorial beliefs gain such traction in society. Signaling pressures, such as the modifications overtime that enhance ease-of-detection and thus lead to exaggeration in the signaling medium, lead to the formation of conspiratorial beliefs in virtue of their adaptive function within the context of coalition building.

Henry Roe. *Sub-agential groups can have epistemic vices, too.*

In the emerging sub-field of collective vice epistemology, it has often been presupposed, with some noteworthy exceptions (Byerly & Byerly 2016; Holroyd 2020), that only those social groups that meet the necessary conditions for group agency may be ascribed collective epistemic vices. That is, only institutionalised or 'established' groups, like corporations, research teams, or police forces, can be said to demonstrate vices like closed-mindedness, prejudice, testimonial injustice, or inferential inertia (Fricker, 2012; 2020; Lahroodi, 2007; 2019).

In this paper, I argue that this position fails to account for various claims of collective vice aimed at informal social groups, like men, white people, or the privileged and powerful, that arise in philosophical work in the feminist and critical philosophy of race traditions. These groups do not, at least not obviously, meet the necessary conditions for group agency, though their members share a common identity or distinctive social ties that, I argue, mean they cannot be considered 'mere populations' (Lahroodi, 2007). Following Nguyen and Strohl (2019), I call such groups 'sub-agential'. Rather than denying the possibility of these claims or offering clarifications that dilute their potency, I argue that there are distinct forms of agency that informal groups like these can demonstrate that allow us to ascribe vices to them. In short, this paper defends the view that sub-agential groups have structural features that makes the attribution of epistemic vices legitimate. To show how, I develop an account of collective epistemic vice that centres around the operation of epistemically vicious social norms within these informally organised groups.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I introduce some prominent views from the extant literature on collective epistemic vice (and virtue) and evidence how prominent theorists have presupposed that only group agents can be ascribed collective virtues and vices. Second, I show how this position conflicts with our everyday practices of collective vice ascriptions and with various claims of collective epistemic vice that arise within the philosophical traditions of feminism and critical philosophy of race. These claims often focus on informally organised groups, including social identity groups, such as men, white people, the rich, privileged, or powerful; sub-agential groups, which lack certain features of paradigmatic group agents yet maintain distinctive features that facilitate some forms of group agency. Third, I argue that we ought to jettison the idea that only group agents can have collective epistemic vices. I consider Sean Cordell's (2017) challenge to the project of collectivising vice (and virtue) ascriptions and set out an account that is responsive to these concerns. I argue that sub-agential groups can demonstrate collective epistemic vices in virtue of distinctive vicious social norms that pervade within these groups and which their members, qua members, are therefore disposed toward. To conclude, I consider the ways in which this norms-based account of collective epistemic vice can also provide greater explanatory power in cases of institutional epistemic vice and illuminate this suggestion with reference to the vices demonstrated by London's Metropolitan Police Service.

Alexis Rozanski. *Solving the paradox of non-existence in ontology, a naturalist social metaphysics.*

In this article, I will show how, by solving the paradox of non-existence in ontology, we create a naturalist social ontology. Meinong's Theory of Objects captures any kind of entity we may think of with the help of intentional object. (Meinong 1904: GA II: 486) As a consequence, it is said in Meinong's theory that we are in relation with weird entities (which lack being) that are usually labelled as "non-existent entities". Russell objected that there is a contradiction in Meinong's theory : there are Objects which do not exist, but how can such non-existent objects exist ? (Russell 1996: 449-450) Russell tried to solve this issue with the theory of definite description, which has been attacked by Kripke. I solve The Russell-Meinong debate by identifying non-existent entities as social artifacts, thus, I can refer to "Russell's Pegasus" and anyone who has read Russell's article can identify what I implicitly mean when I talk about this particular Pegasus. Here, I don"t follow Searle's view (inspired by Russell) on Intentionality, as he admits intentional states without intentional object. Then I develop an ontology in which non-existent objects exist in some way. To admit these weird entities, we must criticize our ordinary view about what it means for something to exist. This ontology is not naturalist per se. The ontology developed here is "neutral" with regards to metaphysics. I chose the path of naturalism because I consider self-referential-consistency to be a good criteria from a meta-ontological point of view. Finally, I take the essentialist view on race and the constructivist view on gender as examples to show why the ontology developed here is important. The structure of the argument is similar to Quine's argument in "On what there is" but the substance is different.

Leah Ritterfeld. *Who Would Want to be an Incel?*

The term 'incels' refers to a subculture of mostly young men who identify as 'involuntary celibates', meaning they view themselves as unable to find romantic or sexual partners despite wanting to. This group has built an online community wherein members share their feelings of frustration and resentment. After several violent attacks in the past few years were connected to the incel movement, the group has become a concern for law enforcement and public safety in several countries. However, it is important to note that most members of the incel community do not support or engage in violent behavior. Nonetheless, the incel group is known for its explicitly hateful (misogynist, racist) rhetoric. Several philosophers, especially from feminist philosophy, such as Kate Manne, Amia Srinivasan, and Filipa Melo Lopes, have engaged with the incel moment, arguing that the incel ideology has harmful consequences for society.

Part of my research consists in examining philosophical explanations for the incel phenomenon and identifying their underlying presuppositions. I hypothesize that there may be some flaws in these presuppositions which could explain why the explanations do not align with recently discovered empirical evidence. My aim is to develop an alternative theoretical framework for the incel phenomenon which is based on an analysis of individual experiences as well as group-level social identity formation. More specifically, I will integrate the concepts 'inferiority complex' (Alfred Adler), 'ressentiment' (Max Scheler), and 'looping effects' (Ian Hacking), with references to psychology and sociology. Additionally, it appears to be crucial to contextualize the incel movement within relevant developments in today's dating culture, the rise in rates of loneliness among young men, and sexual shame and stigma. Though the term 'incel' is such a negatively laden term, it continues to function as a positive identity category for some men. My theoretical framework aims to shed light on the social dynamics that promote the formation and maintenance of this identity category. In contrast to other philosophers, I will not merely examine the hateful posts on incel forums but will conduct semi-structured interviews with self-identified incels to verify my theoretical framework. Normative implications (e.g., epistemic, discursive, or ontic injustice) that may follow from my proposal will be discussed.

Abe Roth. *Reasons preservation and entitlement in testimony – lessons from shared agency and lessons for epistemic injustice.*

An important development in the philosophy of action and practical reasoning is the understanding of intention as a committal state. Intention involves a practical matter being settled so that the agent can take it for granted in subsequent practical reasoning, planning, and action (Harman 1986, Bratman 1987). But it is important for a theory of agency to connect this committal element with another aspect of agency, namely the justification and explanation of action in terms of reasons (Anscombe 1957, Davidson 1963). The connection between intention and reasons explanation comes with understanding intention as a reason-preserving mechanism. Reasons that figure in episodes of deliberation and intention formation are preserved and "transmitted" so that when subsequently acting on the intention, the agent counts as acting for those reasons. The agent is entitled to those reasons even if she doesn't have them in mind at the time of action. No doubt more controversial is an interpersonal version of entitlement, especially insofar as this raises issues regarding collective responsibility and blame. But examples suggest that it's quite plausible to think of a suitably restricted and qualified entitlement holding across individuals involved in joint intention and shared agency.

I suggest that something like this reasons-preservation and entitlement in intention can help us understand the distinctive warrant one has for belief acquired through testimony. Several philosophers have argued for an "inheritance" view, where the reasons that justify or warrant the hearer's belief that P upon being told that P are the very reasons that warrant the speaker's expressed belief that P (e.g., Owens 2017; Schmitt 2006; Faulkner 2000, and on some readings Burge 1993, 1997). Many criticize the inheritance view (Barnett 2015 and Malmgren 2013). It certainly runs afoul of the influential Humean reduction of testimonial warrant to induction on the track record of speaker reliability. The case for the inheritance picture draws strength, however, from an analogy with memory and the epistemology thereof. This analogy is developed most forcefully by Burge, even if its implications for the preservation/inheritance picture are obscured by Burge's concern with the orthogonal issue of a priori warrant.

Malmgren has rightly challenged defenders of the inheritance model to provide a mechanism that implements interpersonal warrant preservation and entitlement. I propose to provide precisely that. If we adopt the mechanism familiar to us from thinking about intention in the philosophy of action and shared agency, then we can see how the speaker's epistemic agency can sometimes be exerted on and through the hearer, and – under the right conditions – shared with the hearer. And if this is indeed an instance of shared epistemic agency, then the hearer will be entitled to the speaker's reasons.

I defend this intention model of the reasons-preservation mechanism. I address an argument that would, if successful, show that the intention mechanism cannot work for testimonial belief because we lack the particular form of rational control over beliefs that we have for intentions. I also explore implications of this model of testimony to better characterize a form of epistemic injustice (Fricker 2003, 2007).

Jan Rostek. *Can group mind realists secure mental causation?*

I argue that interpretivism, which is a popular theory of intentional states among group mind realists, leads to major worries about the causal efficacy of group mental states, which puts group mind realism into doubt.

Realists about group minds usually choose to endorse functionalism or interpretivism about the nature of intentional states (Strohmaier 2020). The latter approach, which is based on Dennett's theory of intentional stance, is a foundation for some of the major realist theories such as those of Tollefsen (2015) or List and Pettit (2011). These are examples of non-reductive positions and non-reductivism has long been notorious for being susceptible to the causal exclusion problem. Recently the most popular way out for non-reductionists has been adopting some less metaphysically loaded notion of causation, such as Woodward's (2003) interventionism or List's and Menzies' (2009) difference-making account. Also Eronen (2020) has argued that interpretivism becomes a plausible position when coupled with interventionism.

I want to present two important worries about this interpretivism-interventionism marriage, which potentially have serious impact for the plausibility of group mind realism. First worry is specific for group agents and concerns the differences between interventions on individual and group intentional states. According to interventionism, in simplified terms, some state X causes some behavior Y if there is a possible intervention on X which affects the occurence of Y. Intepretivists claims that mental states are states of the whole agent (and not just e.g. her brain), so in the case of individual mental causation interventionism sounds plausible, as we have a grasp of what it takes to intervene on a belief or intention per se (and we might not even know which interventions on brain properties would affect the behavior Y). However, the group case is different, as we are much more familiar with what it would take to intervene on group agent's internal properties (such as group members' intentional states or group's procedures) than with the possibility of intervening on a group intentional state per se. The possibility of intervention on the group as a single agent is significantly less comprehensible than interventions on a whole individual. This relates to Moen's (2019) broader worry that intentional stance might not be the best option when interpreting groups.

My second point arises from Tollefsen's commitment to dispositionalism, which could even be a must for any form of interpretivism, as Curry (2021) acknowledges. According to dispositionalism, having intentional states is tantamount to having some set of behavioral dispositions. When paired with interventionism it would mean that an intentional state X causes a behavior Y if there is an intervention on a set of dispositions which affects the occurence of the very behavior included in those dispositions. That would make claims about mental causation analytic truths about dispositions, which stands in opposition to a reasonable requirement of causation being at least partly an empirical matter. This is a general problem for dispositionalists of all sorts.

Grant Rozeboom. *Corporate Sincerity: Accommodation, Appreciation, and Applause.*

A question of corporate sincerity arises in two kinds of situations: Accommodation – we consider whether to avoid burdening an organization with a request or task that, but for the distinctive normative commitments it claims, it would be expected to carry out. And Appreciation – we consider to what extent an organization's good behavior on some occasion warrants a response of trust, gratitude, and/or appreciation, i.e., of giving moral credit. I argue that, in both kinds of situations, we are centrally confronted with the question of whether the corporate agent maintains a relevant set of practical dispositions that, on Strawsonian views of moral responsibility, help constitute attitudes of "goodwill." Building on previous work, I provide an account of how corporate agents can maintain such dispositions. This specifies an important form of corporate sincerity, of when corporate agents "really mean it" when they act well or make admirable claims.

I first illustrate Accommodation and Appreciation situations and argue that they have a common normative core. Accommodation situations are exemplified by companies, such as Hobby Lobby, that tout their distinctive cultural or religious identity/culture as a reason to avoid participating in activities that are objectionable in light of the normative commitments contained in this identity. Appreciation situations are exemplified by companies, such as Amazon and its environmental or DEI efforts, that do something genuinely morally good or right, but these actions leave open the question of whether the company deserves moral credit – of whether the company's action warrants trust, appreciation, or gratitude. In both kinds of situations, I argue, we sensibly look at the corporate agent's wider practical dispositions. Does the corporate agent's decision-making manifest a holistic normative stance, where "holistic" refers to the wider set of valuing attitudes that a given normative commitment entails? I argue that the best way to explain our concern with a corporate agent's holistic practical dispositions is by viewing them as (partially) constitutive of attitudes of Strawsonian goodwill – care, respect, love, and the like.

I go on to provide a general account of what it is for corporate agents to manifest holistic practical dispositions that help constitute Strawsonian goodwill-attitudes, focusing on corporate decision-making and information-gathering procedures (both formal and informal). The basic idea is that corporate agents need to implement procedures that instantiate the practical functioning of goodwill-attitudes. This generates an informative, unifying conception of corporate sincerity – of when corporate agents "really mean it," both in what they say and do. I conclude by showing how this conception of corporate sincerity helps both explain and decentralize worries about deception that arise when organizations are accused of performing good, "token" actions merely for the sake of reputation management ,i.e., greenwashing or bluewashing. Are they merely trying to elicit applause, or are they sincere and acting for the right reasons? While deception may be a typical symptom of the former, it is not necessary; what is fundamentally at stake is whether companies manifest corporate practical dispositions of goodwill.

Kevin Richardson. *"Just a Little Gay": How Sexual Orientation Comes in Degrees.*

You can be a little gay or a lot gay. You can be mostly heterosexual. You can be somewhat lesbian. You can be bicurious. You can be heteroflexible — heterosexual in some circumstances but not others. You can be sexually fluid. What I'm saying is: sexual orientation comes in degrees. This point is well-established in sexuality studies, but largely neglected by philosophers. The on-off (or absolutist) model of sexual orientation, which is implicit in most philosophical theories of sexual orientation, misrepresents social reality. I aim to correct this state of affairs. I propose a theory of sexual orientation that is fundamentally scalar and multidimensional: scalar, because sexual orientation comes in degrees; multidimensional, because there are various dimensions of sexual orientation — desire, disposition, duration, etc.

Here is the plan for my presentation. I start by describing non-binary sexual orientations like heteroflexible. I show that existing theories of sexual orientation fail to perspicuously describe non-binary sexual orientations. These theories fail because they cannot account for the scalar nature of sexual orientation. I also argue that we need theories of sexual orientation to account for non-binary sexual orientations. Sexuality studies scholars show that a large portion of the population may have non-binary sexual orientations; so the case of non-binary sexual orientation is not merely an exception to the rule.

For the rest of the presentation, I lay out my positive theory. I represent the basic structure of a theory of sexual orientation and then argue that a good theory should be multidimensional and scalar. I use conceptual spaces theory to conceive of sexual orientations geometrically, as regions in (what I call) sexual orientation space. According to conceptual spaces theory, concepts are represented as prototypes or exemplars, not descriptive lists of properties. Objects can be more or less similar to such exemplars. In the case of sexual orientation, we pick out sexual orientation categories using exemplars of the respective categories; even stronger: to be a member of a sexual orientation category is to be sufficiently similar to the exemplar of that category. I end by showing how the resulting theory of sexual orientation can account for the diversity of sexual orientation categories.

Dusan Reboij. Norms of the many, courage of the few: the role of an act-based view of courage in a structural account of non-domination

The paper is part of ongoing work to formulate a theory of political courage. It claims that a nondemanding view of courage can be made to interact with the recent literature on the emergence and maintenance of norms (social and otherwise), resulting in a new account of how courage performs an old political role – that of helping secure non-domination.

I assume the following: (1) Efforts to realise non-domination – irrespective of non-domination's precise relation to freedom and justice –, continue to be the most relevant context in which to explain the political function of courage. (2) Due to the success of the situationist critique of traditional virtue ethics, courage is best understood as a standard of action rather than a trait of character capable of securing desirable behaviour across situations. (3) Non-domination, understood in structural but agential terms, is ultimately secured by the formation and maintenance of formal and non-formal norms.

In pursuit of (1), I claim that despite (2), courage can play a part in (3). I outline three ways in which courage can do so.

Courage is a property of acts that are risky or difficult, and appropriate to the realisation of a good. Further, courage is a property of acts rather than personalities, such that a courageous act does not increase the likelihood that the agent will act courageously in the future, or would in a different situation. The former feature makes courageous acting accessible to few people. The latter renders

it occasional even from these people's perspective. If so, what role can courage – a property of occasional acts of few people – play in the formation and maintenance of norms – regularities of behaviour with which most people comply and expect others to comply on the pain of penalty, ranging from legal sanctions to social censure? Bracketing the question whether failure to act courageously can be justifiably penalised, I suggest that courageous action can impact several aspects of norm formation and maintenance:

a) as demanding vigilance – acts of personal endangerment or sacrifice in defence of the basic conditions for norm compliance, including the compliance with legal norms

b) as acts of personal endangerment or sacrifice in establishing norms

b1) as acts that make undesirable behaviour too costly, e.g., to establish the deliberative norms of mutual acceptability ("Deliberate or else!")

b2) as acts that provoke bandwagon behaviour and norm cascades, e.g., in acts of civil disobedience

b3) as risky instances of trust in political conflict before trust can be properly institutionalized

c) once norms are established, as examples of compliance with them, particularly as acts of resilience in the face of pandemics, environmental collapse, and demographic change.

I claim that the above satisfies two requirements. Because in all three aspects courage retains the elements of individual initiative and deliberateness, it continues to constitute a virtue. And because it need not predict cross-situational and cross-temporal consistency of behaviour in all people, it respects the conditions of the situationist critique of virtue ethics.

Jooseppi Räikkönen. *Political Self Deception and the Construction of Money.*

This paper argues that there has been a failure in recent political economy and political theory literature to distinguish between two different understandings of "political money" or money as a social construction. I further claim that this confusion has led to them conflating two kinds of political wrong resulting from "depoliticising" money, and hence unduly ignoring the inherent power relations behind monetary arrangements. The first way of understanding money as political, "the construction conception" is to view it as a social object created by a group agent. The second way, "the contingency conception" is to view any given monetary arrangement as contingent.

In Keynesian-inspired research on money, it has been proposed that so-called "depoliticised" money is a problematic form of self-delusion by political communities, as money is inherently politically and socially constructed (Eich 2022; Pettifor 2017). But using my distinction between the construction and contingency conceptions, I point out that these arguments conflate two senses of political self-deception.

While the contingency arguments often claim that money's contingency originates in its "social construction", the sense in which a community depoliticises money in the two cases is different. Under construction conceptions the political "harm" or wrong of depoliticisation is akin to self-deception, here done by group agents. If an individual refuses to acknowledge they are an alcoholic, for example, they are deceiving themself. Similarly, if a group treats its own construction as an eternal fact, it is deceiving itself (I use Tuomela 2013 here). Contrary to this, in the contingency conception, self-deception is about naturalising the arrangement, when alternative arrangements are still possible (I use Hacking 1999). Keynesians also sometimes limit the construction of money strictly only to the state, hence the construction conception could only be strict self-deception by the state itself.

Hence if Keynesian authors do not make my distinction, when they claim that "we" are deceiving ourselves about "our" constructions, it is not entirely clear whether they refer to society at large, or to the state system in particular. If money is constructed in the strict sense only by the state, then the state is deceiving itself in the construction sense, and society at large in the contingency sense. When an account fails to distinguish between these two senses it is also in danger of ignoring the inherent power structures behind monetary arrangements, as attributing self-deception to a broad "us", when we have not constructed anything, is a mistake. I finish with a brief remark about how these debates around money could benefit from following Åsa Burman's recent plea for nonideal social ontology.

Wendy Salkin. *"Writers Are Not Congressmen".*

Many willingly take it upon themselves to speak and write publicly about the plights of others. Some, like artists, authors, journalists, and academics, structure their lives' works around doing so. This social role and its context are characterized by four features:

(1) group-regarding: the subject matter of their work is about a social group;

(2) public-facing: the work is intended for public dissemination, rather than directed at de jure or de facto private audiences (like a scholarly milieu);

(3) intentional: the writers and speakers intend to speak publicly about the underlying subject matter; and

(4) theoretical authoritativeness: the writers and speakers are theoretical authorities about their underlying subject matter.

People tend to enter this social role voluntarily.

Frequently, parties who inhabit the social role just described, call them "public-facing theoretical authorities" (PFTAs), come to be regarded by audiences to be speaking not merely about the social group at issue but, further, to be speaking for the group itself as its informal political representative (IPR). We may think of the transition they face as one of going from a position solely of theoretical authority or go-between (reporting on the group or its plight to broader audiences) to a position of practical go-between (speaking on the group's behalf). Some IPRs may even become practical authorities with respect to those they represent.

Although it is foreseeable that PFTAs will often be taken to speak for the groups they document, it would be inapt to say that they intend to be regarded as so doing. Commonly, the institutional roles inhabited by PFTAs are mediated by professional ethics that counsel impartiality, neutrality, objectivity—principles prima facie at odds with the expectation that they do or even may speak for the groups about which they write or speak. But, while we may confidently say that many PFTAs do not intend to speak or act for the groups about which they write or speak, we cannot straightforwardly conclude that they have then been conscripted into the role of IPR. Unlike other private parties, PFTAs elect to speak and write publicly about particular groups. They do not attempt to keep themselves out of the public eye totally.

How should we understand the ambiguous social role such speakers and writers inhabit—who have voluntarily undertaken the role of speaking or writing publicly about particular groups but who did necessarily sign up for an unintended (although arguably foreseeable) consequent role of IPR for groups whose plights they document?

In §II, I discuss my approach. In §III, I examine the relationship between the PFTA role and more familiar social roles. In §§IV-V, I examine two moral considerations: In §IV, I consider broad questions about what we want these roles to be. In §V, I consider the individual political morality of the PFTA.

To ground this inquiry in concrete examples, I focus on three examples of parties who have both inhabited the PFTA role and reflected publicly on what that role requires of them—Arlie Hochschild, Wesley Lowery, and Ida B. Wells-Barnett.

Hans Bernhard Schmid. We, Together – The Social Ontology of Us
This talk summarizes the main ideas in the 2023 OUP book by the talk title.

Who are we? We are agents, and what we do is – among other things – live together. Living together is a joint intentional activity. It involves joint/shared/collective intention. But what about joint/shared/collective intention is it that is joint/shared/collective?

The first part of the book proposes to structure the landscape of actual and possible positions in the field according to the analysis of intentionality in terms of intentional content, intentional mode, and intentional subject. Content-accounts, mode-accounts and subject-accounts each have their problems, and they have come to the fore in recent philosophical research. However, the standard objection against straightforward subject accounts rests on a mistaken ontology of the intentional subject.

The second part of the book argues that the intentional subject is the way in which intentionality is subjective, and that it is subjective in virtue of pre-reflective self-awareness under suitable circumstances. Pre-reflective self-awareness delivers self-identification, self-validation, self-commitment, and self-authorization (first-person authority). It is argued that these functions are realized *plurally* in "we intend to phi (together)", which is to say that attitude of this form has a plural intentional subject.

The third part of the book addresses the question of how this account of living together (or joint/shared/collective intention) cashes out in terms of basic social notions (such as community, social norm, society, politics, and ethics). One of the arguments developed here is this: being pre-reflectively self-identified, within "we intend to phi (together)", as who we (together) are is insufficient to live *rationally* together. We need to know, reflectively, who we are in order to organize ourselves. Self-conception, however, is notoriously prone to biases such as parochialism and conceptual imperialism. It is politically and ethically important to remember that who we are (pre-reflectively) is not who we take ourselves to be.

Mridula Sharma. *Gender Tokenised: Social Power, Co-optation, and Impact on Social Justice.*

Major corporate institutions across the world have instituted policies to emphasise the recruitment of individuals whose social kinds such as gender and race place them at a relative disadvantage on account of systemic inequalities. An increased focus on hiring does not, however, result in streamlined access to similar opportunities for workplace learning, mentorship, and promotion. Besides, whether or not an institution prioritises diversity inclusion, the facticity of inclusion by default does not merit adequacy when considered against the larger backdrop of social justice movements: women's inclusion in, for instance, capitalist corporate industries that create the false perception of radical change while maintaining existing systems of hierarchy does not merit celebration because corporations that accept and endorse identity to advertise their credibility without comprehending or supporting concrete moments of social transformation remain institutionally incapable of resonating with intellectual and activist traditions of resistance and critique.

The question, then, is: can a public demand for women billionaires productively contribute to existing conversations on social justice, given the potential of its pernicious impact on economic inequalities, which may even extend to accommodate political forms of organisation of power? If the demonstration of women leaders' investment in social justice remains incompatible with their embrace of systemic inequality, can and should diversity be visibilised? Further, can an institutionalised demand of women professionals' commitment to social justice recreate the very vocabularies of exclusion and control that require deformation? In engaging significant concerns pertaining to emerging shifts in global gender dynamics, my presentation aims to reconfigure dialogues on social justice, diversity inclusion, and identity politics in the workplace.

Ritu Sharma. *Rethinking Linguistic Agency in Speech Act Perspective.*

In this paper, I attempt to provide a roadmap for a non-binary model of linguistic agency that is capable of capturing victimization without ruling out the possibility of agency on the part of the silenced/powerless. In doing so, the aim is to find ways in which the systematic oppression of victims need not be seen as undermining the victims' agency. Instead, they are oppressed subjects who (despite their oppression) retain the use of speech and who, therefore, can attain the speech benefits. To establish my point about linguistic agency, I begin by evaluating Hornsby and Langton's account (1998) of illocutionary silencing, which I believe provides an insight into an account of linguistic agency in the speech act context. The assumption that underlies this particular claim is that the idea of linguistic agency can be understood as the ability to exercise agency in speech. In Hornsby and Langotn's account, such an ability follows from people's social power. Thus, a person can be said to have linguistic agency if they have power in the relevant domain. Similarly, the absence of power may mean the lack of agency. I object to this view by arguing that in light of the kinds of assumptions made about power in the account of illocutionary silencing, the idea of agency is caught up in a powerful/powerless binary, which has negative implications for a theory of linguistic agency in the context of oppression. My main concern here is that it appears that for the speaker to perform an act, they must have social power, which could lead to the problematic entailment that only the powerful get to perform illocutionary acts. Thus, in the absence of power, victims of silencing are reduced to agency-less subjects who can never be conceptualized in the role of linguistic agents that are ever in a position to perform illocutionary acts.

To establish my claim about the power-powerless binary, I draw on Mary Follett's (1942) ideas of "ontology of relations" and "power with" that appear in Banerjee's (2010) paper. Here, approaching a speech situation through an ontology of relations as opposed to an ontology of entities and bringing them to bear on speech act theory, I propose a way to develop a nuanced account of linguistic agency. Drawing on Banerjee (2010), I show how the feminist pragmatist ontology of relations allows us to see that an accurate account of agency or empowerment can be developed only when it portrays social reality in its many aspects. Thus, the focus should not be so much on speakers and hearers as individual entities tied within a dyadic relation but as nodes within a confluence of multiple relations. Considering the problems associated with the dichotomous understanding of power, I argue that a comprehensive account of agency must capture the victimization, practices, acts, or social relations that can feasibly be rendered as unjust but do not overrule agency in the process.

Sebastian Stuart. *From Dysphoria to Euphoria: A Trans Account of Gender Kinds.*

A central question of the 'culture wars' is how the nature of gender impacts the oppression of marginalised groups. Scholars in social ontology (Jenkins 2018; Dembroff 2020; Ásta 2018) have attempted to provide trans inclusive accounts of gender. Feminist epistemologists (Bettcher 2009; Fricker 2007; Harding 2004) have argued that marginalised groups have an epistemic advantage in understanding their oppression, so centering first person testimony is vital to combat injustices. However, despite dysphoria being a paradigmatic theme of trans lived experiences of gender, none of these works have addressed the role of dysphoria in determining gender kinds. Through an analysis of first person testimonies I argue that dysphoria and euphoria modify gender to form distinct gender kinds.

Dysphoria is when present sex characteristics do not match an internal target of one's congruent sex characteristics. More precisely I define dysphoria as having three related elements as follows:

- A marked incongruence between one's experienced or anticipated sex characteristics, and one's natal sex characteristics.

- A strong desire to be rid of at least one of one's natal sex characteristics.

- A strong desire for sex characteristics one does not possess, congruent with one's gender.

By euphoria I mean the absence of dysphoria — the absence of incongruence between one's present sex characteristics and one's internal target of one's congruent sex characteristics. This could either be because one's present sex characteristics match one's internal target of congruent sex characteristics or because one has no internal target of congruent sex characteristics to fail to match with. Similarly to dysphoria, euphoria can be more precisely stated with respect to three components:

- An absence of incongruence between one's experienced or anticipated sex characteristics, and one's present sex characteristics.

- No desire to be rid of any of one's present sex characteristics.

- No desire for sex characteristics one does not possess, congruent with another gender.

I agree with Jenkins (2020) that there is an implicit consensus in social ontology that social constraints and enablements at least partly constitute what it is to be a given social kind. In particular, I focus on gender kinds - social kinds which are in some appropriate way grounded in sex characteristics. Gender constraints and enablements contain an implicit justification grounded in sex characteristics, and they paradigmatically refer to sex characteristics. For example, men in pest-control are required to be clean-shaven to ensure gas-masks seal; the need for the rule is explained by the disposition of men to grow facial hair. Where the given sex characteristic is the object of dysphoria, dysphoric people face an additional cost as the salience of dysphoria is raised, producing the characteristic distress. Therefore, dysphoria systematically modifies gender constraints and enablements, forming distinct modified gender kinds.

The most important upshot is that recognising that dysphoria forms a distinct gender kind reveals a distinctive justification for physical transition to remove dysphoria. Failing to provide physical transition perpetuates an ontic injustice where dysphoric people are forced into being a different gender kind.

Ric Sims. *A coordinated systems approach to group cognition.*

How should we understand group cognition? In an influential paper George Theiner, Colin Allen, and Robert Goldstone (2010) propose that group cognition in human beings is an emergent phenomenon consisting in the manifestation of various cognitive capacities at the level of the group, and that this is a consequence of taking an 'extended mind' approach to cognition. They support these claims through examples such as the goal-directed behaviour of social insects and the formation of human path patterns. These claims are hotly contested by, amongst others, Kirk Ludwig (2015) who argues that the alleged group-level capacity can be explained in terms of individual capacities, thus denying its emergentist credentials, or by a denying the existence of the group-level capacity in the first place. One of the reasons that Theiner and colleagues run into problems is their reluctance to provide a complete theoretical framework for understanding their claims. Instead, they appeal to examples and claim a functional equivalence between the group and the individual cases – a parity principle if you will. It seems that they hope that the examples chosen leverage intuitions about the plausibility of such a parity principle. If the equivalence is doubted, the relevance of the examples questioned, or the intuitions rejected there is little else to support the argument.

The current paper provides a general framework for understanding cognition at all scales including at the social level. It therefore supplies the missing jigsaw piece to support the claims of Theiner and colleagues. The central proposal is that a cognitive system may be characterised as a coordinated set of more or less autonomous processes. Coordination can be given a precise functional description and amounts to a 'fitting together' of these processes in a time critical manner. Central to this coordinated systems account (CSA) is the notion of stigmergy by which the results of previous actions of the system in the world (or its constituent processes) help coordinate future actions. The CSA provides a framework to understand and support the claims made by Theiner et al regarding group cognition. The CSA brings with it some desirable consequences. It avoids begging the cognitive question on representations, represented goals, or phenomenal consciousness. It supposes that the goals and tasks at system-level are also emergent entities thus removing the requirement for shared goals on behalf of group members. It is scale-invariant in that CSA analysis may apply to sub-personal systems, personal systems, or social systems. It allows groups to be cognitive as well as the individuals that make them up – considered by Theiner to be true group cognition (2014). It provides a way of understanding minimal cognition that does not privilege any particular class of organism – for example, plants are not ruled out of the cognitive club purely on zoological grounds. Finally, it shows why some of the examples chosen by Theiner et al are paradigmatic rather than arbitrary. These examples work well because they illustrate the essentially distributed nature of cognition in a direct way – for example, in both social insects and path formation systems, the essential stigmergy is clear to see. The paper outlines the CSA and applies it to both the examples and the objections. The CSA supplies a research programme that suggests further investigations.

Shabnam Singla. *Understanding Testimonial Injustice Through the Lens of Conflicting Social Group Membership.*

In this paper, I aim to bring together the literature on different accounts of social groups (Fine 1999, Bratman 1993, Koslicki 2008, Ritchie, 2018) in order to provide a deeper understanding of the phenomenon of testimonial injustice. According to Fricker, testimonial injustice occurs when hearers attribute credibility deficit to a speaker because of a systematic identity prejudice and consequently dismiss the speaker's testimonial assertions (Fricker, 2007). I will apply different accounts of social group memberships to understand what exactly this injustice.

Firstly, I will show how the "systematic identity prejudice" in the given definition usually stems from one's belonging to a social group of marginalized race, gender, class, etc. - this can be understood as one level of the social group membership of the speaker. Secondly, I will postulate that, on another level, one can understand the 'group' involving the hearers and speakers in the given context to be a second social group. Hence, this is the second group membership of the speaker. On the surface, this second social group is involved in the joint action of communication - understanding a certain situation through the speaker's testimony. Where all members participate knowledgeably in coordination with one another (Bratman, 2014). They have shared intentions to communicate, and have common knowledge of group members, and have "meshing intentions" to perform the act of communication by the way of action and plan of other members (Bratman, 2014). I will apply this (and other accounts) and show how, as one looks deeper, it becomes clearer that the epistemic harm suffered by the speakers in epistemic injustice stems directly from the asymmetric dependence of the speaker on the hearers. Hence, breaking the assumptions of meshing intentions and equal cooperation. That is, the setting of this group does not allow for the assumptions of joint action and shared intentionality to hold. Hence, leading to impaired cooperation.

But what exactly causes this impaired cooperation in joint action? I argue that this impaired cooperation arises by virtue of the speaker's membership in the marginalized social group. I analyze these two levels of the group membership of the speaker and show how membership of one group can impact the properties of another group – leading to epistemic injustice in this case. Overall, this would have interesting implications on our metaphysical understanding of social groupings and their properties – here, I have shown that the property of an individual, that is, the 'individual's property' of being a member of one group can affect the 'group property' of another group. This can be applied to cases of other kinds of injustice, and further work on this can lead to interesting connections showing how we might otherwise understand/construct social categories with the aim of social improvement.

Kenneth Silver and Kyle Fritz. *Guilty by Association: How Group Membership Can Undermine Standing to Blame.*

It may seem rich for a police officer in the US to criticize someone for using excessive violence, given that the police are often accused of such violence themselves. Calls for bipartisanship from a member of a famously isolated political party might also raise rancor, and a reply, "Why don't you tell that to your own group?" In some cases, it can appear appropriate to respond to one's blame by pointing out the bad behavior of other members of the blamer's group.

In the literature on blame, there has been good recent work on various conditions of moral standing—what is required to be in a position to appropriately blame—as well as on the considerations that may undermine it. Relevantly, if someone has been engaging in the very conduct for which they are blaming another, then they are a hypocrite, and they plausibly lack the standing to blame others for that conduct. But what if they didn't engage in that bad conduct, but they are a member of a group whose other members do regularly engage in that conduct? Does their affiliation somehow undermine their standing to blame others?

We explore this question of whether and how being a member of a group with members engaging in certain bad conduct undermines one's standing to blame others for conduct of that kind. To begin, we survey the most popular explanations for why hypocritical blamers lack standing. On moral equality accounts, the hypocritical blamer violates the moral equality of persons by blaming others but not themselves. On taking norms seriously accounts, the hypocritical blamer fails to take norms seriously by blaming others but not themselves. Either of these accounts could explain why, in certain cases, a group member may lack standing even if they are not guilty of the wrongdoing themselves. When the group constitutively involves engaging in the bad conduct, and when the potential blamer is themselves merely a voluntary member of the group, continued membership in the group may express a violation of the moral equality of persons or a failure to take the relevant norms seriously.

Yet it's more challenging to make sense of the charge of undermined standing when the group does not constitutively or even necessarily violate the norm in question, but where there is merely a stereotype of disregarding that norm. Similarly, when the potential blamer cannot leave the group, or only leave it at high cost, the charge may not stick. These nuances make relevant the introduction of adjacent discussions involving complicity, potential duties to countersignal, stereotyping, and oppression.

We close the paper by considering the dynamics of using this charge of insufficient standing dialectically. Arguably, adverting to the bad conduct of members of the potential blamer's group smacks of a disingenuous evading of blame, a form of "whataboutism". Using the tools developed in the paper, though, we show how to tease out the cases where standing is undermined by group membership, and when and why the non sequitur charge is warranted.

Matti Sarkia. *Methodological naturalism and social ontology.*

Methodological naturalism in the philosophy of the social sciences refers to the idea that the methods of philosophy are continuous with the methods of the social sciences, and that the objects of investigation of the philosophy of the social sciences are not fundamentally different in kind from the objects of investigation of the natural sciences in a manner that would make them in principle unamenable to scientific investigation (Ross 2011). Many contemporary philosophers of social ontology, which I understand as a part of the philosophy of the social sciences, have claimed that their accounts are ontologically naturalistic in the sense that they are compatible with the basic tenets of the natural sciences—such as the atomic theory of matter or the Darwinian theory of evolution by natural selection (e.g. Searle 2010; Tuomela 2013). Nevertheless, numerous philosophers with a background in the philosophy of science have during recent years argued that much contemporary research on social ontology is still carried out in a methodologically anti-naturalist spirit, which seeks to separate philosophical investigation from the social sciences rather than to establish a solid connection between the two (e.g. Guala 2016; Kincaid 2012; Sarkia 2021). My presentation disentangles three types of criticisms that have been directed at contemporary social ontology from a methodologically naturalist perspective (Sarkia&Kaidesoja, forthcoming):

(Relevance challenge)

Social ontology is too detached from social scientific research practices to give social scientists any practically relevant guidance in their research

(Epistemic challenge)

Social ontology relies on an unacceptably a priori mode of reasoning, which is not compatible with the a posteriori nature of scientific investigation

(Scope challenge)

Social ontology erroneously advocates global solutions to local and pragmatic problems, whereas most (social) scientific models and theories have restricted scope and require weighing different epistemic virtues against one another

My presentation argues that a particular naturalistic approach to social ontology, which is based on theoretical modeling and model-construction as a central method of philosophical investigation, is able to answer to these three challenges (Sarkia 2021). In the philosophy of science, theoretical modeling has been analyzed as one central strategy of scientific investigation, which relies on indirect study of some surrogate system (e.g. a system of differential equations or a model organism), which is then used to draw inferences about the world, instead of directly studying the world through empirical observation and experiment (Godfrey-Smith 2006; Weisberg 2007). Importantly, theoretical models can also be studied in their own right, independently of the formulation of any detailed theoretical hypotheses about in what respects and to what extent the model is similar to the world (Giere 1988). In principle, theoretical modeling thus embodies a type of two-stage process, where a theoretical model is first constructed "in the laboratory of the mind" and then calibrated to fit the details of a particular phenomenon, even if there may in practice be considerable back-and-forth motion between the two stages. In my presentation, I argue that this guarantees a reasonable degree of independence to philosophical social ontology, while also ensuring that it is continuous with the social sciences in the manner intended by methodological naturalists.

Glenda Satne. *Sharing Affordances: From Dyadic Interaction to Collective Information.*

Cognitivist approaches to joint attention conceptualize it as a form of triangular interaction between two agents and one object. When describing the interpersonal dimension of this triangle they frame it as a form of simulation, theorising or both, involving representations of the other agent's mental states – representation of representations – and inferences. In this presentation, I advocate for a different framework for understanding shared attention, the ecological psychology framework, that understands attention through the notion of 'affordance'. The ecological psychology framework understands attention through the notion of 'affordance'. Affordances are relational and not representational. They are direct relationships between agents and their environments.

The notion of 'social affordance' has been used in recent literature on social cognition (see Heft 2007, 2017; Rietveld and Kiverstein 2014; Moreira de Carvalho 2020) to describe our ability to perceive the social world, both as it is portrayed in our partners' attitudes towards the world, and as it is conveyed by the social objects that are part of our cultural environments. Yet the notion of 'social affordance' remains general and imprecise. The problem is that the term is used in the specialised literature to refer to different phenomena that involve social interactions in very different ways. To address this issue this presentation offers a novel categorical framework that classifies social affordances in different kinds: from dyadic relations between agents, and different forms of triangular interaction between agents -reciprocal and non-reciprocal- that provide direct and indirect information about common environments, to collective affordances that lie at the basis of socio-cultural forms of life. To conclude, it is argued that this categorical framework fares better than its cognitivist alternative in accounting for the acquisition of the sociocultural norms that come to permeate human perception as an outcome of social development. Categorising the notion of 'social affordances' in its different types offers fundamental tools to make sense of the fundamental components of early human social interactions, by repeatedly engaging in social interactions that involve the mutual coordination and perception of social affordances, children learn social norms, consolidating perception-action habits that enable them to behave according to what is considered normal or acceptable within their communities.

The upshot of this theoretical reconceptualisation of basic forms of social interaction is not only the defence of the idea that joint action is possible without mental representations, but also that the learning of the socio-cultural norms that permeate our cultural perceptions and actions does not depend on the existence of such representations. Rather, this form of socio-cultural learning depends on our habitualization to embodied socio-cultural norms that we learn from other community members from early childhood.

Cynthia Stark. *Structural Gender Injustice and Rawls's Social Ontology.*

A society that is just by liberal standards may nevertheless contain structural gender injustice. For example, women in existing liberal societies are burdened with more unpaid care and domestic work than men, despite legal prohibitions on employment discrimination, the availability of gender-neutral family leave provisions and individuals' commitments to gender equality. This type of injustice consists in and is supported by social practices of male dominance which are made up of schemas that generate an unequal division of benefits and burdens between women and men. The fact that women do more care work than men, for instance, is caused by (among other things) internalized gender norms assigning responsibility for that work to women and ideals about and what types of activities qualify as work. Some liberals have recently proposed solutions to structural gender injustice that they claim is consistent with John Rawls's general approach. The first proposes an addition to Rawls's social ontology, namely an "ethos" of gender justice that can minimize practices of male dominance through non-coercive means. Promoting such an ethos would combat e.g., the belief that women are primarily responsible for care work. The second approach claims that the ideal of equal citizenship demands eradicating practices of male dominance by coercively regulating basic social institutions. The extra labor demanded of women, on this view, diminishes their opportunities to e.g., participate in politics. So, the state should ensure the wide availability of heavily subsidized, high-quality childcare.

I argue, first, that the notion of an ethos is in tension with Rawls's social ontology and that revising it to eliminate that tension explains away the problem of structural gender injustice rather than solving it. I argue, second, that the coercive regulation of basic institutions is not apt to alter schemas and so can be only minimally effective in eliminating gender unjust practices. I then sketch the following solution: liberals should seek to establish social conditions that disrupt, discourage, or undermine practices of male dominance. For example, data show that what dictates women's attrition from male-dominated occupations is not primarily women's preferences for flexible jobs, which they are alleged to seek as a means of balancing work and family obligations. Rather, it is whether the training for their jobs also affords them skills for coping with sexism on the job. This suggests a policy consistent with liberal values: schools should teach girls specific strategies for managing workplace sexism.

Anna Strasser and Joshua Rust. *Music Group Survival Factors.*

What are the factors that can account for the survival or persistence of a music group? As there is no simple answer that could be based on necessary conditions applying to all types of music groups, we investigate the manifold varieties of music groups and propose a spectrum of possibilities that can capture all kinds of music groups.

Following Brian Epstein (2019), we begin with two exemplars of music groups: a loosely connected group of street musicians that comes into existence as soon as they play together and terminates when they stop playing after a few minutes, and an institutionally structured group, such as the Berliner Philharmoniker that is typically formed when articles of incorporation are filed with the appropriate authorities and persists until it has been formally disbanded, whether or not its members are regularly playing music. As the persistence of a group of street musicians is closely connected to the fact that they are playing music, groups of this type can be characterized by a functionalist conception (Guala 2016). Concerning institutionally structured groups, the persistence depends rather on their constitutive rules than their function (Searle 1995).

The example of music groups is a fertile one and we explore modalities of survival that resist being shoehorned into either one of these exemplary cases. In addition to function and constitutive rules, we consider other relevant factors such as self- and other-attribution, structure, changes in line-up, and performance characteristics. Thereby we show, for example, that being institutionally anchored is not a necessary condition for arguing for the persistence of a group that is not always fulfilling its function of playing music. Furthermore, our investigation into the varieties of music groups will demonstrate that groups can even survive the transition from one kind of group to another. Finally, we consider cases where the continued existence of a group is indeterminate. In such cases, the question of persistence seems to be an empty question (Parfit 1986) and cannot be answered but is decided by internal or external ascriptions. Acknowledging interesting in-between cases motivates our claim that there is a spectrum of music groups and explains how factors decisive to persistence can vary. In this way, we expand Epstein's disjunctive conceptual framework by allowing music groups to fulfill very distinct sets of conditions and conclude by drawing several lessons we think the investigation implies for social ontological inquiry in general.

Pyro Suarez. *High-Order Moral Twin-Earth.*

How to understand ontological disputes is a disputed matter. Within this broader dispute, under a deflationist approach to ontology, many ontological disputes end up being merely verbal. The High-Order Moral Twin-Earth [HOMTE] intends to show that such an approach gives the wrong results for debates on moral realism and race/gender realism.

I appeal to the following thought experiment [HOMTE]. Take a community of pessimistic amoral scientists who happen to be value nihilists1. They limit the scope of their speech to what science can reach and refuse to use moral predicates given that, according to them, these are empty words. Parallelly, take a community of robust moral realists2 who largely use moral predicates to guide their behavior as they believe that non-natural mind-independent moral entities are being referred to by their predicates. These realists argue that we should act morally by virtue of these entities. It is precisely about this respect that we should think that both communities have a genuine disagreement.

I argue that ontological deflationism is unable to model the metaethical dispute described in [HOMTE] as a genuine one. Both Quantifier Variance3 [QV], and the Easy Ontology4 [EO] are committed to modeling the disagreement in [HOMTE] as one where disagreeing parties are talking past each other. On the one hand, [QV] is committed to a dependence of existential claims on linguistic choices of the speakers—via polysemy in the quantifier. On the other hand, [EO] is committed to a dependence of existential claims on the application conditions of a term—which are dependent of speakers' competencies. Hence, the disagreement described in [HOMTE] would have to be understood under the following logical forms:

(Take 'E' to be an Existential Quantifier)

[HOMTE] according to [QV] = E_1xFx vs. $\neg E_2xFx$

[HOMTE] according to [EO] = ExF_1x vs. $\neg ExF_2x$

I argue that these characterizations fail because (1) they are not instances of genuine disagreements, (2) one disagreeing party is unable to properly express the mistake they think the other one is committed, and (3) there is no inconsistency of any sort between the claims—i.e., both propositions could be held believed at the same time by a rational agent.

[HOMTE], mutatis mutandis, also makes a stand in a series of current debates in social metaontology. Within the meaningful discussions that are occurring in social ontology—for instance, debates about the reality of gender or race—typically, a deflationary approach to ontology has been taken to characterize what is at stake in these debates. I argue that, for similar reasons as in the metaethical disagreement, a deflationary approach to ontology is unsuccessful in the task of modeling the dispute.

George Surtees. *The Use and Abuse of Oppression: Credibility Excess and Marginalised Identities.*

Recently, there has been an increasing interest in the ways that social identity interacts with epistemic credibility (e.g. Fricker, 2010; Yap, 2017; Medina, 2013; Davies, 2016). In my talk, I argue that marginalised speakers can, under certain conditions, be given excessive epistemic credibility when they use their experience of marginalisation to justify oppressing others from marginalised groups. While related to other phenomena discussed in the literature, I argue that this represents a distinct contribution. Examining it is important, I suggest, because it feeds into several socio-epistemic dynamics that further harm marginalised people. To illustrate this phenomenon, I take J.K. Rowling's anti-trans essay, and the positive media responses it received, as a prime example.

The relationship between social identity and epistemic credibility has received a lot of attention. Most relevant to my talk is the work of Emmalon Davies (2016). As she argues, marginalised speakers often receive a credibility excess that harms them, by foisting on them the role of 'spokesperson', even if this is undesired and unwarranted by their particular expertise (Ibid). This is a good example of oppression causing marginalised people to receive an excess of credibility. However, while Davies is concerned with how this credibility excess harms the speaker themselves, I am concerned with how this excess credibility can be used by the speaker to harm other marginalised people. As I suggest, there are cases where a speaker's marginalised identity can be invoked to justify testimony that oppresses others.

My talk is structured as follows. I explain Fricker's concepts of credibility deficiency and excess and outline how this has been developed further by Davies. I explain my argument for there being certain cases in which credibility excess can accrue to those with marginal social identities who use this social identity to justify oppressing other members of marginalised groups. To illustrate this, I give the example of J.K. Rowling's essay (2020) in which she justifies transphobic public policies by reference to her own experience as a cis woman who has survived domestic violence. I explain why her argument for this position is unsuccessful. I examine the excessive credibility she has received, arguing that this is partly due to her weaponising her identity as a cis woman and survivor of domestic violence. By foregrounding marginalised aspects of her identity, she attempts to convince others to treat her testimony with a level of credibility that exceeds what her testimony deserves, given the essay's numerous flaws.

I consider how weaponising one's oppression in this way can be useful for defusing criticism of the speaker's testimony. I suggest that it allows three negative accusations to be levelled at those who critique the speaker's words. These are, that doing so is testimonially unjust to the speaker, that it involves being callous towards the speaker's suffering, and - by doing either of these - evinces hypocrisy. I end with some tentative ideas for how we might combat these socio-epistemic dynamics.

Gloria Sanso. *Deontic States of Affairs: the Case of Money.*

Money is one of the most debated topics in social ontology, and many theories have been proposed over the years. Recently, some philosophers have tried to characterize money is terms of causal powers (Cohen 2011; Maki 2021; Hindriks 2022). The power-view has the merit to capture the fact that money, in virtue of its purchasing power, allows people to perform some actions, such as buying. There are, however, doubts about the existence of causal powers in the social realm (see Wahlberg 2020). Indeed, causal powers are typically considered intrinsic (Harré 1970; Molnar 2003; Bird 2007; Marmodoro 2017; Williams 2019), whereas social properties typically are not. In addition, although it seems quite correct to say that the purchasing power allows people to buy things, it is a bit of a stretch to say that the agent, in virtue of her purchasing power, causes a purchase. It seems more correct to say that, in virtue of her purchasing power, when the agent transfers some paper bills to another party, this act constitutes a purchase.

The main aim of this paper is to test an alternative view that gives an account of the possibilities entailed by money without referring to causal powers. This account relies on two main assumptions. First, the term "money" should be used to exclusively denote an institution. Although, in everyday life, people use the term "money" to denote also devices such as coins and paper bills, to use the term "money" to denote both these devices and the institutions within they are used is a manifestation of folk ontology (see Guala 2020) and, as such, ontologically misleading. Second, the institution of money can be seen as the actualization of a complex of deontic states of affairs, where with the term "deontic state of affairs" I mean an extra-linguistic fact whose existence depends on a convention (Di Lucia & Passerini Glazel: 2022). Some examples include: "It is permitted to use the currency X", and "It is mandated to accept the currency X". I tentatively argue that this complex of deontic states of affairs is precisely what one should look at in order to fully understand the institution of money and the potentiality of its devices. I also argue that this complex of deontic states of affairs can help us to better understand the nature of cryptocurrencies, such as bitcoin, and the differences between them and more traditional currencies, such as dollar and euro.

Agnes Tam. *Solidarity as Narrative We-Agency.*

Solidarity is receiving renewed attention of late, not least because of its prominence in public discussions of COVID-19, racial reckoning, refugee crises, and migration issues. Despite it being a contested concept, a consensus is slowly emerging in the recent philosophical literature on solidarity, namely that it is a kind of joint action structured by joint commitment to a shared goal (e.g. Kolers 2016, Scholz 2008, Sangiovanni 2015, Tuomela 2013). While these shared agency accounts make important advances in conceptualizing solidarity as a distinct phenomenon from mere fellow-feeling, universal obligations of justice, and individual acts of charity, they fail to adequately account for its scalar nature. My goal in this paper is three-fold: to (a) explain how solidarity is scalar across individual members and time; (b) show how these new theories fail to account for such scalar features by relying on inadequately relational and diachronic conceptions of shared agency (e.g. Bratman 2018, Gilbert 2013, Tuomela 2013); and finally (c) advance a new narrative conception of shared agency to address the problem (Polletta and Gardner 2015, Mayer 2014, Tollefsen and Gallagher 2017, Velleman 2007). On this new conception, each member is individually committed to their own character and jointly committed to the singular plot. Not only can members' differential levels of individual commitment be explained by the different characters (e.g. leading roles vs. subsidiary roles, heroes vs. victims) they are given, but the ebbs and flows of solidarity can also be accounted for by the unfolding nature of a story and its narrative process. By bringing together the literature on solidarity, shared agency, and narrative, this paper sheds new light on how to foster strong and durable solidarity via narrative practices.

Naomi Thompson. *Social Metaphysics: Realism and Reality.*

Some metaphysically interesting notions fall outside of the realm of the mind-independent, and as such will erroneously be considered unworthy of our attention by any view that thinks of realism in terms of mind-independence and only of realist metaphysics as substantive (Taylor, forthcoming). Insofar as we think of social kinds, categories, entities and structures as mind-dependent, they will fall foul of this pervasive idea about the purview of substantive metaphysics. In this paper, I suggest two ways in which we might reconceive of substantive metaphysics so as to include the metaphysics of the social.

It is common to find the task of realist metaphysics described as one of 'carving nature at the joints'. The metaphor suggests that there is some objectively correct way to divide reality with our words and concepts, and our job is to find it. The traditional alternative to realism and its commitment to joint-carving is metaphysical deflationism, where deflationists think that metaphysical disputes can be settled as a matter of convention, or depending on the choice we make of conceptual or linguistic framework. The first proposal I consider is something of a middle way, according to which we can accept that there are better and worse ways to carve things up, but deny that the relevant 'joints' are entirely mind-independent. Some ways of thinking and talking are genuinely better than others, but part of what makes them better is that they are better for us, given some or all of factors including our particular interests, conceptual schemes, patterns of concern, and explanatory aims. Such a view has two immediate advantages over traditional realism: it allows that debates in social metaphysics can be substantive when they are cast in joint-carving terms, and it renders the problematic epistemology of the realist notion of joint-carving far more tractable.

The second proposal is to think of the domain of substantive metaphysics as aligning with that of what I'll call 'reality', but where reality includes more than merely the mind-independent. Roughly, we can think of reality as a system of explanatory dependence where everything that either makes a sufficient explanatory difference or is itself sufficiently explained by other parts of the system is part of reality. The basic idea is that whatever is sufficiently embedded in our explanatory system – whatever forms part of our best theory of the world or is itself explained by that theory, counts as part of reality. This is a permissive conception both of reality and of the domain of metaphysics, but it is not overly permissive. Social kinds, categories, and so on play important explanatory roles and so will count as part of reality, but star signs and witches don't and won't.

Elanor Taylor. *Substantivity as Explanatory Power.*

Substantivity is the genuineness of metaphysical inquiry. Traditionally metaphysicians have defined substantivity in terms of responsiveness to mind-independent features of reality, such as fundamentality or structure. On such approaches substantive metaphysical debates are settled by the extent to which the rival views accurately capture these features of reality. If a debate can be settled by a choice of framing device, such as a choice of linguistic framework or an interpretation of a quantifier, then that debate is non-substantive.

Recently some have argued that traditional approaches to substantivity fail to accommodate central strands of social metaphysics, automatically returning the result that social metaphysics is non-substantive. Some reply that this is no bad thing, as substantivity is not a meaningful standard for social metaphysics. Others have argued that this issue reveals a broader problem for traditional views of substantivity, indicating the need for a new approach that can accommodate social metaphysics, as well as other, similar problem cases. In this paper I take up this task, and sketch a new account of substantivity that avoids these problems.

I articulate and defend an explanation-based approach to substantivity on which debates are substantive if and only if the rival answers differ in their explanatory power. I briefly motivate two desiderata for an account of substantivity: that metaphysical debates are non-arbitrary, and that substantivity cannot be defined in purely mind-independent terms. I then sketch an account of explanatory substantivity that meets these desiderata. This approach is based on a non-realist backing model of explanation. According to backing models explanations are backed, or supported by, dependence relations (or "backers") that are not themselves explanations, but that support explanations. For example, we can offer a causal explanation by giving information about an event causing another, and in this case the causal dependence "backs" the causal explanation. Non-realist backing permits a range of backers including mind-independent, objective backers such as causation and grounding, and mind-dependent backers such as conceptual dependence. This approach portrays explanatory power as non-arbitrary and as not entirely determined by mind-independent factors.

As I will argue, this view avoids the problems associated with attempting to accommodate social metaphysics in a traditional, purely mind-independent approach to substantivity, and handles other cases well, including problem cases from metaphysics of science.

Gerhard Thonhauser. *The primacy of collective agency in team sports.*

Team sports like football, basketball or handball are intriguing settings for the study of collective action. Athletes are faced with the task of coordinating their movements within the team in such a way that they succeed in outplaying the opposing team through collective team actions. In other words, the actions of individual athletes are ultimately to be evaluated according to their contribution to team success. At the same time, there are factors in the wider sporting environment (such as competition for playing time within the team or media focus on individual performances) that contribute to players focusing more on the perception of their own performance than on team success. The primacy of collective agency in team sports must therefore be asserted among both participants and observers (such as fans or media representatives) against tendencies that emphasize individual agency.

The talk deals with this tension between individual and collective agency in team sports, making the case for the primacy of collective agency. The specific coordination processes in team sports are best conceived if we conceptualize the actions of individual athletes as contributions to sequences of collective activity, instead of proceeding the other way around by understanding the collective actions of the team as aggregates of coordinated individual actions. Supporting this claim, research on training processes in team sports suggests that practitioners in the field proceed, at least implicitly, in light of this premise when analyzing performances and designing training processes. Even the training of supposedly individual skills is usually structured in such a way that the goal is to enable athletes to participate skillfully in sequences of collective activity. For instance, the skills of throwing and catching in a team sporting context need to be practiced in such a way that they enable athletes to become skillful participants in the collective activity of passing.

Translated into action theory, the question is where to place the agentive center of an activity. Here, the previous argument can be translated into the claim that the agentive center of many actions in team sports should indeed be located on the collective level. Conceptually speaking, an agentive center of an action is to be located where a totality of movements receives its structuring such that it can be individuated as one action. In the example of a pass, the collective of at least two athletes is the agentive center from which the movements of the athletes involved become comprehensible as structured contributions to the collective activity of passing.

Amanda Thorell. *Health and Disease: Between Naturalism and Normativism.*

Traditionally, the philosophical debate about health and disease is characterized as containing two opposite camps of theories: naturalism and normativism. Whereas naturalism is associated with terms such as 'value-freedom', 'objectivity', 'natural kinds' and 'science', normativism is associated with terms such as 'value-ladenness', 'subjectivity', 'social construction', and 'politics'. This dichotomous division into naturalistic and normative theories is, however, unfortunate. This is because it restricts the debate about health and disease to an unnecessarily limited space of possible positions. A more nuanced description of possible positions could better stimulate progress. Recent novel contributions to the debate show that theories of health and disease need not be purely naturalistic or normative, but may be located somewhere in between. The first purpose of this talk is to further advance this line of nuancing. I will argue that there are, so far unacknowledged, aspects that are important to consider when theorizing about health and disease. These aspects concern two different senses in which health facts can be taken to be objective. I will argue that a theory of health and disease may be objective in one sense and simultaneously non-objective in the other sense. The second purpose is to argue in favor of a specific position, which the added aspects of objectivity reveal. I call this position 'subjectively salient naturalism'. Subjectively salient naturalism is similar to naturalism, but differs in two important respects. First, it does not claim that a successful theory of health and disease needs to be value-free at the level where its operationalizations are justified. Second, it does not claim that health facts are about natural kinds in any ontologically strong sense. I will argue that if one is interested in scientific concepts of health and disease, subjectively salient naturalism is a more plausible position than naturalism.

Oda Tvedt. *Trust, distrust and collaboration among the Greeks.*

Trust has become a key notion of democratic theory. It is regarded as a necessity for efficient communities, in which cooperation is often seen as a defining feature. It has been argued that "trust is at the heart of collective voluntary compliance", yet it seems many of our political institutions have been designed to compensate for a lack of trust. The notion of distrust has received more attention in recent years, and particularly relevant for this paper is democratic theory on trust and institutions. Trust seems to be both necessary for cooperation, while at the same time posing a risk to the possibilities for cooperation and joint action, making democracies vulnerable. This paradoxical status of trust within democratic societies is one of which the ancient Greeks of democratic Athens were also aware. This paper will argue that Plato in the Republic develops the makings of a theory of 'reasoned trust', based on Plato's general theory of motivation. In making this argument, the proposed paper will apply methods from contemporary research on trust and its political and social function to the ancient texts by Plato and his contemporaries. Gerald Mara argues that the ancient Greek notions of democracy and trust can provide a perspective on trust that is missing in deliberative understandings of democracy. This paper will agree with Mara, but further claim that our understanding of the ancients can also in turn be benefitted by the application of a contemporary framework and vocabulary. This paper takes Russel Hardin's definition of relational trust as "encapsuled self-interest" as a vantage point for analysis. This definition is, preliminary, consistent with Plato's conception of reason, which Josiah Ober has recently shown can be construed as rational self-interest. The paper will conclude by trying to show how the moral psychology of Plato can be seen as a tool for assessing and predicting outcomes, especially when actions require coordination between two or more agents, and as such places the moral psychology of Plato back into its proper political context.

Nicholas Wiltsher. *Psychological Kinds as Social Kinds.*

In mainstream philosophy of mind, psychological kinds tend to be treated as either natural-ish or ephemeral, ontologically speaking. On the natural-ish side are those psychological kinds that figure in the generalisations and explanations provided by psychology and cognitive science (Fodor 1974). On the ephemeral side are those kinds that figure in everyday talk involving mental terms, which is often called ``folk psychology''.

How to relate these two sorts of kind presents a problem. One solution is to argue that the ephemeral kinds reduce, in more or less complicated ways, to the natural-ish ones. For example, Langland-Hassan (2020) argues that imagination reduces to combinations of beliefs, desires, and so on. Another is to argue that the ephemeral kinds are irreducible, but harmlessly so: precisely because they are insubstantial, we can continue to talk in their terms without ontological embarrassment (Stich 1983). Perhaps one can even adopt both solutions: some kinds reduce, some evanesce.

The problem with these two solutions is that many psychological kinds that seem to do neither. Imagination, consent, suspicion, love: all seem genuinely substantial, explanatory, and yet irreducible to orderly entities in the sciences. The aim of this paper is to work towards developing an account of such psychological kinds according to which they are essentially substantial social entities.

To do so, I first argue that such kinds are not folk-psychological. Folk psychology is a system of causal-functional kinds whose attribution to individuals offers explanations of their behaviour. But the kinds on which I am focussed are not merely explicatory of behaviour, not merely causal-functional in nature, and fail to form any kind of system. Rather, their attribution in particular contexts offers thick description of a person's patterns of thought, action, and interaction; beyond those contexts, such description might not apply, and even within a given context, these kinds rarely cohere in a useful system.

I then argue that these kinds are better seen as ontologically dependent on social practices in which they are embedded. They are real and substantial insofar as they are irreducibly present in explications of such practices, not insofar as they figure in explanatory generalisations. Their nature is discovered by close investigation of the roles they play in the practices in which they are implicated, not from inspection of language, concepts, or attributions to individuals. Their social basis explains their thickly descriptive qualities, their labile nature across times and contexts, and their lack of systematicity. This account picks up on and develops suggestions by, among others, Millikan (1999); Hacking (2002); Craver (2020). I conclude with brief consideration of how many psychological kinds might plausibly be thought to have this social basis, with particular reference to new mechanism in philosophy of mind Krickel (2018).

Bill Wringe and Yavuz Selim Sen. *Social Ontology Meets Political Realism: Joint Commitment as a Distinctive Source of Political Normativity.*

Political realists, such as Bernard Williams, have argued against a view that they call 'political moralism' by suggesting that political normativity involves a distinctive kind of non-moral normativity. Recently, Maynard and Worsnip have cast a skeptical eye on a number of arguments for thinking that political normativity is distinctive, claiming that these arguments are consistent with the view that political normativity involves a domain-restricted form of moral normativity. Here we argue that political normativity does indeed involve a distinctive form of normativity.

We argue that the political normativity involves a distinctive source of normativity: namely the normativity of joint commitment. As Margaret Gilbert has argued, joint commitment generates a set of norms which are distinct from moral norms. However, not all norms of joint commitment can be described as political. We follow Williams in taking what he calls the 'Basic Legitimation Demand' - the idea that exercises of coercive power need to be justified to those over whom power is exercised - to play a role in delimiting the scope of the political. Political normativity is the normativity characteristic of communities that share a joint commitment to meeting the Basic Legitimation Demand.

After sketching this conception of political normativity, we defend our account of the distinctiveness of political obligation against three challenges. First, we distinguish it from a view developed by Margaret Gilbert on which citizens' obligations to the state are grounded in obligations of joint commitment. Our view is broader than Gilbert's in two respects, and narrower than another. It is broader insofar as it covers the obligations of those who exercise power as well as those over whom it is exercised, and it covers a range of non-legal obligation; and it is narrower insofar as it applies only in societies where there is a shared commitment to the Basic Legitimation Demand. Secondly, we consider Sellars' view that moral normativity is grounded in the joint commitments of a hypothetical community of all rational beings, and argue that even if we accept Sellars view, political normativity is still a distinctive kind of normativity. Finally, we consider and reject the view that political normativity, as we conceive of it, lacks any genuine critical bite

Konrad Werner. *Ontological conditions of institutional resilience.*

The planned presentation develops a conception according to which institutions can be seen as complex developments of human cognitive niches. According to Andy Clark "cognitive niche construction" is characterized as "the process by which animals build physical structures that transform problem spaces in ways that aid (or sometimes impede) thinking and reasoning about some target domain or domains." But I argue that the issue is much deeper, philosophically, meaning that cognitive niches do not only transform the world to the effect that the selected segments of it aid cognition; more fundamentally – cognitive niches are structures that make the world cognitively accessible in the first place. In case of human cognition – they render the surrounding world intelligible.

Therefore, if institutions are thought of as complex social cognitive niches, their primary goal is to make certain parts, aspects of the world accessible as potential targets of action, thus as potential goods.

Now, there is a growing number of publications focused on the question of institutional resilience, i.e., the capacity of an institution to thrive in spite of external shocks. In a somewhat metaphorical way it is usually defined as the capacity of an institution or a whole system governed by an institution to "bounce back" after a major disruption such as natural disaster, economic collapse, war, etc. Needless to say, though, this metaphor needs some more conceptual work. Especially given the fact that the capacity to "bounce back" likely relies on how a given institution was maintained in more standard circumstances. For example, it is said in the relevant resilience literature that an institution avoids a major collapse if a majority of actors participating in it, "takes for granted" the behavioral patterns or rules established in standard circumstances.

That being said, there is a corelated ontological question, of the kind of realm or system, thus a specific being making it possible to adopt the "take for granted" position. To be more specific, I would like to discuss what kind of institution-as-cognitive-niche makes institutional resilience possible, achievable and maintainable.

The presentation makes use of a bulk of literature in such areas as embodied/enactive cognition, ontological foundations of embodied cognition, and system theory, which shall result in a relatively new conceptualization of institutional resilience (and maintenance) in terms of systems' autonomy.

Vojtěch Zachník. *Agent Types in Social Norms.*

Social norms are generally described as rules that specify what individuals – having a specific role, position, or distinctive characteristics – ought to do in a particular context. Whereas many accounts of norms focus on the specification of the action prescription, i.e., what is required or demanded, and they traditionally define a social norm in terms of behavioural patterns of individuals who follow a set of requirements (Ulmann-Margalit 1977; Bicchieri 2006; Brennan et al. 2013), the issue of what types of agents appear in these situations remains unanswered. The awareness of what kind of individuals may participate in social norms is crucial for understanding the sustainability of norms and what motivations may subvert the effectiveness of norms. Usually, some individuals have an active role in fulfilling the requirements of a norm as they follow what is demanded and obey the rule. On the other hand, others are rather passive spectators who approve or disapprove the observed conduct, or particular members of a group may even actively monitor and enforce these norms. The paper intends to analyse various motivations of different types of norm agents based on their distinct roles in social norms situations. Clarifying these roles and how they mutually affect each other reveals an important and neglected aspect of social norms that also provides insight into novel ways of norm violation. There are several cases of pathological behaviour in social norms based on misidentification, such as avoidance or strategic misplacement. These and many other instances reveal the need for a comprehensive approach concerning how one identifies with a specific role, what is agent's motivation or how other parties influence his or her behaviour.

First, this paper analyses the general types of agents involved in the social norm context. It starts with the simple model of social norms found in the literature, where different types of agents are introduced. This simple model distinguishes various categories of agents, such as enforcers, observers, and subjects, who have different roles and may be eligible to perform specific actions. I suggest that this initial investigation can be further refined and extended in terms of agents' roles and powers that are based on the assignment of the status, acknowledgement of someone's authority, or granted by the complex system of interlocking motivations. Second, I argue that based on this typology of agents, it is desirable to identify possible scenarios of norm violations that have origin in intentional or unintentional errors in identification or selection. These cases have significant importance for policy-making and institutional design, yet little has been said about them from the perspective of social ontology. This paper intends to correct this omission.

Jaana Virta. *Ontological distinctions within social categories.*

In my presentation, I study the ontology of social categories by drawing distinctions corresponding to ontologically distinct, but in practice often causally interconnected, aspects of social kinds. The social categories I am interested are the ones people are categorized as like genders, professions, and relationship statuses, and my focus lies on the level of an individual person.

People are categorized as for example being a man, a nurse, a mother, an athletic. In everyday life it is often not necessary to make ontological distinctions within a category, but to understand these phenomena and the political struggles relating to them, it is useful to understand the complexities they contain at the ontological level. For example, a person being a nurse can refer to many things that have quite different metaphysical constitution. A person can be categorized as a nurse for example if a person:

A) works currently as a nurse, or

B) has graduated as a nurse, but does not work as nurse, or

C) has an official status giving them the permission to work as a nurse, or

D) identify as a nurse, or

E) is conferred as a nurse in specific time and place.

If we study these situations, we notice that they differ ontologically from each other, since their constitution and constituents differ. If simplified, A refers to ongoing process where a person repeatedly performs tasks relating to nursing like taking care of patients. B refers to a person's personal history, C refers to a legal or official status, D to mental attitudes the person has towards themselves, and E is constituted by action or attitudes of mostly other people in the specific situation.

There are situations, where a person is categorized as a nurse, but only one of those features is true about them, or on the other hand situations where all of them are true. None of those is "the real definition" of being a nurse or neither are those different parts of a single ontologically unified feature of "being a nurse". Those are different, often interrelated aspects of it, and in my argument, even ontologically distinct aspects of being a nurse. Being a nurse is not one thing, it is many things, and to make the situation even more complex, these things change from one context to another, like for example within different legislations or time periods. In real life, the political struggles often happen when one of these aspects and its hegemonical importance gets challenged, since in real life, these different aspects contradict each other often in a person's life.

Similar ontological distinctions can be made to most of the other social categories too. Different social categories have focus on different kinds of aspects, and the relevance of those comes from the society the category in question is studied. For example, being a nurse in Finland in 2023 does not have so strong social pressure for the person to have certain bodily features that it would make there to exist an ontologically distinct aspect of it, but many other categories do. The struggles of the ontological status of bodily features of an individual of for example different genders, races, disabilities, kinship statuses are ongoing, since the understanding that these features have other aspects than just bodily features is raising.

Rosa Vince. What is 'Context-Creeping Objectification' and what should we do about it?

Catcalling someone, staring at an interviewee's breasts, adverts featuring semi-clothed women: these things have been criticised for being sexually objectifying. But we can also really desire and enjoy other kinds of sexual objectification: exchanging erotic photos, casual sex with relative strangers. How do we accommodate this? One option is to declare that the benign cases simply do not count as 'objectification', because objectification should be bad. Taking this option is a mistake, and misses a valuable opportunity to get clearer on precisely where the harms lie. I analyse when objectification seems to involve harm, and why.

Objectification can be benign, but harm tends to occur in three circumstances:

(1) when objectification is non-consensual,

(2) when 'context-creeping' objectification occurs,

(3) when the objectification reinforces some kind of oppression.

These three harm-generating circumstances are not uncommon. Non-consensual objectification is always harmful, and that harm can be magnified by unjust social conditions. Some consensual objectification can nonetheless also seem troubling. If half of the advertisements you pass on your walk home use sexually objectifying images, you might think there's something wrong, even though the images were created and distributed consensually. The phenomenon of 'context-creeping' objectification is introduced to explain this. 'Context-creeping' objectification describes when instances of sexual objectification (which may be, in themselves, benign) regularly occur outside of sexual contexts, in a way that reinforces particular rape myths. I suggest that the seeping of sexual objectification into many ostensibly non-sexual contexts reinforces the myth that women are always available for objectification, in all circumstances, rather than only when they explicitly choose to be objectified. In the third harmful circumstance, objectification acts as the medium for something else: a catcall could be transphobic and objectifying, a deodorant advert could be racist and objectifying. These are harmful instances of objectification, but I claim that objectification is the wrong conceptual tool to fully explain the harms of these kinds of cases, because different kinds of oppression work in distinct ways.

I have provided three circumstances in which harm is done in cases of objectification, and show that these harms are illuminated by paying close attention to social context and existing social relations. My analysis also helps explain why many people take objectification to always be harmful; when harmful cases are abundant, it is unsurprising that benign objectification is overlooked.

My account gives us reason to believe that the literature on sexual objectification should be radically redirected from its current foci. My account would undermine the claim that pornography is harmful because it objectifies, and would suggest non-sexual media is more concerning. I end with a warning, though: we should be very careful in how we respond to the phenomena I explicate in this paper, particularly 'context-creeping' objectification, as attempts to mitigate any harms associated with objectifying media can badly misfire. When criticisms of sexual objectification in media pay inadequate attention to existing injustices against the subjects of that media, those injustices can be reinforced and amplified.

Bianca Waked. *Counterfactual Bodies, Accessible Worlds.*

The category of "disabilities" has become increasingly topical among analytic philosophers in recent years, moving beyond the realm of bioethics and into the purview of metaphysicians. Defining the category of "disability" has become an increasingly herculean task, largely due to the diversity subsumed under the label. Disabilities can be physical or mental, chronic or continuous, visible or invisible. More often than not, however, disabilities are some combination of these subcategories, with both physical and mental dimensions, and chronic or continuous symptoms depending on one's context. Put simply, the category of "disabilities" is notoriously difficult to characterize and rampant with controversy. And yet, any hope to ameliorate structural inequalities requires that we define the category of disabilities, determine who counts as disabled, and work with this group to improve societal conditions. At least, this is how the literature has proceeded thus far.

In what follows, I propose that we redirect our focus to explaining the logic of ableism. I contend that ableism is a type of modal oppression. More specifically, I argue that it is a pernicious form of counterfactual thinking in which a knower without some specific disability assumes that they can understand the experience of some disability by reducing or limiting some aspect of their current self or life.

My argument proceeds as follows: following a brief overview of recent accounts of disability, I offer three reasons why the usual method of identifying recurring or common patterns among members of a set which generates necessary and sufficient conditions (or cluster concepts) fails when applied to disabilities.

Distinctions: We ought to avoid drawing distinctions between physical, cognitive, emotional, and other forms of disabilities because they crumble under the slightest pressure. In other words, strict distinctions which might be necessary for other reasons inevitably fail in a descriptively accurate picture of disability.

Methodology: We ought to strive to be as inclusive as possible in our categories. So the category of disability ought to be broad enough to be inclusive, but specific enough to do the political and philosophical work required.

Perspectives: There are numerous perspectives that one can take when establishing the conditions for the category of disability—the disabled person, the Archimedean point, other members of society, etc. And there is an important distinction between descriptively disabled and politically disabled.

Taken together, these complications suggest that a project seeking to explain the category of "disability" in order to address the wrongs of ableism must overcome too many hurdles. Instead, I contend that a metaphysical account of disability ought to begin by understanding the nature of the shared oppression of ableism. Relying on Timothy Williamson's account of imaginative counterfactual knowledge, I argue that ableism is the relentless conception of disabled individuals (and disabilities) through the lens of an imaginative counterfactual in which the non-disabled individual reduces or limits some part of themselves or their life. The understanding which follows from this imaginative counterfactual, then, determines who is disabled and how their disabilities ought to be understood. A metaphysical account of the category of "disability," then, requires tracking what bodies are subject to this pernicious counterfactual thinking.

I conclude by considering some objections to this approach to delineating the category of disability, which includes the erasure of the disabled body in my approach, the prioritization of non-disabled people and their problematic inferences on this account, and the possibility that my account is overly broad and captures too many types of identities which are not, in fact, disabilities.

Randall Westgren. *Categorization of Organizations in Social Science: Practice and Social Metaphysics.*

In his 2018 entry in the SEP, Brian Epstein notes that, "The nature of institutions, organizations, and firms is treated more extensively in sociology and economics than in philosophy." This is undoubtedly true. In this paper I argue that formal organizations are interesting fodder for social metaphysics for three reasons. First -- perhaps with embarrassing obviousness -- organizations are formally, purposively constructed by human groups and one should be interested in the intentionality behind the formation which bears on the relationships between the group and its constituent members. Some of these organizations are created for social goals (Mothers Against Drunk Driving, Amnesty International, etc.). Affiliations go beyond group membership: clients, funders, employees, and other forms of adherence. Miller McPherson's work in organizational sociology seeks the causes of adherents' mobility between such organizations, analogously to why economists and management scholars study dynamics of adherence to business organizations as customers, employees, and investors. Organization theory has developed sophisticated ontologies of these affiliations in a hew sub-field: stakeholder theory.

The second reason follows. If one studies the dynamics of individual-organization affiliations, then there must be some useful ontology for groups of organizations; they are groups of human groups that actively compete against each other for stakeholders. Thus, we need social metaphysics for identifying organizational kinds and the boundaries between them. In organization theory, one of the hottest social science topics of the past fifteen years is categorization.

In the organizational categorization literature there is one methodological distinction that will resonate with philosophers. Practitioners speak of emic and etic approaches to identifying social kinds. The former relies on the cognitive structures of the individuals operating in the domain. How do they name, compare, group/nest, and distinguish groups of groups? The latter relies on an external conceptual structure (or set of structures) that can be applied to observations of the putative groups. This would be the obvious methodology of the social scientist. Except that it isn't always so. Three recent examples studies that elicit emic categorizations highlight important phenomena in the social science of organizations that contribute to the discourse in social metaphysics. (1) Agency by organizations to span emic category boundaries and the resultant mutability of those categories. (2) The conferral of legitimacy to category member organizations and to the category, per se. Conferral sources include members as well as non-member stakeholders, often in conflict about boundary conditions and essential properties. (3) There is an important literature on what has been called optimal distinctiveness, the tension between meeting category property requirements to be recognized as an instance of the emic kind and the need for a singular identity that promotes adherence by stakeholders to the specific organization. The paper contains an annotated bibliography of the seminal research on categorization and of recent work that relates to the phenomena described above.

Michael Wilby: Joint Attention: Perceptual or Communicative?

Joint attention involves two or more people standing in an attentive relation to an object or event, where their joint attentive awareness of that object is open or transparent between them (see Eilan 2005). Thus, there are at least two central elements that an account of joint attention might want to capture: (a) a referential component that explains how the agents' attention is fixed on an object in an articulate enough way to say that the agents are attending to the same object; and (b) a transparency component that explains how the agents might be said to be attending to the object together, as co-attenders, rather than parallel attenders.

It has recently been argued that the best way to account for these features is to suppose that joint attention is necessarily communicative (Carpenter & Liebal 2011; Seemann 2019; Harder 2022). There are two main considerations that are put forward in favour of this view. Firstly, it is suggested that joint attention is not fully articulate unless there is some shared 'comment' or 'attitude' implicit within the episode of joint attention (e.g., perhaps a shared sense of delight, or horror, or surprise). Secondly, it is argued that joint attention is not fully transparent unless there is a way to account for how the agents might consider themselves as co-attenders. And it is argued that only by thinking of joint attention as essentially communicative, can we explain both features of joint attention; a mere perceptual relation is too thin to suffice.

In this paper, I argue that – contra the communicative conception – joint attention can be both articulate and transparent on a 'perceptualist account' (to use Harder's (2022) term). In particular, it is argued that focus on the role that attention plays in joint attention – how it 'selects' certain features of the visual scene and 'filter out' others – allows for a version of the perceptualist account that is both articulate and transparent.

Having blocked the communicativist challenge to the perceptualist it is then argued that the perceptualist account is to be preferred on two grounds: (a) there are some 'bottom-up' cases of joint attention that don't appear to involve any communication, yet are intuitively fully transparent and articulate; and (b) communication, at least with regards to perceptually present events, appears to be grounded in joint attention (Campbell 2002), so a communicative conception of joint attention, at least at first glance, would appear to be at risk of either a regress or a circularity.

Charlotte Witt. *The Artisanal Model for Social Role Normativity.*

"The great puzzle of social norms is not why people obey them, even when it is not in their self-interest to do so. It is, how do shared standards of conduct ever acquire their normativity to begin with? Once we understand this, there is no further difficulty in understanding the motive to obey them. We obey them because we believe that we ought to." In this paper I propose an answer to Anderson's question "how do shared standards of conduct ever acquire their normativity to begin with?" As a mother, I ought to put my children first, but as an academic I ought to pursue knowledge above all. Where do these "ought-tos" come from? What is the source of their normativity? I distinguish two approaches to the question of the source of social role normativity: internalism and externalism. Internalism labels views that develop some version of the idea that both the source of social role normativity and the reason why particular norms attach to individuals originate in the same place, namely in the subject or agent herself.   What these views share is a focus on the subject (or subjects) --her preferences, endorsements or recognitive attitudes--as the source of normativity, including social role normativity. According to these views social normativity enters the world through the attitudes of the persons who are subject to the norms. Externalism refers to positions that root social role normativity in the social world itself, in its positions, institutions, and larger architecture. The core insight of externalism is that in some circumstances the structure of an enterprise or activity can bring with it normative demands quite independently of the attitudes of those who engage with it. Then I sketch a prima facie case for externalism. Finally, I propose an externalist model for social role normativity: the artisanal model. Just as a carpenter or a chef is responsive to and evaluable under a set of artisanal norms so too is a mother and an academic. The source of normativity is the technique/expertise, and these are independent of the preferences, endorsements or recognitive attitudes of individuals.

K. Brad Wray. *Understanding Social Groups: Insight from the Theory of Reference Groups.*

The social ontology has developed considerably since landmark publications by Margaret Gilbert (1989/1992) and others (Hacking 1999, for example).   But philosophers have yet to exploit the full range of resources developed in sociology and social psychology for thinking about social ontology.

In her account of social facts, Gilbert explicitly and effectively draws on the work of Emile Durkheim (see Gilbert 1989/1992, Chapter V). And Miriam Solomon has drawn on the concepts of Groupthink and The Wisdom of Crowds (see Solomon 2006). These engagements with the work of sociologists and social psychologists have been quite fruitful and have provided valuable insights into understand social ontology. I want to extend this practice by analyzing the theory of reference groups and its relevance to social ontology.

I will briefly review some of the history of the theory of reference groups, as developed by Robert K. Merton (see Merton 1957/1968). I will also briefly present applications of the theory. Merton, for example, discusses how conscription soldiers resent privileges of their fellow conscripts, even relatively trivial privileges, but express no resent at the significantly greater privileges experienced by officers (see Merton 1957/1968, 282-283). In Merton's words, the soldiers are concerned with relative deprivation.

I will then argue that when we examine the role that reference groups play in individuals' lives, we realize that we live our lives as part of groups, and in relationship to groups. Social groups, and our relationship to them, are foundational to our self-understanding. In fact, there is an important sense in which an individual person is constituted by their reference groups.

There are interesting features of reference groups that deserve to be noted, as they shed important insight into our self-understanding and the social world. First, there is a certain sense in which a reference group has an objective reality, like Durkheim's social facts (see Durkheim 1982). Though different individuals can choose different reference groups, the groups are not constituted by the individual. In this sense, reference groups have quite a strong objective reality. We are in important respects constrained by our reference groups. Second, two individuals that occupy comparable positions in society can have radically different experiences and qualities of life, if they have different reference groups. Thus, one academic may find working at a four-year state college rewarding while another, with a different reference group, finds their career frustrating and disappointing.

Margot Witte. *Why We Shouldn't Ask "What is Gender?"*

Many existing theories of gender face a tradeoff between two theoretical virtues: simplicity and inclusivity. As a result, attempts at unified theories of gender incur serious costs. Inclusive accounts look unsatisfyingly complex or ad hoc, while simple accounts fail to deliver the right results, often by excluding trans women. In this paper, I draw on discussions in the philosophy of science to explain why this tension emerges. I argue that the persistence of this tension suggests we're starting our inquiry with the wrong question. "What is gender?" leads us down dead ends, and we ought instead to ask multiple, more specific questions.

Two recent accounts of gender illustrate the tension I have in mind: Katherine Jenkins' twin concepts (Jenkins 2016), and Ásta's conferalism (Ásta 2018). Jenkins' theory prioritizes inclusivity, and is therefore forced to make sacrifices to simplicity, whereas Ásta's preserves simplicity at the expense of inclusivity. This trade-off generalizes across theories of gender, and the forced choice between simplicity and inclusivity is neither accidental nor easily avoidable. The tension is one instance of a more general phenomenon familiar in the philosophy of science, between empirical adequacy and simplicity (Gauch 2002). I argue that the demands of inclusivity are a type of empirical adequacy, so it is unsurprising that this familiar tension appears in our theorizing about gender.

I propose that the many theories of gender that run into this problem share a common error. If a theory is an answer to a question (Anderson 1995), our current theories of gender set out to answer the question "What is gender?" But the stubbornness of the tension between inclusivity and simplicity suggests that this is the wrong question to be asking. Instead, we should ask more specific questions, tracking the phenomena that matter most to us (e.g. "How can we predict patterns of sex-based oppression?" or "Who needs access to mammograms?"). This approach sets up multiple, parallel theories. There is a further question of whether our theories of sex-based oppression, healthcare access, etc. can be united in a coherent story, but we ought not to start from the assumption that they can be united under a single theory of "gender." This paper offers a novel argument for the conclusion suggested by others, including (Dembroff 2018), (Cull 2022), and (Jenkins 2022) that we should begin our inquiry by asking multiple questions.

I argue that fragmenting our theorizing of gender this way mitigates the tension between simplicity and inclusivity. When we select a specific phenomenon to track, it becomes easier to give a theory that is empirically adequate, but not excessively complicated: Our theory of gender-based oppression need not also predict healthcare needs. This approach of asking multiple specific questions also gives us more tools to navigate the tradeoff when it does emerge. By narrowing the context of our theory, it's easier to make judgment calls about how to prioritize theoretical virtues. Finally, this approach lets us select which specific questions we care about most, and focus on answering them.

Rory Wilson. *Gender Identity and Inclusion: Adding a Dual-Focus to Norm Relevancy.*

Norm Relevancy, Katharine Jenkins's account of gender identity, has two functions. Initially, norm relevancy was posed as an answer to an inclusion problem with Haslanger's 2012 account of "woman". Later, it was expanded into a target concept of gender identity for transgender rights campaigns. So, norm relevancy is intended to include trans women in our concept of "women" and offer a concept of gender identity that can be used to advocate for transgender people.

Under norm relevancy gender identity is just that; the collection of norms a person finds relevant to themselves. Norms are generally associated with a particular gender class, or the category of man or woman as Haslanger defines it. Relevancy is an intentionally broad concept. Any norm that is relevant to a person is a norm that helps to guide them through being viewed as a woman, man, or neither.

However, relevancy is so broad that this central notion becomes a problem for inclusion. Transgender people spend a portion of their life or may consistently experience, being viewed differently from their self-identification. If gender identities are formed to guide us through these gender classes, then transgender people will find norms relevant that reflect how they are viewed by others and not just themselves. This makes our concept of woman overinclusive. Transmen who find women's norms relevant due to habit or being early in their transition would appear to have women's gender identities.

This broadness becomes a more fatal problem when applied to nonbinary people. Gender-binary is present throughout our world in gendered bathrooms, social institutions, language and so on. Jenkins considers a nonbinary gender identity to guide a person through neither norms classed as a man or a woman rendering nonbinary people as either men or women. Using such a view in campaigns for transgender rights renders nonbinary people marginal to the movement that seeks to advocate for them.

Relevancy must be refined to distinguish between norms meant to guide someone in how they are most often classed, and norms meant to guide someone in how they wish to be classed. I propose a modification, called dual-focus norm relevancy. Dual-focus norm relevancy accounts for two senses of relevancy called imposed and reactive following this distinction. Norms that are relevant in an imposed sense are norms that are internalized through being classed regularly as a particular gender. While norms relevant in a reactive sense are norms that are relevant due to larger normative evaluations of the self, relative to the gender classes.

Splitting relevancy avoids overinclusion and erasure by actively recognizing conflict in gender identity. If we take reactive relevancy to be the primary indicator of gender identity, we have a more inclusive concept of woman. And by recognizing the imposed side of gender identity we recognize gender incongruence as well, a key concept needed in advocating for transgender rights in medicine, thus meeting norm relevancy's goal as an account for trans rights campaigns.

Minhua Yan, Sarah Mathew, and Robert Boyd. *"Doing what others do" does not stabilize continuous norms.*

Differences in social norms are a key source of behavioral variation among human populations. It is widely assumed that a vast range of behaviors, even deleterious ones, can persist as long as they are locally common because deviants suffer coordination failures and social sanctions. Previous models have confirmed this intuition, showing that different populations may exhibit different norms even if they face similar environmental pressures or are linked by migration. Crucially, these studies have modeled norms as having a few discrete variants. Many norms, however, have a continuous range of variants. Here we present a mathematical model of the evolutionary dynamics of continuously varying norms and show that when the social payoffs of the behavioral options vary continuously, the pressure to do what others do does not result in multiple stable equilibria. Instead, factors such as environmental pressure, individual preferences, moral beliefs, and cognitive attractors determine the outcome even if their effects are weak, and absent such factors populations linked by migration converge to the same norm. The results suggest that the content of norms across human societies is less arbitrary or historically constrained than previously assumed. Instead, there is greater scope for norms to evolve towards optimal individual or group-level solutions. Our findings also suggest that cooperative norms such as those that increase contributions to public goods might require evolved moral preferences, and not just social sanctions on deviants, to be stable.

Omer Yerushalmi. *Where is Jerusalem – Individuating Geographical Entities.*

Human geographers take as their main locus of research geographical entities such as neighborhoods and cities. This talk aims to explore the ontology of these entities and to suggest a way for their individuation. In the first part of the talk few recent approaches from the ontology of cities and the social ontology literature will be surveyed and criticized. The discussion will lead to the identification of two central problems: the location problem and the gerrymandering problem. Hindriks (2013) suggested a plausible solution to the location problem. However, his solution is vulnerable to the gerrymandering problem. In the second part of the talk, I will suggest a solution to the latter.

Both Epting (2016) and Varzi (2021) conceive cities as mereological sums. The mereological approach, I argue, leads to what has been called the location problem (Hindriks, 2013). Assume all Jerusalemites travel to Tel Aviv. By the mereologist own assumption, these people are a part of Jerusalem. This means that part of Jerusalem will be in Tel Aviv. I argue that this is a problematic conclusion. Jerusalem is a geographical entity that seems to have spatial boundaries. Geographers look to identify these boundaries. The mereological approach will have them looking in the wrong places.

Hindriks' own solution to the location problem (in the case of corporate agents) is to distinguish between an institutionally assigned location and the location of the members of the institution. This solution could seem, prima facie, adequate also for geographical entities. Cities and neighborhoods also have a location institutionally assigned to them. Yet, when it comes to geographical entities, accepting this kind of a solution leads to a new problem: the gerrymandering problem. The location assigned to these entities could be manipulated by the assigning authority in a way that disregards what is thought to be Jerusalem in the time of the demarcation (e.g., in 1967 Jerusalem was reinvented to encapsulate neighboring villages). We are left with the task of trying to demarcate the proper boundaries of geographical entities.

One of the main tenets of geographical research is that locational thinking is fundamental. For instance, while modelling in GIS (Geographic Information Systems) one needs to determine what are the boundaries of each entity and where it is located. An apt criterion for individuation should capture this tenet by elucidating what exactly are the grounds for the location of the entities. The solution I propose is based on the idea that each geographical entity has a relevant social group that stands as its basis. The members of these groups share a specific geographically centered we-mode. Each member conceives himself as part of a group that is grounded in some specific location. Thus, the location of the geographical entity depends on where the relevant group – as a group - conceives it to be. The key to a proper demarcation of the entities, I claim, would start by identifying the different groups-agents that make up each geographical entity.

Shimin Zhao. *Is 'race' explanatorily useful? An interventionist perspective.*

Social metaphysicians commonly refer to how "explanatory" a concept is (e.g., Haslanger 2000, Díaz-León 2018), but little guidance has been provided on what "explanatory" means and how to evaluate a concept's explanatoriness. This paper aims to fill in this gap by drawing resources from philosophy of science.

My starting point is the interventionist theory of causal explanation, according to which C is a cause of E when an appropriate intervention on C would lead to a change in E. To give a correct causal explanation is to give a genuine cause of the explanandum, defined as above. Moreover, among several correct causal explanations, some may be explanatorily better, for example, in terms of stability, proportionality, or specificity (Woodward 2003, 2010).

A concept is explanatorily useful just in case its associated variable contributes to the correctness or goodness of a causal explanation. For example, if a racial variable, which takes two or more races as its possible values, can deliver a causal explanation of a particular phenomenon that would be unexplainable or be explained less well otherwise, we say the concept 'race' is explanatorily useful in this particular case.

To see how this works, I use Bertrand and Mullainathan (2004) as a case study. They find that fictitious resumes with stereotypically black names have a much lower callback rate than equally qualified resumes with white names. What explains this phenomenon? From an interventionist perspective, this is to ask for the causes of the effect variable Callback {had a callback, no callback}.

I'll discuss three options: Name {black name, white name}, Perception of Race {being perceived as black, being perceived as white}, and Race {being Black, being White}. As we'll see, each count as a cause of Callback, and can deliver a correct causal explanation. However, the explanation by Race is better, because it locates the cause of discrimination at the most appropriate level. In particular, it leaves out inessential details of the study, such as how racial information was delivered (by name, neighborhood, or facial features?), or who it was delivered to (this particular employer or another?). The Race explanation is more proportional than the Name explanation and the Perception of race explanation. This suggests that racial variables are more explanatorily useful than alternatives, such as variables on racial proxy or variables on the perception of race. This is a reason to keep 'race' in our conceptual framework or grant their reality.

By shifting the focus from the question "Is race real?" to questions like "Is a racial variable explanatorily useful in explaining this phenomenon?", we can build more connections between social metaphysics and philosophy of social science, as we do in other disciplines such as physics and biology.

Ella Zhang. *Gender Ideology as Two-tier Gender Norms.*

An ideology, as succinctly described by Sally Haslanger, is "[a] background cognitive and affective frame that gives actions and reactions meaning within a social system and contributes to its survival." Based on the widely accepted feminist assumption that gender oppression stems from our existing gender structure, we need to identify the dominant gender ideology that underlies our existing gender structure to elucidate its contribution to various forms of gender oppression.

In this paper, drawing from Robin Dembroff's account of the dominant gender ideology, I propose an account of the dominant gender ideology as consisting of two tiers of gender norms. The first tier consists of two assumptions that underlie what it means to have a "proper" gender in dominant social contexts: the alignment assumption that one's gender aligns with one's chromosomes, genitals, or biological sex, and the binary assumption that one can be only one of the mutually exclusive genders, man or woman. These two assumptions together dictate being a cis man or a cis woman as the only two "proper" ways to be a gendered individual. People who fail to comply with norms of gender in the first tier are severely punished and are viewed as not gendered in the "right way". The second tier, underpinned by the androcentric assumption that masculine social roles and norms are more valuable than feminine ones, consists of more specific and local norms and dictates the specific details of being a cis man or a cis woman. People who fail to comply with gender norms in the second tier are also punished materially and socially, though as long as they fully comply with norms of gender in the first tier and sufficiently comply with gender norms in the second tier, they are still viewed as "properly" gendered.

Given my two-tier account of the dominant gender ideology, we can explain three distinct kinds of gender oppression, the oppression of cis woman, the oppression of trans people, and the oppression of non-binary people, with the androcentric assumption, the genital assumption, and the binary assumption respectively. Moreover, we can explain the distinction between the oppression of cis women and the oppression of trans women and non-binary individuals: the former primarily rests on the devaluation of feminine norms and roles, and the lack of such devaluation does not alter the cis-normative and binary assumptions that are foundational to our existing gender structure; the latter rests on the cis-normative and binary assumptions of our existing gender structure, and the lack of these assumptions implies the total dismantlement of our existing gender structure, including the androcentric assumption that undergirds the second tier of gender norms. One of the theoretical merits of my account is that it demonstrates how the liberation of trans and non-binary individuals works in tandem with the liberation of cis women since the first-tier norms of gender enable the binary division between "feminine" and "masculine" norms and the lack of first-tier norms implies a lack of normative justification of upholding any second-tier norm.